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Fixes #445
Renames GetOrReuseKeyFromKeyPool to GetKeyFromPool, with fAllowReuse arg and bool result.
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Collapsed multiple wallet mutexes to a single cs_wallet, to avoid deadlocks with wallet methods that acquired locks in different order.
Also change master RPC call handler to acquire cs_main and cs_wallet locks before executing RPC calls; requiring each RPC call to acquire the right set of locks in the right order was too error-prone.
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Encryption readme update and minor rpc.cpp fixes
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To a variation on:
// Copyright (c) 2009-2010 Satoshi Nakamoto
// Copyright (c) 2011 The Bitcoin developers
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Avoid references to addresses using strings, and use CBitcoinAddress
as much as possible. Also added some validity checks on addresses
entered using RPC.
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Instead of conversion functions between pubkey/uint160/address in
base58.h, have a fully fledged class CBitcoinAddress (CAddress was
already taken) to represent addresses.
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Make CKeyStore's interface work on uint160's instead of pubkeys, so
no separate global mapPubKeys is necessary anymore.
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[-Wunused-but-set-variable]
Signed-off-by: Giel van Schijndel <me@mortis.eu>
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Remove several unused variables.
Signed-off-by: Giel van Schijndel <me@mortis.eu>
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[-Wtautological-compare]
Don't check for a negative parameter count, because not only will it
never happen, it doesn't make any sense either.
Invalid sockets (as returned by socket(2)) are always exactly -1 (not
just negative as negative file descriptors are technically not
prohibited by POSIX) on POSIX systems. Since we store them in SOCKET
(unsigned int), however, that really is ~0U (or MAX_UINT) which happens
to be what INVALID_SOCKET is already defined to, so an additional check
for being negative is not only unnecessary (unsigned integers aren't
*ever* negative) its redundant as well (the INVALID_SOCKET comparison is
enough).
Signed-off-by: Giel van Schijndel <me@mortis.eu>
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This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet.
All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase
is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses.
Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is
calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and
a random salt.
By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC
command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options->
Encrypt Wallet.
When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password
to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call
walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first.
A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool
(requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first).
keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the
number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call
keypoolrefill).
Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate
thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some
delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including
one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected,
however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as
ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon
as the specified lock time has arrived.
When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool
returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to
vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time.
A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to
allow the user to change their password via RPC.
Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase,
the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt
is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material.
This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the
memory is not possible.
Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop
systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an
RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main
advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend
coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives
payment except for cases of manual intervention.
Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others
for all their input.
Conflicts:
src/wallet.cpp
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This problem was reported independently by laanwj in Issue #350.
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Signed-off-by: Giel van Schijndel <me@mortis.eu>
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In order to be a proper HTTP implementation clients that aren't allowed
to connect to the RPC server (using -rpcallowip), should receive a
proper HTTP response. So instead of closing the connection on them send
a '403 Forbidden' status.
Signed-off-by: Giel van Schijndel <me@mortis.eu>
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* A new class CKeyStore manages private keys, and script.cpp depends on access to CKeyStore.
* A new class CWallet extends CKeyStore, and contains all former wallet-specific globals; CWallet depends on script.cpp, not the other way around.
* Wallet-specific functions in CTransaction/CTxIn/CTxOut (GetDebit, GetCredit, GetChange, IsMine, IsFromMe), are moved to CWallet, taking their former 'this' argument as an explicit parameter
* CWalletTx objects know which CWallet they belong to, for convenience, so they have their own direct (and caching) GetDebit/... functions.
* Some code was moved from CWalletDB to CWallet, such as handling of reserve keys.
* Main.cpp keeps a set of all 'registered' wallets, which should be informed about updates to the block chain, and does not have any notion about any 'main' wallet. Function in main.cpp that require a wallet (such as GenerateCoins), take an explicit CWallet* argument.
* The actual CWallet instance used by the application is defined in init.cpp as "CWallet* pwalletMain". rpc.cpp and ui.cpp use this variable.
* Functions in main.cpp and db.cpp that are not used by other modules are marked static.
* The code for handling the 'submitorder' message is removed, as it not really compatible with the idea that a node is independent from the wallet(s) connected to it, and obsolete anyway.
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Optimize header dependencies; improve Makefile dependency graph
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For instance any nBits compressed value from 0x1a44b800 thru
0x1a44b9ff will show as difficulty 244139.4816. This patch will
more accurately convert the nBits compressed values to the double
difficulty.
This will display any of the recent difficulty levels slightly
differently though. Early difficulties and testnet difficulties are
not large enough to trigger this bug.
None of the actual targets or compressed targets are changed, only
the conversion to the floating point difficulty is changed and afaik
it is only ever displayed, never converted back so the patch does not
effect the target calculations, binary files, databases nor the binary
protocol.
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Allow move RPC to take account balances negative
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Use case: Customer owes you bitcoins, so you create a payment address
associated with an account with a negative balance (the amount they owe).
When customer pays, that account balance will go to zero.
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Conflicts:
src/sha256.cpp
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there is no internal modification of any file in this commit
files are moved into directories according to established standards in
sourcecode distribution; these directories contain:
src - Files that are used in constructing the executable binaries,
but are not installed.
doc - Files in HTML and text format that document usage, quirks of
the implementation, and contributor checklists.
locale - Files that contain human language translation of strings
used in the program
contrib - Files contributed from distributions or other third party
implementing scripts and auxiliary programs
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