Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
|
signals
e57980b4738c10344baf136de3e050a3cb958ca5 [mempool] Remove NotifyEntryAdded and NotifyEntryRemoved callbacks (John Newbery)
2dd561f36124972d2364f941de9c3417c65f05b6 [validation] Remove pool member from ConnectTrace (John Newbery)
969b65f3f527631ede1a31c7855151e5c5d91f8f [validation] Remove NotifyEntryRemoved callback from ConnectTrace (John Newbery)
5613f9842b4000fed088b8cf7b99674c328d15e1 [validation] Remove conflictedTxs from PerBlockConnectTrace (John Newbery)
cdb893443cc16edf974f099b8485e04b3db1b1d7 [validation interface] Remove vtxConflicted from BlockConnected (John Newbery)
1168394d759b13af68acec6d5bfa04aaa24561f8 [wallet] Notify conflicted transactions in TransactionRemovedFromMempool (John Newbery)
Pull request description:
These boost signals were added in #9371, before we had a `TransactionRemovedFromMempool` method in the validation interface. The `NotifyEntryAdded` callback was used by validation to build a vector of conflicted transactions when connecting a block, which the wallet was notified of in the `BlockConnected` CValidationInterface callback.
Now that we have a `TransactionRemovedFromMempool` callback, we can fire that signal directly from the mempool for conflicted transactions.
Note that #9371 was implemented to ensure `-walletnotify` events were fired for these conflicted transaction. We inadvertently stopped sending these notifications in #16624 (Sep 2019 commit 7e89994). We should probably fix that, but in a different PR.
ACKs for top commit:
jonatack:
Re-ACK e57980b
ryanofsky:
Code review ACK e57980b4738c10344baf136de3e050a3cb958ca5, no code changes since previous review, but helpful new code comments have been added and the PR description is now more clear about where the old code came from
Tree-SHA512: 3bdbaf1ef2731e788462d4756e69c42a1efdcf168691ce1bbfdaa4b7b55ac3c5b1fd4ab7b90bcdec653703600501b4224d252cfc086aef28f9ce0da3b0563a69
|
|
In PeerLogicValidation::PeerLogicValidation() we would schedule a lambda
function to execute later, capturing the local variable
`consensusParams` by reference.
Presumably this was considered safe because `consensusParams` is a
reference itself to a global variable which is not supposed to change,
but it can in tests.
Fixes https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/18372
|
|
fa36f3a29538012a6eb5c3402b3b3c18fd32b230 refactor: move DUMP_BANS_INTERVAL to banman.h (MarcoFalke)
fadafb83cff9a9a340eac1b5a853e2467d5e0ef7 scheduler: Make schedule* methods type safe (MarcoFalke)
fa70ccc6c4e304646b4610228f3975b3a9762643 scheduler: Use C++11 member initialization, add shutdown assert (MarcoFalke)
Pull request description:
Main benefit is that stuff like `15 * 60 * 1000` is replaced by `minutes{15}`
ACKs for top commit:
vasild:
ACK fa36f3a (code review, not tested)
ajtowns:
ACK fa36f3a29538012a6eb5c3402b3b3c18fd32b230
jonatack:
ACK fa36f3a
Tree-SHA512: f35f1a1d643dfa676bd47474659f6492ed05cca04cdb556064b126f654a6a44a4b93fcaddcdcd41faf81b8f11439c11e5c7ab88685ba2eef12f7188843d17ad8
|
|
This refactor does two things:
* Pass mempool in to PeerLogicValidation
* Pass m_mempool around where needed
|
|
The wallet now uses TransactionRemovedFromMempool to be notified about
conflicted wallet, and no other clients use vtxConflicted.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
to fix -Wrange-loop-analysis warning introduced in a029e18
|
|
check
a029e18c2bf67dd00552b0f4bbc85fa2fa5b973b Use rolling bloom filter of recent block tx's for AlreadyHave() check (Suhas Daftuar)
Pull request description:
In order to determine whether to download or process a relayed transaction, we first try to check whether we already have the transaction -- either in the mempool, in our filter of recently rejected transactions, in our orphan pool, or already confirmed in a block.
