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b224a47a1 Add address_types test (Pieter Wuille)
7ee54fd7c Support downgrading after recovered keypool witness keys (Pieter Wuille)
940a21932 SegWit wallet support (Pieter Wuille)
f37c64e47 Implicitly know about P2WPKH redeemscripts (Pieter Wuille)
57273f2b3 [test] Serialize CTransaction with witness by default (Pieter Wuille)
cf2c0b6f5 Support P2WPKH and P2SH-P2WPKH in dumpprivkey (Pieter Wuille)
37c03d3e0 Support P2WPKH addresses in create/addmultisig (Pieter Wuille)
3eaa003c8 Extend validateaddress information for P2SH-embedded witness (Pieter Wuille)
30a27dc5b Expose method to find key for a single-key destination (Pieter Wuille)
985c79552 Improve witness destination types and use them more (Pieter Wuille)
cbe197470 [refactor] GetAccount{PubKey,Address} -> GetAccountDestination (Pieter Wuille)
0c8ea6380 Abstract out IsSolvable from Witnessifier (Pieter Wuille)
Pull request description:
This implements a minimum viable implementation of SegWit wallet support, based on top of #11389, and includes part of the functionality from #11089.
Two new configuration options are added:
* `-addresstype`, with options `legacy`, `p2sh`, and `bech32`. It controls what kind of addresses are produced by `getnewaddress`, `getaccountaddress`, and `createmultisigaddress`.
* `-changetype`, with the same options, and by default equal to `-addresstype`, that controls what kind of change is used.
All wallet private and public keys can be used for any type of address. Support for address types dependent on different derivation paths will need a major overhaul of how our internal detection of outputs work. I expect that that will happen for a next major version.
The above also applies to imported keys, as having a distinction there but not for normal operations is a disaster for testing, and probably for comprehension of users. This has some ugly effects, like needing to associate the provided label to `importprivkey` with each style address for the corresponding key.
To deal with witness outputs requiring a corresponding redeemscript in wallet, three approaches are used:
* All SegWit addresses created through `getnewaddress` or multisig RPCs explicitly get their redeemscripts added to the wallet file. This means that downgrading after creating a witness address will work, as long as the wallet file is up to date.
* All SegWit keys in the wallet get an _implicit_ redeemscript added, without it being written to the file. This means recovery of an old backup will work, as long as you use new software.
* All keypool keys that are seen used in transactions explicitly get their redeemscripts added to the wallet files. This means that downgrading after recovering from a backup that includes a witness address will work.
These approaches correspond to solutions 3a, 1a, and 5a respectively from https://gist.github.com/sipa/125cfa1615946d0c3f3eec2ad7f250a2. As argued there, there is no full solution for dealing with the case where you both downgrade and restore a backup, so that's also not implemented.
`dumpwallet`, `importwallet`, `importmulti`, `signmessage` and `verifymessage` don't work with SegWit addresses yet. They're remaining TODOs, for this PR or a follow-up. Because of that, several tests unexpectedly run with `-addresstype=legacy` for now.
Tree-SHA512: d425dbe517c0422061ab8dacdc3a6ae47da071450932ed992c79559d922dff7b2574a31a8c94feccd3761c1dffb6422c50055e6dca8e3cf94a169bc95e39e959
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-BEGIN VERIFY SCRIPT-
for f in \
src/*.cpp \
src/*.h \
src/bench/*.cpp \
src/bench/*.h \
src/compat/*.cpp \
src/compat/*.h \
src/consensus/*.cpp \
src/consensus/*.h \
src/crypto/*.cpp \
src/crypto/*.h \
src/crypto/ctaes/*.h \
src/policy/*.cpp \
src/policy/*.h \
src/primitives/*.cpp \
src/primitives/*.h \
src/qt/*.cpp \
src/qt/*.h \
src/qt/test/*.cpp \
src/qt/test/*.h \
src/rpc/*.cpp \
src/rpc/*.h \
src/script/*.cpp \
src/script/*.h \
src/support/*.cpp \
src/support/*.h \
src/support/allocators/*.h \
src/test/*.cpp \
src/test/*.h \
src/wallet/*.cpp \
src/wallet/*.h \
src/wallet/test/*.cpp \
src/wallet/test/*.h \
src/zmq/*.cpp \
src/zmq/*.h
do
base=${f%/*}/ relbase=${base#src/} sed -i "s:#include \"\(.*\)\"\(.*\):if test -e \$base'\\1'; then echo \"#include <\"\$relbase\"\\1>\\2\"; else echo \"#include <\\1>\\2\"; fi:e" $f
done
-END VERIFY SCRIPT-
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No sensible user will ever keep the default settings here, so not
having sensible defaults only serves to screw users who are
paying less attention, which makes for terrible defaults.
