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included
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-BEGIN VERIFY SCRIPT-
for f in \
src/*.cpp \
src/*.h \
src/bench/*.cpp \
src/bench/*.h \
src/compat/*.cpp \
src/compat/*.h \
src/consensus/*.cpp \
src/consensus/*.h \
src/crypto/*.cpp \
src/crypto/*.h \
src/crypto/ctaes/*.h \
src/policy/*.cpp \
src/policy/*.h \
src/primitives/*.cpp \
src/primitives/*.h \
src/qt/*.cpp \
src/qt/*.h \
src/qt/test/*.cpp \
src/qt/test/*.h \
src/rpc/*.cpp \
src/rpc/*.h \
src/script/*.cpp \
src/script/*.h \
src/support/*.cpp \
src/support/*.h \
src/support/allocators/*.h \
src/test/*.cpp \
src/test/*.h \
src/wallet/*.cpp \
src/wallet/*.h \
src/wallet/test/*.cpp \
src/wallet/test/*.h \
src/zmq/*.cpp \
src/zmq/*.h
do
base=${f%/*}/ relbase=${base#src/} sed -i "s:#include \"\(.*\)\"\(.*\):if test -e \$base'\\1'; then echo \"#include <\"\$relbase\"\\1>\\2\"; else echo \"#include <\\1>\\2\"; fi:e" $f
done
-END VERIFY SCRIPT-
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in ConsiderEviction
Static analyzer (and humans!) will see ...
```
else if (state.m_chain_sync.m_timeout == 0 || (state.m_chain_sync.m_work_header != nullptr && ...
```
... and infer that state.m_chain_sync.m_work_header might be set to nullptr,
and thus flag `state.m_chain_sync.m_work_header->GetBlockHash().ToString()`
as a potential null pointer dereference.
This commit makes the tacit assumption (m_work_header != nullptr) explicit.
Code introduced in 5a6d00 ("Permit disconnection of outbound peers on
bad/slow chains") which was merged into master four days ago.
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We should generally avoid writing to debug.log unconditionally for
inbound peers which misbehave (the peer being about to be banned
being an exception, since they cannot do this twice).
To avoid removing logs for outbound peers, a new log is added to
notify users when a new outbound peer is connected which mimics
the version print.
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a357293 Use MakeUnique<Db>(...) (practicalswift)
3e09b39 Use MakeUnique<T>(...) instead of std::unique_ptr<T>(new T(...)) (practicalswift)
8617989 Add MakeUnique (substitute for C++14 std::make_unique) (practicalswift)
d223bc9 Use unique_ptr for pcoinscatcher/pcoinsdbview/pcoinsTip/pblocktree (practicalswift)
b45c597 Use unique_ptr for pdbCopy (Db) and fix potential memory leak (practicalswift)
29ab96d Use unique_ptr for dbenv (DbEnv) (practicalswift)
f72cbf9 Use unique_ptr for pfilter (CBloomFilter) (practicalswift)
8ccf1bb Use unique_ptr for sem{Addnode,Outbound} (CSemaphore) (practicalswift)
73db063 Use unique_ptr for upnp_thread (boost::thread) (practicalswift)
0024531 Use unique_ptr for dbw (CDBWrapper) (practicalswift)
fa6d122 Use unique_ptr:s for {fee,short,long}Stats (TxConfirmStats) (practicalswift)
5a6f768 Use unique_ptr for httpRPCTimerInterface (HTTPRPCTimerInterface) (practicalswift)
860e912 Use unique_ptr for pwalletMain (CWallet) (practicalswift)
Pull request description:
Use `std::unique_ptr` (C++11) where possible.
Rationale:
1. Avoid resource leaks (specifically: forgetting to `delete` an object created using `new`)
2. Avoid undefined behaviour (specifically: double `delete`:s)
**Note to reviewers:** Please let me know if I've missed any obvious `std::unique_ptr` candidates. Hopefully this PR should cover all the trivial cases.
