Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
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e56771365b Do not use uppercase characters in source code filenames (practicalswift)
419a1983ca docs: Add a note about the source code filename naming convention (practicalswift)
Pull request description:
Add a note about the source code filename naming convention.
Tree-SHA512: 8d329bd9e19bcd26e74b0862fb0bc2369b46095dbd3e69d34859908632763abd7c3d00ccc44ee059772ad4bae4460c2bcc1c0e22fd9d8876d57e5fcd346cea4b
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notifications
87fe292d897e09e176ac7e254144466c319cc9ac doc: Mention disabling BIP61 in bips.md (Wladimir J. van der Laan)
fe16dd8226d924f44432c5b5014aa49ff45c82ff net: Add option `-enablebip61` to configure sending of BIP61 notifications (Wladimir J. van der Laan)
Pull request description:
This commit adds a boolean option `-peersendreject`, defaulting to `1`, that can be used to disable the sending of [BIP61](https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0061.mediawiki) `reject` messages. This functionality has been requested for various reasons:
- security (DoS): reject messages can reveal internal state that can be used to target certain resources such as the mempool more easily.
- bandwidth: a typical node sends lots of reject messages; this counts against upstream bandwidth. Also the reject messages tend to be larger than the message that was rejected.
On the other hand, reject messages can be useful while developing client software (I found them indispensable while creating bitcoin-submittx), as well as for our own test cases, so whatever the default becomes on the long run, IMO the functionality should be retained as option. But that's a discussion for later, for now it's simply a node operator decision.
Also adds a RPC test that checks the functionality.
Tree-SHA512: 9488cc53e13cd8e5c6f8eb472a44309572673405c1d1438c3488f627fae622c95e2198bde5ed7d29e56b948e2918bf1920239e9f865889f4c37c097c37a4d7a9
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0bf431870e45d8e20c4671e51a782ebf97b75fac net: Serve blocks directly from disk when possible (Wladimir J. van der Laan)
Pull request description:
In `ProcessGetBlockData`, send the block data directly from disk if type MSG_WITNESS_BLOCK is requested. This is a valid shortcut as the on-disk format matches the network format.
This is expected to increase performance because a deserialization and subsequent serialization roundtrip is avoided.
Tree-SHA512: 9a9500b4c1354eaae1a6f1c6ef2416c1c1985029852589266f3a70e808f6c7482c135e9ab251a527566935378ab7c32dba4ed43ba5451e802d8e72b77d1ba472
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In `ProcessGetBlockData`, send the block data directly from disk if
type MSG_WITNESS_BLOCK is requested. This is a valid shortcut as the
on-disk format matches the network format.
This is expected to increase performance because a deserialization and
subsequent serialization roundtrip is avoided.
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This commit adds a boolean option `-enablebip61`, defaulting to `1`, that
can be used to disable the sending of BIP61 `reject` messages. This
functionality has been requested for various reasons:
- security (DoS): reject messages can reveal internal state that can be
used to target certain resources such as the mempool more easily.
- bandwidth: a typical node sends lots of reject messages; this counts
against upstream bandwidth. Also the reject messages tend to be larger
than the message that was rejected.
On the other hand, reject messages can be useful while developing client
software (I found them indispensable while creating bitcoin-submittx),
as well as for our own test cases, so whatever the default becomes on the
long run, IMO the functionality should be retained as option. But that's
a discussion for later.
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fad63eb [logging] Don't incorrectly log that REJECT messages are unknown. (John Newbery)
Pull request description:
Reject messages are logged to debug.log if NET debug logging is enabled.
Because of the way the `ProcessMessages()` function is structured,
processing for REJECT messages will also drop through to the default
branch and incorrectly log `Unknown command "reject" from peer-?`. Fix
that by exiting from `ProcessMessages()` early.
without this PR:
```
2018-05-03T17:37:00.930600Z received: reject (21 bytes) peer=0
2018-05-03T17:37:00.930620Z Reject message code 16: spammy spam
2018-05-03T17:37:00.930656Z Unknown command "reject" from peer=0
```
with this PR:
```
2018-05-03T17:35:04.751246Z received: reject (21 bytes) peer=0
2018-05-03T17:35:04.751274Z Reject message code 16: spammy spam
```
Tree-SHA512: 5c84c98433ab99e0db2dd481f9c2db6f87ff0d39022ff317a791737e918714bbcb4a23e81118212ed8e594ebcf098ab7f52f7fd5e21ebc3f07b1efb279b9b30b
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Do not share functions that are meant to be translation unit local with
other translation units. Use internal linkage for those consistently.
