| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
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de9a1db Acquire cs_main lock before cs_wallet during wallet initialization (Russell Yanofsky)
Pull request description:
`CWallet::MarkConflicted` may acquire the `cs_main` lock after `CWalletDB::LoadWallet` acquires the `cs_wallet` lock during wallet initialization. (`CWalletDB::LoadWallet` calls `ReadKeyValue` which calls `CWallet::LoadToWallet` which calls `CWallet::MarkConflicted`). This is the opposite order that `cs_main` and `cs_wallet` locks are acquired in the rest of the code, and so leads to `POTENTIAL DEADLOCK DETECTED` errors if bitcoin is built with `-DDEBUG_LOCKORDER`.
This commit changes `CWallet::LoadWallet` (which calls `CWalletDB::LoadWallet`) to acquire both locks in the standard order.
Error was reported by @luke-jr in https://botbot.me/freenode/bitcoin-core-dev/msg/90244330/
Tree-SHA512: 353fe21bc0a4a2828b41876897001a3c414d4b115ee7430925bd391d8bc396fca81661145d00996c1ba1a01516d9acf8b89fb5c3da27092f5f3aa7e37ef26ffa
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6af49dd Output a bit more information for fee calculation report. (Alex Morcos)
a54c7b9 Fix rounding errors in calculation of minimum change size (Alex Morcos)
Pull request description:
Thanks to @juscamarena for reporting this.
Please backport to 0.15.
There was a potential rounding error where the fee for the change added to the fee for the original tx could be less than the fee for the tx including change.
This is fixed in the first commit. The second commit adds one more snippet of information in the fee calculation report. I actually realized that there is more information that would be nice to report, but we can add that post 0.15.
An open question is whether we should be returning failure if the test in line 2885 is hit or just resetting pick_new_inputs and continuing. Originally I made it a failure to avoid any possible infinite loops. But the case hit here is an example of where that logic possibly backfired.
Tree-SHA512: efe049781acc1f6a8ad429a689359ac6f7b7c44cdfc9578a866dff4a2f6596e8de474a89d25c704f31ef4f8c89af770e98b75ef06c25419d5a6dfc87247bf274
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f01103c MOVEONLY: Init functions wallet/wallet.cpp -> wallet/init.cpp (Russell Yanofsky)
e7fe320 MOVEONLY: Fee functions wallet/wallet.cpp -> wallet/fees.cpp (Russell Yanofsky)
d97fe20 Move some static functions out of wallet.h/cpp (Russell Yanofsky)
Pull request description:
This just moves some static wallet fee and init functions out of `wallet/wallet.cpp` and into new `wallet/fees.cpp` and `wallet/init.cpp` source files. There is one commit updating declarations and callers, followed by two MOVEONLY commits actually moving the function bodies.
This change is desirable because wallet.h/cpp are monolithic and hard to navigate, so pulling things out and grouping together pieces of related functionality should improve the organization.
Another motivation is the wallet process separation work in https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/10973, where (at least initially) parameter parsing and fee estimation are still done in the main process rather than the wallet process, and having functions that run in different processes scrambled up throughout wallet.cpp is unnecessarily confusing.
Tree-SHA512: 6e6982ff82b2ab4e681c043907e2b1801ceb9513394730070f16c46ad338278a863f5b3759aa13db76a259b268b1c919c81f4e339f0796a3cfb990161e8c316d
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CWallet::MarkConflicted may acquire the cs_main lock after
CWalletDB::LoadWallet acquires the cs_wallet lock during wallet initialization.
(CWalletDB::LoadWallet calls ReadKeyValue which calls CWallet::LoadToWallet
which calls CWallet::MarkConflicted). This is the opposite order that cs_main
and cs_wallet locks are acquired in the rest of the code, and so leads to
POTENTIAL DEADLOCK DETECTED errors if bitcoin is built with -DDEBUG_LOCKORDER.
This commit changes CWallet::LoadWallet (which calls CWalletDB::LoadWallet) to
acquire both locks in the standard order. It also fixes some tests that were
acquiring wallet and main locks out of order and failed with the new locking in
CWallet::LoadWallet.
