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functions in `UnlockContext`
9fa43b5af6b180f4b5f76726f443ee60259d2cd0 refactor: Disable unused special members functions in `UnlockContext` (Hennadii Stepanov)
Pull request description:
Also `UnlockContext::valid` and `UnlockContext::relock` are `const` now.
ACKs for top commit:
achow101:
ACK 9fa43b5af6b180f4b5f76726f443ee60259d2cd0
john-moffett:
ACK 9fa43b5af6b180f4b5f76726f443ee60259d2cd0
furszy:
ACK 9fa43b5a
Tree-SHA512: 6d9fa8208676b9bd5d85b73cb2d3136e7f28ef59e68ee34915ec598458868e302a80b9ef1384c0bf7a4c42f936830c3add9662ca0bae73860a55a25cc374b699
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that was resolved in PR27036 "test: Remove last uses of snprintf and simplify"
and while here, fix up 2 words in docs to make the spelling linter green again.
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CSubNet::SanityCheck() was added in #20140, and not removed in #22570
when it became orphaned code.
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Since we no longer store a ref to the global `ArgsManager`
inside the wallet, we can move the util/system.h
include to the cpp.
This dependency removal opened a can of worms, as few
other places were, invalidly, depending on the wallet's
header including it.
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we are not using it anymore
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non-final network messages (round 2)
691eaf8873fe2f189153ca637506a0291504c97a Pass MSG_MORE flag when sending non-final network messages (Matt Whitlock)
Pull request description:
**N.B.:** This is my second attempt at introducing this optimization. #12519 (2018) was closed in deference to switching to doing gathering socket writes using `sendmsg(2)`, which I agree would have superior performance due to fewer syscalls, but that work was apparently abandoned in late 2018. Ever since, Bitcoin Core has continued writing tons of runt packets to the wire. Can we proceed with my halfway solution for now?
----
Since Nagle's algorithm is disabled, each and every call to `send(2)` can potentially generate a separate TCP segment on the wire. This is especially inefficient when sending the tiny header preceding each message payload.
Linux implements a `MSG_MORE` flag that tells the kernel not to push the passed data immediately to the connected peer but rather to collect it in the socket's internal transmit buffer where it can be combined with data from successive calls to `send(2)`. Where available, specify this flag when calling `send(2)` in `CConnman::SocketSendData(CNode &)` if the data buffer being sent is not the last one in `node.vSendMsg`.
ACKs for top commit:
sipa:
ACK 691eaf8873fe2f189153ca637506a0291504c97a
vasild:
ACK 691eaf8873fe2f189153ca637506a0291504c97a
Tree-SHA512: 9a7f46bc12edbf78d488f05d1c46760110a24c95af74b627d2604fcd198fa3f511c5956bac36d0034e88c632d432f7d394147e667a11b027af0a30f70a546d70
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various improvements
511aa4f1c7508f15cab8d7e58007900ad6fd3d5d Add unit test for ChaCha20's new caching (Pieter Wuille)
fb243d25f754da8f01793b41e2d225b917f3e5d7 Improve test vectors for ChaCha20 (Pieter Wuille)
93aee8bbdad808b7009279b67470d496cc26b936 Inline ChaCha20 32-byte specific constants (Pieter Wuille)
62ec713961ade7b58e90c905395558a41e8a59f0 Only support 32-byte keys in ChaCha20{,Aligned} (Pieter Wuille)
f21994a02e1cc46d41995581b54222abc655be93 Use ChaCha20Aligned in MuHash3072 code (Pieter Wuille)
5d16f757639e2cc6e81db6e07bc1d5dd74abca6c Use ChaCha20 caching in FastRandomContext (Pieter Wuille)
38eaece67b1bc37b2f502348c5d7537480a34346 Add fuzz test for testing that ChaCha20 works as a stream (Pieter Wuille)
5f05b27841af0bed1b6e7de5f46ffe33e5919e4d Add xoroshiro128++ PRNG (Martin Leitner-Ankerl)
12ff72476ac0dbf8add736ad3fb5fad2eeab156c Make unrestricted ChaCha20 cipher not waste keystream bytes (Pieter Wuille)
6babf402130a8f3ef3058594750aeaa50b8f5044 Rename ChaCha20::Seek -> Seek64 to clarify multiple of 64 (Pieter Wuille)
e37bcaa0a6dbb334ab6e817efcb609ccee6edc39 Split ChaCha20 into aligned/unaligned variants (Pieter Wuille)
Pull request description:
This is an alternative to #25354 (by my benchmarking, somewhat faster), subsumes #25712, and adds additional test vectors.
It separates the multiple-of-64-bytes-only "core" logic (which becomes simpler) from a layer around which performs caching/slicing to support arbitrary byte amounts. Both have their uses (in particular, the MuHash3072 code can benefit from multiple-of-64-bytes assumptions), plus the separation results in more readable code. Also, since FastRandomContext effectively had its own (more naive) caching on top of ChaCha20, that can be dropped in favor of ChaCha20's new built-in caching.
