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Keep a references to chainparams, rather than calling the global
Params() function every time it's needed. This is fine, since
globalChainParams does not get updated once it's been set, and it's
available at the point of constructing the PeerLogicValidation object.
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We don't have a project style for ordering class members, but it always
makes sense to have no more than one of each public/protected/private
specifier.
Also move documentation for MaybeDiscourageAndDisconnect to the header.
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networks
86d4cf42d97abf4c436d1eabf29e2ed150f69c1e Increase the ip address relay branching factor for unreachable networks (Pieter Wuille)
Pull request description:
Onion addresses propagate very badly among the IPv4/IPv6 network, resulting
in difficulty for those to find each other.
The branching factor 1 is probably so low that propagations die out before
they reach another onion peer. Increase it to 1.5 on average.
ACKs for top commit:
practicalswift:
ACK 86d4cf42d97abf4c436d1eabf29e2ed150f69c1e -- patch looks correct
naumenkogs:
ACK 86d4cf4
jonatack:
ACK 86d4cf42d97abf4c436d1eabf29e2ed150f69c1e. Code review, built and running with some sanity check logging. `RelayAddress()` is called by `ProcessMessage() ADDR` msg handling, from within the loop while processing each new address to relay it to a limited number of other nodes. According to git blame, the line setting `nRelayNodes` hasn't been touched since 2016 in e736772c56a *Move network-msg-processing code out of main to its own file*, which moved the line but otherwise did not change it. Running a mixed clearnet/onion node with this patch and the logging below, I'm only seeing values of `fReachable 1, nRelayNodes 2`. IIUC, I need to use the settings in `init.cpp` that call `SetReachable(*, false)`. *Edit:* with `onlynet=onion` am now seeing entries of `fReachable 0` with `nRelayNodes` values of 1 and 2.
vasild:
ACK 86d4cf42d
Tree-SHA512: 22391e16d60bcfdec9a9336728da39d68a24a183b3d1b0e8fbc038d265ca6ddf71d16db018f3678745fd9f3e9281049e42197fa0a29124833c50a9170ed6f793
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Previously we deduced it was a block-relay-only based on presence of the
m_tx_relay structure. Now we have the ability to identify it directly via a
connection type accessor function.
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Co-authored-by: Suhas Daftuar <sdaftuar@gmail.com>
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We previously identified if we relay addresses to the connection by checking
for the existence of the m_addr_known data structure. With this commit, we
answer this question based on the connection type.
IsAddrRelayPeer() checked for the existence of the m_addr_known
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fb56d37612dea6666e7da73d671311a697570dae p2p: ensure inv is GenMsgTx before ToGenTxid in inv processing (John Newbery)
aa3621385ee66c9dde5c632c0a79fba3a6ea2d62 test: use CInv::MSG_WITNESS_TX flag in p2p_segwit (Jon Atack)
24ee4f01eadb870435712950a1364cf0def06e9f p2p: make gtxid(.hash) and fAlreadyHave localvars const (Jon Atack)
b1c855453bf2634e7fd9b53c4a76a8536fc9865d p2p: use CInv block message helpers in net_processing.cpp (Jon Atack)
acd66421671e42a58e8e067868e1ab86268e3231 [net processing] Change AlreadyHaveTx() to take a GenTxid (John Newbery)
5fdfb80b861e0de3fcf8a57163b3f52af4b2df3b [net processing] Change AlreadyHaveBlock() to take block_hash argument (John Newbery)
430e183b89d00b4148f0b77a6fcacca2cd948202 [net processing] Remove mempool argument from AlreadyHaveBlock() (John Newbery)
42ca5618cae0fd9ef97d2006b17d896bc58cc17c [net processing] Split AlreadyHave() into separate block and tx functions (John Newbery)
39f1dc944554218911b0945fff7e6d06f3dab284 p2p: remove nFetchFlags from NetMsgType TX and INV processing (Jon Atack)
471714e1f024fb3b4892a7a8b34a76b83a13fa19 p2p: add CInv block message helper methods (Jon Atack)
Pull request description:
Building on #19590 and the recent `wtxid` and `GenTxid` changes, this is a refactoring and cleanup PR to simplify and improve some of the net processing code.
Some of the diffs are best reviewed with `-w` to ignore spacing.