Prior to this commit, the heuristic for checking whether a transaction was confirmed in a block is based on whether there's a coin cache entry corresponding to the 0- or 1-index vout of the tx. While that is a quick check, it is very imprecise (eg if those outputs were already spent in another block, we wouldn't detect that the transaction has already been confirmed) -- we can do better by just keeping a rolling bloom filter of the transactions in recent blocks, which will better capture the case of a transaction which has been confirmed and then fully spent.
This should reduce the bandwidth that we waste by requesting transactions which will not be accepted to the mempool.
To avoid relay problems for transactions which have been included in a recent block but then reorged out of the chain, we clear the bloom filter whenever a block is disconnected.
ACKs for top commit:
MarcoFalke:
re-ACK a029e18c2b only stylistic and comment fixups 🍴
sipa:
utACK a029e18c2bf67dd00552b0f4bbc85fa2fa5b973b
jonatack:
Code review ACK a029e18c2bf67dd00552b0f4bbc85fa2fa5b973b also built/ran tests and am running bitcoind with mempool debug logging and custom logging. Looked a bit into CRollingBloomFilter and also the mempool median time past checks mentioned above; I don't have a deep understanding of those areas yet but the concept here and changes LGTM. Tests and other optimisations could be added as a follow-up. In favor of seeing this move forward if no major immediate concerns.
Tree-SHA512: 784c9a35bcd3af5db469063ac7d26b4bac430e451e5637a34d8a538c3ffd1433abdd3f06e5584e7a84bfa9e791449e61819397b5a6c7890fa59d78ec3ba507b2
|
|
In order to determine whether to download or process a relayed transaction, we
try to determine if we already have the transaction, either in the mempool, in
our recently rejected filter, in our orphan pool, or already confirmed in the
chain itself.
Prior to this commit, the heuristic for checking the chain is based on whether
there's an output corresponding to the 0- or 1-index vout in our coin cache.
While that is a quick check, it is very imprecise (say if those outputs were
already spent in a block) -- we can do better by just keeping a rolling bloom
filter of the transactions in recent blocks, which will capture the case of a
transaction which has been confirmed and then fully spent already.
To avoid relay problems for transactions which have been included in a recent
block but then reorged out of the chain, we clear the bloom filter whenever a
block is disconnected.
|
|
Identified via -Wdocumentation, e.g.:
./rpc/rawtransaction_util.h:31:13: error: parameter 'prevTxs' not found in the function declaration [-Werror,-Wdocumentation]
* @param prevTxs Array of previous txns outputs that tx depends on but may not yet be in the block chain
^~~~~~~
./rpc/rawtransaction_util.h:31:13: note: did you mean 'prevTxsUnival'?
* @param prevTxs Array of previous txns outputs that tx depends on but may not yet be in the block chain
^~~~~~~
prevTxsUnival
netbase.cpp:766:11: error: parameter 'outProxyConnectionFailed[out]' not found in the function declaration [-Werror,-Wdocumentation]
* @param outProxyConnectionFailed[out] Whether or not the connection to the
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
netbase.cpp:766:11: note: did you mean 'outProxyConnectionFailed'?
* @param outProxyConnectionFailed[out] Whether or not the connection to the
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
outProxyConnectionFailed
|
|
-BEGIN VERIFY SCRIPT-
./contrib/devtools/copyright_header.py update ./
-END VERIFY SCRIPT-
|
|
-BEGIN VERIFY SCRIPT-
# Delete outdated alias for RecursiveMutex
sed -i -e '/CCriticalSection/d' ./src/sync.h
# Replace use of outdated alias with RecursiveMutex
sed -i -e 's/CCriticalSection/RecursiveMutex/g' $(git grep -l CCriticalSection)
-END VERIFY SCRIPT-
|
|
4bdd68f301a9cee3360deafc7531c638e923226b Add missing typeinfo includes (Wladimir J. van der Laan)
4d88c3dcb61e7c075ed3dd442044e0eff4e3c8de net: Log to net category for exceptions in ProcessMessages (Wladimir J. van der Laan)
Pull request description:
Remove the forest of special exceptions based on string matching, and simply log a short message to the NET logging category when an exception happens during packet processing. It is not good to panick end users with verbose errors (let alone writing to stderr) when any peer can generate them.
