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Without this change there are errors from boost like:
/ci_container_base/depends/i686-pc-linux-gnu/include/boost/signals2/expired_slot.hpp:23:28: error: 'what' overrides a member function but is not marked 'override' [-Werror,-Wsuggest-override]
/ci_container_base/depends/i686-pc-linux-gnu/include/boost/signals2/detail/signal_template.hpp:750:32: error: 'lock_pimpl' overrides a member function but is not marked 'override' [-Werror,-Wsuggest-override]
/ci_container_base/depends/i686-pc-linux-gnu/include/boost/signals2/connection.hpp:150:22: error: 'connected' overrides a member function but is not marked 'override' [-Werror,-Wsuggest-override]
There do not seem to be errors from capnproto currently, but add a suppression
for it, too, to be consistent with other libraries.
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Co-authored-by: Alfonso Roman Zubeldia <alfonsoromanz24@gmail.com>
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These annotations belong in the declarations rather than the definitions.
While harmless now, future versions of clang may warn about these.
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creating arbitrary sockets
1245d1388b003c46092937def7041917aecec8de netbase: extend CreateSock() to support creating arbitrary sockets (Vasil Dimov)
Pull request description:
Allow the callers of `CreateSock()` to pass all 3 arguments to the `socket(2)` syscall. This makes it possible to create sockets of any domain/type/protocol. In addition to extending arguments, some extra safety checks were put in place.
The need for this came up during the discussion in https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/30043#discussion_r1618837102
ACKs for top commit:
achow101:
ACK 1245d1388b003c46092937def7041917aecec8de
tdb3:
re ACK 1245d1388b003c46092937def7041917aecec8de
theStack:
re-ACK 1245d1388b003c46092937def7041917aecec8de
Tree-SHA512: cc86b56121293ac98959aed0ed77812d20702ed7029b5a043586f46e74295779c5354bb0d5f9e80be6c29e535df980d34c1dbf609064fb7ea3e5ca0f0ed54d6b
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without inputs
969e047cfbab86e5819a2c9056e8d2dab17513a8 Replace hard-coded constant in test (Lőrinc)
327a31d1a4f0e9c7b22063bc725bbd160092c552 Validate oversized transaction (Lőrinc)
1984187840972a455f4c210f0cb576633ef5bddb Validate transaction without inputs (Lőrinc)
c3a884318981c7ebabd0b8e8023a14519e26c72b Use SCRIPT_VERIFY_NONE instead of hard-coded 0 in transaction_tests (Lőrinc)
Pull request description:
Based on https://maflcko.github.io/b-c-cov/test_bitcoin.coverage/src/consensus/tx_check.cpp.gcov.html empty inputs and oversized transactions weren't covered by Boost unit tests (though they're covered by [python](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/master/test/functional/mempool_accept.py#L231) [tests](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/master/test/functional/data/invalid_txs.py#L102)).
<img alt="image" src="https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/assets/1841944/57a74ff5-5466-401f-a4fe-d79e36964adf">
I have tried including the empty transaction into [tx_invalid.json](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/master/src/test/data/tx_invalid.json#L34-L36), but it failed for another reason, so I added a separate test case for it in the end.
The oversized tx data is on the failure threshold now (lower threshold fails for a different reason, but I guess that's fine, we're testing the boundary here).
ACKs for top commit:
achow101:
ACK 969e047cfbab86e5819a2c9056e8d2dab17513a8
tdb3:
ACK 969e047cfbab86e5819a2c9056e8d2dab17513a8 pending `MSan, depends` CI failure.