Error was reported by Luke Dashjr <luke-jr@utopios.org> in
https://botbot.me/freenode/bitcoin-core-dev/msg/90244330/
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a897d0e tests: Remove OldSetKeyFromPassphrase/OldEncrypt/OldDecrypt (practicalswift)
Pull request description:
Reduces the number of non-free:d allocs with four (Δ in use at exit = -928 bytes).
With this patch applied:
```
$ valgrind --leak-check=full --show-leak-kinds=all src/test/test_bitcoin --log_level=test_suite --run_test=wallet_crypto
…
==20243== HEAP SUMMARY:
==20243== in use at exit: 72,704 bytes in 1 blocks
==20243== total heap usage: 53,138 allocs, 53,137 frees, 49,600,420 bytes allocated
==20243==
==20243== 72,704 bytes in 1 blocks are still reachable in loss record 1 of 1
==20243== at 0x4C2DB8F: malloc (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)
==20243== by 0x6AA5EFF: ??? (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libstdc++.so.6.0.21)
==20243== by 0x40106B9: call_init.part.0 (dl-init.c:72)
==20243== by 0x40107CA: call_init (dl-init.c:30)
==20243== by 0x40107CA: _dl_init (dl-init.c:120)
==20243== by 0x4000C69: ??? (in /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/ld-2.23.so)
==20243== by 0x2: ???
==20243== by 0xFFF0006A2: ???
==20243== by 0xFFF0006B8: ???
==20243== by 0xFFF0006CF: ???
==20243==
==20243== LEAK SUMMARY:
==20243== definitely lost: 0 bytes in 0 blocks
==20243== indirectly lost: 0 bytes in 0 blocks
==20243== possibly lost: 0 bytes in 0 blocks
==20243== still reachable: 72,704 bytes in 1 blocks
==20243== suppressed: 0 bytes in 0 blocks
```
Without this patch applied:
```
$ valgrind --leak-check=full --show-leak-kinds=all src/test/test_bitcoin --log_level=test_suite --run_test=wallet_crypto
…
==19023== HEAP SUMMARY:
==19023== in use at exit: 73,632 bytes in 5 blocks
==19023== total heap usage: 52,718 allocs, 52,713 frees, 49,502,962 bytes allocated
==19023==
==19023== 24 bytes in 1 blocks are still reachable in loss record 1 of 5
==19023== at 0x4C2DB8F: malloc (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)
==19023== by 0x642DE77: CRYPTO_malloc (in /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libcrypto.so.1.0.0)
==19023== by 0x64E5665: lh_insert (in /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libcrypto.so.1.0.0)
==19023== by 0x64E7BB3: ??? (in /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libcrypto.so.1.0.0)
==19023== by 0x64E87AD: ERR_get_state (in /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libcrypto.so.1.0.0)
==19023== by 0x64E883D: ERR_put_error (in /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libcrypto.so.1.0.0)
==19023== by 0x64EAAE4: EVP_DecryptFinal_ex (in /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libcrypto.so.1.0.0)
==19023== by 0x3AD150: wallet_crypto::OldDecrypt(std::vector<unsigned char, std::allocator<unsigned char> > const&, std::vector<unsigned char, secure_allocator<unsigned char> >&, unsigned char const*, unsigned char const*) (crypto_tests.cpp:81)
==19023== by 0x3AF892: wallet_crypto::TestCrypter::TestDecrypt(CCrypter const&, std::vector<unsigned char, std::allocator<unsigned char> > const&, std::vector<unsigned char, std::allocator<unsigned char> > const&) (crypto_tests.cpp:137)
==19023== by 0x3AD5E9: wallet_crypto::decrypt::test_method() (crypto_tests.cpp:223)
==19023== by 0x3ADC11: wallet_crypto::decrypt_invoker() (crypto_tests.cpp:216)
==19023== by 0x182596: invoke<void (*)()> (callback.hpp:56)
==19023== by 0x182596: boost::unit_test::ut_detail::callback0_impl_t<boost::unit_test::ut_detail::unused, void (*)()>::invoke() (callback.hpp:89)
==19023==
==19023== 128 bytes in 1 blocks are still reachable in loss record 2 of 5
