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Always print full hashes (tx, block, inv)
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This introduces the concept of the 'sync node', which is the one we
asked for missing blocks. In case the sync node goes away, a new one
will be selected.
For now, the heuristic is very simple, but it can easily be extended
later to add better policies.
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Limited mapAlreadyAskedFor
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Thread / shutdown cleanup
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Update transaction statistics
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As these were not updated when 'backporting' the 225430 checkpoint
into head.
Additionally, also report verification progress in debug.log, and
tweak the sigcheck-verification-speed-factor a bit.
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Two reasons for this change:
1. Need to always use boost::thread's sleep, even on Windows, so the
sleeps can be interrupted (prior code used Windows' built-in Sleep).
2. I always forgot what units the old Sleep took.
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Create a boost::thread_group object at the qt/bitcoind main-loop level
that will hold pointers to all the main-loop threads.
This will replace the vnThreadsRunning[] array.
For testing, ported the BitcoinMiner threads to use its
own boost::thread_group.
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Global cleanups
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This reverts commit 643160f6e7e5e8ca84bc7d2c1a0f37d9cf43a6e1.
Turns out this commit was useless after a more careful reading of
CNode::AskFor
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There exists a per-message-processed send buffer overflow protection,
where processing is halted when the send buffer is larger than the
allowed maximum.
This protection does not apply to individual items, however, and
getdata has the potential for causing large amounts of data to be
sent. In case several hundreds of blocks are requested in one getdata,
the send buffer can easily grow 50 megabytes above the send buffer
limit.
This commit breaks up the processing of getdata requests, remembering
them inside a CNode when too many are requested at once.
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* Change CNode::vRecvMsg to be a deque instead of a vector (less copying)
* Make sure to acquire cs_vRecvMsg in CNode::CloseSocketDisconnect (as it
may be called without that lock).
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Replaces CNode::vRecv buffer with a vector of CNetMessage's. This simplifies
ProcessMessages() and eliminates several redundant data copies.
Overview:
* socket thread now parses incoming message datastream into
header/data components, as encapsulated by CNetMessage
* socket thread adds each CNetMessage to a vector inside CNode
* message thread (ProcessMessages) iterates through CNode's CNetMessage vector
Message parsing is made more strict:
* Socket is disconnected, if message larger than MAX_SIZE
or if CMessageHeader deserialization fails (latter is impossible?).
Previously, code would simply eat garbage data all day long.
* Socket is disconnected, if we fail to find pchMessageStart.
We do not search through garbage, to find pchMessageStart. Each
message must begin precisely after the last message ends.
ProcessMessages() always processes a complete message, and is more efficient:
* buffer is always precisely sized, using CDataStream::resize(),
rather than progressively sized in 64k chunks. More efficient
for large messages like "block".
* whole-buffer memory copy eliminated (vRecv -> vMsg)
* other buffer-shifting memory copies eliminated (vRecv.insert, vRecv.erase)
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This should make detecting leaks much easier.
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small changes in init, main, checkpoints.h and bitcoin-qt.pro
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Various performance tweaks to CCoinsView
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Native versions for AllocateFileRange()
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- remove an unneeded MODAL flag, as MSG_ERROR sets MODAL
- re-order an if-clause in main to have bool checks before a function call
- fix some log messages that used wrong function names
- make a log message use a correct ellipsis
- remove some unneded spaces, brackets and line-breaks
- fix style for adding files in the Qt project
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Bugfix CValidationResult for BIP30 + add DoS
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Calling ResendWalletTransactions when reindexing, importing or on IBD spams
other nodes with our old transactions, because they become unconfirmed.
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Make transactions larger than 100K non-standard
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Extremely large transactions with lots of inputs can cost the network
almost as much to process as they cost the sender in fees.
We would never create transactions larger than 100K big; this change
makes transactions larger than 100K non-standard, so they are not
relayed/mined by default. This is most important for miners that might
create blocks larger than 250K big, who could be vulnerable to a
make-your-blocks-so-expensive-to-verify-they-get-orphaned attack.
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and ensure orphan processing (when their parents are found) cannot be used to counter-DDoS the node providing the parent
Also fix a minor typo
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Improve error handling during validation
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Treat non-final transactions as non-standard
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At least one service that accepted zero-confirmation transactions
was vulnerable because an attacker could send a transaction
with a lock time far in the future, and then have plenty of time in
which to get a double-spend mined (perhaps from a miner who wasn't
on the network when the first transaction was broadcast).
That is a variation on the "Finney attack". We still don't
recommend anybody accept 0-confirmation transactions as final
payment for anything. This change keeps non-final transactions
from appearing in the wallet, and, assuming most of the network
accepts this change, will prevent them from being relayed until
they are final.
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Remove IsFromMe() check in CTxMemPool::accept()
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* Pass txid's to CCoinsView functions by reference instead of by value
* Add a method to swap CCoins, and use it in some places to avoid a
allocating copy + destruct.
* Optimize CCoinsViewCache::FetchCoins to do only a single search
through the backing map.
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Add optional transaction index to databases
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Bugfix - Moved SyncWithWallets out of ProcessMessage and into CTxMemPool::accept()
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