diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/consensus/tx_check.cpp | 18 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/consensus/tx_verify.cpp | 10 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/consensus/validation.h | 8 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/validation.cpp | 112 |
4 files changed, 74 insertions, 74 deletions
diff --git a/src/consensus/tx_check.cpp b/src/consensus/tx_check.cpp index a9d5cec4ac..88bb12c713 100644 --- a/src/consensus/tx_check.cpp +++ b/src/consensus/tx_check.cpp @@ -11,24 +11,24 @@ bool CheckTransaction(const CTransaction& tx, TxValidationState& state) { // Basic checks that don't depend on any context if (tx.vin.empty()) - return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, false, "bad-txns-vin-empty"); + return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, "bad-txns-vin-empty"); if (tx.vout.empty()) - return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, false, "bad-txns-vout-empty"); + return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, "bad-txns-vout-empty"); // Size limits (this doesn't take the witness into account, as that hasn't been checked for malleability) if (::GetSerializeSize(tx, PROTOCOL_VERSION | SERIALIZE_TRANSACTION_NO_WITNESS) * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR > MAX_BLOCK_WEIGHT) - return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, false, "bad-txns-oversize"); + return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, "bad-txns-oversize"); // Check for negative or overflow output values (see CVE-2010-5139) CAmount nValueOut = 0; for (const auto& txout : tx.vout) { if (txout.nValue < 0) - return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, false, "bad-txns-vout-negative"); + return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, "bad-txns-vout-negative"); if (txout.nValue > MAX_MONEY) - return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, false, "bad-txns-vout-toolarge"); + return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, "bad-txns-vout-toolarge"); nValueOut += txout.nValue; if (!MoneyRange(nValueOut)) - return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, false, "bad-txns-txouttotal-toolarge"); + return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, "bad-txns-txouttotal-toolarge"); } // Check for duplicate inputs (see CVE-2018-17144) @@ -39,19 +39,19 @@ bool CheckTransaction(const CTransaction& tx, TxValidationState& state) std::set<COutPoint> vInOutPoints; for (const auto& txin : tx.vin) { if (!vInOutPoints.insert(txin.prevout).second) - return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, false, "bad-txns-inputs-duplicate"); + return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, "bad-txns-inputs-duplicate"); } if (tx.IsCoinBase()) { if (tx.vin[0].scriptSig.size() < 2 || tx.vin[0].scriptSig.size() > 100) - return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, false, "bad-cb-length"); + return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, "bad-cb-length"); } else { for (const auto& txin : tx.vin) if (txin.prevout.IsNull()) - return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, false, "bad-txns-prevout-null"); + return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, "bad-txns-prevout-null"); } return true; diff --git a/src/consensus/tx_verify.cpp b/src/consensus/tx_verify.cpp index 47242aae93..31bdabea28 100644 --- a/src/consensus/tx_verify.cpp +++ b/src/consensus/tx_verify.cpp @@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ bool Consensus::CheckTxInputs(const CTransaction& tx, TxValidationState& state, { // are the actual inputs available? if (!inputs.HaveInputs(tx)) { - return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MISSING_INPUTS, false, "bad-txns-inputs-missingorspent", + return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MISSING_INPUTS, "bad-txns-inputs-missingorspent", strprintf("%s: inputs missing/spent", __func__)); } @@ -172,27 +172,27 @@ bool Consensus::CheckTxInputs(const CTransaction& tx, TxValidationState& state, // If prev is coinbase, check that it's matured if (coin.IsCoinBase() && nSpendHeight - coin.nHeight < COINBASE_MATURITY) { - return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_PREMATURE_SPEND, false, "bad-txns-premature-spend-of-coinbase", + return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_PREMATURE_SPEND, "bad-txns-premature-spend-of-coinbase", strprintf("tried to spend coinbase at depth %d", nSpendHeight - coin.nHeight)); } // Check for negative or overflow input values nValueIn += coin.out.nValue; if (!MoneyRange(coin.out.nValue) || !MoneyRange(nValueIn)) { - return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, false, "bad-txns-inputvalues-outofrange"); + return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, "bad-txns-inputvalues-outofrange"); } } const CAmount value_out = tx.GetValueOut(); if (nValueIn < value_out) { - return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, false, "bad-txns-in-belowout", + return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, "bad-txns-in-belowout", strprintf("value in (%s) < value out (%s)", FormatMoney(nValueIn), FormatMoney(value_out))); } // Tally transaction fees const CAmount txfee_aux = nValueIn - value_out; if (!MoneyRange(txfee_aux)) { - return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, false, "bad-txns-fee-outofrange"); + return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, "bad-txns-fee-outofrange"); } txfee = txfee_aux; diff --git a/src/consensus/validation.h b/src/consensus/validation.h index 34bdf36c5f..cdc3aecc1e 100644 --- a/src/consensus/validation.h +++ b/src/consensus/validation.h @@ -121,13 +121,13 @@ class TxValidationState : public ValidationState { private: TxValidationResult m_result; public: - bool Invalid(TxValidationResult result, bool ret = false, + bool Invalid(TxValidationResult result, const std::string &reject_reason="", const std::string &debug_message="") { m_result = result; ValidationState::Invalid(reject_reason, debug_message); - return ret; + return false; } TxValidationResult GetResult() const { return m_result; } }; @@ -136,12 +136,12 @@ class BlockValidationState : public ValidationState { private: BlockValidationResult m_result; public: - bool Invalid(BlockValidationResult result, bool ret = false, + bool Invalid(BlockValidationResult result, const std::string &reject_reason="", const std::string &debug_message="") { m_result = result; ValidationState::Invalid(reject_reason, debug_message); - return ret; + return false; } BlockValidationResult GetResult() const { return m_result; } }; diff --git a/src/validation.cpp b/src/validation.cpp index f21e44d348..21f7f9c8db 100644 --- a/src/validation.cpp +++ b/src/validation.cpp @@ -506,11 +506,11 @@ private: { CAmount mempoolRejectFee = m_pool.GetMinFee(gArgs.GetArg("-maxmempool", DEFAULT_MAX_MEMPOOL_SIZE) * 1000000).GetFee(package_size); if (mempoolRejectFee > 0 && package_fee < mempoolRejectFee) { - return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, "mempool min fee not met", strprintf("%d < %d", package_fee, mempoolRejectFee)); + return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, "mempool min fee not met", strprintf("%d < %d", package_fee, mempoolRejectFee)); } if (package_fee < ::minRelayTxFee.GetFee(package_size)) { - return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, "min relay fee not met", strprintf("%d < %d", package_fee, ::minRelayTxFee.GetFee(package_size))); + return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, "min relay fee not met", strprintf("%d < %d", package_fee, ::minRelayTxFee.GetFee(package_size))); } return true; } @@ -563,29 +563,29 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws) // Coinbase is only valid in a block, not as a loose transaction if (tx.IsCoinBase()) - return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, false, "coinbase"); + return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, "coinbase"); // Rather not work on nonstandard transactions (unless -testnet/-regtest) std::string reason; if (fRequireStandard && !IsStandardTx(tx, reason)) - return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_NOT_STANDARD, false, reason); + return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_NOT_STANDARD, reason); // Do not work on transactions that are too small. // A transaction with 1 segwit input and 1 P2WPHK output has non-witness size of 82 bytes. // Transactions smaller than this are not relayed to mitigate CVE-2017-12842 by not relaying // 64-byte transactions. if (::GetSerializeSize(tx, PROTOCOL_VERSION | SERIALIZE_TRANSACTION_NO_WITNESS) < MIN_STANDARD_TX_NONWITNESS_SIZE) - return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_NOT_STANDARD, false, "tx-size-small"); + return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_NOT_STANDARD, "tx-size-small"); // Only accept nLockTime-using transactions that can be mined in the next // block; we don't want our mempool filled up with transactions that can't // be mined yet. if (!CheckFinalTx(tx, STANDARD_LOCKTIME_VERIFY_FLAGS)) - return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_PREMATURE_SPEND, false, "non-final"); + return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_PREMATURE_SPEND, "non-final"); // is it already in the memory pool? if (m_pool.exists(hash)) { - return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONFLICT, false, "txn-already-in-mempool"); + return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONFLICT, "txn-already-in-mempool"); } // Check for conflicts with in-memory transactions @@ -617,7 +617,7 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws) } } if (fReplacementOptOut) { - return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, "txn-mempool-conflict"); + return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, "txn-mempool-conflict"); } setConflicts.insert(ptxConflicting->GetHash()); @@ -643,7 +643,7 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws) for (size_t out = 0; out < tx.vout.size(); out++) { // Optimistically just do efficient check of cache for outputs if (coins_cache.HaveCoinInCache(COutPoint(hash, out))) { - return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONFLICT, false, "txn-already-known"); + return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONFLICT, "txn-already-known"); } } // Otherwise assume this might be an orphan tx for which we just haven't seen parents yet @@ -668,7 +668,7 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws) // Must keep pool.cs for this unless we change CheckSequenceLocks to take a // CoinsViewCache instead of create its own if (!CheckSequenceLocks(m_pool, tx, STANDARD_LOCKTIME_VERIFY_FLAGS, &lp)) - return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_PREMATURE_SPEND, false, "non-BIP68-final"); + return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_PREMATURE_SPEND, "non-BIP68-final"); CAmount nFees = 0; if (!Consensus::CheckTxInputs(tx, state, m_view, GetSpendHeight(m_view), nFees)) { @@ -677,11 +677,11 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws) // Check for non-standard pay-to-script-hash in inputs if (fRequireStandard && !AreInputsStandard(tx, m_view)) - return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_NOT_STANDARD, false, "bad-txns-nonstandard-inputs"); + return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_NOT_STANDARD, "bad-txns-nonstandard-inputs"); // Check for non-standard witness in P2WSH if (tx.HasWitness() && fRequireStandard && !IsWitnessStandard(tx, m_view)) - return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_WITNESS_MUTATED, false, "bad-witness-nonstandard"); + return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_WITNESS_MUTATED, "bad-witness-nonstandard"); int64_t nSigOpsCost = GetTransactionSigOpCost(tx, m_view, STANDARD_SCRIPT_VERIFY_FLAGS); @@ -705,7 +705,7 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws) unsigned int nSize = entry->GetTxSize(); if (nSigOpsCost > MAX_STANDARD_TX_SIGOPS_COST) - return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_NOT_STANDARD, false, "bad-txns-too-many-sigops", + return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_NOT_STANDARD, "bad-txns-too-many-sigops", strprintf("%d", nSigOpsCost)); // No transactions are allowed below minRelayTxFee except from disconnected @@ -713,7 +713,7 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws) if (!bypass_limits && !CheckFeeRate(nSize, nModifiedFees, state)) return false; if (nAbsurdFee && nFees > nAbsurdFee) - return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_NOT_STANDARD, false, + return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_NOT_STANDARD, "absurdly-high-fee", strprintf("%d > %d", nFees, nAbsurdFee)); const CTxMemPool::setEntries setIterConflicting = m_pool.GetIterSet(setConflicts); @@ -771,7 +771,7 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws) // this, see https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2018-November/016518.html if (nSize > EXTRA_DESCENDANT_TX_SIZE_LIMIT || !m_pool.CalculateMemPoolAncestors(*entry, setAncestors, 2, m_limit_ancestor_size, m_limit_descendants + 1, m_limit_descendant_size + EXTRA_DESCENDANT_TX_SIZE_LIMIT, dummy_err_string)) { - return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, "too-long-mempool-chain", errString); + return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, "too-long-mempool-chain", errString); } } @@ -784,7 +784,7 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws) const uint256 &hashAncestor = ancestorIt->GetTx().GetHash(); if (setConflicts.count(hashAncestor)) { - return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, false, "bad-txns-spends-conflicting-tx", + return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, "bad-txns-spends-conflicting-tx", strprintf("%s spends conflicting transaction %s", hash.ToString(), hashAncestor.ToString())); @@ -824,7 +824,7 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws) CFeeRate oldFeeRate(mi->GetModifiedFee(), mi->GetTxSize()); if (newFeeRate <= oldFeeRate) { - return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, "insufficient fee", + return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, "insufficient fee", strprintf("rejecting replacement %s; new feerate %s <= old feerate %s", hash.ToString(), newFeeRate.ToString(), @@ -852,7 +852,7 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws) nConflictingSize += it->GetTxSize(); } } else { - return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, "too many potential replacements", + return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, "too many potential replacements", strprintf("rejecting replacement %s; too many potential replacements (%d > %d)\n", hash.ToString(), nConflictingCount, @@ -876,7 +876,7 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws) // it's