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* This removes block-size-limiting code in favor of GBT clients
doing the limiting themselves (if at all).
* -blockmaxsize is deprecated and only used to calculate an implied
blockmaxweight, addressing confusion from multiple users.
* getmininginfo's currentblocksize return value was returning
garbage values, and has been removed, also removing a
GetSerializeSize call in some block generation inner loops and
potentially addressing some performance edge cases.
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This redefines dust to be the value of an output such that it would
cost that value in fees to (create and) spend the output at the dust
relay rate. The previous definition was that it would cost 1/3 of the
value. The default dust relay rate is correspondingly increased to
3000 sat/kB so the actual default dust output value of 546 satoshis
for a non-segwit output remains unchanged. This commit is a refactor
only unless a dustrelayfee is passed on the commandline in which case
that number now needs to be increased by a factor of 3 to get the same
behavior. -dustrelayfee is a hidden command line option.
Note: It's not exactly a refactor due to edge case changes in rounding
as evidenced by the required change to the unit test.
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...from amount.o to policy/feerate.o
Policy, because it moves policy code to the policy directory (common module)
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Remove ability of mining code to fill part of a block with transactions sorted by coin age.
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Three categories of modifications:
1)
1 instance of 'The Bitcoin Core developers \n',
1 instance of 'the Bitcoin Core developers\n',
3 instances of 'Bitcoin Core Developers\n', and
12 instances of 'The Bitcoin developers\n'
are made uniform with the 443 instances of 'The Bitcoin Core developers\n'
2)
3 instances of 'BitPay, Inc\.\n' are made uniform with the other 6
instances of 'BitPay Inc\.\n'
3)
4 instances where there was no '(c)' between the 'Copyright' and the year
where it deviates from the style of the local directory.
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uncompressed keys for segwit scripts
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c59c434 qa: Add test for standardness of segwit v0 outputs (Suhas Daftuar)
1ffaff2 Make witness v0 outputs non-standard before segwit activation (Johnson Lau)
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Includes changes by Suhas Daftuar, Luke-jr, and mruddy.
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- Replace NOP3 with CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY (BIP112)
<nSequence> CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY -> <nSequence>
- Fails if txin.nSequence < nSequence, allowing funds of a txout to be locked for a number of blocks or a duration of time after its inclusion in a block.
- Pull most of CheckLockTime() out into VerifyLockTime(), a local function that will be reused for CheckSequence()
- Add bitwise AND operator to CScriptNum
- Enable CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY as a standard script verify flag
- Transactions that fail CSV verification will be rejected from the mempool, making it easy to test the feature. However blocks containing "invalid" CSV-using transactions will still be accepted; this is *not* the soft-fork required to actually enable CSV for production use.
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b043c4b fix sdaftuar's nits again (Alex Morcos)
a51c79b Bug fix to RPC test (Alex Morcos)
da6ad5f Add RPC test exercising BIP68 (mempool only) (Suhas Daftuar)
c6c2f0f Implement SequenceLocks functions (Alex Morcos)
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it boggles the mind why these nits can't be delivered on a more timely basis
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SequenceLocks functions are used to evaluate sequence lock times or heights per BIP 68.
The majority of this code is copied from maaku in #6312
Further credit: btcdrak, sipa, NicolasDorier
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Make RPC tests have a default block priority size of 50000 (the old default) so we can still use free transactions in RPC tests. When priority is eliminated, we will have to make a different change if we want to continue allowing free txs.