Co-authored by John Newbery.
ACKs for top commit:
laanwj:
Code review ACK fb56d37612dea6666e7da73d671311a697570dae
jnewbery:
utACK fb56d37612dea6666e7da73d671311a697570dae
vasild:
ACK fb56d3761
Tree-SHA512: ba39b58e6aaf850880a842fe5f6295e9f1870906ef690206acfc17140aae2ac854981e1066dbcd4238062478762fbd040ef772fdc2c50eea6869997c583e6a6d
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ea74e10acf17903e44c85e3678853414653dd4e1 doc: Add best practice for annotating/asserting locks (Hennadii Stepanov)
2ee7743fe723227f2ea1b031eddb14fc6863f4c8 sync.h: Make runtime lock checks require compile-time lock checks (Anthony Towns)
23d71d171e6e22ba5e4a909d597a54595b2a2c1f Do not hide compile-time thread safety warnings (Hennadii Stepanov)
3ddc150857178bfb1c854c05bf9b526777876f56 Add missed thread safety annotations (Hennadii Stepanov)
af9ea55a72c94678b343f5dd98dc78f3a3ac58cb Use LockAssertion utility class instead of AssertLockHeld() (Hennadii Stepanov)
Pull request description:
On the way of transit from `RecursiveMutex` to `Mutex` (see #19303) it is crucial to have run-time `AssertLockHeld()` assertion that does _not_ hide compile-time Clang Thread Safety Analysis warnings.
On master (65e4ecabd5b4252154640c7bac38c92a3f3a7018) using `AssertLockHeld()` could hide Clang Thread Safety Analysis warnings, e.g., with the following patch applied:
```diff
--- a/src/txmempool.h
+++ b/src/txmempool.h
@@ -607,7 +607,7 @@ public:
void addUnchecked(const CTxMemPoolEntry& entry, setEntries& setAncestors, bool validFeeEstimate = true) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs, cs_main);
void removeRecursive(const CTransaction& tx, MemPoolRemovalReason reason) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs);
- void removeForReorg(const CCoinsViewCache* pcoins, unsigned int nMemPoolHeight, int flags) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs, cs_main);
+ void removeForReorg(const CCoinsViewCache* pcoins, unsigned int nMemPoolHeight, int flags) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main);
void removeConflicts(const CTransaction& tx) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs);
void removeForBlock(const std::vector<CTransactionRef>& vtx, unsigned int nBlockHeight) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs);
```
Clang compiles the code without any thread safety warnings.
See "Add missed thread safety annotations" commit for the actual thread safety warnings that are fixed in this PR.
ACKs for top commit:
MarcoFalke:
ACK ea74e10acf 🎙
jnewbery:
ACK ea74e10acf17903e44c85e3678853414653dd4e1
ajtowns:
ACK ea74e10acf17903e44c85e3678853414653dd4e1
Tree-SHA512: 8cba996e526751a1cb0e613c0cc1b10f027a3e9945fbfb4bd30f6355fd36b9f9c2e1e95ed3183fc254b42df7c30223278e18e5bdb5e1ef85db7fef067595d447
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This change prepares for upcoming commit "Do not hide compile-time
thread safety warnings" by replacing AssertLockHeld() with
LockAssertion() where needed.
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8e35bf59062b3a823182588e0bf809b3367c2be0 scripted-diff: rename misbehavior members (John Newbery)
1f96d2e673a78220eebf3bbd15b121c51c4cd97b [net processing] Move misbehavior tracking state to Peer (John Newbery)
7cd4159ac834432dadd60a5e8ee817f3cadbee55 [net processing] Add Peer (John Newbery)
aba03359a6e62a376ae44914f609f82a1556fc89 [net processing] Remove CNodeState.name (John Newbery)
Pull request description:
We currently have two structures for per-peer data:
- `CNode` in net, which should just contain connection layer data (eg socket, send/recv buffers, etc), but currently also contains some application layer data (eg tx/block inventory).
- `CNodeState` in net processing, which contains p2p application layer data, but requires cs_main to be locked for access.
This PR adds a third struct `Peer`, which is for p2p application layer data, and doesn't require cs_main. Eventually all application layer data from `CNode` should be moved to `Peer`, and any data that doesn't strictly require cs_main should be moved from `CNodeState` to `Peer` (probably all of `CNodeState` eventually).
