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There is one tests that checks version=1 blocks are rejected. For all
other tests the version doesn't matter as long as it is large enough.
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Use object returned from add_p2p_connection to refer to
p2ps. Add a test class attribute if it needs to be used across
many methods. Don't use the p2p property.
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-BEGIN VERIFY SCRIPT-
sed -i 's/\.mininode/\.p2p/g' $(git grep -l "mininode")
git mv test/functional/test_framework/mininode.py test/functional/test_framework/p2p.py
-END VERIFY SCRIPT-
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substitutes "for x in range(N):" by "for _ in range(N):"
indicates to the reader that a block is just repeated N times, and
that the loop counter is not used in the body
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-BEGIN VERIFY SCRIPT-
./contrib/devtools/copyright_header.py update ./
-END VERIFY SCRIPT-
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The solve parameter is unnecessary. Remove it and add
comments.
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block has the correct hash internally
7a6627ae87b637bf32c03122865402bd71adf0d1 Fix mining to an invalid target + ensure that a new block has the correct hash internally in Python tests (Samer Afach)
Pull request description:
Test with block 47 in the `feature_block.py` creates a block with a hash higher than the target, which is supposed to fail. Now two issues exist there, and both have low probability of showing up:
1. The creation is done with `while (hash < target)`, which is wrong, because hash = target is a valid mined value based on the code in the function `CheckProofOfWork()` that validates the mining target:
```
if (UintToArith256(hash) > bnTarget)
return false;
```
2. As we know the hash stored in CBlock class in Python is stateful, unlike how it's in C++, where calling `CBlock::GetHash()` will actively calculate the hash and not cache it anywhere. With this, blocks that come out of the method `next_block` can have incorrect hash value when `solve=False`. This is because the `next_block` is mostly used with `solve=True`, and solving does call the function `rehash()` which calculates the hash of the block, but with `solve=False`, nothing calls that method. And since the work to be done in regtests is very low, the probably of this problem showing up is very low, but it practically happens (well, with much higher probability compared to issue No. 1 above).
This PR fixes both these issues.
Top commit has no ACKs.
Tree-SHA512: f3b54d18f5073d6f1c26eab89bfec78620dda4ac1e4dde4f1d69543f1b85a7989d64c907e091db63f3f062408f5ed1e111018b842819ba1a5f8348c7b01ade96
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correct hash internally in Python tests
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The function implementing segwit v0 signature hash was originally named
SegwitVersion1SignatureHash() (presumably before segwit v0 was named
segwit v0). Rename it to SegwitV0SignatureHash().
Also rename SignatureHash() to LegacySignatureHash() for disambiguation.
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p2p_invalid_block test.
0c62e3aa73839e97e65a3155e06a98d84b700a1e New regression testing for CVE-2018-17144, CVE-2012-2459, and CVE-2010-5137. (lucash-dev)
38bfca6bb2ad68719415e9c54a981441052da072 Added comments referencing multiple CVEs in tests and production code. (lucash-dev)
Pull request description:
This functional test includes two scenarios that test for regressions of vulnerabilities, but they are only briefly described. There are freely available documents explaining in detail the issues, but without explicit mentions, the developer trying to maintain the code needs an additional step of digging in commit history and PR conversations to figure it out.
Added comments to explicitly mention CVE-2018-17144 and CVE-2012-2459, for more complete documentation.
This improves developer experience by making understanding the tests easier.
ACKs for top commit:
laanwj:
ACK 0c62e3aa73839e97e65a3155e06a98d84b700a1e, checked the CVE numbers, thanks for adding documentation
Tree-SHA512: 3ee05351745193b8b959e4a25d50f25a693b2d24b0732ed53cf7d5882df40b5dd0f1877bd5c69cffb921d4a7acf9deb3cc1160b96dc730d9b5984151ad06b7c9
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fa8489a15511f61a372473927e73c34692bbec23 test: Add test for BIP30 duplicate tx (MarcoFalke)
77770d95e2838d7665fa8f621e9e83d79f9b3196 test: Properly serialize BIP34 coinbase height (MarcoFalke)
Pull request description:
This adds a test for BIP30 to check that duplicate txs can exist in the blockchain given the first one was completely spent when the second one is added. (Requested by ajtowns in https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/16333#issuecomment-508604071)
We can not add a test that a later duplicate tx overwrites a previous one, because BIP30 is always enforced on regtest. If someone feels strongly about such a test, some Bitcoin Core code would have to be modified, which can be done in a follow up pull request.