==19023== at 0x4C2DB8F: malloc (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)
==19023== by 0x642DE77: CRYPTO_malloc (in /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libcrypto.so.1.0.0)
==19023== by 0x64E5331: lh_new (in /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libcrypto.so.1.0.0)
==19023== by 0x64E7862: ??? (in /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libcrypto.so.1.0.0)
==19023== by 0x64E7B7F: ??? (in /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libcrypto.so.1.0.0)
==19023== by 0x64E87AD: ERR_get_state (in /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libcrypto.so.1.0.0)
==19023== by 0x64E883D: ERR_put_error (in /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libcrypto.so.1.0.0)
==19023== by 0x64EAAE4: EVP_DecryptFinal_ex (in /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libcrypto.so.1.0.0)
==19023== by 0x3AD150: wallet_crypto::OldDecrypt(std::vector<unsigned char, std::allocator<unsigned char> > const&, std::vector<unsigned char, secure_allocator<unsigned char> >&, unsigned char const*, unsigned char const*) (crypto_tests.cpp:81)
==19023== by 0x3AF892: wallet_crypto::TestCrypter::TestDecrypt(CCrypter const&, std::vector<unsigned char, std::allocator<unsigned char> > const&, std::vector<unsigned char, std::allocator<unsigned char> > const&) (crypto_tests.cpp:137)
==19023== by 0x3AD5E9: wallet_crypto::decrypt::test_method() (crypto_tests.cpp:223)
==19023== by 0x3ADC11: wallet_crypto::decrypt_invoker() (crypto_tests.cpp:216)
==19023==
==19023== 176 bytes in 1 blocks are still reachable in loss record 3 of 5
==19023== at 0x4C2DB8F: malloc (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)
==19023== by 0x642DE77: CRYPTO_malloc (in /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libcrypto.so.1.0.0)
==19023== by 0x64E530F: lh_new (in /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libcrypto.so.1.0.0)
==19023== by 0x64E7862: ??? (in /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libcrypto.so.1.0.0)
==19023== by 0x64E7B7F: ??? (in /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libcrypto.so.1.0.0)
==19023== by 0x64E87AD: ERR_get_state (in /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libcrypto.so.1.0.0)
==19023== by 0x64E883D: ERR_put_error (in /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libcrypto.so.1.0.0)
==19023== by 0x64EAAE4: EVP_DecryptFinal_ex (in /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libcrypto.so.1.0.0)
==19023== by 0x3AD150: wallet_crypto::OldDecrypt(std::vector<unsigned char, std::allocator<unsigned char> > const&, std::vector<unsigned char, secure_allocator<unsigned char> >&, unsigned char const*, unsigned char const*) (crypto_tests.cpp:81)
==19023== by 0x3AF892: wallet_crypto::TestCrypter::TestDecrypt(CCrypter const&, std::vector<unsigned char, std::allocator<unsigned char> > const&, std::vector<unsigned char, std::allocator<unsigned char> > const&) (crypto_tests.cpp:137)
==19023== by 0x3AD5E9: wallet_crypto::decrypt::test_method() (crypto_tests.cpp:223)
==19023== by 0x3ADC11: wallet_crypto::decrypt_invoker() (crypto_tests.cpp:216)
==19023==
==19023== 600 bytes in 1 blocks are still reachable in loss record 4 of 5
==19023== at 0x4C2DB8F: malloc (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)
==19023== by 0x642DE77: CRYPTO_malloc (in /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libcrypto.so.1.0.0)
==19023== by 0x64E8745: ERR_get_state (in /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libcrypto.so.1.0.0)
==19023== by 0x64E883D: ERR_put_error (in /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libcrypto.so.1.0.0)
