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-BEGIN VERIFY SCRIPT-
sed -i 's:#include <interfaces/chain.h>:#include <banman.h>\n#include <interfaces/chain.h>\n#include <net.h>\n#include <net_processing.h>:' src/node/context.cpp
sed -i 's/namespace interfaces {/class BanMan;\nclass CConnman;\nclass PeerLogicValidation;\n&/' src/node/context.h
sed -i 's/std::unique_ptr<interfaces::Chain> chain/std::unique_ptr<CConnman> connman;\n std::unique_ptr<PeerLogicValidation> peer_logic;\n std::unique_ptr<BanMan> banman;\n &/' src/node/context.h
sed -i '/std::unique_ptr<[^>]\+> \(g_connman\|g_banman\|peerLogic\);/d' src/banman.h src/net.h src/init.cpp
sed -i 's/g_connman/m_context.connman/g' src/interfaces/node.cpp
sed -i 's/g_banman/m_context.banman/g' src/interfaces/node.cpp
sed -i 's/g_connman/m_node.connman/g' src/interfaces/chain.cpp src/test/setup_common.cpp
sed -i 's/g_banman/m_node.banman/g' src/test/setup_common.cpp
sed -i 's/g_connman/node.connman/g' src/init.cpp src/node/transaction.cpp
sed -i 's/g_banman/node.banman/g' src/init.cpp
sed -i 's/peerLogic/node.peer_logic/g' src/init.cpp
sed -i 's/g_connman/g_rpc_node->connman/g' src/rpc/mining.cpp src/rpc/net.cpp src/rpc/rawtransaction.cpp
sed -i 's/g_banman/g_rpc_node->banman/g' src/rpc/net.cpp
sed -i 's/std::shared_ptr<CWallet> wallet =/node.context()->connman = std::move(test.m_node.connman);\n &/' src/qt/test/wallettests.cpp
-END VERIFY SCRIPT-
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Recent questions have come up regarding dynamic service registration
(see https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/16442#discussion_r308702676
and the assumeutxo project, which needs to dynamically flip NODE_NETWORK).
While investigating how dynamic service registration might work, I was
confused about how we convey local services to peers. This adds some
documentation that hopefully clarifies this process.
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0ba08020c9791f7caf5986ad6490c16a2b66cd83 Disconnect peers violating blocks-only mode (Suhas Daftuar)
937eba91e1550bc3038dc541c236ac83e0a0e6d5 doc: improve comments relating to block-relay-only peers (Suhas Daftuar)
430f489027f15c1e4948ea4378954df24e3fee88 Don't relay addr messages to block-relay-only peers (Suhas Daftuar)
3a5e885306ea954d7eccdc11502e91a51dab8ec6 Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections (Suhas Daftuar)
b83f51a4bbe29bf130a2b0c0e85e5bffea107f75 Add comment explaining intended use of m_tx_relay (Suhas Daftuar)
e75c39cd425f8c4e5b6bbb2beecb9c80034fefe1 Check that tx_relay is initialized before access (Suhas Daftuar)
c4aa2ba82211ea5988ed7fe21e1b08bc3367e6d4 [refactor] Change tx_relay structure to be unique_ptr (Suhas Daftuar)
4de0dbac9b286c42a9b10132b7c2d76712f1a319 [refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure (Suhas Daftuar)
26a93bce29fd813e1402b013f402869c25b656d1 Remove unused variable (Suhas Daftuar)
Pull request description:
Transaction relay is optimized for a combination of redundancy/robustness as well as bandwidth minimization -- as a result transaction relay leaks information that adversaries can use to infer the network topology.
Network topology is better kept private for (at least) two reasons:
(a) Knowledge of the network graph can make it easier to find the source IP of a given transaction.
(b) Knowledge of the network graph could be used to split a target node or nodes from the honest network (eg by knowing which peers to attack in order to achieve a network split).
We can eliminate the risks of (b) by separating block relay from transaction relay; inferring network connectivity from the relay of blocks/block headers is much more expensive for an adversary.
After this commit, bitcoind will make 2 additional outbound connections that are only used for block relay. (In the future, we might consider rotating our transaction-relay peers to help limit the effects of (a).)
ACKs for top commit:
sipa:
ACK 0ba08020c9791f7caf5986ad6490c16a2b66cd83
ajtowns:
ACK 0ba08020c9791f7caf5986ad6490c16a2b66cd83 -- code review, ran tests. ran it on mainnet for a couple of days with MAX_BLOCKS_ONLY_CONNECTIONS upped from 2 to 16 and didn't observe any unexpected behaviour: it disconnected a couple of peers that tried sending inv's, and it successfully did compact block relay with some block relay peers.