ACKs for top commit:
MarcoFalke:
re-ACK 4bdd68f301a9cee3360deafc7531c638e923226b (only change is adding includes) 🕕
promag:
ACK 4bdd68f301a9cee3360deafc7531c638e923226b, could squash.
Tree-SHA512: a005591a3202b005c75e01dfa54249db3992e2f9eefa8b3d9d435acf66130417716ed926ce4e045179cf43788f1abc7362d999750681a9c80b318373d611c366
|
|
The use of `typeid()` for logging exception types requires this include
according to https://en.cppreference.com/w/cpp/language/typeid.
|
|
-BEGIN VERIFY SCRIPT-
./contrib/devtools/copyright_header.py update ./
-END VERIFY SCRIPT-
|
|
Remove the forest of special exceptions, and simply log a short
message to the NET logging category when an exception happens during
packet processing. It is not good to panick end users with errors
that any peer can generate (let alone writing to stderr).
|
|
1a8f0d5a74d5cc0000456932babf35301f5c1686 [tools] update nNextInvSend to use mockable time (Amiti Uttarwar)
4de630354fc6808b9b13b9e82da1a82f2f50f26a [tools] add PoissonNextSend method that returns mockable time (Amiti Uttarwar)
Pull request description:
Introduce a Poisson helper method that wraps the existing method to return `std::chrono::duration` type, which is mockable.
Needed for https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/16698.
ACKs for top commit:
ajtowns:
ACK 1a8f0d5a74d5cc0000456932babf35301f5c1686
MarcoFalke:
re-ACK 1a8f0d5a74d5cc0000456932babf35301f5c1686
naumenkogs:
ACK 1a8f0d5, and let's merge it and come back to it later.
Tree-SHA512: 7e2325d7c55fc0b4357cb86b83e0c218ba269f678c1786342d8bc380bfd9696373bc24ff124b9ff17a6e761c62b2b44ff5247c3911e2afdc7cc5c20417e8290b
|
|
|
|
b6d2183858975abc961207c125c15791e531edcc Minor refactoring to remove implied m_addr_relay_peer. (User)
a552e8477c5bcd22a5457f4f73a2fd6db8acd2c2 added asserts to check m_addr_known when it's used (User)
090b75c14be6b9ba2efe38a17d141c6e6af575cb p2p: Avoid allocating memory for addrKnown where we don't need it (User)
Pull request description:
We should allocate memory for addrKnown filter only for those peers which are expected to participate in address relay.
Currently, we do it for all peers (including SPV and block-relay-only), which results in extra RAM where it's not needed.
Upd:
In future, we would still allow SPVs to ask for addrs, so allocation still will be done by default.
However, they will be able to opt-out via [this proposal](https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2019-October/017428.html) and then we could save some more memory.
This PR still saves memory for block-relay-only peers immediately after merging.
Top commit has no ACKs.
Tree-SHA512: e84d93b2615556d466f5ca0e543580fde763911a3bfea3127c493ddfaba8f05c8605cb94ff795d165af542b594400995a2c51338185c298581408687e7812463
|
|
3004d5a12d09d94bfc4dee2a8e8f2291996a4aaf [validation] Remove fMissingInputs from AcceptToMemoryPool() (John Newbery)
c428622a5bb1e37b2e6ab2c52791ac05d9271238 [validation] Remove unused first_invalid parameter from ProcessNewBlockHeaders() (John Newbery)
7204c6434b944f6ad51b3c895837729d3aa56eea [validation] Remove useless ret parameter from Invalid() (John Newbery)
1a37de4b3174d19a6d8691ae07e92b32fdfaef11 [validation] Remove error() calls from Invalid() calls (John Newbery)
067981e49246822421a7bcc720491427e1dba8a3 [validation] Tidy Up ValidationResult class (John Newbery)
a27a2957ed9afbe5a96caa5f0f4cbec730d27460 [validation] Add CValidationState subclasses (John Newbery)
Pull request description:
Carries out some remaining tidy-ups remaining after PR 15141:
- split ValidationState into TxValidationState and BlockValidationState (commit from ajtowns)
- various minor code style tidy-ups to the ValidationState class
- remove the useless `ret` parameter from `ValidationState::Invalid()`
- remove the now unused `first_invalid` parameter from `ProcessNewBlockHeaders()`
- remove the `fMissingInputs` parameter from `AcceptToMemoryPool()`, and deal with missing inputs the same way as other errors by using the `TxValidationState` object.
