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path: root/src/policy/policy.h
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2016-02-14BIP112: Implement CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFYMark Friedenbach
- Replace NOP3 with CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY (BIP112) <nSequence> CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY -> <nSequence> - Fails if txin.nSequence < nSequence, allowing funds of a txout to be locked for a number of blocks or a duration of time after its inclusion in a block. - Pull most of CheckLockTime() out into VerifyLockTime(), a local function that will be reused for CheckSequence() - Add bitwise AND operator to CScriptNum - Enable CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY as a standard script verify flag - Transactions that fail CSV verification will be rejected from the mempool, making it easy to test the feature. However blocks containing "invalid" CSV-using transactions will still be accepted; this is *not* the soft-fork required to actually enable CSV for production use.
2016-02-12Merge #7184: Implement SequenceLocks functions for BIP 68Wladimir J. van der Laan
b043c4b fix sdaftuar's nits again (Alex Morcos) a51c79b Bug fix to RPC test (Alex Morcos) da6ad5f Add RPC test exercising BIP68 (mempool only) (Suhas Daftuar) c6c2f0f Implement SequenceLocks functions (Alex Morcos)
2016-02-11fix sdaftuar's nits againAlex Morcos
it boggles the mind why these nits can't be delivered on a more timely basis
2016-02-10Implement SequenceLocks functionsAlex Morcos
SequenceLocks functions are used to evaluate sequence lock times or heights per BIP 68. The majority of this code is copied from maaku in #6312 Further credit: btcdrak, sipa, NicolasDorier
2015-12-13Bump copyright headers to 2015MarcoFalke
2015-11-30Change default block priority size to 0Alex Morcos
Make RPC tests have a default block priority size of 50000 (the old default) so we can still use free transactions in RPC tests. When priority is eliminated, we will have to make a different change if we want to continue allowing free txs.
2015-11-16EstimateSmart functions consider mempool min feeAlex Morcos
2015-11-03Revert "Revert "Enable policy enforcing GetMedianTimePast as the end point ↵Gregory Maxwell
of lock-time constraints"" This reverts commit 8537ecdfc40181249ec37556015a99cfae4b21fd.
2015-11-03Restore MedianTimePast for locktime.Gregory Maxwell
Revert "Revert "Add rules--presently disabled--for using GetMedianTimePast as endpoint for lock-time calculations"" This reverts commit 40cd32e835092c3158175511da5193193ec54939. After careful analysis it was determined that the change was, in fact, safe and several people were suffering momentary confusion about locktime semantics.
2015-11-01Revert "Add rules--presently disabled--for using GetMedianTimePast as ↵Gregory Maxwell
endpoint for lock-time calculations" This reverts commit 9d55050773d57c0e12005e524f2e54d9e622c6e2. As noted by Luke-Jr, under some conditions this will accept transactions which are invalid by the network rules. This happens when the current block time is head of the median time past and a transaction's locktime is in the middle. This could be addressed by changing the rule to MAX(this_block_time, MTP+offset) but this solution and the particular offset used deserve some consideration.
2015-11-01Revert "Enable policy enforcing GetMedianTimePast as the end point of ↵Gregory Maxwell
lock-time constraints" This reverts commit dea8d21fc63e9f442299c97010e4740558f4f037.
2015-10-27[Trivial] ensure minimal header conventionsPhilip Kaufmann
- ensure header namespaces and end comments are correct - add missing header end comments - ensure minimal formatting (add newlines etc.)
2015-10-23Enable policy enforcing GetMedianTimePast as the end point of lock-time ↵Mark Friedenbach
constraints Transactions are not allowed in the memory pool or selected for inclusion in a block until their lock times exceed chainActive.Tip()->GetMedianTimePast(). However blocks including transactions which are only mature under the old rules are still accepted; this is *not* the soft-fork required to actually rely on the new constraint in production.
2015-10-23Add rules--presently disabled--for using GetMedianTimePast as endpoint for ↵Mark Friedenbach
lock-time calculations The lock-time code currently uses CBlock::nTime as the cutoff point for time based locked transactions. This has the unfortunate outcome of creating a perverse incentive for miners to lie about the time of a block in order to collect more fees by including transactions that by wall clock determination have not yet matured. By using CBlockIndex::GetMedianTimePast from the prior block instead, the self-interested miner no longer gains from generating blocks with fraudulent timestamps. Users can compensate for this change by simply adding an hour (3600 seconds) to their time-based lock times. If enforced, this would be a soft-fork change. This commit only adds the functionality on an unexecuted code path, without changing the behaviour of Bitcoin Core.
2015-10-06Test LowS in standardness, removes nuisance malleability vector.Gregory Maxwell
This adds SCRIPT_VERIFY_LOW_S to STANDARD_SCRIPT_VERIFY_FLAGS which will make the node require the canonical 'low-s' encoding for ECDSA signatures when relaying or mining. Consensus behavior is unchanged. The rational is explained in a81cd96805ce6b65cca3a40ebbd3b2eb428abb7b: Absent this kind of test ECDSA is not a strong signature as given a valid signature {r, s} both that value and {r, -s mod n} are valid. These two encodings have different hashes allowing third parties a vector to change users txids. These attacks are avoided by picking a particular form as canonical and rejecting the other form(s); in the of the LOW_S rule, the smaller of the two possible S values is used. If widely deployed this change would eliminate the last remaining known vector for nuisance malleability on boring SIGHASH_ALL p2pkh transactions. On the down-side it will block most transactions made by sufficiently out of date software. Unlike the other avenues to change txids on boring transactions this one was randomly violated by all deployed bitcoin software prior to its discovery. So, while other malleability vectors where made non-standard as soon as they were discovered, this one has remained permitted. Even BIP62 did not propose applying this rule to old version transactions, but conforming implementations have become much more common since BIP62 was initially written. Bitcoin Core has produced compatible signatures since a28fb70e in September 2013, but this didn't make it into a release until 0.9 in March 2014; Bitcoinj has done so for a similar span of time. Bitcoinjs and electrum have been more recently updated. This does not replace the need for BIP62 or similar, as miners can still cooperate to break transactions. Nor does it replace the need for wallet software to handle malleability sanely[1]. This only eliminates the cheap and irritating DOS attack. [1] On the Malleability of Bitcoin Transactions Marcin Andrychowicz, Stefan Dziembowski, Daniel Malinowski, Łukasz Mazurek http://fc15.ifca.ai/preproceedings/bitcoin/paper_9.pdf
2015-06-26Policy: MOVEONLY: 3 functions to policy.o:Luke Dashjr
- [script/standard.o] IsStandard - [main.o] IsStandardTx - [main.o] AreInputsStandard Also, don't use namespace std in policy.cpp
2015-06-26Policy: MOVEONLY: Create policy/policy.h with some constantsJorge Timón