TheBlueMatt:
re-utACK 0ba08020c9791f7caf5986ad6490c16a2b66cd83. Pointed out that stats.fRelayTxes was sometimes uninitialized for blocksonly peers (though its not a big deal and only effects RPC), which has since been fixed here. Otherwise changes are pretty trivial so looks good.
jnewbery:
utACK 0ba08020c9791f7caf5986ad6490c16a2b66cd83
jamesob:
ACK https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/commit/0ba08020c9791f7caf5986ad6490c16a2b66cd83
Tree-SHA512: 4c3629434472c7dd4125253417b1be41967a508c3cfec8af5a34cad685464fbebbb6558f0f8f5c0d4463e3ffa4fa3aabd58247692cb9ab8395f4993078b9bcdf
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We don't want relay of addr messages to leak information about
these network links.
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Transaction relay is primarily optimized for balancing redundancy/robustness
with bandwidth minimization -- as a result transaction relay leaks information
that adversaries can use to infer the network topology.
Network topology is better kept private for (at least) two reasons:
(a) Knowledge of the network graph can make it easier to find the source IP of
a given transaction.
(b) Knowledge of the network graph could be used to split a target node or
nodes from the honest network (eg by knowing which peers to attack in order to
achieve a network split).
We can eliminate the risks of (b) by separating block relay from transaction
relay; inferring network connectivity from the relay of blocks/block headers is
much more expensive for an adversary.
After this commit, bitcoind will make 2 additional outbound connections that
are only used for block relay. (In the future, we might consider rotating our
transaction-relay peers to help limit the effects of (a).)
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This helps to distinguish it from CNode::fRelayTxes and avoid bugs like
425278d17bd0edf8a3a7cc81e55016f7fd8e7726
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fa8548c5d1 net: Remove unused unsanitized user agent string CNode::strSubVer (MarcoFalke)
Pull request description:
I fail to see a use case for this unsanitized byte array. In fact this can easily be confused with `cleanSubVer` and be displayed to the user (or logged) by a simple typo that is hard to find in review.
Further reading: https://btcinformation.org/en/developer-reference#version
ACKs for commit fa8548:
promag:
utACK fa8548c, good catch.
practicalswift:
utACK fa8548c5d13957f57f9b1e20e03002600962f7f0
sipa:
utACK fa8548c5d13957f57f9b1e20e03002600962f7f0
Tree-SHA512: 3c3ff1504d1583ad099df9a6aa761458a82ec48a58ef7aaa9b5679a5281dd1b59036ba2932ed708488951a565b669a3083ef70be5a58472ff8677b971162ae2f
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This makes orphan processing work like handling getdata messages:
After every actual transaction validation attempt, interrupt
processing to deal with messages arriving from other peers.
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guarded by cs_vNodes.
eea02be70e Add locking annotation for vNodes. vNodes is guarded by cs_vNodes. (practicalswift)
Pull request description:
Add locking annotation for `vNodes`. `vNodes` is guarded by `cs_vNodes`.
Tree-SHA512: b1e18be22ba5b9dd153536380321b09b30a75a20575f975af9af94164f51982b32267ba0994e77c801513b59da05d923a974a9d2dfebdac48024c4bda98b53af
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Co-authored-by: Suhas Daftuar <sdaftuar@gmail.com>
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0297be61a Allow connections from misbehavior banned peers. (Gregory Maxwell)
Pull request description:
This allows incoming connections from peers which are only banned
due to an automatic misbehavior ban if doing so won't fill inbound.
These peers are preferred for eviction when inbound fills, but may
still be kept if they fall into the protected classes. This
eviction preference lasts the entire life of the connection even
if the ban expires.
If they misbehave again they'll still get disconnected.
The main purpose of banning on misbehavior is to prevent our
connections from being wasted on unhelpful peers such as ones
running incompatible consensus rules. For inbound peers this
can be better accomplished with eviction preferences.
A secondary purpose was to reduce resource waste from repeated
abuse but virtually any attacker can get a nearly unlimited
supply of addresses, so disconnection is about the best we can
do.
This can reduce the potential from negative impact due to incorrect misbehaviour bans.
Tree-SHA512: 03bc8ec8bae365cc437daf70000c8f2edc512e37db821bc4e0fafa6cf56cc185e9ab40453aa02445f48d6a2e3e7268767ca2017655aca5383108416f1e2cf20f
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These were not declared properly, so their results are not properly
processed. E.g.:
https://dev.visucore.com/bitcoin/doxygen/rpcdump_8cpp.html#a994c8748aaa60fbb78009ff8a0638dea
https://dev.visucore.com/bitcoin/doxygen/coins_8cpp.html#aa03af24ef3570144b045f4fca7a0d603
https://dev.visucore.com/bitcoin/doxygen/wallet_2wallet_8cpp.html#a5c2a7725ff8796f03471f844ecded3d9
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This allows incoming connections from peers which are only banned
due to an automatic misbehavior ban if doing so won't fill inbound.