I thought about rebasing #25712 on top of this, but the changes before are fairly extensive, so redid it instead.
ACKs for top commit:
ajtowns:
ut reACK 511aa4f1c7508f15cab8d7e58007900ad6fd3d5d
dhruv:
tACK crACK 511aa4f1c7
Tree-SHA512: 3aa80971322a93e780c75a8d35bd39da3a9ea570fbae4491eaf0c45242f5f670a24a592c50ad870d5fd09b9f88ec06e274e8aa3cefd9561d623c63f7198cf2c7
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onion-prev settings
9d3127b11e34131409dab7c08bde5b444d90b2cb Add settings.json prune-prev, proxy-prev, onion-prev settings (Ryan Ofsky)
Pull request description:
With #602, if proxy and pruning settings are disabled in the GUI and the GUI is restarted, proxy and prune values are not stored anywhere. So if these settings are enabled in the future, default values will be shown, not previous values.
This PR stores previous values so they will preserved across restarts. I'm not sure I like this behavior because showing default values seems simpler and safer to me. Previous values may just have been set temporarily and may have never actually worked, and it adds some code complexity to store them.
This PR is one way of resolving #596. Other solutions are possible and could be implemented as alternatives.
ACKs for top commit:
hebasto:
ACK 9d3127b11e34131409dab7c08bde5b444d90b2cb, tested on Ubuntu 22.04.
vasild:
ACK 9d3127b11e34131409dab7c08bde5b444d90b2cb
jarolrod:
tACK 9d3127b11e34131409dab7c08bde5b444d90b2cb
Tree-SHA512: 1778d1819443490c880cfd5c1711d9c5ac75ea3ee8440e2f0ced81d293247163a78ae8aba6027215110aec6533bd7dc6472aeead6796bfbd51bf2354e28f24a9
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-netinfo table
77192c959816dc8daee138d88bd6f3250ce3bdb6 cli: include local ("unreachable") peers in -netinfo table (Matthew Zipkin)
Pull request description:
Closes https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/26579
The `-netinfo` dashboard did not list peers that were connected via "unroutable" networks. This included local peers including local-network peers. Personally, I run one bitcoind instance on my network that is used by other services like Wasabi Wallet and LND running on other machines.
This PR adds an "npr" (not publicly routable) column to the table of networks (ipv4, ipv6, onion, etc) so that every connection to the node is listed, and the totals are accurate as they relate to max inbound and max outbound limits.
Example connecting in regtest mode to one local and one remote peer:
```
Bitcoin Core client v24.99.0-151ce099ea8f-dirty regtest - server 70016/Satoshi:24.99.0/
<-> type net mping ping send recv txn blk hb addrp addrl age id address version
in npr 0 0 90 90 1 1 127.0.0.1:59180 70016/Satoshi:24.99.0/
out manual ipv4 63 63 84 84 3 3 0 143.244.175.41 70016/Satoshi:24.0.1/
ms ms sec sec min min min
ipv4 ipv6 npr total block manual
in 0 0 1 1
out 1 0 0 1 0 1
total 1 0 1 2
Local addresses: n/a
```
ACKs for top commit:
jonatack:
Re-tested ACK 77192c959816dc8daee138d88bd6f3250ce3bdb6
Tree-SHA512: 78aa68bcff0dbaadb5f0604bf023fe8fd921313bd8276d12581f7655c089466a48765f9e123cb31d7f1d294d5ca45fdefdf8aa220466ff738f32414f41099c06
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used to rescan
`m_relock_mutex` is introduced so that the passphrase is not
deleted from memory when the timeout provided in
`walletpassphrase` is up, but the wallet is still rescanning.
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Wallet passphrases are needed to top up the keypool during a
rescan. The following RPCs need the passphrase when rescanning:
- `importdescriptors`
- `rescanblockchain`
The following RPCs use the information about whether or not the
passphrase is being used to ensure that full rescans are able to
take place:
- `walletlock`
- `encryptwallet`
- `walletpassphrasechange`
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As in title, these docstrings look incorrect.
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so it doesn't persist in memory
3a11adc7004d21b3dfe028b190d83add31691c55 Zero out wallet master key upon lock (John Moffett)
Pull request description:
When an encrypted wallet is locked (for instance via the RPC `walletlock`), the documentation indicates that the key is removed from memory:
https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/b92d609fb25637ccda000e182da854d4b762eee9/src/wallet/rpc/encrypt.cpp#L157-L158
However, the vector (a `std::vector<unsigned char, secure_allocator<unsigned char>>`) is merely _cleared_. As it is a member variable, it also stays in scope as long as the wallet is loaded, preventing the secure allocator from deallocating. This allows the key to persist indefinitely in memory. I confirmed this behavior on my macOS machine by using an open-source third party memory inspector ("Bit Slicer"). I was able to find my wallet's master key in Bit Slicer after unlocking and re-locking my encrypted wallet. I then confirmed the key data was at the address in LLDB.