`Peer` objects are stored as shared pointers in a net processing global map `g_peer_map`, which is protected by `g_peer_mutex`. To use a `Peer` object, `g_peer_mutex` is locked, a copy of the shared pointer is taken, and the lock is released. Individual members of `Peer` are protected by different mutexes that guard related data. The lifetime of the `Peer` object is managed by the shared_ptr refcount.
This PR adds the `Peer` object and moves the misbehaving data from `CNodeState` to `Peer`. This allows us to immediately remove 15 `LOCK(cs_main)` instances.
For more motivation see #19398
ACKs for top commit:
laanwj:
Code review ACK 8e35bf59062b3a823182588e0bf809b3367c2be0
troygiorshev:
reACK 8e35bf59062b3a823182588e0bf809b3367c2be0 via `git range-diff master 9510938 8e35bf5`
theuni:
ACK 8e35bf59062b3a823182588e0bf809b3367c2be0.
jonatack:
ACK 8e35bf59062b3a823182588e0bf809b3367c2be0 keeping in mind Cory's comment (https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/19607#discussion_r470173964) for the follow-up
Tree-SHA512: ad84a92b78fb34c9f43813ca3dfbc7282c887d55300ea2ce0994d134da3e0c7dbc44d54380e00b13bb75a57c28857ac3236bea9135467075d78026767a19e4b1
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and otherwise log that an unknown INV type was received.
In INV processing, when handling transaction type inv messages,
ToGenTxid() expects that we constructed the CInv ourselves or
that we verified that it is for a transaction type CInv.
Therefore, change this `else` branch into an `else if (inv.GenMsgTx())`
to make this safer and log any INVs that fall through.
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The nFetchFlags code can be removed here because GetFetchFlags() can only add
the MSG_WITNESS_FLAG, which is added to the CInv::type field. That CInv is only
passed to AlreadyHave() or ToGenTxid(), and neither of those functions do
anything different depending on whether the CInv type is MSG_TX or
MSG_WITNESS_TX.
Co-authored by: John Newbery <john@johnnewbery.com>
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daed542a12e0a6a4692aca12a61b84cd55accc33 [net_processing] Move ProcessMessage to PeerLogicValidation (John Newbery)
c556770b5ef4306f10e980daff772bee87daaa30 [net_processing] Change PeerLogicValidation to hold a connman reference (John Newbery)
Pull request description:
Rather than ProcessMessage() being a static function in net_processing.cpp, make it a private member function of PeerLogicValidation. This is the start of moving static functions and global variables into PeerLogicValidation to make it better encapsulated.
ACKs for top commit:
jonatack:
ACK daed542a12e0a6a4692aca12a61b84cd55accc33 code review and debug tested
promag:
Code review ACK daed542a12e0a6a4692aca12a61b84cd55accc33.
MarcoFalke:
re-ACK daed542a12, only change is removing second commit 🎴
theStack:
Code Review ACK daed542a12e0a6a4692aca12a61b84cd55accc33
Tree-SHA512: ddebf410d114d9ad5a9e536950018ff333a347c035d74fcc101fb4a3f20a281782c7eac2b7d1bd1c8f6bc7e59f5b5630fb52c2e1b4c32df454fa584673bd021e
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Onion addresses propagate very badly among the IPv4/IPv6 network, resulting
in difficulty for those to find each other.
The branching factor 1 is probably so low that propagations die out before
they reach another onion peer. Increase it to 1.5 on average.
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NODE_COMPACT_FILTERS
f5c003d3ead182335252558c5c6c9b9ca8968065 [test] Add test for NODE_COMPACT_FILTER. (Jim Posen)
132b30d9c84f2a8053714a438f227b583a89a9ea [net] Signal NODE_COMPACT_FILTERS if we're serving compact filters. (Jim Posen)
b3fbc94d4f2937bb682f2766cc9a8d4fde328a3f Apply cfilters review fixups (John Newbery)
Pull request description:
If -peerblockfilters is configured, signal the `NODE_COMPACT_FILTERS` service bit to indicate that we are able to serve compact block filters, headers and checkpoints.