Also, add a commit to fix the BIP34 test failures reported in https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/14633#issue-227712540
ACKs for top commit:
laanwj:
Code review ACK fa8489a15511f61a372473927e73c34692bbec23
Tree-SHA512: c707d0bdc93937263876b603425b53322a2a9f9ec3f50716ae2fa9de8ddc644beb22b26c1bfde7f4aab102633e096b354ef380db919176bd2cb44a2828f884aa
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This commit adds comments referencing multiple CVEs both in production and test code.
CVEs covered in this commit:
CVE-2010-5137
CVE-2010-5139
CVE-2010-5141
CVE-2012-1909
CVE-2012-2459
CVE-2012-3789
CVE-2018-17144
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0ff1c2a838da9e8dc7f77609adc89124bbea3e2b Separate reason for premature spends (coinbase/locktime) (Suhas Daftuar)
54470e767bab37f9b7089782b1be73d5883bb244 Assert validation reasons are contextually correct (Suhas Daftuar)
2120c31521aa51aa1984ee33250b8320506d3a0f [refactor] Update some comments in validation.cpp as we arent doing DoS there (Matt Corallo)
12dbdd7a41bac73e51ed8f7b290b7671196bf9ea [refactor] Drop unused state.DoS(), state.GetDoS(), state.CorruptionPossible() (Matt Corallo)
aa502b88d10c2c3ac56d9163555849b96dc4df1e scripted-diff: Remove DoS calls to CValidationState (Matt Corallo)
7721ad64f40a0c67edefaaf7353264d78df8803e [refactor] Prep for scripted-diff by removing some \ns which annoy sed. (Matt Corallo)
5e78c5734bb0c9aae7b0a7019a745b2d7059b3d9 Allow use of state.Invalid() for all reasons (Matt Corallo)
6b34bc6b6f54f85537494cbea3846d5d195a06d9 Fix handling of invalid headers (Suhas Daftuar)
ef54b486d5333dfc85c56e6b933c81735196a25d [refactor] Use Reasons directly instead of DoS codes (Matt Corallo)
9ab2a0412e96e87956fe61257387683635213035 CorruptionPossible -> BLOCK_MUTATED (Matt Corallo)
6e55b292b0ea944897b6dc2f766446fd209af484 CorruptionPossible -> TX_WITNESS_MUTATED (Matt Corallo)
7df16e70e67c753c871797ce947ea09d7cb0e519 LookupBlockIndex -> CACHED_INVALID (Matt Corallo)
c8b0d22698385f91215ce8145631e3d5826dc977 [refactor] Drop redundant nDoS, corruptionPossible, SetCorruptionPossible (Matt Corallo)
34477ccd39a8d4bfa8ad612f22d5a46291922185 [refactor] Add useful-for-dos "reason" field to CValidationState (Matt Corallo)
6a7f8777a0b193fae4f976196f3464ffac01bf1b Ban all peers for all block script failures (Suhas Daftuar)
7b999103e21509e1c2dec10f68e48744ffe90f55 Clean up banning levels (Matt Corallo)
b8b4c80146780f9011abbd1be72343cc965c07b9 [refactor] drop IsInvalid(nDoSOut) (Matt Corallo)
8818729013e17c650a25f030b2b80e0997389155 [refactor] Refactor misbehavior ban decisions to MaybePunishNode() (Matt Corallo)
00e11e61c0211a62788611cd6a6714a393fdc26c [refactor] rename stateDummy -> orphan_state (Matt Corallo)
f34fa719cf33a51d11f1d2219cbe73ccff6fd697 Drop obsolete sigops comment (Matt Corallo)
Pull request description:
This is a rebase of #11639 with some fixes for the last few comments which were not yet addressed.
The original PR text, with some strikethroughs of text that is no longer correct:
> This cleans up an old main-carryover - it made sense that main could decide what DoS scores to assign things because the DoS scores were handled in a different part of main, but now validation is telling net_processing what DoS scores to assign to different things, which is utter nonsense. Instead, we replace CValidationState's nDoS and CorruptionPossible with a general ValidationInvalidReason, which net_processing can handle as it sees fit. I keep the behavior changes here to a minimum, but in the future we can utilize these changes for other smarter behavior, such as disconnecting/preferring to rotate outbound peers based on them providing things which are invalid due to SOFT_FORK because we shouldn't ban for such cases.
>
> This is somewhat complementary with, though obviously conflicts heavily with #11523, which added enums in place of DoS scores, as well as a few other cleanups (which are still relevant).