This PR manually fills the bytes with zeroes before calling `clear()` by using our `memory_cleanse` function, which is designed to prevent the compiler from optimizing it away. I confirmed that it does remove the data from memory on my machine upon locking.
Note: An alternative approach could be to call `vMasterKey.shrink_to_fit()` after the `clear()`, which would trigger the secure allocator's deallocation. However, `shrink_to_fit()` is not _guaranteed_ to actually change the vector's capacity, so I think it's unwise to rely on it.
## Edit: A little more clarity on why this is an improvement.
Since `mlock`ed memory is guaranteed not to be swapped to disk and our threat model doesn't consider a super-user monitoring the memory in realtime, why is this an improvement? Most importantly, consider hibernation. Even `mlock`ed memory may get written to disk. From the `mlock` [manpage](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/mlock.2.html):
> (But be aware that the suspend mode on laptops and some desktop computers will save a copy of the system's RAM to disk, regardless of memory locks.)
As far as I can tell, this is true of [Windows](https://web.archive.org/web/20190127110059/https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/oldnewthing/20140207-00/?p=1833#:~:text=%5BThere%20does%20not%20appear%20to%20be%20any%20guarantee%20that%20the%20memory%20won%27t%20be%20written%20to%20disk%20while%20locked.%20As%20you%20noted%2C%20the%20machine%20may%20be%20hibernated%2C%20or%20it%20may%20be%20running%20in%20a%20VM%20that%20gets%20snapshotted.%20%2DRaymond%5D) and macOS as well.
Therefore, a user with a strong OS password and a strong wallet passphrase could still have their keys stolen if a thief takes their (hibernated) machine and reads the permanent storage.
ACKs for top commit:
S3RK:
Code review ACK 3a11adc7004d21b3dfe028b190d83add31691c55
achow101:
ACK 3a11adc7004d21b3dfe028b190d83add31691c55
Tree-SHA512: c4e3dab452ad051da74855a13aa711892c9b34c43cc43a45a3b1688ab044e75d715b42843c229219761913b4861abccbcc8d5cb6ac54957d74f6e357f04e8730
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b3b673f7048cce1d1368819abb0b58b7c6699fa5 mapport: require miniupnpc API version 17 or later (fanquake)
Pull request description:
Version 17 is currently the latest version, see: https://github.com/miniupnp/miniupnp/blob/master/miniupnpc/apiversions.txt, and has been available since the release of 2.1. 2.1 or newer is readily available across all distros, see https://repology.org/project/miniupnpc/versions, so drop support for the older API versions.
Split out of #22644.
ACKs for top commit:
hebasto:
ACK b3b673f7048cce1d1368819abb0b58b7c6699fa5, tested on Ubuntu 20.04 w/ and w/o [`libminiupnpc-dev`](https://packages.ubuntu.com/focal/libminiupnpc-dev) package.
TheCharlatan:
ACK b3b673f7048cce1d1368819abb0b58b7c6699fa5
Tree-SHA512: f53b36b82462c4ea83d9b83413dca8097885d1620f7ca0a53a79d6b3d3cf37c7773828b23f4278ccfcc3b14fcb0faffa35f60191b519b04570f3d2783d0303e2
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Co-Authored-By: Andrew Chow <github@achow101.com>
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561848aaf2d67791e92754f3d11813bc53959a8f Exercise non-DIRTY spent coins in caches in fuzz test (Pieter Wuille)
59e6828bb5b56a2354a80059d3f660f551f3e207 Add deterministic mode to CCoinsViewCache (Pieter Wuille)
b0ff31084006ac7d4a7afba3190ca75f5f8441af Add CCoinsViewCache::SanityCheck() and use it in fuzz test (Pieter Wuille)
3c9cea1340fd1358d6854209d782922864945eb0 Add simulation-based CCoinsViewCache fuzzer (Pieter Wuille)
Pull request description:
The fuzzer goes through a sequence of operations that get applied to both a real stack of `CCoinsViewCache` objects, and to simulation data, comparing the two at the end.
ACKs for top commit:
jamesob:
re-ACK https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/27011/commits/561848aaf2d67791e92754f3d11813bc53959a8f
dergoegge:
Code review ACK 561848aaf2d67791e92754f3d11813bc53959a8f
Tree-SHA512: 68634f251fdb39436b128ecba093f651bff12ac11508dc9885253e57fd21efd44edf3b22b0f821c228175ec507df7d46c7f9f5404fc1eb8187fdbd136a5d5ee2
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At the expense of more complexity, this target generates a valid
Miniscript node at every iteration.
This target will at first run populate a list of recipe (a map from
desired type to possible ways of creating such type) and curate it
(remove the unavailable or redundant recipes).
Then, at each iteration it will pick a type, choose a manner to create a
node of such type from the available recipes, and then
pseudo-recursively do the same for the type constraints of the picked
recipe.
