| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
|---|
|
- AddrFetch connections are short lived connections used to getaddr from a peer
- previously called "one shot" connections
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- extract inbound & outbound types
|
|
|
|
9c69cfe4c54e38edd2f54303be2f8a53dcf5bad8 Add <datadir>/settings.json persistent settings storage. (Russell Yanofsky)
eb682c5700e7a9176d0104d470b83ff9aa3589e8 util: Add ReadSettings and WriteSettings functions (Russell Yanofsky)
Pull request description:
Persistent settings are used in followup PRs #15936 to unify gui settings between bitcoin-qt and bitcoind, and #15937 to add a load_on_startup flag to the loadwallet RPC and maintain a dynamic list of wallets that should be loaded on startup that also can be shared between bitcoind and bitcoin-qt.
ACKs for top commit:
MarcoFalke:
Approach re-ACK 9c69cfe4c54e38edd2f54303be2f8a53dcf5bad8 🌾
jnewbery:
utACK 9c69cfe4c54e38edd2f54303be2f8a53dcf5bad8
Tree-SHA512: 39fcc6051717117c9141e934de1d0d3f739484be4685cdf97d54de967c8c816502b4fd0de12114433beaa5c5b7060c810fd8ae4e2b3ce7c371eb729ac01ba2e1
|
|
c8992e89594a54edf283e4916f794475070b5114 test: Fix fuzzer compilation on macOS fixes #19557 (freenancial)
Pull request description:
fixes #19557
Before the fix:
```
➜ bitcoin git:(fix-fuzzer-macos) make
Making all in src
CXX test/fuzz/addition_overflow-addition_overflow.o
In file included from test/fuzz/addition_overflow.cpp:7:
./test/fuzz/util.h:335:13: error: no matching function for call to 'AdditionOverflow'
if (AdditionOverflow((uint64_t)fuzzed_file->m_offset, random_bytes.size())) {
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
./test/fuzz/util.h:201:16: note: candidate template ignored: deduced conflicting types for parameter 'T' ('unsigned long long' vs. 'unsigned long')
NODISCARD bool AdditionOverflow(const T i, const T j) noexcept
^
./test/fuzz/util.h:346:13: error: no matching function for call to 'AdditionOverflow'
if (AdditionOverflow(fuzzed_file->m_offset, n)) {
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
./test/fuzz/util.h:201:16: note: candidate template ignored: deduced conflicting types for parameter 'T' ('long long' vs. 'long')
NODISCARD bool AdditionOverflow(const T i, const T j) noexcept
^
```
After the fix:
```
➜ bitcoin git:(fix-fuzzer-macos) ./configure --enable-fuzz --with-sanitizers=fuzzer,address,undefined CC=/usr/local/opt/llvm/bin/clang CXX=/usr/local/opt/llvm/bin/clang++ --disable-asm && make clean && make -j5
...
...
CXXLD test/fuzz/uint256_deserialize
Making all in doc/man
make[1]: Nothing to be done for `all'.
make[1]: Nothing to be done for `all-am'.
```
ACKs for top commit:
fanquake:
ACK c8992e89594a54edf283e4916f794475070b5114 - tested that compiling works on macOS.
MarcoFalke:
review ACK c8992e89594a54edf283e4916f794475070b5114
Tree-SHA512: 965cdc61b30db0e2209c91b29f0d42de927a9a5b85e1e70f22d1452e0955f876726c7a8c1d1a5f448f12bf24eec3000802071cd4ae28d8605343fd43d174ca84
|
|
c0f09c2c9deaec4cfb35ea587363e6301dd17b88 fuzz: add missing overrides to signature_checker (Jon Atack)
Pull request description:
These functions in `fuzz/signature_checker.cpp` override virtual member functions and should be marked `override` instead of `virtual`, which is for introducing a new virtual function. The overridden virtual functions are in `script/interpreter.h:151/156/161`.
Also, per MarcoFalke suggestion, add missing parentheses in `fuzz/scriptnum_ops.cpp` and remove useless `unsigned int >= 0` conditional in `fuzz/script.cpp`.