These peers are preferred for eviction when inbound fills, but may
still be kept if they fall into the protected classes. This
eviction preference lasts the entire life of the connection even
if the ban expires.
If they misbehave again they'll still get disconnected.
The main purpose of banning on misbehavior is to prevent our
connections from being wasted on unhelpful peers such as ones
running incompatible consensus rules. For inbound peers this
can be better accomplished with eviction preferences.
A secondary purpose was to reduce resource waste from repeated
abuse but virtually any attacker can get a nearly unlimited
supply of addresses, so disconnection is about the best we can
do.
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18185b57c32d0a43afeca4c125b9352c692923e9 scripted-diff: batch-recase BanMan variables (Carl Dong)
c2e04d37f3841d109c1fe60693f9622e2836cc29 banman: Add, use CBanEntry ctor that takes ban reason (Carl Dong)
1ffa4ce27d4ea6c1067d8984455df97994c7713e banman: reformulate nBanUtil calculation (Carl Dong)
daae598feb034f2f56e0b00ecfb4854d693d3641 banman: add thread annotations and mark members const where possible (Cory Fields)
84fc3fbd0304a7d6e660bf783c84bed2dd415141 scripted-diff: batch-rename BanMan members (Cory Fields)
af3503d903b1a608cd212e2d74b274103199078c net: move BanMan to its own files (Cory Fields)
d0469b2e9386a7a4b268cb9725347e7517acace6 banman: pass in default ban time as a parameter (Cory Fields)
2e56702ecedd83c4b7cb8de9de5c437c8c08e645 banman: pass the banfile path in (Cory Fields)
4c0d961eb0d7825a1e6f8389d7f5545114ee18c6 banman: create and split out banman (Cory Fields)
83c1ea2e5e66b8a83072e3d5ad6a4ced406eb1ba net: split up addresses/ban dumps in preparation for moving them (Cory Fields)
136bd7926c72659dd277a7b795ea17f72e523338 tests: remove member connman/peerLogic in TestingSetup (Cory Fields)
7cc2b9f6786f9bc33853220551eed33ca6b7b7b2 net: Break disconnecting out of Ban() (Cory Fields)
Pull request description:
**Old English à la Beowulf**
```
Banman wæs bréme --blaéd wíde sprang--
Connmanes eafera Coreum in.
aéglaéca léodum forstandan
Swá bealdode bearn Connmanes
guma gúðum cúð gódum daédum·
dréah æfter dóme· nealles druncne slóg
```
**Modern English Translation**
```
Banman was famed --his renown spread wide--
Conman's hier, in Core-land.
against the evil creature defend the people
Thus he was bold, the son of Connman
man famed in war, for good deeds;
he led his life for glory, never, having drunk, slew
```
--
With @theuni's blessing, here is Banman, rebased. Original PR: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/11457
--
Followup PRs:
1. Give `CNode` a `Disconnect` method ([source](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/14605#discussion_r248065847))
2. Add a comment to `std::atomic_bool fDisconnect` in `net.h` that setting this to true will cause the node to be disconnected the next time `DisconnectNodes()` runs ([source](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/14605#discussion_r248384309))
Tree-SHA512: 9c207edbf577415c22c9811113e393322d936a843d4ff265186728152a67c057779ac4d4f27b895de9729f7a53e870f828b9ebc8bcdab757520c2aebe1e9be35
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Removes the dependency on arg parsing.
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There's no need to hard-code the path here. Passing it in means that there are
no ordering concerns wrt establishing the datadir.
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Some say he has always been.
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These are separate events which need to be carried out by separate subsystems.
This also cleans up some whitespace and tabs in qt to avoid getting flagged by
the linter.
Current behavior is preserved.
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fac2f5ecae96dd11057977ce988501e18bb162c6 Use C++11 default member initializers (MarcoFalke)
Pull request description:
The second and last change on this topic (c.f. #15109). Split up because the diff would otherwise interleave, making review harder than necessary.
This is not a stylistic change, but a change that avoids bugs such as:
* fix uninitialized read when stringifying an addrLocal #14728
* qt: Initialize members in WalletModel #12426
* net: correctly initialize nMinPingUsecTime #6636
* ...
Tree-SHA512: 547ae72b87aeaed5890eb5fdcff612bfc93354632b238d89e1e1c0487187f39609bcdc537ef21345e0aea8cfcf1ea48da432d672c5386dd87cf58742446a86b1
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These two methods have had the same meaning, but inverted, since
110b62f06992d0fb989153afff2dc3aea62a674f. Having one name for a single
concept simplifies the code.
