Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
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Also add test to make sure this doesn't get broken in the future.
This was breaking vector<bool> serialization in multiprocess code because
template current deduction guides would make it appear like vector<bool> could
be converted to a span, but then the actual conversion to span would fail.
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destroy the session if we get an unexpected error
5c8e15c451ec870b9dd4eb843ec6ca3ba64cda4f i2p: destroy the session if we get an unexpected error from the I2P router (Vasil Dimov)
762404a68c114e8831cdfae937627174544b55a7 i2p: also sleep after errors in Accept() (Vasil Dimov)
Pull request description:
### Background
In the `i2p::sam::Session` class:
`Listen()` does:
* if the session is not created yet
* create the control socket and on it:
* `HELLO`
* `SESSION CREATE ID=sessid`
* leave the control socked opened
* create a new socket and on it:
* `HELLO`
* `STREAM ACCEPT ID=sessid`
* read reply (`STREAM STATUS`), `Listen()` only succeeds if it contains `RESULT=OK`
Then a wait starts, for a peer to connect. When connected,
`Accept()` does:
* on the socket from `STREAM ACCEPT` from `Listen()`: read the Base64 identification of the connecting peer
### Problem
The I2P router may be in such a state that this happens in a quick succession (many times per second, see https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/22759#issuecomment-1609907115): `Listen()`-succeeds, `Accept()`-fails.
`Accept()` fails because the I2P router sends something that is not Base64 on the socket: `STREAM STATUS RESULT=I2P_ERROR MESSAGE="Session was closed"`
We only sleep after failed `Listen()` because the assumption was that if `Accept()` fails then the next `Listen()` will also fail.
### Solution
Avoid filling the log with "Error accepting:" messages and sleep also after a failed `Accept()`.
### Extra changes
* Reset the error waiting time after one successful connection. Otherwise the timer will remain high due to problems that have been solved long time in the past.
* Increment the wait time less aggressively.
* Handle the unexpected "Session was closed" message more gracefully (don't log stupid messages like `Cannot decode Base64: "STREAM STATUS...`) and destroy the session right way.
ACKs for top commit:
achow101:
ACK 5c8e15c451ec870b9dd4eb843ec6ca3ba64cda4f
jonatack:
re-ACK 5c8e15c451ec870b9dd4eb843ec6ca3ba64cda4f
Tree-SHA512: 1d47958c50eeae9eefcb668b8539fd092adead93328e4bf3355267819304b99ab41cbe1b5dbedbc3452c2bc389dc8330c0e27eb5ccb880e33dc46930a1592885
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0e6f6ebc064c5fb425fc3699efe760ec6cd4b6af net: remove unused CConnman::FindNode(const CSubNet&) (Vasil Dimov)
9482cb780fe04c1f1d9050edd1b8e549e52c86ce netbase: possibly change the result of LookupSubNet() to CJDNS (Vasil Dimov)
53afa68026ffa1313ae4aba3664de7791d23b1c8 net: move MaybeFlipIPv6toCJDNS() from net to netbase (Vasil Dimov)
6e308651c441cbf8763c67cc099c538c333c2872 net: move IsReachable() code to netbase and encapsulate it (Vasil Dimov)
c42ded3d9bda8b273780a4a81490bbf1b9e9c261 fuzz: ConsumeNetAddr(): avoid IPv6 addresses that look like CJDNS (Vasil Dimov)
64d6f77907afd461d9b14ee10ab32335f4454734 net: put CJDNS prefix byte in a constant (Vasil Dimov)
Pull request description:
`LookupSubNet()` would treat addresses that start with `fc` as IPv6 even if `-cjdnsreachable` is set. This creates the following problems where it is called:
* `NetWhitelistPermissions::TryParse()`: otherwise `-whitelist=` fails to white list CJDNS addresses: when a CJDNS peer connects to us, it will be matched against IPv6 `fc...` subnet and the match will never succeed.
* `BanMapFromJson()`: CJDNS bans are stored as just IPv6 addresses in `banlist.json`. Upon reading from disk they have to be converted back to CJDNS, otherwise, after restart, a ban entry like (`fc00::1`, IPv6) would not match a peer (`fc00::1`, CJDNS).
* `RPCConsole::unbanSelectedNode()`: in the GUI the ban entries go through `CSubNet::ToString()` and back via `LookupSubNet()`. Then it must match whatever is stored in `BanMan`, otherwise it is impossible to unban via the GUI.
These were uncovered by https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/26859.