Tree-SHA512: 9fbeb47b800ab8ff4e0be9f2a22ab63c23d5c613a0c6716d9183db8d22ddbbce592fb8384a8b7874bf7375c8161efb13ca2197ad6f24b75967148037f0f7b20c
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getheaders
725b79a [test] Verify node doesn't send headers that haven't been fully validated (Russell Yanofsky)
3788a84 Do not send (potentially) invalid headers in response to getheaders (Matt Corallo)
Pull request description:
Nowhere else in the protocol do we send headers which are for
blocks we have not fully validated except in response to getheaders
messages with a null locator. On my public node I have not seen any
such request (whether for an invalid block or not) in at least two
years of debug.log output, indicating that this should have minimal
impact.
Tree-SHA512: c1f6e0cdcdfb78ea577d555f9b3ceb1b4b60eff4f6cf313bfd8b576c9562d797bea73abc23f7011f249ae36dd539c715f3d20487ac03ace60e84e1b77c0c1e1a
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* pcoinscatcher (CCoinsViewErrorCatcher)
* pcoinsdbview (CCoinsViewDB)
* pcoinsTip (CCoinsViewCache)
* pblocktree (CBlockTreeDB)
* Remove variables shadowing pcoinsdbview
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-Wthread-safety-analysis if available.
76ea17c79 Add mutex requirement for AddToCompactExtraTransactions(…) (practicalswift)
4616c825a Use -Wthread-safety-analysis if available (+ -Werror=thread-safety-analysis if --enable-werror) (practicalswift)
7e319d639 Fix -Wthread-safety-analysis warnings. Change the sync.h primitives to std from boost. (Matt Corallo)
Pull request description:
* Add mutex requirement for `AddToCompactExtraTransactions(…)`.
* Use `-Wthread-safety-analysis` if available.
* Rebased on top of https://github.com/TheBlueMatt/bitcoin/commits/2017-08-test-10923 - now includes: Fix -Wthread-safety-analysis warnings. Change the sync.h primitives to std from boost.
Tree-SHA512: fb7365f85daa2741c276a1c899228181a8d46af51db7fbbdffceeaff121a3eb2ab74d7c8bf5e7de879bcc5042d00d24cb4649c312d51caba45a3f6135fd8b38f
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The vector `vExtraTxnForCompact`, which is guarded by the mutex
`cs_main`, is accessed in `AddToCompactExtraTransactions(…)`.
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6262915 Add unit test for stale tip checking (Suhas Daftuar)
83df257 Add CConnmanTest to mutate g_connman in tests (João Barbosa)
ac7b37c Connect to an extra outbound peer if our tip is stale (Suhas Daftuar)
db32a65 Track tip update time and last new block announcement from each peer (Suhas Daftuar)
2d4327d net: Allow connecting to extra outbound peers (Suhas Daftuar)
Pull request description:
This is an alternative approach to #11534. Rather than disconnect an outbound peer when our tip looks stale, instead try to connect to an additional outbound peer.
Periodically, check to see if we have more outbound peers than we target (ie if any extra peers are in use), and if so, disconnect the one that least recently announced a new block (breaking ties by choosing the newest peer that we connected to).
Tree-SHA512: 8f19e910e0bb36867f81783e020af225f356451899adfc7ade1895d6d3bd5afe51c83759610dfd10c62090c4fe404efa0283b2f63fde0bd7da898a1aaa7fb281
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If our tip hasn't updated in a while, that may be because our peers are
not relaying blocks to us that we would consider valid. Allow connection
to an additional outbound peer in that circumstance.
Also, periodically check to see if we are exceeding our target number of
outbound peers, and disconnect the one which has least recently
announced a new block to us (choosing the newest such peer in the case
of tie).