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Reject messages are logged to debug.log if NET debug logging is enabled.
Because of the way the `ProcessMessages()` function is structured,
processing for REJECT messages will also drop through to the default
branch and incorrectly log `Unknown command "reject" from peer-?`. Fix
that by exiting from `ProcessMessages()` early.
without this PR:
```
2018-05-03T17:37:00.930600Z received: reject (21 bytes) peer=0
2018-05-03T17:37:00.930620Z Reject message code 16: spammy spam
2018-05-03T17:37:00.930656Z Unknown command "reject" from peer=0
```
with this PR:
```
2018-05-03T17:35:04.751246Z received: reject (21 bytes) peer=0
2018-05-03T17:35:04.751274Z Reject message code 16: spammy spam
```
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The linter only checked `LogPrintf`, not `LogPrint`.
Fix the remaining cases.
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Seems providing at least minimal visibility to the failure is a good practice.
The only remaining ignored state is in LoadExternalBlockFile, where logging
would likely be spammy.
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a5bca13 Bugfix: Include <memory> for std::unique_ptr (Luke Dashjr)
Pull request description:
Not sure why all these includes were missing, but it's breaking builds for some users:
https://bugs.gentoo.org/show_bug.cgi?id=652142
(Added to all files with a reference to `std::unique_ptr`)
Tree-SHA512: 8a2c67513ca07b9bb52c34e8a20b15e56f8af2530310d9ee9b0a69694dd05e02e7a3683f14101a2685d457672b56addec591a0bb83900a0eb8e2a43d43200509
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92fabcd44 Add LookupBlockIndex function (João Barbosa)
43a32b739 Add missing cs_lock in CreateWalletFromFile (João Barbosa)
f814a3e8f Fix cs_main lock in LoadExternalBlockFile (João Barbosa)
c651df8b3 Lock cs_main while loading block index in AppInitMain (João Barbosa)
02de6a6bc Assert cs_main is held when accessing mapBlockIndex (João Barbosa)
Pull request description:
Replace all `mapBlockIndex` lookups with the new `LookupBlockIndex()`. In some cases it avoids a second lookup.
Tree-SHA512: ca31118f028a19721f2191d86f2dd398144d04df345694575a64aeb293be2f85785201480c3c578a0ec99690516205708558c0fd4168b09313378fd4e60a8412
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eb91835 Add setter for g_initial_block_download_completed (Jonas Schnelli)
3f56df5 [QA] add NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED address relay and sync test (Jonas Schnelli)
158e1a6 [QA] fix mininode CAddress ser/deser (Jonas Schnelli)
fa999af [QA] Allow addrman loopback tests (add debug option -addrmantest) (Jonas Schnelli)
6fe57bd Connect to peers signaling NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED when out-of-IBD (Jonas Schnelli)
31c45a9 Accept addresses with NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED flag (Jonas Schnelli)
Pull request description:
Eventually connect to peers signalling NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED if we are out of IBD.
Accept and relay NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED peers in addrman.
Tree-SHA512: 8a238fc97f767f81cae1866d6cc061390f23a72af4a711d2f7158c77f876017986abb371d213d1c84019eef7be4ca951e8e6f83fda36769c4e1a1d763f787037
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This resolves a bug introduced in
66aa1d58a158991a8014a91335b5bc9c00062f56 where, if when responding
to a series of transaction requests in a getdata we hit the send
buffer limit and set fPauseSend, we will skip one transaction per
call to ProcessGetData.
Bug found by Cory Fields (@theuni).
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9ad6746ccd Use static_cast instead of C-style casts for non-fundamental types (practicalswift)
Pull request description:
A C-style cast is equivalent to try casting in the following order:
1. `const_cast(...)`
2. `static_cast(...)`
3. `const_cast(static_cast(...))`
4. `reinterpret_cast(...)`
5. `const_cast(reinterpret_cast(...))`
By using `static_cast<T>(...)` explicitly we avoid the possibility of an unintentional and dangerous `reinterpret_cast`. Furthermore `static_cast<T>(...)` allows for easier grepping of casts.