==19023== by 0x64EAAE4: EVP_DecryptFinal_ex (in /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libcrypto.so.1.0.0)
==19023== by 0x3AD150: wallet_crypto::OldDecrypt(std::vector<unsigned char, std::allocator<unsigned char> > const&, std::vector<unsigned char, secure_allocator<unsigned char> >&, unsigned char const*, unsigned char const*) (crypto_tests.cpp:81)
==19023== by 0x3AF892: wallet_crypto::TestCrypter::TestDecrypt(CCrypter const&, std::vector<unsigned char, std::allocator<unsigned char> > const&, std::vector<unsigned char, std::allocator<unsigned char> > const&) (crypto_tests.cpp:137)
==19023== by 0x3AD5E9: wallet_crypto::decrypt::test_method() (crypto_tests.cpp:223)
==19023== by 0x3ADC11: wallet_crypto::decrypt_invoker() (crypto_tests.cpp:216)
==19023== by 0x182596: invoke<void (*)()> (callback.hpp:56)
==19023== by 0x182596: boost::unit_test::ut_detail::callback0_impl_t<boost::unit_test::ut_detail::unused, void (*)()>::invoke() (callback.hpp:89)
==19023== by 0x596CCB0: ??? (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libboost_unit_test_framework.so.1.58.0)
==19023== by 0x594C995: boost::execution_monitor::catch_signals(boost::unit_test::callback0<int> const&) (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libboost_unit_test_framework.so.1.58.0)
==19023==
==19023== 72,704 bytes in 1 blocks are still reachable in loss record 5 of 5
==19023== at 0x4C2DB8F: malloc (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)
==19023== by 0x6AA5EFF: ??? (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libstdc++.so.6.0.21)
==19023== by 0x40106B9: call_init.part.0 (dl-init.c:72)
==19023== by 0x40107CA: call_init (dl-init.c:30)
==19023== by 0x40107CA: _dl_init (dl-init.c:120)
==19023== by 0x4000C69: ??? (in /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/ld-2.23.so)
==19023== by 0x2: ???
==19023== by 0xFFF0006A2: ???
==19023== by 0xFFF0006B8: ???
==19023== by 0xFFF0006CF: ???
==19023==
==19023== LEAK SUMMARY:
==19023== definitely lost: 0 bytes in 0 blocks
==19023== indirectly lost: 0 bytes in 0 blocks
==19023== possibly lost: 0 bytes in 0 blocks
==19023== still reachable: 73,632 bytes in 5 blocks
==19023== suppressed: 0 bytes in 0 blocks
==19023==
==19023== For counts of detected and suppressed errors, rerun with: -v
==19023== ERROR SUMMARY: 0 errors from 0 contexts (suppressed: 0 from 0)
```
Tree-SHA512: 38b6552736a5710a42dbad770c490583cfc762acbec716f5db4cf38314f494ea99430713ea407c73b49d867676ced221a282437f3fcfd8346f8f68386f4fc74d
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wallet file
c06755f wallet: Fix memory leak when loading a corrupted wallet file (practicalswift)
Pull request description:
Fix potential memory leak when loading a corrupted wallet file.
Tree-SHA512: 4b836e4ee1fe4267213bb126af0c1174f964ff015fbe28d0a7e679eab877c275769906b3c08f885763958f6a9b559e1b5e6c7bff1df340bf2dfa2acd57500818
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745d2e3 Clean up getbalance RPC parameter handling (Russell Yanofsky)
fd5d71e Update developer notes after params.size() cleanup (Russell Yanofsky)
e067673 Avoid treating null RPC arguments different from missing arguments (Russell Yanofsky)
e666efc Get rid of redundant RPC params.size() checks (Russell Yanofsky)
Pull request description:
This is a followup to #10783.
- The first commit doesn't change behavior at all, just simplifies code.
- The second commit just changes RPC methods to treat null arguments the same as missing arguments instead of throwing type errors.
- The third commit updates developer notes after the cleanup.
- The forth commit does some additional code cleanup in `getbalance`.