These changes fix 5 compile warnings in gcc 10 and 3 in clang 11/12.
ACKs for top commit:
vasild:
ACK c0f09c2
MarcoFalke:
review ACK c0f09c2c9deaec4cfb35ea587363e6301dd17b88
Tree-SHA512: 76ce73ec577c1f23cf8646c31d44dcd6c6303732c47187d041a8921d0d24a50163989a375352ebc221abf2ac337bc0902149be46b6f9eebc071d2f364c407f71
|
|
and also
- add missing parentheses in fuzz/scriptnum_ops.cpp
- remove useless unsigned int conditional in fuzz/script.cpp
These changes fix 5 compile warnings in gcc 10.
|
|
fixes #19557
|
|
4455949d6f0218b40d33d7fe6de6555f8f62192f Make test DoS_mapOrphans deterministic (David Reikher)
Pull request description:
This pull request proposes a solution to make the test `DoS_mapOrphans` in denialofservice_tests.cpp have deterministic coverage.
The `RandomOrphan` function in denialofservice_tests.cpp and the implicitly called function `ecdsa_signature_parse_der_lax` in pubkey.cpp were causing the non-deterministic test coverage.
In the former, if a random orphan was selected the index of which is bigger than the max. orphan index in `mapOrphanTransactions`, the last orphan was returned from `RandomOrphan`. If the random number generated was never large enough, this condition would not be fulfilled and the corresponding branch wouldn't run. The proposed solution is to force one of the 50 dependant orphans to depend on the last orphan in `mapOrphanTransactions` using the newly introduced function `OrphanByIndex` (and passing it a large uint256), forcing this branch to run at least once.
In the latter, if values for ECDSA `R` or `S` (or both) had no leading zeros, some code would not be executed. The solution was to find a constant signature that would be comprised of `R` and `S` values with leading zeros and calling `CPubKey::Verify` at the end of the test with this signature forcing this code to always run at least once at the end even if it hadn't throughout the test.
To test that the coverage is (at least highly likely) deterministic, I ran
`contrib/devtools/test_deterministic_coverage.sh denialofservice_tests/DoS_mapOrphans 1000`
and the result was deterministic coverage across 1000 runs.
Also - removed denialofservice_tests test entry from the list of non-deterministic tests in the coverage script.
ACKs for top commit:
MarcoFalke:
ACK 4455949d6f0218b40d33d7fe6de6555f8f62192f
Tree-SHA512: 987eb1f94b80d5bec4d4944e91ef43b9b8603055750362d4b4665b7f011be27045808aa9f4c6ccf8ae009b61405f9a1b8671d65a843c3328e5b8acce1f1c00a6
|
|
The RandomOrphan function and the function ecdsa_signature_parse_der_lax
in pubkey.cpp were causing non-deterministic test coverage.
Force seed in the beginning of the test to make it deterministic.
The seed is selected carefully so that all branches of the function
ecdsa_signature_parse_der_lax are executed. Prior to this fix, the test
was exhibiting non-deterministic coverage since none of the ECDSA
signatures that were generated during the test had leading zeroes in
either R, S, or both, resulting in some branches of said function not
being executed. The seed ensures that both conditions are hit.
Removed denialofservice_tests test entry from the list of non-deterministic
tests in the coverage script.