For a more thorough discussion, see ["ES.49: If you must use a cast, use a named cast"](https://isocpp.github.io/CppCoreGuidelines/CppCoreGuidelines#es49-if-you-must-use-a-cast-use-a-named-cast) in the C++ Core Guidelines (Stroustrup & Sutter).
Tree-SHA512: bd6349b7ea157da93a47b8cf238932af5dff84731374ccfd69b9f732fabdad1f9b1cdfca67497040f14eaa85346391404f4c0495e22c467f26ca883cd2de4d3c
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This moves the error messages for misbehavior (when available) into the
line that reports the misbehavior, as well as moves the logging to the
`net` category.
This is a continuation of #11583 and avoids serious-looking errors due
to misbehaving peers.
To do this, Misbehaving() gains an optional `message` argument.
E.g. change:
2018-01-18 16:02:27 Misbehaving: x.x.x.x:62174 peer=164603 (80 -> 100) BAN THRESHOLD EXCEEDED
2018-01-18 16:02:27 ERROR: non-continuous headers sequence
to
2018-01-18 16:02:27 Misbehaving: x.x.x.x:62174 peer=164603 (80 -> 100) BAN THRESHOLD EXCEEDED: non-continuous headers sequence
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This should (marginally) speed up validationinterface queue
draining by avoiding a cs_main lock in one client.
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fbf327b Minimal code changes to allow msvc compilation. (Aaron Clauson)
Pull request description:
These changes are required to allow the Bitcoin source to build with Microsoft's C++ compiler (#11562 is also required).
I looked around for a better place for the typedef of ssize_t which is in random.h. The best candidate looks like src/compat.h but I figured including that header in random.h is a bigger change than the typedef. Note that the same typedef is in at least two other places including the OpenSSL and Berkeley DB headers so some of the Bitcoin code already picks it up.
Tree-SHA512: aa6cc6283015e08ab074641f9abdc116c4dc58574dc90f75e7a5af4cc82946d3052370e5cbe855fb6180c00f8dc66997d3724ff0412e4b7417e51b6602154825
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file already included
a720b92 Remove includes in .cpp files for things the corresponding .h file already included (practicalswift)
Pull request description:
Remove includes in .cpp files for things the corresponding .h file already included.
Example case:
* `addrdb.cpp` includes `addrdb.h` and `fs.h`
* `addrdb.h` includes `fs.h`
Then remove the direct inclusion of `fs.h` in `addrman.cpp` and rely on the indirect inclusion of `fs.h` via the included `addrdb.h`.
In line with the header include guideline (see #10575).
Tree-SHA512: 8704b9de3011a4c234db336a39f7d2c139e741cf0f7aef08a5d3e05197e1e18286b863fdab25ae9638af4ff86b3d52e5cab9eed66bfa2476063aa5c79f9b0346
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be9f38c Do not make it trivial for inbound peers to generate log entries (Matt Corallo)
Pull request description:
Based on #11580 because I'm lazy.
We should generally avoid writing to debug.log unconditionally for
inbound peers which misbehave (the peer being about to be banned
being an exception, since they cannot do this twice).
Tree-SHA512: 8e59c8d08d00b1527951b30f4842d010a4c2fc440503ade112baa2c1b9afd0e0d1c5c2df83dde25183a242af45089cf9b9f873b71796771232ffb6c5fc6cc0cc
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included
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-BEGIN VERIFY SCRIPT-
for f in \
src/*.cpp \
src/*.h \
src/bench/*.cpp \
src/bench/*.h \
src/compat/*.cpp \
src/compat/*.h \
src/consensus/*.cpp \
src/consensus/*.h \
src/crypto/*.cpp \
src/crypto/*.h \
src/crypto/ctaes/*.h \
src/policy/*.cpp \
src/policy/*.h \
src/primitives/*.cpp \
src/primitives/*.h \
src/qt/*.cpp \
src/qt/*.h \
src/qt/test/*.cpp \
src/qt/test/*.h \
src/rpc/*.cpp \
src/rpc/*.h \
src/script/*.cpp \
src/script/*.h \
src/support/*.cpp \
src/support/*.h \
src/support/allocators/*.h \
src/test/*.cpp \
src/test/*.h \
src/wallet/*.cpp \
src/wallet/*.h \
src/wallet/test/*.cpp \
src/wallet/test/*.h \
src/zmq/*.cpp \
src/zmq/*.h
do
base=${f%/*}/ relbase=${base#src/} sed -i "s:#include \"\(.*\)\"\(.*\):if test -e \$base'\\1'; then echo \"#include <\"\$relbase\"\\1>\\2\"; else echo \"#include <\\1>\\2\"; fi:e" $f
done
-END VERIFY SCRIPT-
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in ConsiderEviction
Static analyzer (and humans!) will see ...