Followup changes that should happen in future PRs:
- [ ] Replace uses of `.isTrue()` with calls to `.get_bool()` so numbers, objects, and strings cause type errors instead of being interpreted as false. https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/11050#discussion_r133850525
- [ ] Add braces around if statements. https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/11050#discussion_r133851133
- [ ] Maybe improve UniValue type error exceptions and eliminate RPCTypeCheck and RPCTypeCheckArgument functions. https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/11050#discussion_r133829303
Tree-SHA512: e72f696011d20acc0778e996659e41f9426bffce387b29ff63bf59ad1163d5146761e4445b2b9b9e069a80596a57c7f4402b75a15d5d20f69f775ae558cf67e9
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40a0f9f Enable devirtualization opportunities by using the final specifier (C++11) (practicalswift)
9a1675e optim: mark a few classes final (Cory Fields)
Pull request description:
Using gcc's ```-Wsuggest-final-types``` and lto, I identified a few easy devirtualization wins:
> wallet/wallet.h:651:7: warning: Declaring type 'struct CWallet' final would enable devirtualization of 26 calls [-Wsuggest-final-types]
>coins.h:201:7: warning: Declaring type 'struct CCoinsViewCache' final would enable devirtualization of 13 calls [-Wsuggest-final-types]
>txdb.h:67:7: warning: Declaring type 'struct CCoinsViewDB' final would enable devirtualization of 5 calls [-Wsuggest-final-types]
>zmq/zmqnotificationinterface.h:16:7: warning: Declaring type 'struct CZMQNotificationInterface' final would enable devirtualization of 4 calls [-Wsuggest-final-types]
>httpserver.cpp:42:7: warning: Declaring type 'struct HTTPWorkItem' final would enable devirtualization of 2 calls [-Wsuggest-final-types]
Tree-SHA512: 2a825fd27121ccabaacff5cde2fc8a50d1b4cc846374606caa2a71b0cd8fcb0d3c9b5b3fd342d944998610e2168048601278f8a3709cc515191a0bb2d98ba782
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e53615b Remove vchDefaultKey and have better first run detection (Andrew Chow)
Pull request description:
Removes vchDefaultKey which was only used for first run detection. Improves wallet first run detection by checking to see if any keys were read from the database.
This also fixes a (rather contrived) case where an encrypted non-HD wallet has corruption such that the default key is no longer valid and is loaded into a Core version that supports HD wallets. This causes a runtime exception since a new hd master key is generated as the software believes the wallet file is newly created but cannot add the generated key to the wallet since it is encrypted. I was only able to replicate this error by creating a non-hd wallet, encrypting it, then editing the wallet using `db_dump` and `db_load` before loading the wallet with hd enabled. This problem has been reported by [two](https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1993244.0) [users](https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1746976.msg17511261#msg17511261) so it is something that can happen, although that raises the question of "what corrupted the default key".
~P.S. I don't know what's up with the whitespace changes. I think my text editor is doing something stupid but I don't think those are important enough to attempt undoing them.~ Undid those
Tree-SHA512: 63b485f356566e8ffa033ad9b7101f7f6b56372b29ec2a43b947b0eeb1ada4c2cfe24740515d013aedd5f51aa1890dfbe499d2c5c062fc1b5d272324728a7d55
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67ceff4 [wallet] Add logging to MarkReserveKeysAsUsed (John Newbery)
1221f60 [wallet] Remove keypool_topup_cleanups (John Newbery)
Pull request description:
A couple of minor cleanups suggested by @ryanofsky here: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/11022#pullrequestreview-55598940
Does not affect functionality. Not required for v0.15.
Tree-SHA512: d8d0698fd26ea49a4157e68669d5511095760c3a1ecfa3f917e3f273efbafb55c51a202d677614216eae3f796b6e8d17506b2ec2d4799a94f18981b396e65eec
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8f2f1e0 wallet: Avoid second mapWallet lookup (João Barbosa)
Pull request description:
All calls to `mapWallet.count()` have the intent to detect if a `txid` exists and most are followed by a second lookup to retrieve the `CWalletTx`.
This PR replaces all `mapWallet.count()` calls with `mapWallet.find()` to avoid the second lookup.
Tree-SHA512: 96b7de7f5520ebf789a1aec1949a4e9c74e13683869cee012f717e5be8e51097d068e2347a36e89097c9a89f1ed1a1529db71760dac9b572e36a3e9ac1155f29
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Unused function. Mostly reverts c25d90f125d69e33688288eff439eb7be75012e9
c25d90f... was merged as part of PR 11022 but is not required.
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In order to avoid unintended implicit conversions.