For instance, if it is instructed based on the fuzzer output to create a
Miniscript node of type 'Bd', it could choose to create an 'or_i(subA, subB)'
nodes with type constraints 'B' for subA and 'Bd' for subB. It then
consults the recipes for creating subA and subB, etc...
Here is the list of all the existing recipes, by type constraint:
B: 0()
B: 1()
B: older()
B: after()
B: sha256()
B: hash256()
B: ripemd160()
B: hash160()
B: c:(K)
B: d:(Vz)
B: j:(Bn)
B: n:(B)
B: and_v(V,B)
B: and_b(B,W)
B: or_b(Bd,Wd)
B: or_d(Bdu,B)
B: or_i(B,B)
B: andor(Bdu,B,B)
B: thresh(Bdu)
B: thresh(Bdu,Wdu)
B: thresh(Bdu,Wdu,Wdu)
B: multi()
V: v:(B)
V: and_v(V,V)
V: or_c(Bdu,V)
V: or_i(V,V)
V: andor(Bdu,V,V)
K: pk_k()
K: pk_h()
K: and_v(V,K)
K: or_i(K,K)
K: andor(Bdu,K,K)
W: a:(B)
W: s:(Bo)
Bz: 0()
Bz: 1()
Bz: older()
Bz: after()
Bz: n:(Bz)
Bz: and_v(Vz,Bz)
Bz: or_d(Bzdu,Bz)
Bz: andor(Bzdu,Bz,Bz)
Bz: thresh(Bzdu)
Vz: v:(Bz)
Vz: and_v(Vz,Vz)
Vz: or_c(Bzdu,Vz)
Vz: andor(Bzdu,Vz,Vz)
Bo: sha256()
Bo: hash256()
Bo: ripemd160()
Bo: hash160()
Bo: c:(Ko)
Bo: d:(Vz)
Bo: j:(Bon)
Bo: n:(Bo)
Bo: and_v(Vz,Bo)
Bo: and_v(Vo,Bz)
Bo: or_d(Bodu,Bz)
Bo: or_i(Bz,Bz)
Bo: andor(Bzdu,Bo,Bo)
Bo: andor(Bodu,Bz,Bz)
Bo: thresh(Bodu)
Vo: v:(Bo)
Vo: and_v(Vz,Vo)
Vo: and_v(Vo,Vz)
Vo: or_c(Bodu,Vz)
Vo: or_i(Vz,Vz)
Vo: andor(Bzdu,Vo,Vo)
Vo: andor(Bodu,Vz,Vz)
Ko: pk_k()
Ko: and_v(Vz,Ko)
Ko: andor(Bzdu,Ko,Ko)
Bn: sha256()
Bn: hash256()
Bn: ripemd160()
Bn: hash160()
Bn: c:(Kn)
Bn: d:(Vz)
Bn: j:(Bn)
Bn: n:(Bn)
Bn: and_v(Vz,Bn)
Bn: and_v(Vn,B)
Bn: and_b(Bn,W)
Bn: multi()
Vn: v:(Bn)
Vn: and_v(Vz,Vn)
Vn: and_v(Vn,V)
Kn: pk_k()
Kn: pk_h()
Kn: and_v(Vz,Kn)
Kn: and_v(Vn,K)
Bon: sha256()
Bon: hash256()
Bon: ripemd160()
Bon: hash160()
Bon: c:(Kon)
Bon: d:(Vz)
Bon: j:(Bon)
Bon: n:(Bon)
Bon: and_v(Vz,Bon)
Bon: and_v(Von,Bz)
Von: v:(Bon)
Von: and_v(Vz,Von)
Von: and_v(Von,Vz)
Kon: pk_k()
Kon: and_v(Vz,Kon)
Bd: 0()
Bd: sha256()
Bd: hash256()
Bd: ripemd160()
Bd: hash160()
Bd: c:(Kd)
Bd: d:(Vz)
Bd: j:(Bn)
Bd: n:(Bd)
Bd: and_b(Bd,Wd)
Bd: or_b(Bd,Wd)
Bd: or_d(Bdu,Bd)
Bd: or_i(B,Bd)
Bd: or_i(Bd,B)
Bd: andor(Bdu,B,Bd)
Bd: thresh(Bdu)
Bd: thresh(Bdu,Wdu)
Bd: thresh(Bdu,Wdu,Wdu)
Bd: multi()
Kd: pk_k()
Kd: pk_h()
Kd: or_i(K,Kd)
Kd: or_i(Kd,K)
Kd: andor(Bdu,K,Kd)
Wd: a:(Bd)
Wd: s:(Bod)
Bzd: 0()
Bzd: n:(Bzd)
Bzd: or_d(Bzdu,Bzd)
Bzd: andor(Bzdu,Bz,Bzd)
Bzd: thresh(Bzdu)
Bod: sha256()
Bod: hash256()
Bod: ripemd160()
Bod: hash160()
Bod: c:(Kod)
Bod: d:(Vz)
Bod: j:(Bon)
Bod: n:(Bod)
Bod: or_d(Bodu,Bzd)
Bod: or_i(Bz,Bzd)
Bod: or_i(Bzd,Bz)
Bod: andor(Bzdu,Bo,Bod)