ACKs for top commit:
MarcoFalke:
re-review and Concept ACK f5c003d3ead182335252558c5c6c9b9ca8968065
fjahr:
Code review ACK f5c003d3ead182335252558c5c6c9b9ca8968065
clarkmoody:
Concept ACK f5c003d3ead182335252558c5c6c9b9ca8968065
ariard:
Concept and Code Review ACK f5c003d
jonatack:
ACK f5c003d3e
Tree-SHA512: 34d1c153530a0e55d09046fe548c9dc37344b5d6d50e00af1b4e1de1e7b49de770fca8471346a17c151de9fe164776296bb3dd5af331977f0c3ef1e6fc906f85
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Hold a reference to connman rather than a pointer because:
- PeerLogicValidation can't run without a connman
- The pointer never gets reseated
The alternative is to always assert that the pointer is non-null before
dereferencing.
Change the name from connman to m_connman at the same time to conform
with current style guidelines.
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to addrman
37a480e0cd94895b6051abef12d984ff74bdc4a3 [net] Add addpeeraddress RPC method (John Newbery)
ae8051bbd8377f2458ff1f167dc30c2d5f83e317 [test] Test that getnodeaddresses() can return all known addresses (John Newbery)
f26502e9fc8a669b30717525597e3f468eaecf79 [addrman] Specify max addresses and pct when calling GetAddresses() (John Newbery)
Pull request description:
Currently addrman only allows a maximum of 1000 records or 23% of all records to be returned in a call to `GetAddr()`. Relax this limit and have the client specify the max records they want. For p2p, behaviour is unchanged (but the rate limiting is set inside net_processing, where it belongs). For RPC, `getnodeaddresses` can now return the complete addrman, which is helpful for testing and monitoring.
Also add a test-only RPC `addpeeraddress`, which adds an IP address:port to addrman. This is helpful for testing (eg #18991).
ACKs for top commit:
naumenkogs:
utACK 37a480e0cd94895b6051abef12d984ff74bdc4a3
laanwj:
Code review and lightly manually tested ACK 37a480e0cd94895b6051abef12d984ff74bdc4a3
Tree-SHA512: f86dcd410aaebaf6e9ca18ce6f23556e5e4649c1325577213d873aa09967298e65ab2dc19a72670641ae92211a923afda1fe124a82e9d2c1cad73d478ef27fdc
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-BEGIN VERIFY SCRIPT-
sed -i 's/nMisbehavior/m_misbehavior_score/g' src/net_processing.cpp src/net_processing.h src/rpc/net.cpp src/qt/rpcconsole.cpp
-END VERIFY SCRIPT-
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Misbehavior tracking state is now contained in Peer instead of
CNode. It is no longer guarded by cs_main, but instead by a
dedicated m_misbehavior_mutex lock.
This allows us to remove 14 cs_main locks from net_processing.
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Peer is a struct for holding per-peer data. This structure is not
protected by cs_main since it does not contain validation-critical data.
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This has been unused since logging peer IPs was removed from
Misbehaving() in a8865f8b.
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CAddrMan.GetAddr() would previously limit the number and percentage of
addresses returned (to ADDRMAN_GETADDR_MAX (1000) and
ADDRMAN_GETADDR_MAX_PCT (23) respectively). Instead, make it the callers
responsibility to specify the maximum addresses and percentage they want
returned.
For net_processing, the maximums are MAX_ADDR_TO_SEND (1000) and
MAX_PCT_ADDR_TO_SEND (23). For rpc/net, the maximum is specified by the
client.