|
|
|
|
LoadExternalBlockFile and other FILE* consumers
ad6c34881dc125c973b6b9ba1daa999d3141b1ae tests: Add fuzzing harness for CBlockPolicyEstimator::{Read,Write} (policy/fees.h) (practicalswift)
614e0807a8137d82832aea45e4864b424f71f698 tests: Add fuzzing harness for CBufferedFile::{SetPos,GetPos,GetType,GetVersion} (stream.h) (practicalswift)
7bcc71e5f8cdfd8ba1411c799c0726f503e52343 tests: Add fuzzing harness for LoadExternalBlockFile(...) (validation.h) (practicalswift)
98233760305a36acbd41d76aeebeada1340f6367 tests: Add fuzzing harness for CBufferedFile (streams.h) (practicalswift)
f3aa659be676a4dd0c20fe6c5cb4acd7a5b38b76 tests: Add fuzzing harness for CAutoFile (streams.h) (practicalswift)
e507c0799d759355dd0cfbe83449f0f767a7264e tests: Add serialization/deserialization fuzzing helpers WriteToStream(…)/ReadFromStream(…) (practicalswift)
e48094a506ad031d211b9dfe7639d8b3a2239788 tests: Add FuzzedAutoFileProvider which provides a CAutoFile interface to FuzzedDataProvider (practicalswift)
9dbcd6854ca05a9bd1e9a5e1222dac1758048231 tests: Add FuzzedFileProvider which provides a FILE* interface to FuzzedDataProvider using fopencookie (practicalswift)
Pull request description:
Add fuzzing harnesses for `CAutoFile`, `CBufferedFile`, `LoadExternalBlockFile` and other `FILE*` consumers:
* Add `FuzzedFileProvider` which provides a `FILE*` interface to `FuzzedDataProvider` using `fopencookie`
* Add `FuzzedAutoFileProvider` which provides a `CAutoFile` interface to `FuzzedDataProvider`
* Add serialization/deserialization fuzzing helpers `WriteToStream(…)`/`ReadFromStream(…)`
* Add fuzzing harness for `CAutoFile` (`streams.h`)
* Add fuzzing harness for `CBufferedFile` (`streams.h`)
* Add fuzzing harness for `LoadExternalBlockFile(...)` (`validation.h`)
* Add fuzzing harness for `CBlockPolicyEstimator::Read` and `CBlockPolicyEstimator::Write` (`policy/fees.h`)
See [`doc/fuzzing.md`](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/master/doc/fuzzing.md) for information on how to fuzz Bitcoin Core. Don't forget to contribute any coverage increasing inputs you find to the [Bitcoin Core fuzzing corpus repo](https://github.com/bitcoin-core/qa-assets).
Happy fuzzing :)
ACKs for top commit:
Crypt-iQ:
Tested ACK ad6c348
Tree-SHA512: a38e142608218496796a527d7e59b74e30279a2815450408b7c27a76ed600cebc6b88491e831665a0639671e2d212453fcdca558500bbadbeb32b267751f8f72
|
|
f58c4b538ebd67fcfea0a4aff5e062fd59fb19f5 [tests] Remove unnecessary cs_mains in denialofservice_tests (Matt Corallo)
Pull request description:
9fdf05d70cac4a62d1aeeb4299e2c3a9a866f8af resolved some lock
inversion warnings in denialofservice_tests, but left in a number
of cs_main locks that are unnecessary (introducing lock inversion
warnings in future changes).
ACKs for top commit:
promag:
ACK f58c4b538ebd67fcfea0a4aff5e062fd59fb19f5.
jonatack:
ACK f58c4b538ebd67fcfe verified the test locks correspond to the locks in net/net_processing, and the debug build is clean/unit tests pass.
Tree-SHA512: de2d9b2a8f08081b2ce31e18585e4677b167a11752b797d790c281575d7dfef3587f8be4fc7f8f16771141b6ff0b0145c7488cf30e79256b0043947c67a6182c
|
|
net_processing.cpp
0c8461a88ed66a1f70559fc96646708949b17e4b refactor: replace CConnman pointers by references in net_processing.cpp (Sebastian Falbesoner)
Pull request description:
This is a follow-up to the recently merged PR https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/19053, replacing ~~two more types of~~ one more type of pointer (CConnman) by references to increase the code quality -- pointers should either check for `nullptr` or be replaced by references, and the latter strategy seems to be more reasonable.