Bod: andor(Bodu,Bz,Bzd)
Bod: thresh(Bodu)
Kod: pk_k()
Kod: andor(Bzdu,Ko,Kod)
Bu: 0()
Bu: 1()
Bu: sha256()
Bu: hash256()
Bu: ripemd160()
Bu: hash160()
Bu: c:(K)
Bu: d:(Vz)
Bu: j:(Bnu)
Bu: n:(B)
Bu: and_v(V,Bu)
Bu: and_b(B,W)
Bu: or_b(Bd,Wd)
Bu: or_d(Bdu,Bu)
Bu: or_i(Bu,Bu)
Bu: andor(Bdu,Bu,Bu)
Bu: thresh(Bdu)
Bu: thresh(Bdu,Wdu)
Bu: thresh(Bdu,Wdu,Wdu)
Bu: multi()
Bzu: 0()
Bzu: 1()
Bzu: n:(Bz)
Bzu: and_v(Vz,Bzu)
Bzu: or_d(Bzdu,Bzu)
Bzu: andor(Bzdu,Bzu,Bzu)
Bzu: thresh(Bzdu)
Bou: sha256()
Bou: hash256()
Bou: ripemd160()
Bou: hash160()
Bou: c:(Ko)
Bou: d:(Vz)
Bou: j:(Bonu)
Bou: n:(Bo)
Bou: and_v(Vz,Bou)
Bou: and_v(Vo,Bzu)
Bou: or_d(Bodu,Bzu)
Bou: or_i(Bzu,Bzu)
Bou: andor(Bzdu,Bou,Bou)
Bou: andor(Bodu,Bzu,Bzu)
Bou: thresh(Bodu)
Bnu: sha256()
Bnu: hash256()
Bnu: ripemd160()
Bnu: hash160()
Bnu: c:(Kn)
Bnu: d:(Vz)
Bnu: j:(Bnu)
Bnu: n:(Bn)
Bnu: and_v(Vz,Bnu)
Bnu: and_v(Vn,Bu)
Bnu: and_b(Bn,W)
Bnu: multi()
Bonu: sha256()
Bonu: hash256()
Bonu: ripemd160()
Bonu: hash160()
Bonu: c:(Kon)
Bonu: d:(Vz)
Bonu: j:(Bonu)
Bonu: n:(Bon)
Bonu: and_v(Vz,Bonu)
Bonu: and_v(Von,Bzu)
Bdu: 0()
Bdu: sha256()
Bdu: hash256()
Bdu: ripemd160()
Bdu: hash160()
Bdu: c:(Kd)
Bdu: d:(Vz)
Bdu: j:(Bnu)
Bdu: n:(Bd)
Bdu: and_b(Bd,Wd)
Bdu: or_b(Bd,Wd)
Bdu: or_d(Bdu,Bdu)
Bdu: or_i(Bu,Bdu)
Bdu: or_i(Bdu,Bu)
Bdu: andor(Bdu,Bu,Bdu)
Bdu: thresh(Bdu)
Bdu: thresh(Bdu,Wdu)
Bdu: thresh(Bdu,Wdu,Wdu)
Bdu: multi()
Wdu: a:(Bdu)
Wdu: s:(Bodu)
Bzdu: 0()
Bzdu: n:(Bzd)
Bzdu: or_d(Bzdu,Bzdu)
Bzdu: andor(Bzdu,Bzu,Bzdu)
Bzdu: thresh(Bzdu)
Bodu: sha256()
Bodu: hash256()
Bodu: ripemd160()
Bodu: hash160()
Bodu: c:(Kod)
Bodu: d:(Vz)
Bodu: j:(Bonu)
Bodu: n:(Bod)
Bodu: or_d(Bodu,Bzdu)
Bodu: or_i(Bzu,Bzdu)
Bodu: or_i(Bzdu,Bzu)
Bodu: andor(Bzdu,Bou,Bodu)
Bodu: andor(Bodu,Bzu,Bzdu)
Bodu: thresh(Bodu)
Co-authored-by: Pieter Wuille <pieter.wuille@gmail.com>
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This is a "dumb" way of randomly generating a Miniscript node from
fuzzer input. It defines a strict binary encoding and will always generate
a node defined from the encoding without "helping" to create valid nodes.
It will cut through as soon as it encounters an invalid fragment so
hopefully the fuzzer can tend to learn the encoding and generate valid
nodes with a higher probability.
On a valid generated node a number of invariants are checked, especially
around the satisfactions and testing them against the Script
interpreter.
The node generation and testing is modular in order to later introduce
other ways to generate nodes from fuzzer inputs with minimal code.