glozow:
utACK 969e047cfbab86e5819a2c9056e8d2dab17513a8
Tree-SHA512: 2a472690eabfdacc276b7e0414d3a4ebc75c227405b202c9fe3c8befad875f6e4d9b40c056fb05971ad3ae479c8f53edebb2eeeb700088856caf5cf58bfca0c1
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immediate discouragement
6eecba475efd025eb011400af58621ad5823994e net_processing: make MaybePunishNodeFor{Block,Tx} return void (Pieter Wuille)
ae60d485da33f238ed2186799da4e109d4edd3a1 net_processing: remove Misbehavior score and increments (Pieter Wuille)
6457c311977bba3585648e32e3bd5754028aa292 net_processing: make all Misbehaving increments = 100 (Pieter Wuille)
5120ab1478c200b18ee621a6ffa0362f4e991959 net_processing: drop 8 headers threshold for incoming BIP130 (Pieter Wuille)
944c54290d5c081dc433dae7e7941074a3a8b5a7 net_processing: drop Misbehavior for unconnecting headers (Pieter Wuille)
9f66ac7cf1931c4d7c36abbb000b7de306d83a4c net_processing: do not treat non-connecting headers as response (Pieter Wuille)
Pull request description:
So far, discouragement of peers triggers when their misbehavior score exceeds 100 points. Most types of misbehavior increment the score by 100, triggering immediate discouragement, but some types do not. This PR makes all increments equal to either 100 (meaning any misbehavior will immediately cause disconnection and discouragement) or 0 (making the behavior effectively unconditionally allowed), and then removes the logic for score accumulation.
This simplifies the code a bit, but also makes protocol expectations clearer: if a peer misbehaves, they get disconnected. There is no good reason why certain types of protocol violations should be permitted 4 times (howmuch=20) or 9 times (howmuch=10), while many others are never allowed. Furthermore, the distinction between these looks arbitrary.
The specific types of misbehavior that are changed to 100 are:
* Sending us a `block` which does not connect to our header tree (which necessarily must have been unsollicited). [used to be score 10]
* Sending us a `headers` with a non-continuous headers sequence. [used to be score 20]
* Sending us more than 1000 addresses in a single `addr` or `addrv2` message [used to be score 20]
* Sending us more than 50000 invs in a single `inv` message [used to be score 20]
* Sending us more than 2000 headers in a single `headers` message [used to be score 20]
The specific types of misbehavior that are changed to 0 are:
* Sending us 10 (*) separate BIP130 headers announcements that do not connect to our block tree [used to be score 20]
* Sending us more than 8 headers in a single `headers` message (which thus does not get treated as a BIP130 announcement) that does not connect to our block tree. [used to be score 10]
I believe that none of these behaviors are unavoidable, except for the one marked (*) which can in theory happen still due to interaction between BIP130 and variations in system clocks (the max 2 hour in the future rule). This one has been removed entirely. In order to remove the impact of the bug it was designed to deal with, without relying on misbehavior, a separate improvement is included that makes `getheaders`-tracking more accurate.
In another unrelated improvement, this also gets rid of the 8 header limit heuristic to determine whether an incoming non-connecting `headers` is a potential BIP130 announcement, as this rule is no longer needed to prevent spurious Misbehavior. Instead, any non-connecting `headers` is now treated as a potential announcement.
ACKs for top commit:
sr-gi:
ACK [6eecba4](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/29575/commits/6eecba475efd025eb011400af58621ad5823994e)
achow101:
ACK 6eecba475efd025eb011400af58621ad5823994e
mzumsande:
Code Review ACK 6eecba475efd025eb011400af58621ad5823994e
glozow:
light code review / concept ACK 6eecba475efd025eb011400af58621ad5823994e
Tree-SHA512: e11e8a652c4ec048d8961086110a3594feefbb821e13f45c14ef81016377be0db44b5311751ef635d6e026def1960aff33f644e78ece11cfb54f2b7daa96f946
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fseek error
fa7bc9bbca9348cf31b97bee0789ea7caeec635c fuzz: Fix wallet_bdb_parser 32-bit unhandled fseek error (MarcoFalke)
Pull request description:
`std::fseek` on 64-bit past the end of the file may work fine (the following read would fail). However, on 32-bit it may fail early.
Fix it, by ignoring the error, treating it similar to a read error.
