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This switches bitcoin's transaction/block verification logic to use a
"coin database", which contains all unredeemed transaction output scripts,
amounts and heights.
The name ultraprune comes from the fact that instead of a full transaction
index, we only (need to) keep an index with unspent outputs. For now, the
blocks themselves are kept as usual, although they are only necessary for
serving, rescanning and reorganizing.
The basic datastructures are CCoins (representing the coins of a single
transaction), and CCoinsView (representing a state of the coins database).
There are several implementations for CCoinsView. A dummy, one backed by
the coins database (coins.dat), one backed by the memory pool, and one
that adds a cache on top of it. FetchInputs, ConnectInputs, ConnectBlock,
DisconnectBlock, ... now operate on a generic CCoinsView.
The block switching logic now builds a single cached CCoinsView with
changes to be committed to the database before any changes are made.
This means no uncommitted changes are ever read from the database, and
should ease the transition to another database layer which does not
support transactions (but does support atomic writes), like LevelDB.
For the getrawtransaction() RPC call, access to a txid-to-disk index
would be preferable. As this index is not necessary or even useful
for any other part of the implementation, it is not provided. Instead,
getrawtransaction() uses the coin database to find the block height,
and then scans that block to find the requested transaction. This is
slow, but should suffice for debug purposes.
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Special serializers for script which detect common cases and encode
them much more efficiently. 3 special cases are defined:
* Pay to pubkey hash (encoded as 21 bytes)
* Pay to script hash (encoded as 21 bytes)
* Pay to pubkey starting with 0x02, 0x03 or 0x04 (encoded as 33 bytes)
Other scripts up to 121 bytes require 1 byte + script length. Above
that, scripts up to 16505 bytes require 2 bytes + script length.
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Check for canonical public keys and signatures
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Due to a bug in the implementation of MakeSameSize(), using OP_AND, OP_OR, or OP_XOR with signed values of unequal size will result in the sign-value becoming part of the smaller integer, with nonsensical results. This patch documents the unexpected behavior and provides the basis of a solution should decision be made to fix the bug in the future.
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Only enabled inside tests for now.
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Implement listunspent / getrawtransaction / createrawtransaction /
signrawtransaction, to support creation and
signing-on-multiple-device multisignature transactions.
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Minor refactor to support signrawtx signing/verifying transactions
when it might only have the previous transaction's txid and
txOut.
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This introduces internal types:
* CKeyID: reference (hash160) of a key
* CScriptID: reference (hash160) of a script
* CTxDestination: a boost::variant of the former two
CBitcoinAddress is retrofitted to be a Base58 encoding of a
CTxDestination. This allows all internal code to only use the
internal types, and only have RPC and GUI depend on the base58 code.
Furthermore, the header dependencies are a lot saner now. base58.h is
at the top (right below rpc and gui) instead of at the bottom. For the
rest: wallet -> script -> keystore -> key. Only keystore still requires
a forward declaration of CScript. Solving that would require splitting
script into two layers.
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More than doubles the speed of verifying already-cached signatures
that use compressed pubkeys:
Before: ~200 microseconds
After: ~80 microseconds
(no caching at all: ~3,300 microseconds per signature)
Also encapsulates the signature cache code in a class
and fixes a signed/unsigned comparison warning.
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I originally created a pull to replace the "COPYING" in crypter.cpp and
crypter.h, but it turned out that COPYING was actually the correct
file.
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At these code sites, it is preferable to cast rather than change
a variable's type.
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Fixes several sign-comparison warnings.
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C++ STL ::size() generally returns unsigned, which implies that "int idx"
style of loop variable will generate a signed-vs-unsigned comparison warning
when testing the loop exit condition "idx < blah.size()"
Update areas of the bitcoin code where loop variables may be more properly and
correctly defined as unsigned.
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This commit removes the dependency of serialize.h on PROTOCOL_VERSION,
and makes this parameter required instead of implicit. This is much saner,
as it makes the places where changing a version number can have an
influence obvious.
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keystore if they care)
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so it takes a flag for how to interpret OP_EVAL.
Also increased IsStandard size of scriptSigs to 500 bytes, so
a 3-of-3 multisig transaction IsStandard.
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OP_EVAL is a new opcode that evaluates an item on the stack as a script.
It enables a new type of bitcoin address that needs an arbitrarily
complex script to redeem.
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Initial support for (a and b), (a or b), and 2-of-3 escrow
transactions (where a, b, and c are keys).
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Conflicts:
src/main.cpp
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Collapsed multiple wallet mutexes to a single cs_wallet, to avoid deadlocks with wallet methods that acquired locks in different order.
Also change master RPC call handler to acquire cs_main and cs_wallet locks before executing RPC calls; requiring each RPC call to acquire the right set of locks in the right order was too error-prone.
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To a variation on:
// Copyright (c) 2009-2010 Satoshi Nakamoto
// Copyright (c) 2011 The Bitcoin developers
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Conflicts:
src/script.cpp
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ExtractAddress was called with the keystore as argument in RPC and
UI, limiting results to own keys. This caused empty "address"
fields.
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Conflicts:
src/bitcoinrpc.cpp
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Split off features unrelated to addresses from CBitcoinAddress to
CBase58Data, so they can be reused.
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Instead of conversion functions between pubkey/uint160/address in
base58.h, have a fully fledged class CBitcoinAddress (CAddress was
already taken) to represent addresses.
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Make CKeyStore's interface work on uint160's instead of pubkeys, so
no separate global mapPubKeys is necessary anymore.
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Add default cases to opcode switches to assert that they should never
occur.
Signed-off-by: Giel van Schijndel <me@mortis.eu>
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This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet.
All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase
is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses.
Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is
calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and
a random salt.
By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC
command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options->
Encrypt Wallet.
When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password
to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call
walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first.
A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool
(requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first).
keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the
number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call
keypoolrefill).
Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate
thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some
delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including
one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected,
however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as
ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon
as the specified lock time has arrived.
When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool
returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to
vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time.
A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to
allow the user to change their password via RPC.
Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase,
the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt
is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material.
This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the
memory is not possible.
Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop
systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an
RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main
advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend
coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives
payment except for cases of manual intervention.
Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others
for all their input.
Conflicts:
src/wallet.cpp
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