```
else if (state.m_chain_sync.m_timeout == 0 || (state.m_chain_sync.m_work_header != nullptr && ...
```
... and infer that state.m_chain_sync.m_work_header might be set to nullptr,
and thus flag `state.m_chain_sync.m_work_header->GetBlockHash().ToString()`
as a potential null pointer dereference.
This commit makes the tacit assumption (m_work_header != nullptr) explicit.
Code introduced in 5a6d00 ("Permit disconnection of outbound peers on
bad/slow chains") which was merged into master four days ago.
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We should generally avoid writing to debug.log unconditionally for
inbound peers which misbehave (the peer being about to be banned
being an exception, since they cannot do this twice).
To avoid removing logs for outbound peers, a new log is added to
notify users when a new outbound peer is connected which mimics
the version print.
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a357293 Use MakeUnique<Db>(...) (practicalswift)
3e09b39 Use MakeUnique<T>(...) instead of std::unique_ptr<T>(new T(...)) (practicalswift)
8617989 Add MakeUnique (substitute for C++14 std::make_unique) (practicalswift)
d223bc9 Use unique_ptr for pcoinscatcher/pcoinsdbview/pcoinsTip/pblocktree (practicalswift)
b45c597 Use unique_ptr for pdbCopy (Db) and fix potential memory leak (practicalswift)
29ab96d Use unique_ptr for dbenv (DbEnv) (practicalswift)
f72cbf9 Use unique_ptr for pfilter (CBloomFilter) (practicalswift)
8ccf1bb Use unique_ptr for sem{Addnode,Outbound} (CSemaphore) (practicalswift)
73db063 Use unique_ptr for upnp_thread (boost::thread) (practicalswift)
0024531 Use unique_ptr for dbw (CDBWrapper) (practicalswift)
fa6d122 Use unique_ptr:s for {fee,short,long}Stats (TxConfirmStats) (practicalswift)
5a6f768 Use unique_ptr for httpRPCTimerInterface (HTTPRPCTimerInterface) (practicalswift)
860e912 Use unique_ptr for pwalletMain (CWallet) (practicalswift)
Pull request description:
Use `std::unique_ptr` (C++11) where possible.
Rationale:
1. Avoid resource leaks (specifically: forgetting to `delete` an object created using `new`)
2. Avoid undefined behaviour (specifically: double `delete`:s)
**Note to reviewers:** Please let me know if I've missed any obvious `std::unique_ptr` candidates. Hopefully this PR should cover all the trivial cases.
Tree-SHA512: 9fbeb47b800ab8ff4e0be9f2a22ab63c23d5c613a0c6716d9183db8d22ddbbce592fb8384a8b7874bf7375c8161efb13ca2197ad6f24b75967148037f0f7b20c
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getheaders
725b79a [test] Verify node doesn't send headers that haven't been fully validated (Russell Yanofsky)
3788a84 Do not send (potentially) invalid headers in response to getheaders (Matt Corallo)
Pull request description:
Nowhere else in the protocol do we send headers which are for
blocks we have not fully validated except in response to getheaders
messages with a null locator. On my public node I have not seen any
such request (whether for an invalid block or not) in at least two
years of debug.log output, indicating that this should have minimal
impact.
Tree-SHA512: c1f6e0cdcdfb78ea577d555f9b3ceb1b4b60eff4f6cf313bfd8b576c9562d797bea73abc23f7011f249ae36dd539c715f3d20487ac03ace60e84e1b77c0c1e1a
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* pcoinscatcher (CCoinsViewErrorCatcher)
* pcoinsdbview (CCoinsViewDB)
* pcoinsTip (CCoinsViewCache)
* pblocktree (CBlockTreeDB)
* Remove variables shadowing pcoinsdbview
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-Wthread-safety-analysis if available.