This was found by OSS-Fuzz.
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=69414
ACKs for top commit:
TheCharlatan:
ACK fa7bc9bbca9348cf31b97bee0789ea7caeec635c
brunoerg:
utACK fa7bc9bbca9348cf31b97bee0789ea7caeec635c
Tree-SHA512: 7a752a005837bae6846ce315a7b3b1a5fe1f440c7797c750f2c0bbb20b1ef1537cd390c425747c0c85d012655e2f908bd300ea084f82e5ada19badbf826e1ec9
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expected_last_page to silence fuzz ISan
fa9cb101cf33b57b2c043b29f1f3d55b990ba4c6 refactor: Add explicit cast to expected_last_page to silence fuzz ISan (MarcoFalke)
Pull request description:
Fixes #30247
I don't think this implicit cast can lead to any bugs, so make it explicit to silence the fuzz integer sanitizer.
Can be tested with:
```
FUZZ=wallet_bdb_parser UBSAN_OPTIONS="suppressions=$(pwd)/test/sanitizer_suppressions/ubsan:print_stacktrace=1:halt_on_error=1:report_error_type=1" ./src/test/fuzz/fuzz /tmp/1376869be72eebcc87fe737020add634b1a29533
```
After downloading the raw fuzz input from https://github.com/bitcoin-core/qa-assets/blob/24c507b3ea6263e6b121fb8dced01123065c44c2/fuzz_seed_corpus/wallet_bdb_parser/1376869be72eebcc87fe737020add634b1a29533
ACKs for top commit:
dergoegge:
utACK fa9cb101cf33b57b2c043b29f1f3d55b990ba4c6
Tree-SHA512: 226dcc58be8d70b4eec1657f232c9c6648b5dac5eb2706e7390e65ce0a031fbaf8afce97d71a535c8294467dca4757c96f294d8cc03d5e6a1c0a036b0e070325
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refactor: CBlockHeaderAndShortTxIDs constructor now always takes an explicit nonce.
test: Make blockencodings_tests deterministic using fixed seed providing deterministic
CBlockHeaderAndShortTxID nonces and dummy transaction IDs.
Fixes very rare flaky test failures, where the ShortIDs of test transactions collide, leading to
`READ_STATUS_FAILED` from PartiallyDownloadedBlock::InitData and/or `IsTxAvailable` giving `false`
when the transaction should actually be available.
* Use a new `FastRandomContext` with a fixed seed in each test, to ensure 'random' uint256s
used as fake prevouts are deterministic, so in-turn test txids and short IDs are deterministic
and don't collide causing very rare but flaky test failures.
* Add new test-only/internal initializer for `CBlockHeaderAndShortTxIDs` that takes a specified
nonce to further ensure determinism and avoid rare but undesireable short ID collisions.
In a test context this nonce is set to a fixed known-good value. Normally it is random, as
previously.
Flaky test failures can be reproduced with:
```patch
diff --git a/src/blockencodings.cpp b/src/blockencodings.cpp
index 695e8d806a..64d635a97a 100644
--- a/src/blockencodings.cpp
+++ b/src/blockencodings.cpp
@@ -44,7 +44,8 @@ void CBlockHeaderAndShortTxIDs::FillShortTxIDSelector() const {
uint64_t CBlockHeaderAndShortTxIDs::GetShortID(const Wtxid& wtxid) const {
static_assert(SHORTTXIDS_LENGTH == 6, "shorttxids calculation assumes 6-byte shorttxids");
- return SipHashUint256(shorttxidk0, shorttxidk1, wtxid) & 0xffffffffffffL;
+ // return SipHashUint256(shorttxidk0, shorttxidk1, wtxid) & 0xffffffffffffL;
+ return SipHashUint256(shorttxidk0, shorttxidk1, wtxid) & 0x0f;
}
```
to increase the likelihood of a short ID collision; and running
```shell
set -e;
n=0;
while (( n++ < 5000 )); do
src/test/test_bitcoin --run_test=blockencodings_tests;
done
```
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Also changes the return type of ActiveSnapshot to allow returning the
error message to the user of the loadtxoutset RPC.