Tip for reviewers (thanks ryanofsky!): The first commit ("[validation] Add CValidationState subclasses" ) is huge and can be easier to start reviewing if you revert the rote, mechanical changes:
Substitute the commit hash of commit "[validation] Add CValidationState subclasses" for <CommitHash> in the commands below.
```sh
git checkout <CommitHash>
git grep -l ValidationState | xargs sed -i 's/BlockValidationState\|TxValidationState/CValidationState/g'
git grep -l ValidationResult | xargs sed -i 's/BlockValidationResult\|TxValidationResult/ValidationInvalidReason/g'
git grep -l MaybePunish | xargs sed -i 's/MaybePunishNode\(ForBlock\|ForTx\)/MaybePunishNode/g'
git diff HEAD^
```
After that it's possible to easily see the mechanical changes with:
```sh
git log -p -n1 -U0 --word-diff-regex=. <CommitHash>
```
ACKs for top commit:
laanwj:
ACK 3004d5a12d09d94bfc4dee2a8e8f2291996a4aaf
amitiuttarwar:
code review ACK 3004d5a12d09d94bfc4dee2a8e8f2291996a4aaf. Also built & ran tests locally.
fjahr:
Code review ACK 3004d5a12d09d94bfc4dee2a8e8f2291996a4aaf . Only nit style change and pure virtual destructor added since my last review.
ryanofsky:
Code review ACK 3004d5a12d09d94bfc4dee2a8e8f2291996a4aaf. Just whitespace change and pure virtual destructor added since last review.
Tree-SHA512: 511de1fb380a18bec1944ea82b513b6192df632ee08bb16344a2df3c40811a88f3872f04df24bc93a41643c96c48f376a04551840fd804a961490d6c702c3d36
|
|
Handle this failure in the same way as all other failures: call Invalid()
with the reasons for the failure.
|
|
No callers use the returned value in first_invalid. Remove it from the
function signature and don't set it in the function.
|
|
Split CValidationState into TxValidationState and BlockValidationState
to store validation results for transactions and blocks respectively.
|
|
So g_connman and g_banman globals can be removed next commit.
|
|
ed2dc5e48abed1cde6ab98025dc8212917d47d21 Add override/final modifiers to V1TransportDeserializer (Pieter Wuille)
f342a5e61a73e1edf389b662d265d20cf26a1d51 Make resetting implicit in TransportDeserializer::Read() (Pieter Wuille)
6a91499496d76c2b3e84489e9723b60514fb08db Remove oversized message detection from log and interface (Pieter Wuille)
b0e10ff4df3d4c70fb172ea8c3128c82e6e368bb Force CNetMessage::m_recv to use std::move (Jonas Schnelli)
efecb74677222f6c70adf7f860c315f430d39ec4 Use adapter pattern for the network deserializer (Jonas Schnelli)
1a5c656c3169ba525f84145d19ce8c64f2cf1efb Remove transport protocol knowhow from CNetMessage / net processing (Jonas Schnelli)
6294ecdb8bb4eb7049a18c721ee8cb4a53d80a06 Refactor: split network transport deserializing from message container (Jonas Schnelli)
Pull request description:
**This refactors the network message deserialization.**
* It transforms the `CNetMessage` into a transport protocol agnostic message container.
* A new class `TransportDeserializer` (unique pointer of `CNode`) is introduced, handling the network buffer reading and the decomposing to a `CNetMessage`
* **No behavioral changes** (in terms of disconnecting, punishing)
* Moves the checksum finalizing into the `SocketHandler` thread (finalizing was in `ProcessMessages` before)
The **optional last commit** makes the `TransportDeserializer` following an adapter pattern (polymorphic interface) to make it easier to later add a V2 transport protocol deserializer.
Intentionally not touching the sending part.