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01e283068b9e6214f2d77a2f772a4244ebfe2274 [net] Remove unnecessary default args on CNode constructor (Amiti Uttarwar)
bc5d65b3ca41eebb1738fdda4451d1466e77772e [refactor] Remove IsOutboundDisconnectionCandidate (Amiti Uttarwar)
2f2e13b6c2c8741ca9d825eaaef736ede484bc85 [net/refactor] Simplify multiple-connection checks (Amiti Uttarwar)
7f7b83deb2427599c129f4ff581d4d045461e459 [net/refactor] Rework ThreadOpenConnections logic (Amiti Uttarwar)
35839e963bf61d2da0d12f5b8cea74ac0e0fbd7b [net] Fix bug where AddrFetch connections would be counted as outbound full relay (Amiti Uttarwar)
4972c21b671ff73f13a1b5053338b6abbdb471b5 [net/refactor] Clarify logic for selecting connections in ThreadOpenConnections (Amiti Uttarwar)
60156f5fc40d56bb532278f16ce632c5a8b8035e [net/refactor] Remove fInbound flag from CNode (Amiti Uttarwar)
7b322df6296609570e368e5f326979279041c11f [net/refactor] Remove m_addr_fetch member var from CNode (Amiti Uttarwar)
14923422b08ac4b21b35c426bf0e1b9e7c97983b [net/refactor] Remove fFeeler flag from CNode (Amiti Uttarwar)
49efac5cae7333c6700d9b737d09fae0f3f4d7fa [net/refactor] Remove m_manual_connection flag from CNode (Amiti Uttarwar)
d3698b5ee309cf0f0cdfb286d6b30a256d7deae5 [net/refactor] Add connection type as a member var to CNode (Amiti Uttarwar)
46578c03e92a55925308363ccdad04dcfc820d96 [doc] Describe different connection types (Amiti Uttarwar)
442abae2bac7bff85886143df01e14215532b974 [net/refactor] Add AddrFetch connections to ConnectionType enum (Amiti Uttarwar)
af59feb05235ecb85ec9d75b09c66e71268c9889 [net/refactor] Extract m_addr_known logic from initializer list (Amiti Uttarwar)
e1bc29812ddf1d946bc5acca406a7ed2dca064a6 [net/refactor] Add block relay only connections to ConnectionType enum (Amiti Uttarwar)
0e52a659a2de915fc3dce37fc8fac39be1c8b6fa [net/refactor] Add feeler connections to ConnectionType enum (Amiti Uttarwar)
1521c47438537e192230486dffcec0228a53878d [net/refactor] Add manual connections to ConnectionType enum (Amiti Uttarwar)
26304b4100201754fb32440bec3e3b78cd3f0e6d [net/refactor] Introduce an enum to distinguish type of connection (Amiti Uttarwar)
3f1b7140e95d0f8f958cb35f31c3d964c57e484d scripted-diff: Rename OneShot to AddrFetch (Amiti Uttarwar)
Pull request description:
**This is part 1 of #19315, which enables the ability to test `outbound` and `block-relay-only` connections from the functional tests.** Please see that PR for more information of overall functionality.
**This PR simplifies how we manage different connection types.** It introduces an enum with the various types of connections so we can explicitly define the connection type. The existing system relies on a series of independent flags, then has asserts scattered around to ensure that conflicting flags are not enabled at the same time. I find this approach to be both brittle and confusing. While making these changes, I found a small bug due to the silent assumptions.
This PR also proposes a rename from `OneShot` to `AddrFetch`. I find the name `OneShot` to be very confusing, especially when we also have `onetry` manual connections. Everyone I've talked to offline has agreed that the name is confusing, so I propose a potential alternative. I think this is a good opportunity for a rename since I'm creating an enum to explicitly define the connection types.
(some context for the unfamiliar: `oneshot` or `addrfetch` connections are short-lived connections created on startup. They connect to the seed peers, send a `getaddr` to solicit addresses, then close the connection.)
Overview of this PR:
* rename `oneshot` to `addrfetch`
* introduce `ConnectionType` enum
* one by one, add different connection types to the enum
* expose the `conn_type` on CNode, and use this to reduce reliance on flags (& asserts)
* fix the bug in counting different type of connections
* some additional cleanup to simplify logic and make expectations explicit/inclusive rather than implicit/exclusive.
ACKs for top commit:
jnewbery:
utACK 01e283068b9e6214f2d77a2f772a4244ebfe2274
laanwj:
Code review ACK 01e283068b9e6214f2d77a2f772a4244ebfe2274, the commits are pretty straightforward to follow, and I think this is a move in the right direction overall
vasild:
ACK 01e283068
sdaftuar:
ACK 01e283068b9e6214f2d77a2f772a4244ebfe2274.
fanquake:
ACK 01e283068b9e6214f2d77a2f772a4244ebfe2274 - I don't have as much experience with the networking code but these changes look fairly straight forward, the new code seems more robust/understandable and the additional documentation is great. I'm glad that a followup branch is already underway. There might be some more review comments here later today, so keep an eye on the discussion, however I'm going to merge this now.