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4ccb3d6d0d576d32da8a1b9c6e70962cbd0f19fe fuzz: have package_rbf always make small txns (Greg Sanders)
Pull request description:
hopefully resolves https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/30241
The fuzz target is generating a large amount of
transactions, but the core of the logic is
ConsumeTxMemPoolEntry making the mempool
entries for adding to the mempool. Since
ConsumeTxMemPoolEntry generates its own transaction "vsize",
we can improve efficiency of the target
by explicitly creating very small transactions,
reducing the hashing and memory burden.
ACKs for top commit:
maflcko:
lgtm ACK 4ccb3d6d0d576d32da8a1b9c6e70962cbd0f19fe
hodlinator:
ACK 4ccb3d6d0d576d32da8a1b9c6e70962cbd0f19fe
glozow:
ACK 4ccb3d6d0d576d32da8a1b9c6e70962cbd0f19fe
Tree-SHA512: 5d2e7e98460c6144dfe7deac554865e2e8e0e5f934dbdf5857dc4b4f471a64dc933297dc0dcf516f748a4348be6bd184808b7ece17ce073fdcc77f81b74c64de
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The addresses of the iterator values are non-deterministic (i.e. they
depend on where the values were allocated). This causes stability issues
when fuzzing (e.g. in the `txorphan` and `mini_miner` harnesses), due
the orders (derived from IteratorComparator) not being deterministic.
Improve stability by comparing the first element in the iterator value
pair instead of using the the value addresses.
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Set tip at the start of the function and only update it for a long poll.
Additionally have getTipHash return an optional, so the
caller can explicitly check that a tip exists.
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This makes the options argument for BlockAssembler constructor mandatory,
dropping implicit use of ArgsManager. The caller i.e. the Mining
interface implementation now handles this.
In a future Stratum v2 change the Options object needs to be
mofified after arguments have been processed. Specifically
the pool communicates how many extra bytes it needs for
its own outputs (payouts, extra commitments, etc). This will need
to be substracted from what the user set as -blockmaxweight.
Such a change can be implemented in createNewBlock, after
ApplyArgsManOptions.
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Start out with a single method isTestChain() that's used by the getblocktemplate RPC.
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The fuzz target is generating a large amount of
transactions, but the core of the logic is
ConsumeTxMemPoolEntry making the mempool
entries for adding to the mempool. Since
ConsumeTxMemPoolEntry generates its own transaction
"vsize", we can improve efficiency of the target
by explicitly creating very small transactions,
reducing the hashing and memory burden.
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See: https://github.com/miniupnp/miniupnp/commit/c0a50ce33e3b99ce8a96fd43049bb5b53ffac62f
The return value of 2 now indicates:
"A valid connected IGD has been found but its IP address is reserved (non routable)"
We continue to ignore any return value other than 1.
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94ed4fbf8e1a396c650b5134d396d6c0be35ce10 Add release note for size 2 package rbf (Greg Sanders)
afd52d8e63ed323a159ea49fd1f10542abeacb97 doc: update package RBF comment (Greg Sanders)
6e3c4394cfadf32c06c8c4732d136ca10c316721 mempool: Improve logging of replaced transactions (Greg Sanders)
d3466e4cc5051c314873dd14ec8f7a88494c0780 CheckPackageMempoolAcceptResult: Check package rbf invariants (Greg Sanders)
316d7b63c97144ba3e21201315c784852210f8ff Fuzz: pass mempool to CheckPackageMempoolAcceptResult (Greg Sanders)
4d15bcf448eb3c4451b63e8f78cc61f3f9f9b639 [test] package rbf (glozow)
dc21f61c72e5a97d974ca2c5cb70b8328f4fab2a [policy] package rbf (Suhas Daftuar)
5da396781589177d4ceb3b4b59c9f309a5e4d029 PackageV3Checks: Relax assumptions (Greg Sanders)
Pull request description:
Allows any 2 transaction package with no in-mempool ancestors to do package RBF when directly conflicting with other mempool clusters of size two or less.
