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small changes in init, main, checkpoints.h and bitcoin-qt.pro
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Various performance tweaks to CCoinsView
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Native versions for AllocateFileRange()
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- remove an unneeded MODAL flag, as MSG_ERROR sets MODAL
- re-order an if-clause in main to have bool checks before a function call
- fix some log messages that used wrong function names
- make a log message use a correct ellipsis
- remove some unneded spaces, brackets and line-breaks
- fix style for adding files in the Qt project
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Bugfix CValidationResult for BIP30 + add DoS
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Calling ResendWalletTransactions when reindexing, importing or on IBD spams
other nodes with our old transactions, because they become unconfirmed.
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Make transactions larger than 100K non-standard
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Extremely large transactions with lots of inputs can cost the network
almost as much to process as they cost the sender in fees.
We would never create transactions larger than 100K big; this change
makes transactions larger than 100K non-standard, so they are not
relayed/mined by default. This is most important for miners that might
create blocks larger than 250K big, who could be vulnerable to a
make-your-blocks-so-expensive-to-verify-they-get-orphaned attack.
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and ensure orphan processing (when their parents are found) cannot be used to counter-DDoS the node providing the parent
Also fix a minor typo
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Improve error handling during validation
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Treat non-final transactions as non-standard
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At least one service that accepted zero-confirmation transactions
was vulnerable because an attacker could send a transaction
with a lock time far in the future, and then have plenty of time in
which to get a double-spend mined (perhaps from a miner who wasn't
on the network when the first transaction was broadcast).
That is a variation on the "Finney attack". We still don't
recommend anybody accept 0-confirmation transactions as final
payment for anything. This change keeps non-final transactions
from appearing in the wallet, and, assuming most of the network
accepts this change, will prevent them from being relayed until
they are final.
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Remove IsFromMe() check in CTxMemPool::accept()
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* Pass txid's to CCoinsView functions by reference instead of by value
* Add a method to swap CCoins, and use it in some places to avoid a
allocating copy + destruct.
* Optimize CCoinsViewCache::FetchCoins to do only a single search
through the backing map.
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Add optional transaction index to databases
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Bugfix - Moved SyncWithWallets out of ProcessMessage and into CTxMemPool::accept()
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Add a notfound message to getdata.
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Send transactions after a CMerkleBlock when asked for it in an inv.
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aren't in the relayable set are requested.
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This actually simplifies some SPV code, as they can keep track of
a filtered block and its txn before accepting both in one step.
The previous argument was that SPV nodes should handle the txn the
same as any other free txn and then mark them as connected to a
block when they get the filtered block itself. However, it now
appears that SPV nodes will need to put in more effort to verify
loose txn than they would to verify txn in blocks, thus making it
more approriate to send the txn after the filtered block.
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that when adding multiple wallets they will be aware of each other's transactions.
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By specifying -txindex when initializing the database, a txid-to-diskpos
index is maintained in the blktree database. This database is used to
help answering getrawtransaction() RPC queries, when enabled.
Changing the -txindex value requires a -reindex; the client will abort
at startup if the database and the specified -txindex mismatch.
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Parallel script verification
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This adds a compact representation for a subset of a merkle tree's
nodes.
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Note that the default value for fRelayTxes is false, meaning we
now no longer relay tx inv messages before receiving the remote
peer's version message.
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Fixes issue #2178 : attacker could penny-flood with invalid-signature
transactions to deduce which addresses belonged to your node.
I'm committing this early for code review; I still need to write up
a test plan.
Executive summary of fix: check all transactions received from the network
for penny-flood rate-limiting before adding to the memory pool. But do NOT
ratelimit transactions added to the memory pool:
- because of blockchain reorgs
- stored in the wallet and added at startup
- sent from the GUI or one of the send* RPC commands (CWallet::CommitTransaction)
The limit-free-transactions code really should be a method on CNode, with
counters per-peer. But that is a bigger change for another day.
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Remove fClient
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