jb55:
wow this code was messy before... ACK 01e283068b9e6214f2d77a2f772a4244ebfe2274
Tree-SHA512: 7bb644a6ed5849913d777ebc2ff89133ca0fbef680355a9a344e07496a979e6f9ff21a958e8eea93dcd7d5c343682b0c7174b1a3de380a4247eaae73da436e15
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missing parents of orphan transactions
4c0731f9c50b0556f8a57b912c8f295c7a9ea89c Deduplicate missing parents of orphan transactions (Suhas Daftuar)
81961762439fb72fc2ef168164689ddc29d7ef94 Rewrite parent txid loop of requested transactions (Suhas Daftuar)
Pull request description:
I noticed a couple of places recently where we loop over all inputs of a transaction in order to do some processing on the txids we find in those inputs. There may be thousands of inputs in a transaction, and the same txid may appear many times. In a couple of places in particular, we loop over those txids and add them to a rolling bloom filter; doing that multiple times for the same txid wastes entries in that filter.
This PR fixes that in two places relating to transaction relay: one on the server side, where we look for parent transactions of a tx that we are delivering to a peer to ensure that getdata requests for those parents will succeed; and the other on the client side, where when we process an orphan tx we want to loop over the parent txids and ensure that all are eventually requested from the peer who provided the orphan.
This addresses a couple of [related](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/19109#discussion_r455197217) [comments](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/19109#discussion_r456820373) left in #19109.
ACKs for top commit:
laanwj:
Code review ACK 4c0731f9c50b0556f8a57b912c8f295c7a9ea89c
jonatack:
ACK 4c0731f9c50b0556f8a57b912c8f295c7a9ea89c
ajtowns:
ACK 4c0731f9c50b0556f8a57b912c8f295c7a9ea89c
Tree-SHA512: 8af9df7f56c6e54b5915519d7d5465e081473ceb1bcc89bbebf83e78722cf51ff58145e588cf57126bce17071a8053273f4bcef0ad8166bec83ba14352e40f5d
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Extract logic that check multiple connection types into interface functions &
structure as switch statements. This makes it very clear what touch points are
for accessing `m_conn_type` & using the switch statements enables the compiler
to warn if a new connection type is introduced but not handled for these cases.
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-BEGIN VERIFY SCRIPT-
sed -i 's/a oneshot/an addrfetch/g' src/chainparams.cpp #comment
sed -i 's/oneshot/addrfetch/g' src/net.cpp #comment
sed -i 's/AddOneShot/AddAddrFetch/g' src/net.h src/net.cpp
sed -i 's/cs_vOneShots/m_addr_fetches_mutex/g' src/net.h src/net.cpp
sed -i 's/vOneShots/m_addr_fetches/g' src/net.h src/net.cpp
sed -i 's/fOneShot/m_addr_fetch/g' src/net.h src/net.cpp src/net_processing.cpp
sed -i 's/ProcessOneShot/ProcessAddrFetch/g' src/net.h src/net.cpp
-END VERIFY SCRIPT-
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9f88ded82b2898ca63d44c08072f1ba52f0e18d7 test addition of unknown segwit spends to txid reject filter (Gregory Sanders)
7989901c7eb62ca28b3d1e5d5831041a7267e495 Add txids with non-standard inputs to reject filter (Suhas Daftuar)
Pull request description:
Our policy checks for non-standard inputs depend only on the non-witness
portion of a transaction: we look up the scriptPubKey of the input being
spent from our UTXO set (which is covered by the input txid), and the p2sh
checks only rely on the scriptSig portion of the input.
Consequently it's safe to add txids of transactions that fail these checks to
the reject filter, as the witness is irrelevant to the failure. This is helpful
for any situation where we might request the transaction again via txid (either
from txid-relay peers, or if we might fetch the transaction via txid due to
parent-fetching of orphans).
Further, in preparation for future witness versions being deployed on the
network, ensure that WITNESS_UNKNOWN transactions are rejected in
AreInputsStandard(), so that transactions spending v1 (or greater) witness
outputs will fall into this category of having their txid added to the reject
filter.