Co-Authored-By: Pieter Wuille <pieter@wuille.net>
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This is a workaround for Miniscript descriptors containing hash
challenges. For those we can't mock the signature creator without making
OP_EQUAL mockable in the interpreter, so CalculateMaximumInputSize will
always return -1 and outputs for these descriptors would appear
unsolvable while they actually are.
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Preimages must be externally provided (typically, via a PSBT).
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Try to solve a script using the Miniscript satisfier if the legacy
solver fails under P2WSH context. Only solve public key and public key
hash challenges for now.
We don't entirely replace the raw solver and especially rule out trying to
solve CHECKMULTISIG-based multisigs with the Miniscript satisfier since
some features, such as the transaction input combiner, rely on the
specific behaviour of the former.
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Cherry-picked and squashed from
https://github.com/sipa/bitcoin/commits/202302_miniscript_improve.
- Explain thresh() and multi() satisfaction algorithms
- Comment on and_v dissatisfaction
- Mark overcomplete thresh() dissats as malleable and explain
- Add comment on unnecessity of Malleable() in and_b dissat
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This introduces the logic to "sign for" a Miniscript.
Co-Authored-By: Pieter Wuille <pieter.wuille@gmail.com>
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When an encrypted wallet is locked (for instance via the
RPC `walletlock`), the docs indicate that the key is
removed from memory. However, the vector (with a secure
allocator) is merely cleared. This allows the key to persist
indefinitely in memory. Instead, manually fill the bytes with
zeroes before clearing.
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2d955ff006b8949017fe617c35cfc1cfe117db6e net: add `Ensure{any}Banman` (brunoerg)
Pull request description:
This PR adds `Ensure{any}Banman` functions to avoid code repetition and make it cleaner. Same approach as done with argsman, chainman, connman and others.
ACKs for top commit:
davidgumberg:
ACK [2d955ff](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/commit/2d955ff006b8949017fe617c35cfc1cfe117db6e)
Tree-SHA512: 0beb7125312168a3df130c1793a1412ab423ef0f46023bfe2a121630c79df7e55d3d143fcf053bd09e2d96e9385a7a04594635da3e5c6be0c5d3a9cafbe3b631
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Use ChainstateManagerOpts struct to remove ArgsManager uses from validation.cpp.
This commit does not change behavior.
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Use DBParams struct to remove ArgsManager uses from txdb.
To reduce size of this commit, this moves references to gArgs variable out of
txdb.cpp to calling code in chainstate.cpp. But these moves are temporary. The
gArgs references in chainstate.cpp are moved out to calling code in init.cpp in
later commits.
This commit does not change behavior.
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Add CoinsViewOptions struct to remove ArgsManager uses from txdb.
To reduce size of this commit, this moves references to gArgs variable out of
txdb.cpp to calling code in validation.cpp. But these moves are temporary. The
gArgs references in validation.cpp are moved out to calling code in init.cpp in
later commits.
This commit does not change behavior.
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Add DBParams and DBOptions structs to remove ArgsManager uses from dbwrapper.
To reduce size of this commit, this moves references to gArgs variable out of
dbwrapper.cpp to calling code in txdb.cpp. But these moves are temporary. The
gArgs references in txdb.cpp are moved out to calling code in init.cpp in later
commits.
This commit does not change behavior.
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to generate semi-random CAmounts up to MAX_MONEY rather
than only uint32, and use it in the unit tests.
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it adds `Ensure{any}Banman` functions to avoid
code repetition and make it cleaner. Similar
approach as done with argsman, chainman, connman
and others.
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4de02def844102c08b65bf1311a333e7aca482b9 qt: Persist Mask Values option (Andrew Chow)
Pull request description:
The mask values option is memory only. If a user has enabled this option, it's reasonable to expect that they would want to have it enabled on the next start.
ACKs for top commit:
RandyMcMillan:
tACK https://github.com/bitcoin-core/gui/commit/4de02def844102c08b65bf1311a333e7aca482b9
jarolrod:
tACK 4de02def844102c08b65bf1311a333e7aca482b9
pablomartin4btc:
> tACK [4de02de](https://github.com/bitcoin-core/gui/commit/4de02def844102c08b65bf1311a333e7aca482b9)
john-moffett:
tACK 4de02def844102c08b65bf1311a333e7aca482b9
Tree-SHA512: 247deb78df4911516625bf8b25d752feb480ce30eb31335cf9baeb07b7c6c225fcc37d5c45de62d6e6895ec10c7eefabb15527e3c9723a3b8ddda1e12ebbf46b
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bar label
faff2ba4f80fad5af63a31559fd4065e631a8166 Remove reindex special case from the progress bar label (MarcoFalke)
Pull request description:
The user knows which option they passed to the program, so it seems overly verbose to offer the user feedback whether or not they passed `-reindex`. Treat it as `DISK`, like all other cases that are treated as `DISK`:
* `-reindex-chainstate`
* `-loadblock`
ACKs for top commit:
john-moffett:
Re-ACK faff2ba4f80fad5af63a31559fd4065e631a8166
hebasto:
ACK faff2ba4f80fad5af63a31559fd4065e631a8166, I have reviewed the code and it looks OK, I agree it can be merged.