Pre-Requirement for BIP324 (v2 message transport protocol).
Replacement for #14046 and inspired by a [comment](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/14046#issuecomment-431528330) from sipa
ACKs for top commit:
promag:
Code review ACK ed2dc5e48abed1cde6ab98025dc8212917d47d21.
marcinja:
Code review ACK ed2dc5e48abed1cde6ab98025dc8212917d47d21
ryanofsky:
Code review ACK ed2dc5e48abed1cde6ab98025dc8212917d47d21. 4 cleanup commits added since last review. Unaddressed comments:
ariard:
Code review and tested ACK ed2dc5e.
Tree-SHA512: bab8d87464e2e8742529e488ddcdc8650f0c2025c9130913df00a0b17ecdb9a525061cbbbd0de0251b76bf75a8edb72e3ad0dbf5b79e26f2ad05d61b4e4ded6d
|
|
|
|
168b781fe7f3f13b24c52a151f36de4cdd0a340a Continue relaying transactions after they expire from mapRelay (Anthony Towns)
Pull request description:
This change allows peers to request transactions even after they've expired from mapRelay and even if they're not doing mempool requests. This is intended to allow for CPFP of old transactions -- if parent tx P wasn't relayed due to low fees, then a higher fee rate child C is relayed, peers will currently request the parent P, but we prior to this patch, we will not relay it due to it not being in mapRelay.
ACKs for top commit:
MarcoFalke:
re-ACK 168b781fe7f3f13b24c52a151f36de4cdd0a340a (only change is comment fixup)
sdaftuar:
re-ACK 168b781fe7f3f13b24c52a151f36de4cdd0a340a
sipa:
ACK 168b781fe7f3f13b24c52a151f36de4cdd0a340a
Tree-SHA512: b206666dd1450cd0a161ae55fd1a7eda2c3d226842ba27d91fe463b551fd924b65b92551b14d6786692e15cf9a9a989666550dfc980b48ab0f8d4ca305bc7762
|
|
9075d13153ce06cd59a45644831ecc43126e1e82 [docs] Add release notes for removal of REJECT reasons (John Newbery)
04a2f326ec0f06fb4fce1c4f93500752f05dede8 [validation] Fix REJECT message comments (John Newbery)
e9d5a59e34ff2d538d8f5315efd9908bf24d0fdc [validation] Remove REJECT code from CValidationState (John Newbery)
0053e16714323c1694c834fdca74f064a1a33529 [logging] Don't log REJECT code when transaction is rejected (John Newbery)
a1a07cfe99fc8cee30ba5976dc36b47b1f6532ab [validation] Fix peer punishment for bad blocks (John Newbery)
Pull request description:
We no longer send BIP 61 REJECT messages, so there's no need to set
a REJECT code in the CValidationState object.
Note that there is a minor bug fix in p2p behaviour here. Because the
call to `MaybePunishNode()` in `PeerLogicValidation::BlockChecked()` only
previously happened if the REJECT code was > 0 and < `REJECT_INTERNAL`,
then there are cases were `MaybePunishNode()` can get called where it
wasn't previously:
- when `AcceptBlockHeader()` fails with `CACHED_INVALID`.
- when `AcceptBlockHeader()` fails with `BLOCK_MISSING_PREV`.
Note that `BlockChecked()` cannot fail with an 'internal' reject code. The
only internal reject code was `REJECT_HIGHFEE`, which was only set in
ATMP.
This reverts a minor bug introduced in 5d08c9c579ba8cc7b684105c6a08263992b08d52.
ACKs for top commit:
ariard:
ACK 9075d13, changes since last reviewed are splitting them in separate commits to ease understanding and fix nits
fjahr:
ACK 9075d13153ce06cd59a45644831ecc43126e1e82, confirmed diff to last review was fixing nits in docs/comments.
ryanofsky:
Code review ACK 9075d13153ce06cd59a45644831ecc43126e1e82. Only changes since last review are splitting the main commit and updating comments
Tree-SHA512: 58e8a1a4d4e6f156da5d29fb6ad6a62fc9c594bbfc6432b3252e962d0e9e10149bf3035185dc5320c46c09f3e49662bc2973ec759679c0f3412232087cb8a3a7
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Because the call to MaybePunishNode() in
PeerLogicValidation::BlockChecked() only previously happened if the
REJECT code was > 0 and < REJECT_INTERNAL, then there are cases were
MaybePunishNode() can get called where it wasn't previously:
- when AcceptBlockHeader() fails with CACHED_INVALID.