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of lock-time constraints""
This reverts commit 8537ecdfc40181249ec37556015a99cfae4b21fd.
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Revert "Revert "Add rules--presently disabled--for using GetMedianTimePast as endpoint for lock-time calculations""
This reverts commit 40cd32e835092c3158175511da5193193ec54939.
After careful analysis it was determined that the change was, in fact, safe and several people were suffering
momentary confusion about locktime semantics.
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endpoint for lock-time calculations"
This reverts commit 9d55050773d57c0e12005e524f2e54d9e622c6e2.
As noted by Luke-Jr, under some conditions this will accept transactions which are invalid by the network
rules. This happens when the current block time is head of the median time past and a transaction's
locktime is in the middle.
This could be addressed by changing the rule to MAX(this_block_time, MTP+offset) but this solution and
the particular offset used deserve some consideration.
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lock-time constraints"
This reverts commit dea8d21fc63e9f442299c97010e4740558f4f037.
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- ensure header namespaces and end comments are correct
- add missing header end comments
- ensure minimal formatting (add newlines etc.)
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constraints
Transactions are not allowed in the memory pool or selected for inclusion in a block until their lock times exceed chainActive.Tip()->GetMedianTimePast(). However blocks including transactions which are only mature under the old rules are still accepted; this is *not* the soft-fork required to actually rely on the new constraint in production.
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lock-time calculations
The lock-time code currently uses CBlock::nTime as the cutoff point for time based locked transactions. This has the unfortunate outcome of creating a perverse incentive for miners to lie about the time of a block in order to collect more fees by including transactions that by wall clock determination have not yet matured. By using CBlockIndex::GetMedianTimePast from the prior block instead, the self-interested miner no longer gains from generating blocks with fraudulent timestamps. Users can compensate for this change by simply adding an hour (3600 seconds) to their time-based lock times.
If enforced, this would be a soft-fork change. This commit only adds the functionality on an unexecuted code path, without changing the behaviour of Bitcoin Core.
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This adds SCRIPT_VERIFY_LOW_S to STANDARD_SCRIPT_VERIFY_FLAGS which
will make the node require the canonical 'low-s' encoding for
ECDSA signatures when relaying or mining.
Consensus behavior is unchanged.
The rational is explained in a81cd96805ce6b65cca3a40ebbd3b2eb428abb7b:
Absent this kind of test ECDSA is not a strong signature as given
a valid signature {r, s} both that value and {r, -s mod n} are valid.
These two encodings have different hashes allowing third parties a
vector to change users txids. These attacks are avoided by picking
a particular form as canonical and rejecting the other form(s); in
the of the LOW_S rule, the smaller of the two possible S values is
used.
If widely deployed this change would eliminate the last remaining
known vector for nuisance malleability on boring SIGHASH_ALL
p2pkh transactions. On the down-side it will block most
transactions made by sufficiently out of date software.
Unlike the other avenues to change txids on boring transactions this
one was randomly violated by all deployed bitcoin software prior to
its discovery. So, while other malleability vectors where made
non-standard as soon as they were discovered, this one has remained
permitted. Even BIP62 did not propose applying this rule to
old version transactions, but conforming implementations have become
much more common since BIP62 was initially written.
Bitcoin Core has produced compatible signatures since a28fb70e in
September 2013, but this didn't make it into a release until 0.9
in March 2014; Bitcoinj has done so for a similar span of time.
Bitcoinjs and electrum have been more recently updated.
This does not replace the need for BIP62 or similar, as miners can
still cooperate to break transactions. Nor does it replace the
need for wallet software to handle malleability sanely[1]. This
only eliminates the cheap and irritating DOS attack.
[1] On the Malleability of Bitcoin Transactions
Marcin Andrychowicz, Stefan Dziembowski, Daniel Malinowski, Łukasz Mazurek
http://fc15.ifca.ai/preproceedings/bitcoin/paper_9.pdf
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- [script/standard.o] IsStandard
- [main.o] IsStandardTx
- [main.o] AreInputsStandard
Also, don't use namespace std in policy.cpp
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