Tree-SHA512: 7f110c4beb1451d26f32da3a60150dac91c8a7b8d1c01749017204712b73cc1b77578af492930e4b6704097a73ed051f77bc39d8f60e0ff15a797a201805312e
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and `wallets/` subdir
c9ba4f9ecb1a282d98e7456a84ca84362b161757 test: Add test for file system permissions (Hennadii Stepanov)
581f16ef3404274cb5c1a79dd3d6ee7b584f9844 Apply default umask in `SetupEnvironment()` (Hennadii Stepanov)
8a6219e54379911605aed860519e0194f1433b72 Remove `-sysperms` option (Hennadii Stepanov)
Pull request description:
On master (1e7564eca8a688f39c75540877ec3bdfdde766b1) docs say:
```
$ ./src/bitcoind -help | grep -A 3 sysperms
-sysperms
Create new files with system default permissions, instead of umask 077
(only effective with disabled wallet functionality)
```
Basing on that, one could expect that running `bitcoind` first time will create data directory and `wallets/` subdirectory with safe 0700 permissions.
But that is not the case:
```
$ stat .bitcoin | grep id
Access: (0775/drwxrwxr-x) Uid: ( 1000/ hebasto) Gid: ( 1000/ hebasto)
$ stat .bitcoin/wallets | grep id
Access: (0775/drwxrwxr-x) Uid: ( 1000/ hebasto) Gid: ( 1000/ hebasto)
```
Both directories, in fact, are created with system default permissions.
With this PR:
```
$ stat .bitcoin/wallets | grep id
Access: (0700/drwx------) Uid: ( 1000/ hebasto) Gid: ( 1000/ hebasto)
$ stat .bitcoin/wallets | grep id
Access: (0700/drwx------) Uid: ( 1000/ hebasto) Gid: ( 1000/ hebasto)
```
---
This PR:
- is alternative to bitcoin/bitcoin#13389
- fixes bitcoin/bitcoin#15902
- fixes bitcoin/bitcoin#22595
- closes bitcoin/bitcoin#13371
- reverts bitcoin/bitcoin#4286
Changes in behavior: removed `-sysperms` command-line argument / configure option. The related discussions are here:
- https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/13389#issuecomment-395306690
- https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/13389#issuecomment-539906114
- https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/13389#discussion_r279160472
If users rely on non-default access permissions, they could use `chmod`.
ACKs for top commit:
john-moffett:
ACK c9ba4f9ecb1a282d98e7456a84ca84362b161757
willcl-ark:
ACK c9ba4f9ecb1a282d98e7456a84ca84362b161757
Tree-SHA512: 96c745339e6bd0e4d7bf65daf9a721e2e1945b2b0ab74ca0f66576d0dc358b5de8eb8cdb89fe2160f3b19c39d2798bb8b291784316085dc73a27102d3415bd57
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as many of the unit tests don't use this code
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935acdcc79d1dc5ac04a83b92e5919ddbfa29329 refactor: modernize the implementation of uint256.* (pasta)
Pull request description:
- Constructors of uint256 to utilize Span instead of requiring a std::vector
- converts m_data into a std::array
- Prefers using `WIDTH` instead of `sizeof(m_data)`
- make all the things constexpr
- replace C style functions with c++ equivalents
- memset -> std::fill
This may also be replaced by std::memset, but I think that std::fill is more idiomatic of modern c++ and readable.
- memcpy -> std::copy
Note: In practice, implementations of std::copy avoid multiple assignments and use bulk copy functions such as std::memmove if the value type is TriviallyCopyable and the iterator types satisfy LegacyContiguousIterator. (https://en.cppreference.com/w/cpp/algorithm/copy)
This could also likely be replaced by std::memcpy, but as said above, I believe the using std::copy is the more c++ way to do anything and is almost guaranteed to compile to the same asm
- memcmp -> std::memcmp
ACKs for top commit:
achow101:
ACK 935acdcc79d1dc5ac04a83b92e5919ddbfa29329
hebasto:
Approach ACK 935acdcc79d1dc5ac04a83b92e5919ddbfa29329.
aureleoules:
reACK 935acdcc79d1dc5ac04a83b92e5919ddbfa29329
john-moffett:
ACK 935acdcc79d1dc5ac04a83b92e5919ddbfa29329
stickies-v:
Approach ACK 935acdcc7
Tree-SHA512: 4f1ba54ff2198eea0e505d41e73d552c84c60f6878d5c85a94a8ab57f39afc94ef8d79258e7afd01fa84ec2a99f4404bb877eecd671f65e1ee9273f3129fc650
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This change makes all filesystem artifacts--files and directories--being
created with the default umask.