- when AcceptBlockHeader() fails with BLOCK_MISSING_PREV.
Note that BlockChecked() cannot fail with an 'internal' reject code. The
only internal reject code was REJECT_HIGHFEE, which was only set in
ATMP.
This change restores the behaviour pre-commit
5d08c9c579ba8cc7b684105c6a08263992b08d52 which did punish nodes that
sent us CACHED_INVALID and BLOCK_MISSING_PREV blocks.
|
|
fa25f43ac5692082dba3f90456c501eb08f1b75c p2p: Remove BIP61 reject messages (MarcoFalke)
Pull request description:
Reject messages (BIP 61) appear in the following settings:
* Parsing of reject messages (in case `-debug=net` is set, off by default). This has only been used for a single `LogPrint` call for several releases now. Such logging is completely meaningless to us and should thus be removed.
* The sending of reject messages (in case `-enablebip61` is set, off by default). This can be used to debug a node that is under our control. Instead of hacking this debugging into the p2p protocol, it could be more easily achieved by parsing the debug log. (Use `-printtoconsole` to have it as stream, or read from the `debug.log` file like our python function `assert_debug_log` in the test framework does)
Having to maintain all of this logic and code to accommodate debugging, which can be achieved by other means a lot easier, is a burden. It makes review on net processing changes a lot harder, since the reject message logic has to be carried around without introducing any errors or DOS vectors.
ACKs for top commit:
jnewbery:
utACK fa25f43ac5692082dba3f90456c501eb08f1b75c
laanwj:
I'm still not 100% convinced that I like getting rid of BIP61 conceptually, but apparently everyone wants it, code review ACK fa25f43ac5692082dba3f90456c501eb08f1b75c.
ryanofsky:
Code review ACK fa25f43ac5692082dba3f90456c501eb08f1b75c
Tree-SHA512: daf55254202925e56be3d6cfb3c1c804e7a82cecb1dd1e5bd7b472bae989fd68ac4f21ec53fc46751353056fd645f7f877bebcb0b40920257991423a3d99e0be
|
|
acceptance logic
|
|
|
|
|
|
p2p_invalid_block test.
0c62e3aa73839e97e65a3155e06a98d84b700a1e New regression testing for CVE-2018-17144, CVE-2012-2459, and CVE-2010-5137. (lucash-dev)
38bfca6bb2ad68719415e9c54a981441052da072 Added comments referencing multiple CVEs in tests and production code. (lucash-dev)
Pull request description:
This functional test includes two scenarios that test for regressions of vulnerabilities, but they are only briefly described. There are freely available documents explaining in detail the issues, but without explicit mentions, the developer trying to maintain the code needs an additional step of digging in commit history and PR conversations to figure it out.
Added comments to explicitly mention CVE-2018-17144 and CVE-2012-2459, for more complete documentation.
This improves developer experience by making understanding the tests easier.
ACKs for top commit:
laanwj:
ACK 0c62e3aa73839e97e65a3155e06a98d84b700a1e, checked the CVE numbers, thanks for adding documentation
Tree-SHA512: 3ee05351745193b8b959e4a25d50f25a693b2d24b0732ed53cf7d5882df40b5dd0f1877bd5c69cffb921d4a7acf9deb3cc1160b96dc730d9b5984151ad06b7c9
|
|
Recent questions have come up regarding dynamic service registration
(see https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/16442#discussion_r308702676
and the assumeutxo project, which needs to dynamically flip NODE_NETWORK).