Proposed validation steps:
1) If the transaction package is of size 1, legacy rbf rules apply.
2) Otherwise the transaction package consists of a (parent, child) pair with no other in-mempool ancestors (or descendants, obviously), so it is also going to create a cluster of size 2. If larger, fail.
3) The package rbf may not evict more than 100 transactions from the mempool(bip125 rule 5)
4) The package is a single chunk
5) Every directly conflicted mempool transaction is connected to at most 1 other in-mempool transaction (ie the cluster size of the conflict is at most 2).
6) Diagram check: We ensure that the replacement is strictly superior, improving the mempool
7) The total fee of the package, minus the total fee of what is being evicted, is at least the minrelayfee * size of the package (equivalent to bip125 rule 3 and 4)
Post-cluster mempool this will likely be expanded to general package rbf, but this is what we can safely support today.
ACKs for top commit:
achow101:
ACK 94ed4fbf8e1a396c650b5134d396d6c0be35ce10
glozow:
reACK 94ed4fbf8e via range-diff
ismaelsadeeq:
re-ACK 94ed4fbf8e1a396c650b5134d396d6c0be35ce10
theStack:
Code-review ACK 94ed4fbf8e1a396c650b5134d396d6c0be35ce10
murchandamus:
utACK 94ed4fbf8e1a396c650b5134d396d6c0be35ce10
Tree-SHA512: 9bd383e695964f362f147482bbf73b1e77c4d792bda2e91d7f30d74b3540a09146a5528baf86854a113005581e8c75f04737302517b7d5124296bd7a151e3992
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node::Warnings and remove globals
260f8da71a35232d859d7705861fc1a88bfbbe81 refactor: remove warnings globals (stickies-v)
9c4b0b7ce459765fa1a63b410c3423b90f0d2a5f node: update uiInterface whenever warnings updated (stickies-v)
b071ad9770b7ae7fc718dcbfdc8f62dffbf6cfee introduce and use the generalized `node::Warnings` interface (stickies-v)
20e616f86444d00712ac7eb840666e2b0378af4a move-only: move warnings from common to node (stickies-v)
bed29c481aebeb2b0160450c63c03cc68fb89bc6 refactor: remove unnecessary AppendWarning helper function (stickies-v)
Pull request description:
This PR:
- moves warnings from common to the node library and into the node namespace (as suggested in https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/29845#discussion_r1570069541)
- generalizes the warnings interface to `Warnings::Set()` and `Warnings::Unset()` methods, instead of having a separate function and globals for each warning. As a result, this simplifies the `kernel::Notifications` interface.
- removes warnings.cpp from the kernel library
- removes warning globals
- adds testing for the warning logic
Behaviour change introduced:
- the `-alertnotify` command is executed for all `KernelNotifications::warningSet` calls, which now also covers the `LARGE_WORK_INVALID_CHAIN` warning
- the GUI is updated automatically whenever a warning is (un)set, covering some code paths where it previously wouldn't be, e.g. when `node::AbortNode()` is called, or for the `LARGE_WORK_INVALID_CHAIN` warning
Some discussion points:
- ~is `const std::string& id` the best way to refer to warnings? Enums are an obvious alternative, but since we need to define warnings across libraries, strings seem like a straightforward solution.~ _edit: updated approach to use `node::Warning` and `kernel::Warning` enums._
ACKs for top commit:
achow101:
ACK 260f8da71a35232d859d7705861fc1a88bfbbe81
ryanofsky:
Code review ACK 260f8da71a35232d859d7705861fc1a88bfbbe81. Only change since last review was rebasing
TheCharlatan:
Re-ACK 260f8da71a35232d859d7705861fc1a88bfbbe81
Tree-SHA512: a3fcedaee0d3ad64e9c111aeb30665162f98e0e72acd6a70b76ff2ddf4f0a34da4f97ce353c322a1668ca6ee4d8a81cc6e6d170c5bbeb7a43cffdaf66646b588
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Move the output serialization size and dust calculation into the loop where the
outputs are iterated over to calculate the total sum.