>
> Compared with previous bans, the following changes are made:
>
> Txn with empty vin/vout or null prevouts move from 10 DoS
> points to 100.
> Loose transactions with a dependency loop now result in a ban
> instead of 10 DoS points.
> ~~BIP68-violation no longer results in a ban as it is SOFT_FORK.~~
> ~~Non-SegWit SigOp violation no longer results in a ban as it
> considers P2SH sigops and is thus SOFT_FORK.~~
> ~~Any script violation in a block no longer results in a ban as
> it may be the result of a SOFT_FORK. This should likely be
> fixed in the future by differentiating between them.~~
> Proof of work failure moves from 50 DoS points to a ban.
> Blocks with timestamps under MTP now result in a ban, blocks
> too far in the future continue to not result in a ban.
> Inclusion of non-final transactions in a block now results in a
> ban instead of 10 DoS points.
Note: The change to ban all peers for consensus violations is actually NOT the change I'd like to make -- I'd prefer to only ban outbound peers in those situations. The current behavior is a bit of a mess, however, and so in the interests of advancing this PR I tried to keep the changes to a minimum. I plan to revisit the behavior in a followup PR.
EDIT: One reviewer suggested I add some additional context for this PR:
> The goal of this work was to make net_processing aware of the actual reasons for validation failures, rather than just deal with opaque numbers instructing it to do something.
>
> In the future, I'd like to make it so that we use more context to decide how to punish a peer. One example is to differentiate inbound and outbound peer misbehaviors. Another potential example is if we'd treat RECENT_CONSENSUS_CHANGE failures differently (ie after the next consensus change is implemented), and perhaps again we'd want to treat some peers differently than others.
ACKs for commit 0ff1c2:
jnewbery:
utACK 0ff1c2a838da9e8dc7f77609adc89124bbea3e2b
ryanofsky:
utACK 0ff1c2a838da9e8dc7f77609adc89124bbea3e2b. Only change is dropping the first commit (f3883a321bf4ab289edcd9754b12cae3a648b175), and dropping the temporary `assert(level == GetDoS())` that was in 35ee77f2832eaffce30042e00785c310c5540cdc (now c8b0d22698385f91215ce8145631e3d5826dc977)
Tree-SHA512: e915a411100876398af5463d0a885920e44d473467bb6af991ef2e8f2681db6c1209bb60f848bd154be72d460f039b5653df20a6840352c5f7ea5486d9f777a3
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This is a first step towards cleaning up our DoS interface - make
validation return *why* something is invalid, and let net_processing
figure out what that implies in terms of banning/disconnection/etc.
Behavior change: peers will now be banned for providing blocks
with premature coinbase spends.
Co-authored-by: Anthony Towns <aj@erisian.com.au>
Suhas Daftuar <sdaftuar@gmail.com>
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Compared with previous bans, the following changes are made:
* Txn with empty vin/vout or null prevouts move from 10 DoS
points to 100.
* Loose transactions with a dependency loop now result in a ban
instead of 10 DoS points.
* Many pre-segwit soft-fork errors now result in a ban.
Note: Transactions that violate soft-fork script flags since P2SH do not generally
result in a ban. Also, banning behavior for invalid blocks is dependent on
whether the node is validating with multiple script check threads, due to a long-
standing bug. That inconsistency is still present after this commit.
* Proof of work failure moves from 50 DoS points to a ban.
* Blocks with timestamps under MTP now result in a ban, blocks
too far in the future continue to *not* result in a ban.
* Inclusion of non-final transactions in a block now results in a
ban instead of 10 DoS points.
Co-authored-by: Anthony Towns <aj@erisian.com.au>
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This removes the dependency on OpenSSL for the interaction tests, by providing a pure-Python
toy implementation of secp256k1.
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and confusion
-BEGIN VERIFY SCRIPT-
FILE_LIST=$(git grep -l 'def sync_blocks' ./test/functional/*.py)
sed -i -e 's/def sync_blocks/def send_blocks/g' $FILE_LIST
sed -i -e 's/self.sync_blocks/self.send_blocks/g' $FILE_LIST
-END VERIFY SCRIPT-
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-BEGIN VERIFY SCRIPT-
sed -i --regexp-extended -e 's/assert ?\((.+)\)(( )*)?(#.*)?$/assert \1\3\3\4/g' $(git grep -l --extended-regexp 'assert ?\(' test)
-END VERIFY SCRIPT-
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fab17e8272f5f70213f186809479ee7a75898b1d test: Add basic test for BIP34 (MarcoFalke)
Pull request description:
BIP34 was disabled for testing, which explains why it had no test.
