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services.
4630479 Make dnsseed's definition of acute need include relevant services. (Gregory Maxwell)
9583477 Be more aggressive in connecting to peers with relevant services. (Gregory Maxwell)
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We normally prefer to connect to peers offering the relevant services.
If we're not connected to enough peers with relevant services, we
probably don't know about them and could use dnsseed's help.
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5eaaa83 Kill insecure_random and associated global state (Wladimir J. van der Laan)
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1724a40 Display minimum ping in debug window. (R E Broadley)
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Only allow skipping relevant services until there are four outbound
connections up.
This avoids quickly filling up with peers lacking the relevant
services when addrman has few or none of them.
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This value can be significantly higher if the users uses addnode
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There are only a few uses of `insecure_random` outside the tests.
This PR replaces uses of insecure_random (and its accompanying global
state) in the core code with an FastRandomContext that is automatically
seeded on creation.
This is meant to be used for inner loops. The FastRandomContext
can be in the outer scope, or the class itself, then rand32() is used
inside the loop. Useful e.g. for pushing addresses in CNode or the fee
rounding, or randomization for coin selection.
As a context is created per purpose, thus it gets rid of
cross-thread unprotected shared usage of a single set of globals, this
should also get rid of the potential race conditions.
- I'd say TxMempool::check is not called enough to warrant using a special
fast random context, this is switched to GetRand() (open for
discussion...)
- The use of `insecure_rand` in ConnectThroughProxy has been replaced by
an atomic integer counter. The only goal here is to have a different
credentials pair for each connection to go on a different Tor circuit,
it does not need to be random nor unpredictable.
- To avoid having a FastRandomContext on every CNode, the context is
passed into PushAddress as appropriate.
There remains an insecure_random for test usage in `test_random.h`.
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Rather than doing a circle and re-resolving the node's IP, just use the one
from nodestats directly.
This requires syncing the addr field from CNode.
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In principle, the checksums of P2P packets are simply 4-byte blobs which
are the first four bytes of SHA256(SHA256(payload)).
Currently they are handled as little-endian 32-bit integers half of the
time, as blobs the other half, sometimes copying the one to the other,
resulting in somewhat confused code.
This PR changes the handling to be consistent both at packet creation
and receiving, making it (I think) easier to understand.
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d9ff591 Move static global randomizer seeds into CConnman (Pieter Wuille)
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f3552da net: fix maxuploadtarget setting (Cory Fields)
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After #8594 the addrFrom sent by a node is not used anymore at all,
so don't bother sending it.
Also mitigates the privacy issue in (#8616). It doesn't completely solve
the issue as GetLocalAddress is also called in AdvertiseLocal, but at
least when advertising addresses it stands out less as *our* address.
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This was broken by 63cafa6329e1a.
Note that while this fixes the settings, it doesn't fix the actual usage of
-maxuploadtarget completely, as there is currently a bug in the
nOptimisticBytesWritten accounting that causes a delayed response if the target
is reached. That bug will be addressed separately.
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36fa01f net: only delete CConnman if it's been created (Cory Fields)
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In the case of (for example) an already-running bitcoind, the shutdown sequence
begins before CConnman has been created, leading to a null-pointer dereference
when g_connman->Stop() is called.
Instead, Just let the CConnman dtor take care of stopping.
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than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
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documenting
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CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
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These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
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This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
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This will eventually solve a circular dependency
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b7c349d Do not shadow variables in networking code (Pavel Janík)
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