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is called
6e8c48dc5 Add const to methods that do not modify the object for which it is called (practicalswift)
Pull request description:
Tree-SHA512: a6888111ba16fb796e320e60806e1a77d36f545989b5405dc7319992291800109eab0b8e8c286b784778f41f1ff5289e7cb6b4afd7aec77f385fbcafc02cffc1
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9d5e98ff8 Fix typos. (practicalswift)
Pull request description:
Fix some typos not covered by #10705.
Tree-SHA512: f06e9541f6ae13ef5d6731399b61795997b21a8816abeb1749c93e99a5c47354e6cbd4a3d145f4dc6ef8a13db179799a3121ecbb7288abf3e8d81cdf81500d37
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Removes vchDefaultKey which was only used for first run detection.
Improves wallet first run detection by checking to see if any keys
were read from the database.
This will now also check for a valid defaultkey for backwards
compatibility reasons and to check for any corruption.
Keys will stil be generated on the first one, but there won't be
any shown in the address book as was previously done.
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Only change in behavior is that unsupported combinations of parameters now
trigger more specific error messages instead of the vague "JSON value is not a
string as expected" error.
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03bc719a8 [wallet] Close DB on error. (Karl-Johan Alm)
Pull request description:
This PR intends to plug some leaks. It specifically implements adherence to the requirement in BDB to close a handle which failed to open (https://docs.oracle.com/cd/E17276_01/html/api_reference/C/dbopen.html):
> The `DB->open()` method returns a non-zero error value on failure and 0 on success. If `DB->open()` fails, the `DB->close()` method must be called to discard the DB handle.
Tree-SHA512: cc1f2b925ef3fd6de785f62108fbc79454443397f80707762acbc56757841d2c32b69c0234f87805571aa40c486da31f315ca4c607a2c7d1c97c82a01301e2a6
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This changes RPC methods to treat null arguments the same as missing arguments,
instead of throwing type errors. Specifically:
- `getbalance` method now returns the wallet balance when the `account` param
is null instead of throwing a type error (same as when parameter is missing).
It is still an error to supply `minconf` or `watchonly` options when the
account is null.
- `addnode` and `setban` methods now return help text instead of type errors if
`command` params are null (same as when params are missing).
- `sendrawtransaction`, `setaccount`, `movecmd`, `sendfrom`,
`addmultisigaddress`, `listaccounts`, `lockunspent` methods accept null
default values where missing values were previously allowed, and treat them
the same.
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No change in behavior.
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This commit just moves a few function declarations and updates callers.
Function bodies are moved in two followup MOVEONLY commits.
This change is desirable because wallet.h/cpp are monolithic and hard to
navigate, so pulling things out and grouping together pieces of related
functionality should improve the organization.
Another proximate motivation is the wallet process separation work in
https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/10973, where (at least initially)
parameter parsing and fee estimation are still done in the main process rather
than the wallet process, and having functions that run in different processes
scrambled up throughout wallet.cpp is unnecessarily confusing.
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They were temporary additions to ease the transition.
-BEGIN VERIFY SCRIPT-
find src/ -name "*.cpp" ! -wholename "src/util.h" ! -wholename "src/util.cpp" | xargs perl -i -pe 's/(?<!\.)(ParseParameters|ReadConfigFile|IsArgSet|(Soft|Force)?(Get|Set)(|Bool|)Arg(s)?)\(/gArgs.\1(/g'
-END VERIFY SCRIPT-
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pointer literal instead of the macro NULL
90d4d89 scripted-diff: Use the C++11 keyword nullptr to denote the pointer literal instead of the macro NULL (practicalswift)
Pull request description:
Since C++11 the macro `NULL` may be:
* an integer literal with value zero, or
* a prvalue of type `std::nullptr_t`
By using the C++11 keyword `nullptr` we are guaranteed a prvalue of type `std::nullptr_t`.
