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# Copyright (c) 2009-2010 Satoshi Nakamoto
# Distributed under the MIT/X11 software license, see the accompanying
# file license.txt or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
CXX=g++
WXINCLUDEPATHS=$(shell wx-config --cxxflags)
WXLIBS=$(shell wx-config --libs)
USE_UPNP:=0
DEFS=-DNOPCH -DUSE_SSL
# for boost 1.37, add -mt to the boost libraries
LIBS= \
-Wl,-Bstatic \
-l boost_system \
-l boost_filesystem \
-l boost_program_options \
-l boost_thread \
-l db_cxx \
-l ssl \
-l crypto
ifdef USE_UPNP
LIBS += -l miniupnpc
DEFS += -DUSE_UPNP=$(USE_UPNP)
endif
LIBS+= \
-Wl,-Bdynamic \
-l gthread-2.0 \
-l z \
-l dl \
-l pthread
# Hardening
# Make some classes of vulnerabilities unexploitable in case one is discovered.
#
# Stack Canaries
# Put numbers at the beginning of each stack frame and check that they are the same.
# If a stack buffer if overflowed, it writes over the canary number and then on return
# when that number is checked, it won't be the same and the program will exit with
# a "Stack smashing detected" error instead of being exploited.
HARDENING=-fstack-protector-all -Wstack-protector
# Make some important things such as the global offset table read only as soon as
# the dynamic linker is finished building it. This will prevent overwriting of addresses
# which would later be jumped to.
HARDENING+=-Wl,-z,relro -Wl,-z,now
# Build position independent code to take advantage of Address Space Layout Randomization
# offered by some kernels.
# see doc/build-unix.txt for more information.
ifdef PIE
HARDENING+=-fPIE -pie
endif
# -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2 does some checking for potentially exploitable code patterns in
# the source such overflowing a statically defined buffer.
HARDENING+=-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2
#
DEBUGFLAGS=-g -D__WXDEBUG__
CXXFLAGS=-O2 -Wno-invalid-offsetof -Wformat $(DEBUGFLAGS) $(DEFS) $(HARDENING)
HEADERS = \
base58.h \
bignum.h \
crypter.h \
db.h \
headers.h \
init.h \
irc.h \
key.h \
keystore.h \
main.h \
net.h \
noui.h \
protocol.h \
bitcoinrpc.h \
script.h \
serialize.h \
strlcpy.h \
ui.h \
uibase.h \
uint256.h \
util.h \
wallet.h
OBJS= \
obj/crypter.o \
obj/db.o \
obj/init.o \
obj/irc.o \
obj/keystore.o \
obj/main.o \
obj/net.o \
obj/protocol.o \
obj/bitcoinrpc.o \
obj/script.o \
obj/util.o \
obj/wallet.o \
cryptopp/obj/sha.o \
cryptopp/obj/cpu.o
all: bitcoin
obj/%.o: %.cpp $(HEADERS)
$(CXX) -c $(CXXFLAGS) $(WXINCLUDEPATHS) -DGUI -o $@ $<
cryptopp/obj/%.o: cryptopp/%.cpp
$(CXX) -c $(CXXFLAGS) -O3 -o $@ $<
bitcoin: $(OBJS) obj/ui.o obj/uibase.o
$(CXX) $(CXXFLAGS) -o $@ $^ $(WXLIBS) $(LIBS)
obj/nogui/%.o: %.cpp $(HEADERS)
$(CXX) -c $(CXXFLAGS) -o $@ $<
bitcoind: $(OBJS:obj/%=obj/nogui/%)
$(CXX) $(CXXFLAGS) -o $@ $^ $(LIBS)
obj/test/test_bitcoin.o: $(wildcard test/*.cpp) $(HEADERS)
$(CXX) -c $(CFLAGS) -o $@ test/test_bitcoin.cpp
test_bitcoin: obj/test/test_bitcoin.o $(filter-out obj/nogui/init.o,$(OBJS:obj/%=obj/nogui/%))
$(CXX) $(CXXFLAGS) -o $@ $(LIBPATHS) $^ -Wl,-Bstatic -lboost_unit_test_framework $(LIBS)
clean:
-rm -f bitcoin bitcoind test_bitcoin
-rm -f obj/*.o
-rm -f obj/nogui/*.o
-rm -f obj/test/*.o
-rm -f cryptopp/obj/*.o
-rm -f headers.h.gch
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