1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
|
// Copyright (c) 2014 The Bitcoin developers
// Distributed under the MIT/X11 software license, see the accompanying
// file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
#include "timedata.h"
#include "netbase.h"
#include "sync.h"
#include "ui_interface.h"
#include "util.h"
#include <boost/foreach.hpp>
using namespace std;
static CCriticalSection cs_nTimeOffset;
static int64_t nTimeOffset = 0;
//
// "Never go to sea with two chronometers; take one or three."
// Our three time sources are:
// - System clock
// - Median of other nodes clocks
// - The user (asking the user to fix the system clock if the first two disagree)
//
//
int64_t GetTimeOffset()
{
LOCK(cs_nTimeOffset);
return nTimeOffset;
}
int64_t GetAdjustedTime()
{
return GetTime() + GetTimeOffset();
}
void AddTimeData(const CNetAddr& ip, int64_t nTime)
{
int64_t nOffsetSample = nTime - GetTime();
LOCK(cs_nTimeOffset);
// Ignore duplicates
static set<CNetAddr> setKnown;
if (!setKnown.insert(ip).second)
return;
// Add data
static CMedianFilter<int64_t> vTimeOffsets(200,0);
vTimeOffsets.input(nOffsetSample);
LogPrintf("Added time data, samples %d, offset %+d (%+d minutes)\n", vTimeOffsets.size(), nOffsetSample, nOffsetSample/60);
// There is a known issue here (see issue #4521):
//
// - The structure vTimeOffsets contains up to 200 elements, after which
// any new element added to it will not increase its size, replacing the
// oldest element.
//
// - The condition to update nTimeOffset includes checking whether the
// number of elements in vTimeOffsets is odd, which will never happen after
// there are 200 elements.
//
// But in this case the 'bug' is protective against some attacks, and may
// actually explain why we've never seen attacks which manipulate the
// clock offset.
//
// So we should hold off on fixing this and clean it up as part of
// a timing cleanup that strengthens it in a number of other ways.
//
if (vTimeOffsets.size() >= 5 && vTimeOffsets.size() % 2 == 1)
{
int64_t nMedian = vTimeOffsets.median();
std::vector<int64_t> vSorted = vTimeOffsets.sorted();
// Only let other nodes change our time by so much
if (abs64(nMedian) < 70 * 60)
{
nTimeOffset = nMedian;
}
else
{
nTimeOffset = 0;
static bool fDone;
if (!fDone)
{
// If nobody has a time different than ours but within 5 minutes of ours, give a warning
bool fMatch = false;
BOOST_FOREACH(int64_t nOffset, vSorted)
if (nOffset != 0 && abs64(nOffset) < 5 * 60)
fMatch = true;
if (!fMatch)
{
fDone = true;
string strMessage = _("Warning: Please check that your computer's date and time are correct! If your clock is wrong Bitcoin Core will not work properly.");
strMiscWarning = strMessage;
LogPrintf("*** %s\n", strMessage);
uiInterface.ThreadSafeMessageBox(strMessage, "", CClientUIInterface::MSG_WARNING);
}
}
}
if (fDebug) {
BOOST_FOREACH(int64_t n, vSorted)
LogPrintf("%+d ", n);
LogPrintf("| ");
}
LogPrintf("nTimeOffset = %+d (%+d minutes)\n", nTimeOffset, nTimeOffset/60);
}
}
|