For a more thorough discussion, see "A name for the null pointer: nullptr" (Sutter &
Stroustrup), http://www.open-std.org/jtc1/sc22/wg21/docs/papers/2007/n2431.pdf
With this patch applied there are no `NULL` macro usages left in the repo:
```
$ git grep NULL -- "*.cpp" "*.h" | egrep -v '(/univalue/|/secp256k1/|/leveldb/|_NULL|NULLDUMMY|torcontrol.*NULL|NULL cert)' | wc -l
0
```
The road towards `nullptr` (C++11) is split into two PRs:
* `NULL` → `nullptr` is handled in PR #10483 (scripted, this PR)
* `0` → `nullptr` is handled in PR #10645 (manual)
Tree-SHA512: 3c395d66f2ad724a8e6fed74b93634de8bfc0c0eafac94e64e5194c939499fefd6e68f047de3083ad0b4eff37df9a8a3a76349aa17d55eabbd8e0412f140a297
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d34957e [wallet] [tests] Add keypool topup functional test (Jonas Schnelli)
095142d [wallet] keypool mark-used and topup (John Newbery)
c25d90f [wallet] Add HasUnusedKeys() helper (John Newbery)
f2123e3 [wallet] Cache keyid -> keypool id mappings (John Newbery)
83f1ec3 [wallet] Don't hold cs_LastBlockFile while calling setBestChain (John Newbery)
2376bfc [wallet] [moveonly] Move LoadKeyPool to cpp (Matt Corallo)
cab8557 [wallet] [moveonly] Move CAffectedKeysVisitor (Jonas Schnelli)
Pull request description:
This PR contains the first part of #10882 :
- if a key from the keypool is used, mark all keys up to that key as used, and then try to top up the keypool
- top up the keypool on startup
Notably, it does not stop the node or prevent the best block from advancing if the keypool drops below a threshold (which means that transactions may be missed and funds lost if restoring from an old HD wallet backup).
Tree-SHA512: ac681fefeaf7ec2aab2fa1da93d12273ea80bd05eb48d7b3b551ea6e5d975dd97ba7de52b7fba52993823280ac4079cc36cf78a27dac708107ebf8fb6326142b
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This commit adds basic keypool mark-used and topup:
- try to topup the keypool on initial load
- if a key in the keypool is used, mark all keys before that as used and
try to top up
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instead of the macro NULL
-BEGIN VERIFY SCRIPT-
sed -i 's/\<NULL\>/nullptr/g' src/*.cpp src/*.h src/*/*.cpp src/*/*.h src/qt/*/*.cpp src/qt/*/*.h src/wallet/*/*.cpp src/wallet/*/*.h src/support/allocators/*.h
sed -i 's/Prefer nullptr, otherwise SAFECOOKIE./Prefer NULL, otherwise SAFECOOKIE./g' src/torcontrol.cpp
sed -i 's/tor: Using nullptr authentication/tor: Using NULL authentication/g' src/torcontrol.cpp
sed -i 's/METHODS=nullptr/METHODS=NULL/g' src/test/torcontrol_tests.cpp src/torcontrol.cpp
sed -i 's/nullptr certificates/NULL certificates/g' src/qt/paymentserver.cpp
sed -i 's/"nullptr"/"NULL"/g' src/torcontrol.cpp src/test/torcontrol_tests.cpp
-END VERIFY SCRIPT-
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recipients
49d903e Eliminate fee overpaying edge case when subtracting fee from recipients (Alex Morcos)
Pull request description:
I'm not sure if this is the cause of the issue in #10034 , but this was a known edge case. I just didn't realize how simple the fix is.
Could use a couple more eyes to make sure nothing silly can go wrong here, but if we all agree it's this simple, we can add this as another 0.15 bug fix.
Tree-SHA512: db1dd1e83363a3c231267b626d3a388893ee70ba1972056fe2c339c5c9e4fbfd30f7fe837c30cc7be884d454797fd4c619b9d631a8d5eeb55cdb07402a83acb3
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producesignature
e222dc2 Replace ismine with producesignature check in witnessifier (Andrew Chow)
Pull request description:
Instead of using ismine to check whether an address can be spent by us, make the witness version of the script or address first and then use ProduceSignature with the DummySignatureCreator to check if we can
solve for the script.
This is to fix cases where we don't have all of the private keys (for something like a multisig address) but have the redeemscript so we can witnessify it.
Tree-SHA512: 371777aee839cceb41f099109a13689120d35cf3880cde39216596cc2aac5cc1096af7d9cf07ad9306c3b05c073897f4518a7e97f0b88642f1e3b80b799f481e
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