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block (more effeciently)
f3d4adf Make p2p-acceptablock not an extended test (Matt Corallo)
00dcda6 [qa] test that invalid blocks on an invalid chain get a disconnect (Matt Corallo)
015a525 Reject headers building on invalid chains by tracking invalidity (Matt Corallo)
932f118 Accept unrequested blocks with work equal to our tip (Matt Corallo)
3d9c70c Stop always storing blocks from whitelisted peers (Matt Corallo)
3b4ac43 Rewrite p2p-acceptblock in preparation for slight behavior changes (Matt Corallo)
Pull request description:
@sdaftuar pointed out that the version in #11487 was somewhat DoS-able as someone could feed you a valid chain that forked off the the last checkpoint block and force you to do lots of work just walking backwards across blocks for each new block they gave you. We came up with a few proposals but settled on the one implemented here as likely the simplest without obvious DoS issues. It uses our existing on-load mapBlockIndex walk to make sure everything that descends from an invalid block is marked as such, and then simply caches blocks which we attempted to connect but which were found to be invalid. To avoid DoS issues during IBD, this will need to depend on #11458.
Includes tests from #11487.
Tree-SHA512: 46aff8332908e122dae72ceb5fe8cd241902c2281a87f58a5fb486bf69d46458d84a096fdcb5f3e8e07fbcf7466232b10c429f4d67855425f11b38ac0bf612e1
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There is no reason to wish to store blocks on disk always just
because a peer is whitelisted. This appears to be a historical
quirk to avoid breaking things when the accept limits were added.
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Nowhere else in the protocol do we send headers which are for
blocks we have not fully validated except in response to getheaders
messages with a null locator. On my public node I have not seen any
such request (whether for an invalid block or not) in at least two
years of debug.log output, indicating that this should have minimal
impact.
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Reading the variable mapBlockIndex requires holding the mutex cs_main.
The new "Disconnect outbound peers relaying invalid headers" code
added in commit 37886d5e2f9992678dea4b1bd893f4f10d61d3ad and merged
as part of #11568 two days ago did not lock cs_main prior to accessing
mapBlockIndex.
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ProcessMessages will now return earlier when processing headers
messages, rather than continuing on (and do nothing).
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e065249 Add unit test for outbound peer eviction (Suhas Daftuar)
5a6d00c Permit disconnection of outbound peers on bad/slow chains (Suhas Daftuar)
c60fd71 Disconnecting from bad outbound peers in IBD (Suhas Daftuar)
Pull request description:
The first commit will disconnect an outbound peer that serves us a headers chain with insufficient work while we're in IBD.
The second commit introduces a way to disconnect outbound peers whose chains fall out of sync with ours:
For a given outbound peer, we check whether their best known block (which is known from the blocks they announce to us) has at least as much work as our tip. If it doesn't, we set a 20 minute timeout, and if we still haven't heard about a block with as much work as our tip had when we set the timeout, then we send a single getheaders message, and wait 2 more minutes. If after two minutes their best known block has insufficient work, we disconnect that peer.
We protect 4 of our outbound peers (who provide some "good" headers chains, ie a chain with at least as much work as our tip at some point) from being subject to this logic, to prevent excessive network topology changes as a result of this algorithm, while still ensuring that we have a reasonable number of nodes not known to be on bogus chains.
We also don't require our peers to be on the same chain as us, to prevent accidental partitioning of the network in the event of a chain split. Note that if our peers are ever on a more work chain than our tip, then we will download and validate it, and then either reorg to it, or learn of a consensus incompatibility with that peer and disconnect. This PR is designed to protect against peers that are on a less work chain which we may never try to download and validate.
Tree-SHA512: 2e0169a1dd8a7fb95980573ac4a201924bffdd724c19afcab5efcef076fdbe1f2cec7dc5f5d7e0a6327216f56d3828884f73642e00c8534b56ec2bb4c854a656
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Currently we have no rotation of outbound peers. If an outbound peer
stops serving us blocks, or is on a consensus-incompatible chain with
less work than our tip (but otherwise valid headers), then we will never
disconnect that peer, even though that peer is using one of our 8
outbound connection slots. Because we rely on our outbound peers to
find an honest node in order to reach consensus, allowing an
incompatible peer to occupy one of those slots is undesirable,
particularly if it is possible for all such slots to be occupied by such
peers.