Thus, flip the result of `LookupSubNet()` to CJDNS if the network base address starts with `fc` and `-cjdnsreachable` is set. Since subnetting/masking does not make sense for CJDNS (the address is "random" bytes, like Tor and I2P, there is no hierarchy) treat `fc.../mask` as an invalid `CSubNet`.
To achieve that, `MaybeFlipIPv6toCJDNS()` has to be moved from `net` to `netbase` and thus also `IsReachable()`. In the process of moving `IsReachable()`, `SetReachable()` and `vfLimited[]` encapsulate those in a class.
ACKs for top commit:
jonatack:
Code review ACK 0e6f6ebc064c5fb425fc3699efe760ec6cd4b6af
achow101:
ACK 0e6f6ebc064c5fb425fc3699efe760ec6cd4b6af
mzumsande:
re-ACK 0e6f6ebc064c5fb425fc3699efe760ec6cd4b6af
Tree-SHA512: 4767a60dc882916de4c8b110ce8de208ff3f58daaa0b560e6547d72e604d07c4157e72cf98b237228310fc05c0a3922f446674492e2ba02e990a272d288bd566
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tapscript
b22810887b3840ad0fcb424ea7e16d2d195767d9 miniscript: make GetWitnessSize accurate for tapscript (Pieter Wuille)
8be98514080ab816fcb2498ea4bc6f211a2b05e0 test: add tests for miniscript GetWitnessSize (Pieter Wuille)
7ed2b2d430e4dc0d3ba62a30f814df2c7c0c0651 test: remove mutable global contexts in miniscript fuzzer/test (Pieter Wuille)
Pull request description:
So far, the same algorithm is used to compute an (upper bound on) the maximum witness size for both P2WSH and P2TR miniscript. That's unfortunate, because it means fee estimations for P2TR miniscript will miss out on the generic savings brought by P2TR witnesses (smaller signatures and public keys, specifically).
Fix this by making the algorithm use script context specification calculations, and add tests for it. Also included is a cleanup for the tests to avoid mutable globals, as I found it hard to reason about what exactly was being tested.
ACKs for top commit:
achow101:
ACK b22810887b3840ad0fcb424ea7e16d2d195767d9
darosior:
ACK b22810887b3840ad0fcb424ea7e16d2d195767d9
Tree-SHA512: e4bda7376628f3e91cfc74917cefc554ca16eb5f2a0e1adddc33eb8717c4aaa071e56a40f85a2041ae74ec445a7bd0129bba48994c203e0e6e4d25af65954d9e
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ff8e2fc2e2416f6f3b84cdb40db8ac168596b579 fuzz: add coverage for `bitcoinconsensus_verify_script_with_spent_outputs` (brunoerg)
c5f2a757d736f14d27ac5256a9df887cd2f174f1 docs: add release notes for #28539 (brunoerg)
de54882348502d860cf1e504100aa8fb1e52aa88 docs: add docs for additional libconsensus functions (Jake Rawsthorne)
70106e0689546fee497814c63a6a4747e0937b36 docs: link to rust-bitcoinconsensus (Jake Rawsthorne)
fb0db07e414fec3318b3af683167ebef9c82fc84 lib: add Taproot support to libconsensus (Jake Rawsthorne)
Pull request description:
Grabbed from #21158. Closes #21133.
ACKs for top commit:
achow101:
ACK ff8e2fc2e2416f6f3b84cdb40db8ac168596b579
theStack:
ACK ff8e2fc2e2416f6f3b84cdb40db8ac168596b579
darosior:
re-ACK ff8e2fc2e2416f6f3b84cdb40db8ac168596b579
Tree-SHA512: bf6f500c7e8c9ff6884137c2cd9b4522c586e52848dd639b774b94d998b0516b877498d24f3a6cc7425aedf81d18b0d30c1ccf19e2d527fdfdfa3955ca49b6e7
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fa05a726c225dc65dee79367bb67f099ae4f99e6 tidy: modernize-use-emplace (MarcoFalke)
Pull request description:
Constructing a temporary unnamed object only to copy or move it into a container seems both verbose in code and a strict performance penalty.
Fix both issues via the `modernize-use-emplace` tidy check.
ACKs for top commit:
Sjors:
re-utACK fa05a726c2
hebasto:
ACK fa05a726c225dc65dee79367bb67f099ae4f99e6.
