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Based on the earlier BIP66 soft-fork logic implemented by Pieter
Wuille's 5a47811da5158df763aa2fca09ce646ee0c51e7b
Rebased-From: 287f54fc90c29301faede8d4ac2ea24a91441917
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Transactions that fail CLTV verification will be rejected from the
mempool, making it easy to test the feature. However blocks containing
"invalid" CLTV-using transactions will still be accepted; this is *not*
the soft-fork required to actually enable CLTV for production use.
Rebased-From: ffd75adce01a78b3461b3ff05bcc2b530a9ce994
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<nLockTime> CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY -> <nLockTime>
Fails if tx.nLockTime < nLockTime, allowing the funds in a txout to be
locked until some block height or block time in the future is reached.
Only the logic and unittests are implemented; this commit does not have
any actual soft-fork logic in it.
Thanks to Pieter Wuille for rebase.
Credit goes to Gregory Maxwell for the suggestion of comparing the
argument against the transaction nLockTime rather than the current
time/blockheight directly.
Rebased-From: bc60b2b4b401f0adff5b8b9678903ff8feb5867b
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Will now be needed by CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY code.
Rebased-From: 48e9c57cf06352f890eac4285ae022d8746cf3fd
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While the existing numeric opcodes are all limited to 4-byte bignum
arguments, new opcodes will need different limits.
Rebased-From: 99088d60d8a7747c6d1a7fd5d8cd388be1b3e138
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This adds SCRIPT_VERIFY_LOW_S to STANDARD_SCRIPT_VERIFY_FLAGS which
will make the node require the canonical 'low-s' encoding for
ECDSA signatures when relaying or mining.
Consensus behavior is unchanged.
The rational is explained in a81cd96805ce6b65cca3a40ebbd3b2eb428abb7b:
Absent this kind of test ECDSA is not a strong signature as given
a valid signature {r, s} both that value and {r, -s mod n} are valid.
These two encodings have different hashes allowing third parties a
vector to change users txids. These attacks are avoided by picking
a particular form as canonical and rejecting the other form(s); in
the of the LOW_S rule, the smaller of the two possible S values is
used.
If widely deployed this change would eliminate the last remaining
known vector for nuisance malleability on boring SIGHASH_ALL
p2pkh transactions. On the down-side it will block most
transactions made by sufficiently out of date software.
Unlike the other avenues to change txids on boring transactions this
one was randomly violated by all deployed bitcoin software prior to
its discovery. So, while other malleability vectors where made
non-standard as soon as they were discovered, this one has remained
permitted. Even BIP62 did not propose applying this rule to
old version transactions, but conforming implementations have become
much more common since BIP62 was initially written.
Bitcoin Core has produced compatible signatures since a28fb70e in
September 2013, but this didn't make it into a release until 0.9
in March 2014; Bitcoinj has done so for a similar span of time.
Bitcoinjs and electrum have been more recently updated.
This does not replace the need for BIP62 or similar, as miners can
still cooperate to break transactions. Nor does it replace the
need for wallet software to handle malleability sanely[1]. This
only eliminates the cheap and irritating DOS attack.
[1] On the Malleability of Bitcoin Transactions
Marcin Andrychowicz, Stefan Dziembowski, Daniel Malinowski, Łukasz Mazurek
http://fc15.ifca.ai/preproceedings/bitcoin/paper_9.pdf
Conflicts:
src/policy/policy.h
Rebased-From: b196b685c9089b74fd4ff3d9a28ea847ab36179b
Github-Pull: #6769
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3916a81 Increase coverage of DERSIG edge cases (Pieter Wuille)
6da2028 Add RPC test for DERSIG BIP switchover logic (Pieter Wuille)
773c30d BIP66 changeover logic (Pieter Wuille)
18695f0 Example unit tests from BIP66 (Pieter Wuille)
abfbeaf Change IsDERSignature to BIP66 implementation (Pieter Wuille)
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Rebased-From: 9fddceda44fb5592be179d783f0e5ac616c51c0d
Github-Pull: #5719
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Conflicts:
src/main.cpp
src/script/bitcoinconsensus.cpp
Rebased-From: 858809a33e4f690c4ad213f44a6c4465fc2ef025
Github-Pull: #5719
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Makes it possible to compactly provide a delibrately invalid signature
for use with CHECK(MULTI)SIG. For instance with BIP19 if m != n invalid
signatures need to be provided in the scriptSig; prior to this change
those invalid signatures would need to be large DER-encoded signatures.
Note that we may want to further expand on this change in the future by
saying that only OP_0 is a "valid" invalid signature; BIP19 even with
this change is inherently malleable as the invalid signatures can be any
validly encoded DER signature.