Again, to keep the review burden managable, the changes are kept simple,
* only tackling `CConnman*` ~~and `BanMan*`~~ pointers
* only within the net_processing module, i.e. no changes that would need adaption in other modules
* keeping the names of the variables as they are
ACKs for top commit:
jnewbery:
utACK 0c8461a88ed66a1f70559fc96646708949b17e4b
MarcoFalke:
ACK 0c8461a88ed66a1f70559fc96646708949b17e4b 🕧
Tree-SHA512: 79dc05144bcfb5e0bbc62180285aadcc6199f044fa3016c0f54f7b7f45037415260970037bd63b18fafefb8aef448549dae14b780bafb540fa2373f493a17f71
|
|
0ecff9dd3418e8c18fa423ba53e9cab1df8be553 Improve "detected inconsistent lock order" error message (Hennadii Stepanov)
bbe9cf4fe4ff9a8d1ea557fb763c76100db07679 test: Improve "potential deadlock detected" exception message (Hennadii Stepanov)
35599344c886b62f198e35fd940c1ab15c4a9f90 Fix mistakenly swapped "previous" and "current" lock orders (Hennadii Stepanov)
Pull request description:
In master (8ef15e8a86038225afef2487ca23abc10ca5dffa) the "previous" and "current" lock orders are mistakenly swapped.
This PR:
- fixes printed lock orders
- improves the `sync_tests` unit test
- makes the "detected inconsistent lock order" error message pointing to the lock location rather `tfm::format()` location.
Debugger output example with this PR (with modified code, of course):
```
2020-06-22T15:46:56Z [msghand] POTENTIAL DEADLOCK DETECTED
2020-06-22T15:46:56Z [msghand] Previous lock order was:
2020-06-22T15:46:56Z [msghand] (2) 'cs_main' in net_processing.cpp:2545 (in thread 'msghand')
2020-06-22T15:46:56Z [msghand] (1) 'g_cs_orphans' in net_processing.cpp:1400 (in thread 'msghand')
2020-06-22T15:46:56Z [msghand] Current lock order is:
2020-06-22T15:46:56Z [msghand] (1) 'g_cs_orphans' in net_processing.cpp:2816 (in thread 'msghand')
2020-06-22T15:46:56Z [msghand] (2) 'cs_main' in net_processing.cpp:2816 (in thread 'msghand')
Assertion failed: detected inconsistent lock order for 'cs_main' in net_processing.cpp:2816 (in thread 'msghand'), details in debug log.
Process 131393 stopped
* thread #15, name = 'b-msghand', stop reason = signal SIGABRT
frame #0: 0x00007ffff775c18b libc.so.6`__GI_raise(sig=2) at raise.c:51:1
(lldb) bt
* thread #15, name = 'b-msghand', stop reason = signal SIGABRT
* frame #0: 0x00007ffff775c18b libc.so.6`__GI_raise(sig=2) at raise.c:51:1
frame #1: 0x00007ffff773b859 libc.so.6`__GI_abort at abort.c:79:7
frame #2: 0x0000555555e5b196 bitcoind`(anonymous namespace)::potential_deadlock_detected(mismatch=0x00007fff99ff6f30, s1=size=2, s2=size=2, lock_location=0x00007fff99ff7010) at sync.cpp:134:9
frame #3: 0x0000555555e5a1b1 bitcoind`(anonymous namespace)::push_lock(c=0x0000555556379220, locklocation=0x00007fff99ff7010) at sync.cpp:158:13
frame #4: 0x0000555555e59e8a bitcoind`EnterCritical(pszName="cs_main", pszFile="net_processing.cpp", nLine=2816, cs=0x0000555556379220, fTry=false) at sync.cpp:177:5
frame #5: 0x00005555555b0500 bitcoind`UniqueLock<AnnotatedMixin<std::recursive_mutex>, std::unique_lock<std::recursive_mutex> >::Enter(this=0x00007fff99ff8c20, pszName="cs_main", pszFile="net_processing.cpp", nLine=2816) at sync.h:134:9
frame #6: 0x00005555555b017f bitcoind`UniqueLock<AnnotatedMixin<std::recursive_mutex>, std::unique_lock<std::recursive_mutex> >::UniqueLock(this=0x00007fff99ff8c20, mutexIn=0x0000555556379220, pszName="cs_main", pszFile="net_processing.cpp", nLine=2816, fTry=false) at sync.h:160:13
frame #7: 0x00005555556aa57e bitcoind`ProcessMessage(pfrom=0x00007fff90001180, msg_type=error: summary string parsing error, vRecv=0x00007fff9c005ac0, nTimeReceived=1592840815980751, chainparams=0x00005555564b7110, chainman=0x0000555556380880, mempool=0x0000555556380ae0, connman=0x000055555657aa20, banman=0x00005555565167b0, interruptMsgProc=0x00005555565cae90) at net_processing.cpp:2816:9
```
ACKs for top commit:
laanwj:
ACK 0ecff9dd3418e8c18fa423ba53e9cab1df8be553
vasild:
ACK 0ecff9dd
Tree-SHA512: ff285de8dd3198b5b33c4bfbdadf9b1448189c96143b9696bc4f41c07e784c00851ec169cf3ed45cc325f3617ba6783620803234f57fcce28bf6bc3d6a7234fb
|
|
9fdf05d70cac4a62d1aeeb4299e2c3a9a866f8af resolved some lock
inversion warnings in denialofservice_tests, but left in a number
of cs_main locks that are unnecessary (introducing lock inversion
warnings in future changes).