TheCharlatan:
ACK fa05a726c225dc65dee79367bb67f099ae4f99e6
Tree-SHA512: 4408a094f406e7bf6c1468c2b0798f68f4d952a1253cf5b20bdc648ad7eea4a2c070051fed46d66fd37bce2ce6f85962484a1d32826b7ab8c9baba431eaa2765
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Co-authored-by: Antonie Poinsot <darosior@protonmail.com>
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Co-authored-by: Bruno Garcia <brunoely.gc@gmail.com>
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-BEGIN VERIFY SCRIPT-
sed -i 's|WithParams(\([a-zA-Z:._]\+\), |\1(|g' $( git grep -l WithParams )
-END VERIFY SCRIPT-
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We make the Satisfier a base in which to store the common methods
between the Tapscript and P2WSH satisfier, and from which they both
inherit.
A field is added to SignatureData to be able to satisfy pkh() under
Tapscript context (to get the pubkey hash preimage) without wallet data.
For instance in `finalizepsbt` RPC. See also the next commits for a
functional test that exercises this.
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In order to exacerbate a mistake in the stack size tracking logic,
sometimes pad the witness to make the script execute at the brink of the
stack size limit. This way if the stack size is underestimated for a
script it would immediately fail `VerifyScript`.
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We introduce another global that dictates the script context under which
to operate when running the target.
For miniscript_script, just consume another byte to set the context.
This should only affect existing seeds to the extent they contain a
CHECKMULTISIG. However it would not invalidate them entirely as they may
contain a NUMEQUAL or a CHECKSIGADD, and this still exercises a bit of
the parser.
For miniscript_string, reduce the string size by one byte and use the
last byte to determine the context. This is the change that i think
would invalidate the lowest number of existing seeds.
For miniscript_stable, we don't want to invalidate any seed. Instead of
creating a new miniscript_stable_tapscript, simply run the target once
for P2WSH and once for Tapscript (with the same seed).
For miniscript_smart, consume one byte before generating a pseudo-random
node to set the context. We have less regard for seed stability for this
target anyways.
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Adapt the test data and the parsing context to support x-only keys.
Adapt the Test() helper to test existing cases under both Tapscript and
P2WSH context, asserting what needs to be valid or not in each.
Finally, add more cases that exercise the logic that was added in the
previous commits (multi_a, different resource checks and keys
serialization under Tapscript, different properties for 'd:' fragment,
..).
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In Tapscript MINIMALIF is a consensus rule, so we can rely on the fact
that the `DUP IF [X] ENDIF` will always put an exact 1 on the stack upon
satisfaction.
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It is the equivalent of multi() but for Tapscript, using CHECKSIGADD
instead of CHECKMULTISIG.
It shares the same properties as multi() but for 'n', since a threshold
multi_a() may have an empty vector as the top element of its
satisfaction. It could also have the 'o' property when it only has a
single key, but in this case a 'pk()' is always preferable anyways.
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Some checks will be different depending on the script context (for
instance the maximum script size).
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We are going to introduce Tapscript support in Miniscript, for which
some of Miniscript rules and properties change (new or modified
fragments, different typing rules, different resources consumption, ..).
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Co-authored-by: MarcoFalke <falke.marco@gmail.com>
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Co-authored-by: Ryan Ofsky <ryan@ofsky.org>
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of regtest
5b878be742dbfcd232d949d2df1fff4743aec3d8 [doc] add release note for submitpackage (glozow)
7a9bb2a2a59ba49f80519c8435229abec2432486 [rpc] allow submitpackage to be called outside of regtest (glozow)
5b9087a9a7da2602485e85e0b163dc3cbd2daf31 [rpc] require package to be a tree in submitpackage (glozow)
e32ba1599c599e75b1da3393f71f633de860505f [txpackages] IsChildWithParentsTree() (glozow)
b4f28cc345ef9c5261c4a8d743654a44784c7802 [doc] parent pay for child in aggregate CheckFeeRate (glozow)
Pull request description:
Permit (restricted topology) submitpackage RPC outside of regtest. Suggested in https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/26933#issuecomment-1510851570
This RPC should be safe but still experimental - interface may change, not all features (e.g. package RBF) are implemented, etc. If a miner wants to expose this to people, they can effectively use "package relay" before the p2p changes are implemented. However, please note **this is not package relay**; transactions submitted this way will not relay to other nodes if the feerates are below their mempool min fee. Users should put this behind some kind of rate limit or permissions.