Protect against this by always checking to see if a peer's best known
block has less work than our tip, and if so, set a 20 minute timeout --
if the peer is still not known to have caught up to a chain with as much
work as ours after 20 minutes, then send a single getheaders message,
wait 2 more minutes, and if a better header hasn't been received by then,
disconnect that peer.
Note:
- we do not require that our peer sync to the same tip as ours, just an
equal or greater work tip. (Doing otherwise would risk partitioning the
network in the event of a chain split, and is also unnecessary.)
- we pick 4 of our outbound peers and do not subject them to this logic,
to be more conservative. We don't wish to permit temporary network
issues (or an attacker) to excessively disrupt network topology.
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When in IBD, we'd like to use all our outbound peers to help us
sync the chain. Disconnect any outbound peers whose headers have
insufficient work.
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15f5d3b17 Switch DNSSeed-needed metric to any-automatic-nodes, not services (Matt Corallo)
5ee88b4bd Clarify docs for requirements/handling of addnode/connect nodes (Matt Corallo)
57edc0b0c Rename fAddnode to a more-descriptive "manual_connection" (Matt Corallo)
44407100f Replace relevant services logic with a function suite. (Matt Corallo)
Pull request description:
This was mostly written as a way to clean things up so that the NETWORK_LIMITED PR (#10387) can be simplified a ton, but its also a nice standalone cleanup that will also require a bit of review because it tweaks a lot of stuff across net. The new functions are fine in protocol.h right now since they're straight-forward, but after NETWORK_LIMITED will really want to move elsewhere after @theuni moves the nServices-based selection to addrman from connman.
Adds HasAllRelevantServices and GetRelevantServices, which check
for NETWORK|WITNESS.
This changes the following:
* Removes nRelevantServices from CConnman, disconnecting it a bit
more from protocol-level logic.
* Replaces our sometimes-connect-to-!WITNESS-nodes logic with
simply always requiring WITNESS|NETWORK for outbound non-feeler
connections (feelers still only require NETWORK).
* This has the added benefit of removing nServicesExpected from
CNode - instead letting net_processing's VERSION message
handling simply check HasAllRelevantServices.
* This implies we believe WITNESS nodes to continue to be a
significant majority of nodes on the network, but also because
we cannot sync properly from !WITNESS nodes, it is strange to
continue using our valuable outbound slots on them.
* In order to prevent this change from preventing connection to
-connect= nodes which have !WITNESS, -connect nodes are now
given the "addnode" flag. This also allows outbound connections
to !NODE_NETWORK nodes for -connect nodes (which was already true
of addnodes).
* Has the (somewhat unintended) consequence of changing one of the
eviction metrics from the same
sometimes-connect-to-!WITNESS-nodes metric to requiring
HasRelevantServices.
This should make NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED much simpler to implement.
Tree-SHA512: 90606896c86cc5da14c77843b16674a6a012065e7b583d76d1c47a18215358abefcbab44ff4fab3fadcd39aa9a42d4740c6dc8874a58033bdfc8ad3fb5c649fc
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Adds HasAllRelevantServices and GetRelevantServices, which check
for NETWORK|WITNESS.
This changes the following:
* Removes nRelevantServices from CConnman, disconnecting it a bit
more from protocol-level logic.
* Replaces our sometimes-connect-to-!WITNESS-nodes logic with
simply always requiring WITNESS|NETWORK for outbound non-feeler
connections (feelers still only require NETWORK).
* This has the added benefit of removing nServicesExpected from
CNode - instead letting net_processing's VERSION message
handling simply check HasAllRelevantServices.