Move the code for adding the the txoutputs to the transaction to after
coin selection.
While this code structure generally follows a more logical flow,
the primary motivation for moving the code for adding outputs to the
transaction sets us up nicely for silent payments (in a future PR):
we need to know the input set before generating the final output scriptPubKeys.
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Now that a CRecipient holds a CTxDestination, we can get the serialized
size and determine if the output is dust using the CRecipient directly.
This does not change any current behavior, but provides a nice generalization
that can be used to apply special logic to a CTxDestination serialization
and dust calculations in the future.
Specifically, in a later PR when support for `V0SilentPayment` destinations is
added, we need to use `WitnessV1Taproot` as the scriptPubKey for serialized
size calcuations whenever the `CRecipient` destination is a `V0SilentPayment`
destination.
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when user specifies fee_rate
f58beabe754363cb7d5b24032fd392654b9514ac test: bumpfee with user specified fee_rate ignores walletIncrementalRelayFee (ismaelsadeeq)
436e88f4336199998184cbfa5d1c889ffaefbfb5 bumpfee: ignore WALLET_INCREMENTAL_RELAY_FEE when user specifies fee rate (ismaelsadeeq)
Pull request description:
Fixes #26973
When using the `bumpfee` RPC and manually specifying `fee_rate`, there should be no requirement that the new fee must be at least the sum of the original fee and `incrementalFee` (maximum of `relayIncrementalFee` and `WALLET_INCREMENTAL_RELAY_FEE`).
This restriction should only apply when user did not specify `fee_rate`.
> because the GUI doesn't let the user specify the new fee rate yet (https://github.com/bitcoin-core/gui/issues/647), it would be very annoying to have to bump 20 times to increment by 20 sat/vbyte.
The restriction should instead be the new fee must be at least the sum of the original fee and `incrementalFee` (`relayIncrementalFee`)
ACKs for top commit:
achow101:
ACK f58beabe754363cb7d5b24032fd392654b9514ac
murchandamus:
ACK f58beabe754363cb7d5b24032fd392654b9514ac
Tree-SHA512: 193259f87173b7d5a8e68e0e29f2ca7e75c550e3cf0dee3d6d822b5b1e07c2e6dec0bfc8fb435855736ebced97a10dbdbfef72e8c5abde06fdefcba122f2e7f1
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fae3a1f0065064d80ab4c0375a9eaeb666c5dd55 log: use error level for critical log messages (MarcoFalke)
Pull request description:
This picks up the first commit from https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/29231, but extends it to also cover cases that were missed in it.
As per https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/master/doc/developer-notes.md#logging, LogError should be used for severe problems that require the node to shut down.
ACKs for top commit:
stickies-v:
re-ACK fae3a1f0065064d80ab4c0375a9eaeb666c5dd55, I'm ~0 on the latest force push as `user_error` was already logged at the right level through `GetNotifications().fatalError(user_error);` so I'd be in favour of deduplicating/cleaning up this logging logic but can be done in follow-up.
kevkevinpal:
ACK [fae3a1f](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/30255/commits/fae3a1f0065064d80ab4c0375a9eaeb666c5dd55)
achow101:
ACK fae3a1f0065064d80ab4c0375a9eaeb666c5dd55
Tree-SHA512: 3f99fd25d5a204d570a42d8fb2b450439aad7685692f9594cc813d97253c4df172a6ff3cf818959bfcf25dfcf8ee9a9c9ccc6028fcfcecdb47591e18c77ef246
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Problem:
If `FuzzedSock::Recv(N, MSG_PEEK)` is called then `N` bytes would be
retrieved from the fuzz provider, saved in `m_peek_data` and returned
to the caller (ok).