|
|
fa108d6a757838225179a8df942cfb6d99c98c90 test: update tests for peer discouragement (Jon Atack)
1a9f462caa63fa16d7b4415312d2032a42b3fe0b gui, doc: rm Ban Score in GUI Peers window/release notes updates (Jon Atack)
Pull request description:
This is the third `-banscore` PR in the mini-series described in #19464. See that PR for the intention and reasoning.
- no longer display "Ban Score" in the GUI peers window and add a release note, plus release note fixups per https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/19464#pullrequestreview-447452052
- update tests (`src/test/denialofservice_tests.cpp` and `test/functional/p2p_leak.py`) from banning to discouragement and per https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/19464#issuecomment-658052518
ACKs for top commit:
jnewbery:
ACK fa108d6a757838225179a8df942cfb6d99c98c90
laanwj:
ACK fa108d6a757838225179a8df942cfb6d99c98c90
Tree-SHA512: 58a449b3f47b8cb5490b34e4442ee8675bfad1ce48af4e4fd5c67715b0c1a596fb8e731d42e576b4c3b64627f76e0a68cbb1da9ea9f588a5932fe119baf40d50
|
|
poly1305_auth, CHKDF_HMAC_SHA256_L32, ChaCha20 and ChaCha20Poly1305AEAD
cca7c577d5d80293cb12de1048f3edd680ac4fad tests: Add fuzzing harness for ChaCha20Poly1305AEAD (practicalswift)
2fc4e5916c1c35902a32830c3f199a308a66bea0 tests: Add fuzzing harness for ChaCha20 (practicalswift)
e9e8aac029acffb5e4cc5c2556f23cdfdcf9bb09 tests: Add fuzzing harness for CHKDF_HMAC_SHA256_L32 (practicalswift)
ec86ca1aaae388cefa2da9904785cee2d550b3d1 tests: Add fuzzing harness for poly1305_auth(...) (practicalswift)
4cee53bba722a480ccd6472d2ffe9b0001394dd9 tests: Add fuzzing harness for AES256CBCEncrypt/AES256CBCDecrypt (practicalswift)
9352c3232594f953d2db11c1e140be3f7f9fbae4 tests: Add fuzzing harness for AES256Encrypt/AES256Decrypt (practicalswift)
Pull request description:
Add fuzzing harness for `AES{CBC,}256{Encrypt,Decrypt}`, `poly1305_auth`, `CHKDF_HMAC_SHA256_L32`, `ChaCha20` and `ChaCha20Poly1305AEAD`.
See [`doc/fuzzing.md`](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/master/doc/fuzzing.md) for information on how to fuzz Bitcoin Core. Don't forget to contribute any coverage increasing inputs you find to the [Bitcoin Core fuzzing corpus repo](https://github.com/bitcoin-core/qa-assets).
