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interval between subsidy reductions
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- add a comment
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Since the minimum signed integer cannot be represented as positive so long as its type is signed, and it's not well-defined what happens if you make it unsigned before negating it, we instead increment the negative integer by 1, convert it, then increment the (now positive) unsigned integer by 1 to compensate
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As noticed by sipa (Pieter Wuille), this can happen when CBigNum::setint64() is
called with an integer value of INT64_MIN (-2^63).
When compiled with -ftrapv, the program would crash. Otherwise, it would
execute an undefined operation (although in practice, usually the correct one).
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Bitcoin will not make an outbound connection to a network group
(/16 for IPv4) that it is already connected to. This means that
if an attacker wants good odds of capturing all a nodes outbound
connections he must have hosts on a a large number of distinct
groups.
Previously both inbound and outbound connections were used to
feed this exclusion. The use of inbound connections, which can be
controlled by the attacker, actually has the potential of making
sibyl attacks _easier_: An attacker can start up hosts in groups
which house many honest nodes and make outbound connections to
the victim to exclude big swaths of honest nodes. Because the
attacker chooses to make the outbound connection he can always
beat out honest nodes for the consumption of inbound slots.
At _best_ the old behavior increases attacker costs by a single
group (e.g. one distinct group to use to fill up all your inbound
slots), but at worst it allows the attacker to select whole
networks you won't connect to.
This commit makes the nodes use only outbound links to exclude
network groups for outbound connections. Fancier things could
be done, like weaker exclusion for inbound groups... but
simplicity is good and I don't believe more complexity is
currently needed.
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Conflicts:
src/main.cpp
src/serialize.h
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Remove orphan transactions from memory once
all of their parent transactions are received
and they're still not valid.
Thanks to Sergio Demian Lerner for suggesting this fix.
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Loop over all inputs doing inexpensive validity checks first,
and then loop over them a second time doing expensive signature
checks. This helps prevent possible CPU exhaustion attacks
where an attacker tries to make a victim waste time checking
signatures for invalid transactions.
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Changes suggested by Sergio Demian Lerner to
help prevent potential DoS attacks.
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This was causing test_bitcoin to abort on a 32-bit system likely due to -ftrapv.
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CBigNum::setint64() does 'n <<= 8', where n is of type "long long".
This leads to shifting onto and past the sign bit, which is undefined
behavior in C++11 and can cause problems in the future.
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sendcoinsentry and connect it to displayUnitChanged() - this ensures all fields in the GUI, who use a display unit are imediately updated, when the user changes this setting in the optionsdialog / ensure used fields init with the current set display unit
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(this fixes a Mac OS X gitian build error for 0.5.x)
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(this fixes a Mac OS X gitian build error for 0.5.x)
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Conflicts:
doc/release-process.txt
src/serialize.h
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(Partial/merge of upstream 9247134eaba9a1d0fa74f22de238af1476663005, 1a3f0da9229a8e524d1010cdc8bd3b9da71fe529, and 3e343522226e6c249f5cb05436eec347b87c6361)
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(partial of 9247134eaba9a1d0fa74f22de238af1476663005)
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confuse users, which could see it before we init with the real wallet balance
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as preview in the Qt Designer anyway
(partial of 4295311da34ed8132351855f057decedfe434b44)
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This contributed to an accidental send (#1384), and has no clear advantage, better to disable it.
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0.4.7rc1
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verification uses the latter too
This caused clients to reject block #177618 since it has a P2SH transaction with over 200 bytes in scriptSig.
(Upstream commit: e679ec969c8b22c676ebb10bea1038f6c8f13b33)
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Acquire an exclusive, advisory lock before sending output to debug.log
and release it when we're done. This should avoid output from multiple
threads being interspersed in the log file.
We can't use CRITICAL_SECTION machinery for this because the debug log
is written during startup and shutdown when that machinery is not
available.
(Thanks to Gavin for pointing out the CRITICAL_SECTION problems based
on his earlier work in this area)
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Conflicts:
src/ui.cpp
src/ui.h
src/uibase.cpp
src/xpm/about.xpm
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Any problems seen during deserialization will throw an uncaught
exception, crashing the entire bitcoin process. Properly return an
error instead, so that we may at least log the error and gracefully
shutdown other portions of the app.
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- Fixes issues with copy/pasting from web or html emails (#1325)
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