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4cdaa95 Resize after succesful result (Pieter Wuille)
9d8604f Header define style cleanups (Pieter Wuille)
a53fd41 Deterministic signing (Pieter Wuille)
3060e36 Add the RFC6979 PRNG (Pieter Wuille)
a8f5087 Add HMAC-SHA256 (Pieter Wuille)
36fa4a7 Split up crypto/sha2 (Pieter Wuille)
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Add a sanity check to prevent cosmic rays from flipping a bit in the
generated public key, or bugs in the elliptic curve code. This is
simply done by signing a (randomized) message, and verifying the
result.
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To avoid the need for libsecp256k1 to expose such functionality.
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Eventually (after 0.10) these files will hold the logic for crypto
verification routines, and CKey/CPubKey will call into them.
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This allows CECKey to be used without directly depending on the secure
allocators
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- add a small wrapper in util around RAND_bytes() and replace with
GetRandBytes() in the code to log errors from calling RAND_bytes()
- remove OpenSSL header rand.h where no longer needed
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- remove some missplaced ;
- ensure end of a namespace is clearly visible
- use same formatting when using namespace
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This also moves the HMAC-SHA512 implementation to sha2.cpp.
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Previously if bitcoind is linked with an OpenSSL which is compiled
without EC support, this is seen as an assertion failure "pKey !=
NULL" at key.cpp:134, which occurs after several seconds. It is an
esoteric piece of knowledge to interpret this as "oops, I linked
with the wrong OpenSSL", and because of the delay it may not even
be noticed.
The new output is
: OpenSSL appears to lack support for elliptic curve cryptography. For
more information, visit
https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/OpenSSL_and_EC_Libraries
: Initialization sanity check failed. Bitcoin Core is shutting down.
which occurs immediately after attempted startup.
This also blocks in an InitSanityCheck() function which currently only
checks for EC support but should eventually do more. See #4081.
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a81cd968 introduced a malleability breaker for signatures
(using an even value for S). In e0e14e43 this was changed to
the lower of two potential values, rather than the even one.
Only the signing code was changed though, the (for now unused)
verification code wasn't adapted.
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There were quite a few places where assert() was used with side effects,
making operation with NDEBUG non-functional. This commit fixes all the
cases I know about, but also adds an #error on NDEBUG because the code
is untested without assertions and may still have vulnerabilities if
used without assert.
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Use misc methods of avoiding unnecesary header includes.
Replace int typedefs with int##_t from stdint.h.
Replace PRI64[xdu] with PRI[xdu]64 from inttypes.h.
Normalize QT_VERSION ifs where possible.
Resolve some indirect dependencies as direct ones.
Remove extern declarations from .cpp files.
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db0e8cc Bump Year Number to 2013 (super3)
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Walletload
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and adding a hash for vchPubKey/vchPrivKey entries in wallet.dat
backwards compatible with previous wallet.dat format
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Only create signatures with even S, and verification mode to check.
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BIP 32 derivation + test vectors
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To fix a minor malleability found by Sergio Lerner (reported here:
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=8392.msg1245898#msg1245898)
The problem is that if (R,S) is a valid ECDSA signature for a given
message and public key, (R,-S) is also valid. Modulo N (the order
of the secp256k1 curve), this means that both (R,S) and (R,N-S) are
valid. Given that N is odd, S and N-S have a different lowest bit.
We solve the problem by forcing signatures to have an even S value,
excluding one of the alternatives.
This commit just changes the signing code to always produce even S
values, and adds a verification mode to check it. This code is not
enabled anywhere yet. Existing tests in key_tests.cpp verify that
the produced signatures are still valid.
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The key refactor changed the way unencrypted private keys with compressed
public key are stored in the wallet. Apparently older versions relied on
this to verify the correctness of stored keys.
Note that earlier pre-release versions do risk creating wallets that can
not be opened by 0.8.3 and earlier.
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Special serializers for script which detect common cases and encode
them much more efficiently. 3 special cases are defined:
* Pay to pubkey hash (encoded as 21 bytes)
* Pay to script hash (encoded as 21 bytes)
* Pay to pubkey starting with 0x02, 0x03 or 0x04 (encoded as 33 bytes)
Other scripts up to 121 bytes require 1 byte + script length. Above
that, scripts up to 16505 bytes require 2 bytes + script length.
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Corrupt wallets used to cause a DB_RUNRECOVERY uncaught exception and a
crash. This commit does three things:
1) Runs a BDB verify early in the startup process, and if there is a
low-level problem with the database:
+ Moves the bad wallet.dat to wallet.timestamp.bak
+ Runs a 'salvage' operation to get key/value pairs, and
writes them to a new wallet.dat
+ Continues with startup.
2) Much more tolerant of serialization errors. All errors in deserialization
are reported by tolerated EXCEPT for errors related to reading keypairs
or master key records-- those are reported and then shut down, so the user
can get help (or recover from a backup).
3) Adds a new -salvagewallet option, which:
+ Moves the wallet.dat to wallet.timestamp.bak
+ extracts ONLY keypairs and master keys into a new wallet.dat
+ soft-sets -rescan, to recreate transaction history
This was tested by randomly corrupting testnet wallets using a little
python script I wrote (https://gist.github.com/3812689)
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- add EC_KEY_free() in CKey::Reset() when pkey != NULL
- init pkey with NULL in CKey constructor
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More than doubles the speed of verifying already-cached signatures
that use compressed pubkeys:
Before: ~200 microseconds
After: ~80 microseconds
(no caching at all: ~3,300 microseconds per signature)
Also encapsulates the signature cache code in a class
and fixes a signed/unsigned comparison warning.
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