ACKs for top commit:
instagibbs:
ACK 5b878be742dbfcd232d949d2df1fff4743aec3d8
achow101:
ACK 5b878be742dbfcd232d949d2df1fff4743aec3d8
dergoegge:
Code review ACK 5b878be742dbfcd232d949d2df1fff4743aec3d8
ajtowns:
ACK 5b878be742dbfcd232d949d2df1fff4743aec3d8
ariard:
Code Review ACK 5b878be742. Though didn’t manually test the PR.
Tree-SHA512: 610365c0b2ffcccd55dedd1151879c82de1027e3319712bcb11d54f2467afaae4d05dca5f4b25f03354c80845fef538d3938b958174dda8b14c10670537a6524
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c1e6c542af6d89a499e2a65465865aec651c4d67 descriptors: disallow hybrid public keys (Pieter Wuille)
Pull request description:
Fixes #28511
The descriptor documentation (`doc/descriptors.md`) and [BIP380](https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0380.mediawiki) explicitly require that hex-encoded public keys start with 02 or 03 (compressed) or 04 (uncompressed). However, the current parsing/inference code permit 06 and 07 (hybrid) encoding as well. Fix this.
ACKs for top commit:
darosior:
ACK c1e6c542af6d89a499e2a65465865aec651c4d67
achow101:
ACK c1e6c542af6d89a499e2a65465865aec651c4d67
Tree-SHA512: 23b674fb420619b2536d12da10008bb87cf7bc0333ec59e618c0d02c3574b468cc71248475ece37f76658d743ef51e68566948e903bca79fda5f7d75416fea4d
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`vfLimited`, `IsReachable()`, `SetReachable()` need not be in the `net`
module. Move them to `netbase` because they will be needed in
`LookupSubNet()` to possibly flip the result to CJDNS (if that network
is reachable).
In the process, encapsulate them in a class.
`NET_UNROUTABLE` and `NET_INTERNAL` are no longer ignored when adding
or removing reachable networks. This was unnecessary.
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The fuzz testing framework runs as if `-cjdnsreachable` is set and in
this case addresses like `{net=IPv6, addr=fc...}` are not possible.
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4cafe9f176e93ebb6c38abb12140e8d8be005cbf [test] Make PeerManager's rng deterministic in tests (dergoegge)
fecec3e1c661ba273470ecc5ef12d4c070b53050 [net processing] FeeFilterRounder doesn't own a FastRandomContext (dergoegge)
47520ed209d9341702a0fb6006bee6f63f7da42e [net processing] Make fee filter rounder non-global (dergoegge)
77506f4ac6b3a3d7396a3a6101345019e05b3b10 [net processing] Addr shuffle uses PeerManager's rng (dergoegge)
a648dd79e5ebfdb627d0221b1207862efb664dfc [net processing] PushAddress uses PeerManager's rng (dergoegge)
87c706713e5d1c78bad943a42bf7c69047d28ea5 [net processing] PeerManager holds a FastRandomContext (dergoegge)
Pull request description:
This lets us avoid some non-determinism in tests (also see #28537).
ACKs for top commit:
MarcoFalke:
re-ACK 4cafe9f176e93ebb6c38abb12140e8d8be005cbf 🕗
glozow:
concept && light code review ACK 4cafe9f176e93ebb6c38abb12140e8d8be005cbf
Tree-SHA512: 3c18700773d0bc547ccb6442c41567e6f26b0b50fab5b79620da417ec91b9c0ae1395d15258da3aa4a91447b8ce560145dd135e39fbbd0610749e528e665b111
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From https://geti2p.net/en/docs/api/samv3:
If SILENT=false was passed, which is the default value, the SAM bridge
sends the client a ASCII line containing the base64 public destination
key of the requesting peer
So, `Accept()` is supposed to receive a Base64 encoded destination of
the connecting peer, but if it receives something like this instead:
STREAM STATUS RESULT=I2P_ERROR MESSAGE="Session was closed"
then destroy the session.
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The descriptor documentation (doc/descriptors.md) and BIP380 explicitly
require that hex-encoded public keys start with 02 or 03 (compressed) or
04 (uncompressed). However, the current parsing/inference code permit 06
and 07 (hybrid) encoding as well. Fix this.
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-BEGIN VERIFY SCRIPT-
sed -i 's/nMaxConnections/m_max_automatic_connections/g' src/net.h src/net.cpp
sed -i 's/\.nMaxConnections/\.m_max_automatic_connections/g' src/init.cpp src/test/denialofservice_tests.cpp
sed -i 's/nMaxFeeler/m_max_feeler/g' src/net.h
sed -i 's/nMaxAddnode/m_max_addnode/g' src/net.h src/net.cpp
sed -i 's/m_max_outbound\([^_]\)/m_max_automatic_outbound\1/g' src/net.h src/net.cpp
-END VERIFY SCRIPT-
Co-authored-by: Martin Zumsande <mzumsande@gmail.com>
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Currently the logic is fragmented between init and connman. Encapsulating this
logic within connman allows for less mental overhead and easier reuse in tests.