Happy fuzzing :)
ACKs for top commit:
laanwj:
ACK cca7c577d5d80293cb12de1048f3edd680ac4fad
Tree-SHA512: cff9acefe370c12a3663aa55145371df835479c6ab8f6d81bbf84e0f81a9d6b0d94e45ec545f9dd5e1702744eaa7947a1f4ffed0171f446fc080369161afd740
|
|
(policy/fees.h)
|
|
CBufferedFile::{SetPos,GetPos,GetType,GetVersion} (stream.h)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
WriteToStream(…)/ReadFromStream(…)
|
|
FuzzedDataProvider
|
|
FuzzedDataProvider using fopencookie
|
|
fa5363538125d996ae5cede55f7f05e88701ace2 util: Make Assert work with any value (MarcoFalke)
Pull request description:
Goal is to avoid compile failures
ACKs for top commit:
jonatack:
ACK fa5363538125d996ae5cede55f7f05e88701ace2
ryanofsky:
Code review ACK fa5363538125d996ae5cede55f7f05e88701ace2. Looks like if argument is an lvalue this effectively does:
Tree-SHA512: a5cf47a8bb2fa1bd8b8895774f33de50ad803165d6f7b520351be1cfcd5612d5d97c51d118461331d30640186c470879e5ad19e3333e09e72685c5e4e4f23079
|
|
|
|
|
|
06059b0c2a6c2db70c87a7715f8a344a13400fa1 net: rename DEFAULT_BANSCORE_THRESHOLD to DISCOURAGEMENT_THRESHOLD (Jon Atack)
1d4024bca8086cceff7539dd8c15e0b7fe1cc5ea net: remove -banscore configuration option (Jon Atack)
Pull request description:
per https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/19219#issuecomment-652684340, https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/19219#discussion_r443074487 and https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/19219#issuecomment-652699592. Edit: now split into 3 straightforward PRs:
- net: remove -banscore configuration option (this PR)
- rpc: deprecate banscore field in getpeerinfo (#19469, *merged*)
- gui: no longer display banscores (TBA in the gui repo)
ACKs for top commit:
MarcoFalke:
review ACK 06059b0c2a6c2db70c87a7715f8a344a13400fa1 📙
vasild:
ACK 06059b0c
Tree-SHA512: 03fad249986e0896697033fbb8ba2cbfaae7d7603b1fb2a38b3d41db697630d238623f4d732b9098c82af249ce5a1767dd432b7ca0fec10544e23d24fbd57c50
|
|
and move it from validation to net processing.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Persistent settings are used in followup PRs #15936 to unify gui settings
between bitcoin-qt and bitcoind, and #15937 to add a load_on_startup flag to
the loadwallet RPC and maintain a dynamic list of wallets that should be loaded
on startup that also can be shared between bitcoind and bitcoin-qt.
|
|
97846d7f5b47ef77469b9f961db77f770e8bcc0f tests: Add fuzzing harness for BanMan (practicalswift)
deba199f1c88c2e5f754b0a4ec43b9ef28de8352 tests: Add ConsumeSubNet(...). Move and increase coverage in ConsumeNetAddr(...). (practicalswift)
Pull request description:
Add fuzzing harness for `BanMan`.
See [`doc/fuzzing.md`](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/master/doc/fuzzing.md) for information on how to fuzz Bitcoin Core. Don't forget to contribute any coverage increasing inputs you find to the [Bitcoin Core fuzzing corpus repo](https://github.com/bitcoin-core/qa-assets).
Happy fuzzing :)
Top commit has no ACKs.
Tree-SHA512: f4126c15bbb77638833367d73f58193c8f05d16bed0b1d6c33b39387d5b610ff34af78cd721adb51778062ce3ac5e79756d1c3895ef54c6c80c61dcf056e94ff
|
|
Currently unused, but includes tests.
|
|
fab558612278909df93bdf88f5727b04f13aef0f doc: Use precise permission flags where possible (MarcoFalke)
Pull request description:
Instead of mentioning the all-encompassing `-whitelist*` settings, change the docs to mention the exact permission flag that will influence the behaviour.
This is needed because in the future, the too-broad `-whitelist*` settings (they either include *all* permission flags or apply to *all* peers) might be deprecated to require the permission flags to be enumerated.