* This implies we believe WITNESS nodes to continue to be a
significant majority of nodes on the network, but also because
we cannot sync properly from !WITNESS nodes, it is strange to
continue using our valuable outbound slots on them.
* In order to prevent this change from preventing connection to
-connect= nodes which have !WITNESS, -connect nodes are now
given the "addnode" flag. This also allows outbound connections
to !NODE_NETWORK nodes for -connect nodes (which was already true
of addnodes).
* Has the (somewhat unintended) consequence of changing one of the
eviction metrics from the same
sometimes-connect-to-!WITNESS-nodes metric to requiring
HasRelevantServices.
This should make NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED much simpler to implement.
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checks, etc.)
76fed83 Avoid NULL pointer dereference when _walletModel is NULL (which is valid) (practicalswift)
4971a9a Use two boolean literals instead of re-using variable (practicalswift)
b5fb339 Remove duplicate uriParts.size() > 0 check (practicalswift)
7466991 Remove redundant check (!ecc is always true) (practicalswift)
55224af Remove redundant NULL checks after new (practicalswift)
Pull request description:
Contains:
* Remove redundant `NULL` checks after throwing `new`
* Remove redundant check (`!ecc` is always true)
* Remove duplicate `uriParts.size() > 0` check
* Use two boolean literals instead of re-using variable
Tree-SHA512: 30e9af8a9d5c8184836f8267b492aeb4e26eca171a3be08f634b3f39b3055b9fa9f06623f6c69b294ca13bf99743f7645cfac2b25e014ff74687bd085a997895
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Sending a getheaders message with an empty locator and a stop hash
is a request for a single header by hash. The node will respond with
headers for blocks not in the main chain as well as those in the main
chain. To avoid fingerprinting, the node should, however, ignore
requests for headers on side branches that are too old.
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A C-style cast is equivalent to try casting in the following order:
1. const_cast(...)
2. static_cast(...)
3. const_cast(static_cast(...))
4. reinterpret_cast(...)
5. const_cast(reinterpret_cast(...))
By using static_cast<T>(...) explicitly we avoid the possibility
of an unintentional and dangerous reinterpret_cast. Furthermore
static_cast<T>(...) allows for easier grepping of casts.
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Combine fLimitFree and fOverrideMempoolLimit into a single boolean:
bypass_limits. This is used to indicate that mempool limiting based on feerate
should be bypassed. It is used when readding transactions from a reorg and then
the mempool is trimmed to size after all transactions are added and they can be
evaluated in the context of their descendants. No changes to behavior.
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The copy in PeerLogicValidation can be used instead.
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Drop boost signals in favor of a stateful class. This will allow the message
processing loop to actually move to net_processing in a future step.
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There are a few too many edge-cases here to make this a scripted diff.
The following commits will move a few functions into PeerLogicValidation, where
the local connman instance can be used. This change prepares for that usage.
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c00199244 Fix potential null dereferences (MeshCollider)
Pull request description:
Picked up by the static analyzer [Facebook Infer](http://fbinfer.com/) which I was playing around with for another research project. Just adding some asserts before dereferencing potentially null pointers.
Tree-SHA512: 9c01dab2d21bce75c7c7ef867236654ab538318a1fb39f96f09cdd2382a05be1a6b2db0a1169a94168864e82ffeae0686a383db6eba799742bdd89c37ac74397
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In order to avoid unintended implicit conversions.
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They were temporary additions to ease the transition.
-BEGIN VERIFY SCRIPT-
find src/ -name "*.cpp" ! -wholename "src/util.h" ! -wholename "src/util.cpp" | xargs perl -i -pe 's/(?<!\.)(ParseParameters|ReadConfigFile|IsArgSet|(Soft|Force)?(Get|Set)(|Bool|)Arg(s)?)\(/gArgs.\1(/g'
-END VERIFY SCRIPT-
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pointer literal instead of the macro NULL
90d4d89 scripted-diff: Use the C++11 keyword nullptr to denote the pointer literal instead of the macro NULL (practicalswift)
Pull request description:
Since C++11 the macro `NULL` may be:
* an integer literal with value zero, or
* a prvalue of type `std::nullptr_t`
By using the C++11 keyword `nullptr` we are guaranteed a prvalue of type `std::nullptr_t`.