Rebased-From: 2fa9a8ec86033b809a1c48f0396c3482c0d5d33c
Github-Pull: #5627
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Previously an empty script wouldn't be hashed, and CScriptID would be
assigned the incorrect value of 0 instead. This bug can be seen in the
RPC decodescript command:
$ btc decodescript ""
{
"asm" : "",
"type" : "nonstandard",
"p2sh" : "31h1vYVSYuKP6AhS86fbRdMw9XHieotbST"
}
Correct output:
$ btc decodescript ""
{
"asm" : "",
"type" : "nonstandard",
"p2sh" : "3J98t1WpEZ73CNmQviecrnyiWrnqRhWNLy"
}
Rebased-From: d78f0dafd520f481f909cca7e361a4e482cbea72
Github-Pull: #5541
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4cdaa95 Resize after succesful result (Pieter Wuille)
9d8604f Header define style cleanups (Pieter Wuille)
a53fd41 Deterministic signing (Pieter Wuille)
3060e36 Add the RFC6979 PRNG (Pieter Wuille)
a8f5087 Add HMAC-SHA256 (Pieter Wuille)
36fa4a7 Split up crypto/sha2 (Pieter Wuille)
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These static objects are only used in once place, so declare them there instead.
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Possible with STRICTENC
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This turns STRICTENC turn into a softforking-safe change (even though it
is not intended as a consensus rule), and as a result guarantee that using
it for mempool validation only results in consensus-valid transactions in
the mempool.
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0391423 Discourage NOPs reserved for soft-fork upgrades (Peter Todd)
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Credit BlueMatt for libbitcoinsonsensus.h/cpp
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NOP1 to NOP10 are reserved for future soft-fork upgrades. In the event
of an upgrade such NOPs have *VERIFY behavior, meaning that if their
arguments are not correct the script fails. Discouraging these NOPs by
rejecting transactions containing them from the mempool ensures that
we'll never accept transactions, nor mine blocks, with scripts that are
now invalid according to the majority of hashing power even if we're not
yet upgraded. Previously this wasn't an issue as the IsStandard() rules
didn't allow upgradable NOPs anyway, but 7f3b4e95 relaxed the
IsStandard() rules for P2SH redemptions allowing any redeemScript to be
spent.
We *do* allow upgradable NOPs in scripts so long as they are not
executed. This is harmless as there is no opportunity for the script to
be invalid post-upgrade.
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Attempt to codify the possible error statuses associated with script
validation. script/types.h has been created with the expectation that it will
be part of the public lib interface. The other flag enums will be moved here in
a future commit.
Logging has also been removed in order to drop the dependency on core.h. It can
be re-added to bitcoind as-needed. This makes script verification finally free
of application state and boost!
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- add a missing license header
- correct some header orderings etc.
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8473862 Fix all header defines (Pavel Janík)
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d2e74c5 boost: moveonly: split CPubKey and friends to new files (Cory Fields)
78c228c boost: moveonly: move BIP32Hash to hash.h (Cory Fields)
900078a boost: moveonly: create eccryptoverify.h|cpp and move helper functions there (Cory Fields)
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2aa6329 Enable customising node policy for datacarrier data size with a -datacarriersize option (Luke Dashjr)
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Eventually (after 0.10) these files will hold the logic for crypto
verification routines, and CKey/CPubKey will call into them.
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99f41b9 MOVEONLY: core.o -> core/block.o (jtimon)
561e9e9 MOVEONLY: Move script/compressor out of script and put CTxOutCompressor (from core) with it (jtimon)
999a2ab MOVEONLY: separate CTxUndo out of core (jtimon)
4a3587d MOVEONLY: Separate CTransaction and dependencies from core (jtimon)
eda3733 MOVEONLY: Move CFeeRate and Amount constants to amount.o (jtimon)
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core) with it
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-datacarriersize option
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Edited-by: Pieter Wuille <pieter.wuille@gmail.com>
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Also use the new flag as a standard rule, and replace the IsCanonicalPush
standardness check with it (as it is more complete).
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Lots of files ended up with indirect includes from script.h.
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This should move to a util header once their dependencies are cleaned up.
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CScripts
This allows for a reversal of the current behavior.
This:
CScript foo;
CScriptID bar(foo.GetID());
Becomes:
CScript foo;
CScriptID bar(foo);
This way, CScript is no longer dependent on CScriptID or Hash();
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* Delete canonical_tests.cpp, and move the tests to script_tests.cpp.
* Split off SCRIPT_VERIFY_DERSIG from SCRIPT_VERIFY_STRICTENC (the BIP62 part of it).
* Change signature STRICTENC/DERSIG semantics to fail the script entirely rather than the CHECKSIG result (softfork safety, and BIP62 requirement).
* Add many autogenerated tests for several odd cases.
* Mention specific BIP62 rules in the script verification flags.
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9d7cd4c Don't return an address for invalid pubkeys (Andy Alness)
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- ensure all licenses are just MIT
- add a missing header end comment
- ensure alphabetical ordering
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