Alternatively, in the future there could be an RPC to set the net permission flags on an existing connection, in which case the `-whitelist*` terminology is of no help.
ACKs for top commit:
jnewbery:
reACK fab558612278909df93bdf88f5727b04f13aef0f
fjahr:
Code review ACK fab558612278909df93bdf88f5727b04f13aef0f
jonatack:
ACK fab558612278909df93bdf88f5727b04f13aef0f
Tree-SHA512: c7dea3e577d90103bb2b0ffab7b7c8640b388932a3a880f69e2b70747fc9213dc1f437085671fd54c902ec2a578458b8a2fae6dbe076642fb88efbf9fa9e679c
|
|
when handling PROXY requests
20d31bdd92cc2ad9b8d26ed80da73bbcd6016144 tests: Avoid fuzzer-specific nullptr dereference in libevent when handling PROXY requests (practicalswift)
Pull request description:
Avoid constructing requests that will be interpreted by libevent as PROXY requests to avoid triggering a `nullptr` dereference. Split out from #19074 as suggested by MarcoFalke.
The dereference (`req->evcon->http_server`) takes place in `evhttp_parse_request_line` and is a consequence of our hacky but necessary use of the internal function `evhttp_parse_firstline_` in the `http_request` fuzzing harness.
The suggested workaround is not aesthetically pleasing, but it successfully avoids the troublesome code path.
`" http:// HTTP/1.1\n"` was a crashing input prior to this workaround.
Before this PR:
```
$ echo " http:// HTTP/1.1" > input
$ src/test/fuzz/http_request input
src/test/fuzz/http_request: Running 1 inputs 1 time(s) each.
Running: input
AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL
=================================================================
==27905==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x000000000108 (pc 0x55a169b7e053 bp 0x7ffd452f1160 sp 0x7ffd452f10e0 T0)
==27905==The signal is caused by a READ memory access.
==27905==Hint: address points to the zero page.
#0 0x55a169b7e053 in evhttp_parse_request_line depends/work/build/x86_64-pc-linux-gnu/libevent/2.1.11-stable-36daee64dc1/http.c:1883:37
#1 0x55a169b7d9ae in evhttp_parse_firstline_ depends/work/build/x86_64-pc-linux-gnu/libevent/2.1.11-stable-36daee64dc1/http.c:2041:7
#2 0x55a1687f624e in test_one_input(std::vector<unsigned char, std::allocator<unsigned char> > const&) src/test/fuzz/http_request.cpp:51:9
…
$ echo $?
1
```
After this PR:
```
$ echo " http:// HTTP/1.1" > input
$ src/test/fuzz/http_request input
src/test/fuzz/http_request: Running 1 inputs 1 time(s) each.
Running: input
Executed input in 0 ms
***
*** NOTE: fuzzing was not performed, you have only
*** executed the target code on a fixed set of inputs.
***
$ echo $?
0
```
See [`doc/fuzzing.md`](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/master/doc/fuzzing.md) for information on how to fuzz Bitcoin Core. Don't forget to contribute any coverage increasing inputs you find to the [Bitcoin Core fuzzing corpus repo](https://github.com/bitcoin-core/qa-assets).
Happy fuzzing :)
Top commit has no ACKs.
Tree-SHA512: 7a6b68e52cbcd6c117487e74e47760fe03566bec09b0bb606afb3b652edfd22186ab8244e8e27c38cef3fd0d4a6c237fe68b2fd22e0970c349e4ab370cf3e304
|
|
fa3365430c5fb57d7c0b5f2bce9fbbe290be93c3 net: Use mockable time for ping/pong, add tests (MarcoFalke)
faab4aaf2fa1153c6d76efc8113fa01b06943ece util: Add count_microseconds helper (MarcoFalke)
Pull request description:
Switch `CNode::m_ping_start` and `CNetMessage::m_time` to mockable time, so that tests can be added.