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fa2510d5c1cdf9c2cd5cc9887302ced4378c7202 Use C++11 default member initializers (MarcoFalke)
Pull request description:
Changes:
* Remove unused constructors that leave some members uninitialized
* Remove manual initialization in each constructor and prefer C++11 default member initializers
This is not a stylistic change, but a change that avoids bugs such as:
* fix uninitialized read when stringifying an addrLocal #14728
* qt: Initialize members in WalletModel #12426
* net: correctly initialize nMinPingUsecTime #6636
* ...
Tree-SHA512: 0f896f3b9fcc464d5fc7525f7c86343ef9ce9fb13425fbc68e9a9728fd8710c2b4e2fd039ee08279ea41ff20fd92b7185cf5cca95a0bcb6a5340a1e6f03cae6b
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4927bf2f257ac53569978980eaf1f61c2c6b04cc Increase maxconnections limit when using poll. (Patrick Strateman)
11cc491a288a73e911be24a285e12abd57df7d04 Implement poll() on systems which support it properly. (Patrick Strateman)
28211a4bc9c65859b641b81a0541726a0e01988f Move SocketEvents logic to private method. (Patrick Strateman)
7e403c0ae705455aa66f7df9a9a99f462fd4e9a8 Move GenerateSelectSet logic to private method. (Patrick Strateman)
1e6afd0dbc1c581435588e1e9bb419a035b81028 Introduce and use constant SELECT_TIMEOUT_MILLISECONDS. (Patrick Strateman)
Pull request description:
Implement poll() on systems which support it properly.
This eliminates the restriction on maximum socket descriptor number.
Tree-SHA512: b945cd9294afdafcce96d547f67679d5cdd684cf257904a239cd1248de3b5e093b8d6d28d8d1b7cc923dc0b2b5723faef9bc9bf118a9ce1bdcf357c2323f5573
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and ensure correct code path tested.
48b37db50 make peertimeout a debug argument, remove error message translation (Zain Iqbal Allarakhia)
8042bbfbf p2p: allow p2ptimeout to be configurable, speed up slow test (Zain Iqbal Allarakhia)
Pull request description:
**Summary:**
1. _Primary_: Adds a `debug_only=true` flag for peertimeout, defaults to 60 sec., the current hard-coded setting.
2. _Secondary_: Drastically speeds up `p2p_timeout.py` test.
3. _Secondary_: Tests that the correct code path is being tested by adding log assertions to the test.
**Rationale:**
- P2P timeout was hard-coded: make it explicitly specified and configurable, instead of a magic number.
- Addresses #13518; `p2p_timeout.py` takes 4 sec. to run instead of 61 sec.
- Makes `p2p_timeout.py` more explicit. Previously, we relied on a comment to inform us of the timeout amount being tested. Now it is specified directly in the test via passing in the new arg; `-peertimeout=3`.
- Opens us up to testing more P2P scenarios; oftentimes slow tests are the reason we don't test.
**Locally verified changes:**
_With Proposed Change (4.7 sec.):_
```
$ time ./test/functional/p2p_timeouts.py
2018-11-19T00:04:19.077000Z TestFramework (INFO): Initializing test directory /tmp/testhja7g2n7
2018-11-19T00:04:23.479000Z TestFramework (INFO): Stopping nodes
2018-11-19T00:04:23.683000Z TestFramework (INFO): Cleaning up /tmp/testhja7g2n7 on exit
2018-11-19T00:04:23.683000Z TestFramework (INFO): Tests successful
real 0m4.743s
```
_Currently on master (62.8 sec.):_
```
$ time ./test/functional/p2p_timeouts.py
2018-11-19T00:06:10.948000Z TestFramework (INFO): Initializing test directory /tmp/test6mo6k21h
2018-11-19T00:07:13.376000Z TestFramework (INFO): Stopping nodes
2018-11-19T00:07:13.631000Z TestFramework (INFO): Cleaning up /tmp/test6mo6k21h on exit
2018-11-19T00:07:13.631000Z TestFramework (INFO): Tests successful
real 1m2.836s
```
_Error message demonstrated for new argument `-peertimeout`:_
```
$ ./bitcoind -peertimeout=-5
...
Error: peertimeout cannot be configured with a negative value.
```
Tree-SHA512: ff7a244ebea54c4059407bf4fb86465714e6a79cef5d2bcaa22cfe831a81761aaf597ba4d5172fc2ec12266f54712216fc41b5d24849e5d9dab39ba6f09e3a2a
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This separates the select() logic from the socket handling logic, setting up
for a switch to poll().
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This separates the socket event collection logic from the logic
deciding which events we're interested in at all.
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