76ea17c79 Add mutex requirement for AddToCompactExtraTransactions(…) (practicalswift)
4616c825a Use -Wthread-safety-analysis if available (+ -Werror=thread-safety-analysis if --enable-werror) (practicalswift)
7e319d639 Fix -Wthread-safety-analysis warnings. Change the sync.h primitives to std from boost. (Matt Corallo)
Pull request description:
* Add mutex requirement for `AddToCompactExtraTransactions(…)`.
* Use `-Wthread-safety-analysis` if available.
* Rebased on top of https://github.com/TheBlueMatt/bitcoin/commits/2017-08-test-10923 - now includes: Fix -Wthread-safety-analysis warnings. Change the sync.h primitives to std from boost.
Tree-SHA512: fb7365f85daa2741c276a1c899228181a8d46af51db7fbbdffceeaff121a3eb2ab74d7c8bf5e7de879bcc5042d00d24cb4649c312d51caba45a3f6135fd8b38f
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The vector `vExtraTxnForCompact`, which is guarded by the mutex
`cs_main`, is accessed in `AddToCompactExtraTransactions(…)`.
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6262915 Add unit test for stale tip checking (Suhas Daftuar)
83df257 Add CConnmanTest to mutate g_connman in tests (João Barbosa)
ac7b37c Connect to an extra outbound peer if our tip is stale (Suhas Daftuar)
db32a65 Track tip update time and last new block announcement from each peer (Suhas Daftuar)
2d4327d net: Allow connecting to extra outbound peers (Suhas Daftuar)
Pull request description:
This is an alternative approach to #11534. Rather than disconnect an outbound peer when our tip looks stale, instead try to connect to an additional outbound peer.
Periodically, check to see if we have more outbound peers than we target (ie if any extra peers are in use), and if so, disconnect the one that least recently announced a new block (breaking ties by choosing the newest peer that we connected to).
Tree-SHA512: 8f19e910e0bb36867f81783e020af225f356451899adfc7ade1895d6d3bd5afe51c83759610dfd10c62090c4fe404efa0283b2f63fde0bd7da898a1aaa7fb281
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If our tip hasn't updated in a while, that may be because our peers are
not relaying blocks to us that we would consider valid. Allow connection
to an additional outbound peer in that circumstance.
Also, periodically check to see if we are exceeding our target number of
outbound peers, and disconnect the one which has least recently
announced a new block to us (choosing the newest such peer in the case
of tie).
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block (more effeciently)
f3d4adf Make p2p-acceptablock not an extended test (Matt Corallo)
00dcda6 [qa] test that invalid blocks on an invalid chain get a disconnect (Matt Corallo)
015a525 Reject headers building on invalid chains by tracking invalidity (Matt Corallo)
932f118 Accept unrequested blocks with work equal to our tip (Matt Corallo)
3d9c70c Stop always storing blocks from whitelisted peers (Matt Corallo)
3b4ac43 Rewrite p2p-acceptblock in preparation for slight behavior changes (Matt Corallo)
Pull request description:
@sdaftuar pointed out that the version in #11487 was somewhat DoS-able as someone could feed you a valid chain that forked off the the last checkpoint block and force you to do lots of work just walking backwards across blocks for each new block they gave you. We came up with a few proposals but settled on the one implemented here as likely the simplest without obvious DoS issues. It uses our existing on-load mapBlockIndex walk to make sure everything that descends from an invalid block is marked as such, and then simply caches blocks which we attempted to connect but which were found to be invalid. To avoid DoS issues during IBD, this will need to depend on #11458.
Includes tests from #11487.
Tree-SHA512: 46aff8332908e122dae72ceb5fe8cd241902c2281a87f58a5fb486bf69d46458d84a096fdcb5f3e8e07fbcf7466232b10c429f4d67855425f11b38ac0bf612e1
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There is no reason to wish to store blocks on disk always just
because a peer is whitelisted. This appears to be a historical
quirk to avoid breaking things when the accept limits were added.
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Nowhere else in the protocol do we send headers which are for
blocks we have not fully validated except in response to getheaders
messages with a null locator. On my public node I have not seen any
such request (whether for an invalid block or not) in at least two
years of debug.log output, indicating that this should have minimal
impact.
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