Co-authored-by: Martin Zumsande <mzumsande@gmail.com>
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addrman table entries
352d5eb2a9e89cff4a2815d94a9d81fcc20c4b2c test: getrawaddrman RPC (0xb10c)
da384a286bd84a97e7ebe7a64654c5be20ab2df1 rpc: getrawaddrman for addrman entries (0xb10c)
Pull request description:
Inspired by `getaddrmaninfo` (#27511), this adds a hidden/test-only `getrawaddrman` RPC. The RPC returns information on all addresses in the address manager new and tried tables. Addrman table contents can be used in tests and during development.
The RPC result encodes the `bucket` and `position`, the internal location of addresses in the tables, in the address object's string key. This allows users to choose to consume or to ignore the location information. If the internals of the address manager implementation change, the location encoding might change too.
```
getrawaddrman
EXPERIMENTAL warning: this call may be changed in future releases.
Returns information on all address manager entries for the new and tried tables.
Result:
{ (json object)
"table" : { (json object) buckets with addresses in the address manager table ( new, tried )
"bucket/position" : { (json object) the location in the address manager table (<bucket>/<position>)
"address" : "str", (string) The address of the node
"port" : n, (numeric) The port number of the node
"network" : "str", (string) The network (ipv4, ipv6, onion, i2p, cjdns) of the address
"services" : n, (numeric) The services offered by the node
"time" : xxx, (numeric) The UNIX epoch time when the node was last seen
"source" : "str", (string) The address that relayed the address to us
"source_network" : "str" (string) The network (ipv4, ipv6, onion, i2p, cjdns) of the source address
},
...
},
...
}
Examples:
> bitcoin-cli getrawaddrman
> curl --user myusername --data-binary '{"jsonrpc": "1.0", "id": "curltest", "method": "getrawaddrman", "params": []}' -H 'content-type: text/plain;' http://127.0.0.1:8332/
```
ACKs for top commit:
willcl-ark:
reACK 352d5eb2a9
amitiuttarwar:
reACK 352d5eb2a9e
stratospher:
reACK 352d5eb.
achow101:
ACK 352d5eb2a9e89cff4a2815d94a9d81fcc20c4b2c
Tree-SHA512: cc462666b5c709617c66b0e3e9a17c4c81e9e295f91bdd9572492d1cb6466fc9b6d48ee805ebe82f9f16010798370effe5c8f4db15065b8c7c0d8637675d615e
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7df450836969b81e98322c9a09c08b35d1095a25 test: improve sock_tests/move_assignment (Vasil Dimov)
5086a99b84367a45706af7197da1016dd966e6d9 net: remove Sock default constructor, it's not necessary (Vasil Dimov)
7829272f7826511241defd34954e6040ea963f07 net: remove now unnecessary Sock::Get() (Vasil Dimov)
944b21b70ae490a5a746bcc1810a5074d74e9d34 net: don't check if the socket is valid in ConnectSocketDirectly() (Vasil Dimov)
aeac68d036e3cff57ce155f1a904d77f98b357d4 net: don't check if the socket is valid in GetBindAddress() (Vasil Dimov)
5ac1a51ee5a57da59f1ff1986b7d9054484d3c80 i2p: avoid using Sock::Get() for checking for a valid socket (Vasil Dimov)
Pull request description:
_This is a piece of #21878, chopped off to ease review._
Peeking at the underlying socket file descriptor of `Sock` and checkig if it is `INVALID_SOCKET` is bad encapsulation and stands in the way of testing/mocking/fuzzing.
Instead use an empty `unique_ptr` to denote that there is no valid socket where appropriate or outright remove such checks where they are not necessary.
The default constructor `Sock::Sock()` is unnecessary now after recent changes, thus remove it.
ACKs for top commit:
ajtowns:
ACK 7df450836969b81e98322c9a09c08b35d1095a25
jonatack:
ACK 7df450836969b81e98322c9a09c08b35d1095a25
Tree-SHA512: 9742aeeeabe8690530bf74caa6ba296787028c52f4a3342afd193b05dbbb1f6645935c33ba0a5230199a09af01c666bd3c7fb16b48692a0d185356ea59a8ddbf
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