ACKs for top commit:
ajtowns:
ACK 9f88ded82b2898ca63d44c08072f1ba52f0e18d7 - code review
jnewbery:
Code review ACK 9f88ded82b2898ca63d44c08072f1ba52f0e18d7
ariard:
Code Review/Tested ACK 9f88ded
naumenkogs:
utACK 9f88ded82b2898ca63d44c08072f1ba52f0e18d7
jonatack:
ACK 9f88ded82b2
Tree-SHA512: 1e93c0a5b68cb432524780ffc0093db893911fdfed9e2ed17f888e59114cc75d2a07062aefad4e5ce2e87c9270886117a8abb3c78fb889c9b9f31967f1777148
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In the logic for requesting missing parents of orphan transactions, parent
transactions with multiple outputs being spent by the given orphan were being
processed multiple times. Fix this by deduplicating the set of missing parent
txids first.
Co-authored-by: Anthony Towns <aj@erisian.com.au>
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Previously, we would potentially add the same txid many times to the rolling
bloom filter of recently announced transactions to a peer, if many outputs of
the same txid appeared as inputs in a transaction. Eliminate this problem and
avoid redundant lookups by asking the mempool for the unique parents of a
requested transaction.
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Our policy checks for non-standard inputs depend only on the non-witness
portion of a transaction: we look up the scriptPubKey of the input being
spent from our UTXO set (which is covered by the input txid), and the p2sh
checks only rely on the scriptSig portion of the input.
Consequently it's safe to add txids of transactions that fail these checks to
the reject filter, as the witness is irrelevant to the failure. This is helpful
for any situation where we might request the transaction again via txid (either
from txid-relay peers, or if we might fetch the transaction via txid due to
parent-fetching of orphans).
Further, in preparation for future witness versions being deployed on the
network, ensure that WITNESS_UNKNOWN transactions are rejected in
AreInputsStandard(), so that transactions spending v1 (or greater) witness
outputs will fall into this category of having their txid added to the reject
filter.
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3bd67ba5a4ef3c20ef1f873b63c9f53a6c8608b6 Test addr response caching (Gleb Naumenko)
cf1569e074505dbbb9d29422803dd31bb62072d4 Add addr permission flag enabling non-cached addr sharing (Gleb Naumenko)
acd6135b43941fa51d52f5fcdb2ce944280ad01e Cache responses to addr requests (Gleb Naumenko)
7cc0e8101f01891aa8be093a00d993bb7579c385 Remove useless 2500 limit on AddrMan queries (Gleb Naumenko)
ded742bc5b96e3215d69c11fb3628d224e7ae034 Move filtering banned addrs inside GetAddresses() (Gleb Naumenko)
Pull request description:
This is a very simple code change with a big p2p privacy benefit.
It’s currently trivial to scrape any reachable node’s AddrMan (a database of all nodes known to them along with the timestamps).
We do have a limit of one GETADDR per connection, but a spy can disconnect and reconnect even from the same IP, and send GETADDR again and again.
Since we respond with 1,000 random records at most, depending on the AddrMan size it takes probably up to 100 requests for an spy to make sure they scraped (almost) everything.
I even have a script for that. It is totally doable within couple minutes.
Then, with some extra protocol knowledge a spy can infer the direct peers of the victim, and other topological stuff.
I suggest to cache responses to GETADDR on a daily basis, so that an attacker gets at most 1,000 records per day, and can’t track the changes in real time. I will be following up with more improvements to addr relay privacy, but this one alone is a very effective. And simple!
I doubt any of the real software does *reconnect to get new addrs from a given peer*, so we shouldn’t be cutting anyone.
I also believe it doesn’t have any negative implications on the overall topology quality. And the records being “outdated” for at most a day doesn’t break any honest assumptions either.
ACKs for top commit:
jnewbery:
reACK 3bd67ba5a4ef3c20ef1f873b63c9f53a6c8608b6
promag:
Code review ACK 3bd67ba5a4ef3c20ef1f873b63c9f53a6c8608b6.
ariard:
Code Review ACK 3bd67ba
Tree-SHA512: dfa5d03205c2424e40a3f8a41af9306227e1ca18beead3b3dda44aa2a082175bb1c6d929dbc7ea8e48e01aed0d50f0d54491caa1147471a2b72a46c3ca06b66f
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Based on a commit by Anthony Towns.
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