Mockable time is also type-safe, since it uses `std::chrono`
ACKs for top commit:
jonatack:
Code review re-ACK fa33654 re-read code, verified rebase per `git range-diff 4b5c919 fa94d6f fa33654`, previous tested ACKs still valid
troygiorshev:
ACK fa3365430c5fb57d7c0b5f2bce9fbbe290be93c3
Tree-SHA512: 7d632bd6019ce7c882029e71b667a61517e783af82755a85dd979ef09380934e172dec8b8f91d57b200a30a6e096aeaf01f19fee7f3aed0e0e871c72eb44d70e
|
|
|
|
fa0540cd46eaf44d9e1a9f91c3a937986826c4fa net: Extract download permission from noban (MarcoFalke)
Pull request description:
It should be possible to grant nodes in a local network (e.g. home, university, enterprise, ...) permission to download blocks even after the maxuploadtarget is hit.
Currently this is only possible by setting the `noban` permission, which has some adverse effects, especially if the peers can't be fully trusted.
Fix this by extracting a `download` permission from `noban`.
ACKs for top commit:
jonatack:
ACK fa0540c
Sjors:
re-utACK fa0540cd46eaf44d9e1a9f91c3a937986826c4fa
Tree-SHA512: 255566baa43ae925d93f5d0a3aa66b475a556d1590f662a88278a4872f16a1a05739a6119ae48a293011868042e05cb264cffe5822a50fb80db7333bf44376d9
|
|
1cabbddbca615b26aa4510c75f459c28d6fe0afd refactor: Use uint16_t instead of unsigned short (Aaron Hook)
Pull request description:
I wanted to see if the `up for grabs` label works and looked at PR #17822 originally opend by ahook I saw it had many acks for example by jonatack and practicalswift but needed rebasing.
So I checked out the remote branch rebased it resolved three conflicts and continued the rebase.
Hope everything is as expected (:
ACKs for top commit:
sipsorcery:
ACK 1cabbddbca615b26aa4510c75f459c28d6fe0afd.
practicalswift:
ACK 1cabbddbca615b26aa4510c75f459c28d6fe0afd -- patch looks correct :)
laanwj:
ACK 1cabbddbca615b26aa4510c75f459c28d6fe0afd
hebasto:
ACK 1cabbddbca615b26aa4510c75f459c28d6fe0afd, I have reviewed the code and it looks OK, I agree it can be merged.
Tree-SHA512: 0e6bf64f274aae5dacb188358b4d5f65ccb207d4f70922f039bc4ed7934709418ddad19f8bfb7462517427837c3d2bb3f86ef284bb40e87119aad2a1e148d9d6
|
|
|
|
|
|
ConsumeNetAddr(...).
|
|
2ad58381fffb33d611abf900b73d9e6b5a4e35f8 Clean up separated ban/discourage interface (Pieter Wuille)
b691f2df5f7d443c0c9ee056ab94aa0fc19566d5 Replace automatic bans with discouragement filter (Pieter Wuille)
Pull request description:
This patch improves performance and resource usage around IP addresses that are banned for misbehavior. They're already not actually banned since #14929, as connections from them are still allowed, but they are preferred for eviction if the inbound connection slots are full.
Stop treating these like manually banned IP ranges, and instead just keep them in a rolling Bloom filter of misbehaving nodes, which isn't persisted to disk or exposed through the ban framework. The effect remains the same: preferred for eviction, avoided for outgoing connections, and not relayed to other peers.
Also change the name of this mechanism to "discouraged" to better reflect reality.
ACKs for top commit:
naumenkogs:
utACK 2ad58381fffb33d611abf900b73d9e6b5a4e35f8
amitiuttarwar:
code review ACK 2ad58381ff
jonatack:
ACK 2ad5838 per changes since last review `git range-diff 3276c14 1f7e0ca 2ad5838`
jnewbery:
Code review ACK 2ad58381fffb33d611abf900b73d9e6b5a4e35f8
Tree-SHA512: 5dedef401d9cbfa026812651303e6286223563dbeed7a10766ed536ac9e3f29ed4bd0df29cc6deadceeb35cbe9f066346add14ef0833958ca9f93d123fe7aab5
|