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b8032293e67a3b61ecad531412be5330f7cb39e3 Remove use of snprintf and simplify (John Moffett)
Pull request description:
These are the only remaining uses of `snprintf` in our project, and they can cause unexpected issues -- for example, see https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/27014. Change them to use our `ToString` (which uses a locale-independent version of `std::to_string`) to convert an `int` to `std::string`. Also remove resulting unused parts of `StringContentsSerializer`.
Closes https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/27014
ACKs for top commit:
Sjors:
tACK b8032293e67a3b61ecad531412be5330f7cb39e3, fixes #27014.
Tree-SHA512: c903977e654711929decafe8887d0de13b38a340d7082875acc5d41950d834dcfde074e9cabecaf5f9a760f62c34322297b4b156af29761650ef5803b1a54b59
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82f895d7b540ae421f80305a4f7cbb42905fb2c6 Update nanobench to version v4.3.10 (Martin Leitner-Ankerl)
Pull request description:
Nothing has changed that would affect Bitcoin's usage of nanobench.
Here is a detailed list of the changes
* Plenty of clang-tidy updates
* documentation updates
* faster Rng::shuffle
* Enable perf counters on older kernels
* Raise default minimum epoch time to 1ms (doesn't effect bitcoin's usage)
* Add support for custom information per benchmark
ACKs for top commit:
hebasto:
ACK 82f895d7b540ae421f80305a4f7cbb42905fb2c6, I've reviewed the code, all related changes from #26642 have been implemented.
Tree-SHA512: 942518398809a2794617a347ab8182b784a8e822e84de5af078b2531eabb438412d687cac22a21936585e60e07138a89b41c28c9750744c05a3d1053f55cad01
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if dbcache is too small
fe683f352480245add0b27fe7efef5fef4c1e8c3 log: Log VerifyDB Progress over multiple lines (Martin Zumsande)
61431e3a57b5613d8715c93c6eae0058e0217eaa validation: Skip VerifyDB checks of level >=3 if dbcache is too small (Martin Zumsande)
Pull request description:
This is the first two commits from #25574, leaving out all changes to `-verifychain` error-handling :
- The Problem of [25563](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/25563) is that when we skip blocks at level 3 due to an insufficient dbcache (skipping some `DisconnectBlock()` calls), we would still attempt the level 4 checks, attempting to reconnect a block that was never disconnected, leading to an assert in `ConnectBlock()`.
Fix this by not attempting level 4 checks in this case.
- Logging of verification progress is now split over multiple lines. This is more verbose, but now each update has its own timestamp, and other threads logging concurrently will no longer lead to mangled output.
This can be tested with a small `dbcache` value, for example:
`bitcoind -signet -dbcache=10`
`bitcoin-cli -signet verifychain 4 1000`
Fixes #25563
ACKs for top commit:
MarcoFalke:
review ACK fe683f352480245add0b27fe7efef5fef4c1e8c3 🗄
john-moffett:
ACK fe683f352480245add0b27fe7efef5fef4c1e8c3
Tree-SHA512: 3e2e0f8b73cbc518a0fa17912c1956da437787aab95001c110b01048472e0dfe4783c44df22bd903d198069dd2f6b02bfdf74e0b934c7a776f144c2e86cb818a
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This change effectively reverts commits from
https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/4286.
Users, who rely on non-default access permissions, should use `chmod`
command.
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fb1c6c14c11ccd4833c1a24f77c507f098d369ad test: Remove redundant test (yancy)
Pull request description:
I can't think of any reason to keep this test case around labeled [fix me](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/master/src/wallet/test/coinselector_tests.cpp#L242). The test was originally added [here](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/commit/4566ab75f277612425337bf7786c1d3a410d894a) however there was never an assertion about the coins that should be selected, only that a solution is found (which is a redundant solution to the test [above](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/master/src/wallet/test/coinselector_tests.cpp#L222)). The comment was later added here to [fix](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/commit/384273260a6ccbcf79dade0830011f528e5a1581) it, however it's unclear what exactly it's testing. A test was later added [here](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/master/src/wallet/test/coinselector_tests.cpp#L366) where if the [long term fee](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/master/src/wallet/test/coinselector_tests.cpp#L357) is less than the current [fee](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/master/src/wallet/test/coinselector_tests.cpp#L356), then select fewer UTXOs, which may have been the original intent.
ACKs for top commit:
S3RK:
ACK fb1c6c14c11ccd4833c1a24f77c507f098d369ad
Zero-1729:
Concept ACK fb1c6c14c11ccd4833c1a24f77c507f098d369ad
achow101:
ACK fb1c6c14c11ccd4833c1a24f77c507f098d369ad
Tree-SHA512: bce2cdae669c144ffaa130237a1643e3b6728e13d603cebf5d9493c4c7c68b3635868e4d93d210783c2ded2a871f185ca09a2053168c05b26a1e056ff6edf68f
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