For a more thorough discussion, see "A name for the null pointer: nullptr" (Sutter &
Stroustrup), http://www.open-std.org/jtc1/sc22/wg21/docs/papers/2007/n2431.pdf
With this patch applied there are no `NULL` macro usages left in the repo:
```
$ git grep NULL -- "*.cpp" "*.h" | egrep -v '(/univalue/|/secp256k1/|/leveldb/|_NULL|NULLDUMMY|torcontrol.*NULL|NULL cert)' | wc -l
0
```
The road towards `nullptr` (C++11) is split into two PRs:
* `NULL` → `nullptr` is handled in PR #10483 (scripted, this PR)
* `0` → `nullptr` is handled in PR #10645 (manual)
Tree-SHA512: 3c395d66f2ad724a8e6fed74b93634de8bfc0c0eafac94e64e5194c939499fefd6e68f047de3083ad0b4eff37df9a8a3a76349aa17d55eabbd8e0412f140a297
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block
3f8fa7f Make sure to clean up mapBlockSource if we've already seen the block (Cory Fields)
Pull request description:
Otherwise we may leave them dangling.
Credit TheBlueMatt.
Tree-SHA512: 8be77e08ebfc4f5b206d5ee7cfbe87f92c1eb5bc2b412471993658fe210306789aaf0f3d1454c635508a7d8effede2cf5ac144d622b0157b872733d9661d65c3
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Credit TheBlueMatt
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instead of the macro NULL
-BEGIN VERIFY SCRIPT-
sed -i 's/\<NULL\>/nullptr/g' src/*.cpp src/*.h src/*/*.cpp src/*/*.h src/qt/*/*.cpp src/qt/*/*.h src/wallet/*/*.cpp src/wallet/*/*.h src/support/allocators/*.h
sed -i 's/Prefer nullptr, otherwise SAFECOOKIE./Prefer NULL, otherwise SAFECOOKIE./g' src/torcontrol.cpp
sed -i 's/tor: Using nullptr authentication/tor: Using NULL authentication/g' src/torcontrol.cpp
sed -i 's/METHODS=nullptr/METHODS=NULL/g' src/test/torcontrol_tests.cpp src/torcontrol.cpp
sed -i 's/nullptr certificates/NULL certificates/g' src/qt/paymentserver.cpp
sed -i 's/"nullptr"/"NULL"/g' src/torcontrol.cpp src/test/torcontrol_tests.cpp
-END VERIFY SCRIPT-
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These have been used to indicate incompatible consensus rules
instead of changing network magic, so we're stuck disconnecting them.
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b1268a1 clang-format: Delete ForEachMacros (Jorge Timón)
5995735 scripted-diff: Remove #include <boost/foreach.hpp> (Jorge Timón)
3eff827 scripted-diff: Remove BOOST_REVERSE_FOREACH (Jorge Timón)
33aed5b Fix const_reverse_iterator constructor (pass const ptr) (Jorge Timón)
300851e Introduce src/reverse_iterator.hpp and include it... (Jorge Timón)
Tree-SHA512: df3405328e9602d0a433ac134ba59a5c9a6202ef64188df2f94a59b2ce58dec7c988b25d0671c7937de516a96b2e6daeb9d04c82fa363b616ee4cf6e9cb0fac6
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5a9b508 [trivial] Add end of namespace comments (practicalswift)
Tree-SHA512: 92b0fcae4d1d3f4da9e97569ae84ef2d6e09625a5815cd0e5f0eb6dd2ecba9852fa85c184c5ae9de5117050330ce995e9867b451fa8cd5512169025990541a2b
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