While investigating how dynamic service registration might work, I was
confused about how we convey local services to peers. This adds some
documentation that hopefully clarifies this process.
|
|
0ba08020c9791f7caf5986ad6490c16a2b66cd83 Disconnect peers violating blocks-only mode (Suhas Daftuar)
937eba91e1550bc3038dc541c236ac83e0a0e6d5 doc: improve comments relating to block-relay-only peers (Suhas Daftuar)
430f489027f15c1e4948ea4378954df24e3fee88 Don't relay addr messages to block-relay-only peers (Suhas Daftuar)
3a5e885306ea954d7eccdc11502e91a51dab8ec6 Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections (Suhas Daftuar)
b83f51a4bbe29bf130a2b0c0e85e5bffea107f75 Add comment explaining intended use of m_tx_relay (Suhas Daftuar)
e75c39cd425f8c4e5b6bbb2beecb9c80034fefe1 Check that tx_relay is initialized before access (Suhas Daftuar)
c4aa2ba82211ea5988ed7fe21e1b08bc3367e6d4 [refactor] Change tx_relay structure to be unique_ptr (Suhas Daftuar)
4de0dbac9b286c42a9b10132b7c2d76712f1a319 [refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure (Suhas Daftuar)
26a93bce29fd813e1402b013f402869c25b656d1 Remove unused variable (Suhas Daftuar)
Pull request description:
Transaction relay is optimized for a combination of redundancy/robustness as well as bandwidth minimization -- as a result transaction relay leaks information that adversaries can use to infer the network topology.
Network topology is better kept private for (at least) two reasons:
(a) Knowledge of the network graph can make it easier to find the source IP of a given transaction.
(b) Knowledge of the network graph could be used to split a target node or nodes from the honest network (eg by knowing which peers to attack in order to achieve a network split).
We can eliminate the risks of (b) by separating block relay from transaction relay; inferring network connectivity from the relay of blocks/block headers is much more expensive for an adversary.
After this commit, bitcoind will make 2 additional outbound connections that are only used for block relay. (In the future, we might consider rotating our transaction-relay peers to help limit the effects of (a).)
ACKs for top commit:
sipa:
ACK 0ba08020c9791f7caf5986ad6490c16a2b66cd83
ajtowns:
ACK 0ba08020c9791f7caf5986ad6490c16a2b66cd83 -- code review, ran tests. ran it on mainnet for a couple of days with MAX_BLOCKS_ONLY_CONNECTIONS upped from 2 to 16 and didn't observe any unexpected behaviour: it disconnected a couple of peers that tried sending inv's, and it successfully did compact block relay with some block relay peers.
TheBlueMatt:
re-utACK 0ba08020c9791f7caf5986ad6490c16a2b66cd83. Pointed out that stats.fRelayTxes was sometimes uninitialized for blocksonly peers (though its not a big deal and only effects RPC), which has since been fixed here. Otherwise changes are pretty trivial so looks good.
jnewbery:
utACK 0ba08020c9791f7caf5986ad6490c16a2b66cd83
jamesob:
ACK https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/commit/0ba08020c9791f7caf5986ad6490c16a2b66cd83
Tree-SHA512: 4c3629434472c7dd4125253417b1be41967a508c3cfec8af5a34cad685464fbebbb6558f0f8f5c0d4463e3ffa4fa3aabd58247692cb9ab8395f4993078b9bcdf
|
|
If we set fRelay=false in our VERSION message, and a peer sends an INV or TX
message anyway, disconnect. Since we use fRelay=false to minimize bandwidth,
we should not tolerate remaining connected to a peer violating the protocol.
|
|
|
|
We don't want relay of addr messages to leak information about
these network links.
|
|
Transaction relay is primarily optimized for balancing redundancy/robustness
with bandwidth minimization -- as a result transaction relay leaks information
that adversaries can use to infer the network topology.
Network topology is better kept private for (at least) two reasons:
(a) Knowledge of the network graph can make it easier to find the source IP of
a given transaction.
(b) Knowledge of the network graph could be used to split a target node or
nodes from the honest network (eg by knowing which peers to attack in order to
achieve a network split).
We can eliminate the risks of (b) by separating block relay from transaction
relay; inferring network connectivity from the relay of blocks/block headers is
much more expensive for an adversary.
After this commit, bitcoind will make 2 additional outbound connections that
are only used for block relay. (In the future, we might consider rotating our
transaction-relay peers to help limit the effects of (a).)
|
|
|