If after this `FuzzedSock::Recv(M, 0)` is called where `M < N`
then the first `M` bytes from `m_peek_data` would be returned
to the caller (ok), but the remaining `N - M` bytes in `m_peek_data`
would be discarded/lost (not ok). They must be returned by a subsequent
`Recv()`.
To resolve this, only remove the head `N` bytes from `m_peek_data`.
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`FuzzedSock::m_peek_data` need not be an optional of a vector.
It can be just a vector whereas an empty vector denotes "no peek data".
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Allow the callers of `CreateSock()` to pass all 3 arguments to the
`socket(2)` syscall. This makes it possible to create sockets of
any domain/type/protocol.
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Both of these cases appear to be harmless, but adding the tests allows us to
turn on the aggressive clang-tidy checks.
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a37778d4d32b4ddeff96f68a130dc8da3a84b278 Squashed 'src/leveldb/' changes from e2f10b4e47..688561cba8 (fanquake)
Pull request description:
Includes https://github.com/bitcoin-core/leveldb-subtree/pull/41 which is used in #30234.
ACKs for top commit:
theuni:
utACK 95812d912b6335caa7af2a084d84447fb4aad156
Tree-SHA512: 3d943695a3d33816cf5558b183f5629aa92a500a1544eecedf84952e93c8592a8cf0d554b88281fc0bad3c9e920ebcff1ed8edc12f8e73f36ed5335482beb829
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bech32 encoding
07f64177a49f1b6b4d486d10cf67fddfa3c995eb Reduce memory copying operations in bech32 encode (Lőrinc)
d5ece3c4b5e109f65f5d3315c43239dd87bb2c81 Reserve hrp memory in Decode and LocateErrors (Lőrinc)
Pull request description:
Started optimizing the base conversions in [TryParseHex](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/29458), [Base58](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/29473) and [IsSpace](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/29602) - this is the next step.
Part of this change was already merged in https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/30047, which made decoding `~26%` faster.
Here I've reduced the memory reallocations and copying operations in bech32 encode, making it `~15%` faster.
> make && ./src/bench/bench_bitcoin --filter='Bech32Encode' --min-time=1000
Before:
```
| ns/byte | byte/s | err% | total | benchmark
|--------------------:|--------------------:|--------:|----------:|:----------
| 19.97 | 50,074,562.72 | 0.1% | 1.06 | `Bech32Encode`
```
After:
```
| ns/byte | byte/s | err% | total | benchmark
|--------------------:|--------------------:|--------:|----------:|:----------
| 17.33 | 57,687,668.20 | 0.1% | 1.10 | `Bech32Encode`
```
ACKs for top commit:
josibake:
ACK https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/29607/commits/07f64177a49f1b6b4d486d10cf67fddfa3c995eb
sipa:
utACK 07f64177a49f1b6b4d486d10cf67fddfa3c995eb
achow101:
ACK 07f64177a49f1b6b4d486d10cf67fddfa3c995eb
Tree-SHA512: 511885217d044ad7ef2bdf9203b8e0b94eec8b279bc193bb7e63e29ab868df6d21e9e4c7a24390358e1f9c131447ee42039df72edcf1e2b11e1856eb2b3e10dd
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Support package RBF where the conflicting package would result
in a mempool cluster of size two, and each of its direct
conflicts are also part of an up-to-size-2 mempool cluster.
This restricted topology allows for exact calculation
of miner scores for each side of the equation, reducing
the surface area for new pins, or incentive-incompatible
replacements.
This allows wallets to create simple CPFP packages
that can fee bump other simple CPFP packages. This,
leveraged with other restrictions such as V3 transactions,
can create pin-resistant applications.
Future package RBF relaxations can be considered when appropriate.
Co-authored-by: glozow <gloriajzhao@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Greg Sanders <gsanders87@gmail.com>
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