Fix that by enabling it and adding a test.
Tree-SHA512: 9cb5702d474117ce6420226eb93ee09d6fb5fc856fabc8b67abe56a088cd727674e0e5462000e1afa83b911374036f90abdbdde56a8c236a75572ed47e10a00f
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59e387705c7e55ec40400301346354fa2d0c613f test: add invalid tx templates for use in functional tests (James O'Beirne)
Pull request description:
This change adds a list of `CTransaction`-generating templates which each correspond to a specific type of invalid transaction. We then use this list to test for a wider variety of invalid tx types in `p2p_invalid_tx.py` and `feature_block.py`.
Consolidating all invalid tx types will allow us to more easily cover all tx reject cases from a variety of tests without repeating ourselves. Validation logic doesn't differ much between mempool and block acceptance, but there *is* a difference and we should be sure we're testing both comprehensively.
Right now, I've only added templates covering the tx reject types listed below but if this approach seems worthwhile I will expand the list to be fully comprehensive.
```
bad-txns-in-belowout
bad-txns-inputs-duplicate
bad-txns-too-many-sigops
bad-txns-vin-empty
bad-txns-vout-empty
bad-txns-vout-negative
```
Tree-SHA512: 05407f4a953fbd7c44c08bb49bb989cefd39a2b05ea00f5b3c92197a3f05e1b302f789e33832445734220e1c333d133aba385740b77b84139b170c583471ce20
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Add templates for easily constructing different kinds of invalid
transactions and use them in feature_block and p2p_invalid_tx.
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661ac15a4a appveyor: Run functional tests on appveyor (Chun Kuan Lee)
2148c36b6e tests: Make it possible to run functional tests on Windows (Chun Kuan Lee)
Pull request description:
This PR do the following things:
- Make functional tests compatible with Windows
- Print color output in functional tests for Windows 10
- Run util and functional tests on appveyor
- Do not run symlink tests on Windows
Note:
- The wallet_multiwallet.py fail is unrelated to the test framework, it's a bug related to c++ code or maybe dependencies. `bitcoind` would exit with 0xC0000005(Access violation) during shutdown occasionally. Disable this for now.
- Not using `--failfast` because this is still in experimental. We should track if there is any other error.
- Disable ZMQ tests because the python zmq library could cause access violation sometimes.
- Disable `feature_notifications` because Bitcoin Core handles the command in different thread, whicha can cause a race condition.
Tree-SHA512: b76db137d264e62a5c130e1cbca7a2ca002a7a0f4153fa0b92c1ea6c9c09ef0533e11c49bdbd566c472d8ff59f245758feb5e5a6ec6cb6bb66a1c67bab5fa48a
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skipping .Addreses #14216. Changed get_deterministic_priv_key() to a
named tuple
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fac95398366f644911b58f1605e6bc37fb76782d qa: Run all tests even if wallet is not compiled (MarcoFalke)
faa669cbcd1fc799517b523b0f850e01b11bf40a qa: Premine to deterministic address with -disablewallet (MarcoFalke)
Pull request description:
Currently the test_runner would exit if the wallet was not compiled into the Bitcoin Core executable. However, a lot of the tests run without the wallet just fine and there is no need to globally require the wallet to run the tests.
Tree-SHA512: 63177260aa29126fd20f0be217a82b10b62288ab846f96f1cbcc3bd2c52702437703475d91eae3f8d821a3149fc62b725a4c5b2a7b3657b67ffcbc81532a03bb
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fac3e22b18cd29053bc17065fd75db7b84ba6f40 qa: Read reject reasons from debug log, not p2p messages (MarcoFalke)
Pull request description:
For local testing we don't need to rely on p2p messages just to assert a reject reason.
Replace reading p2p messages with reading from the debug log file.
Tree-SHA512: fa59598ecf5e00cfb420ef1892d90aa415501fd882e1c608894dc577b0d00e93a442326d3a9167fef77d26aafbe345b730b49109982ccad68a5942384564a90b
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-BEGIN VERIFY SCRIPT-
sed -i --regexp-extended -e "s/sync_blocks\((.*?), (True|False), (1.?), /sync_blocks(\1, success=\2, reject_code=\3, reject_reason=/g" ./test/functional/feature_block.py
-END VERIFY SCRIPT-
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object
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