cheaper to just check if the new input refers to a // tx that's in the mempool. if (m_pool.exists(tx.vin[j].prevout.hash)) { - return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, "replacement-adds-unconfirmed", + return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, "replacement-adds-unconfirmed", strprintf("replacement %s adds unconfirmed input, idx %d", hash.ToString(), j)); } @@ -888,7 +888,7 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws) // transactions would not be paid for. if (nModifiedFees < nConflictingFees) { - return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, "insufficient fee", + return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, "insufficient fee", strprintf("rejecting replacement %s, less fees than conflicting txs; %s < %s", hash.ToString(), FormatMoney(nModifiedFees), FormatMoney(nConflictingFees))); } @@ -898,7 +898,7 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws) CAmount nDeltaFees = nModifiedFees - nConflictingFees; if (nDeltaFees < ::incrementalRelayFee.GetFee(nSize)) { - return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, "insufficient fee", + return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, "insufficient fee", strprintf("rejecting replacement %s, not enough additional fees to relay; %s < %s", hash.ToString(), FormatMoney(nDeltaFees), @@ -926,7 +926,7 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PolicyScriptChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws, Precompute if (!tx.HasWitness() && CheckInputs(tx, state_dummy, m_view, scriptVerifyFlags & ~(SCRIPT_VERIFY_WITNESS | SCRIPT_VERIFY_CLEANSTACK), true, false, txdata) && !CheckInputs(tx, state_dummy, m_view, scriptVerifyFlags & ~SCRIPT_VERIFY_CLEANSTACK, true, false, txdata)) { // Only the witness is missing, so the transaction itself may be fine. - state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_WITNESS_MUTATED, false, + state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_WITNESS_MUTATED, state.GetRejectReason(), state.GetDebugMessage()); } return false; // state filled in by CheckInputs @@ -1009,7 +1009,7 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::Finalize(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws) if (!bypass_limits) { LimitMempoolSize(m_pool, gArgs.GetArg("-maxmempool", DEFAULT_MAX_MEMPOOL_SIZE) * 1000000, std::chrono::hours{gArgs.GetArg("-mempoolexpiry", DEFAULT_MEMPOOL_EXPIRY)}); if (!m_pool.exists(hash)) - return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, "mempool full"); + return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, "mempool full"); } return true; } @@ -1544,7 +1544,7 @@ bool CheckInputs(const CTransaction& tx, TxValidationState &state, const CCoinsV CScriptCheck check2(coin.out, tx, i, flags & ~STANDARD_NOT_MANDATORY_VERIFY_FLAGS, cacheSigStore, &txdata); if (check2()) - return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_NOT_STANDARD, false, strprintf("non-mandatory-script-verify-flag (%s)", ScriptErrorString(check.GetScriptError()))); + return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_NOT_STANDARD, strprintf("non-mandatory-script-verify-flag (%s)", ScriptErrorString(check.GetScriptError()))); } // MANDATORY flag failures correspond to // TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS. Because CONSENSUS @@ -1555,7 +1555,7 @@ bool CheckInputs(const CTransaction& tx, TxValidationState &state, const CCoinsV // support, to avoid splitting the network (but this // depends on the details of how net_processing handles // such errors). - return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, false, strprintf("mandatory-script-verify-flag-failed (%s)", ScriptErrorString(check.GetScriptError()))); + return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, strprintf("mandatory-script-verify-flag-failed (%s)", ScriptErrorString(check.GetScriptError()))); } } @@ -2058,7 +2058,7 @@ bool CChainState::ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& state, for (size_t o = 0; o < tx->vout.size(); o++) { if (view.HaveCoin(COutPoint(tx->GetHash(), o))) { LogPrintf("ERROR: ConnectBlock(): tried to overwrite transaction\n"); - return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, false, "bad-txns-BIP30"); + return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "bad-txns-BIP30"); } } } @@ -2099,14 +2099,14 @@ bool CChainState::ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& state, TxValidationState tx_state; if (!Consensus::CheckTxInputs(tx, tx_state, view, pindex->nHeight, txfee)) { // Any transaction validation failure in ConnectBlock is a block consensus failure - state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, false, + state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, tx_state.GetRejectReason(), tx_state.GetDebugMessage()); return error("%s: Consensus::CheckTxInputs: %s, %s", __func__, tx.GetHash().ToString(), FormatStateMessage(state)); } nFees += txfee; if (!MoneyRange(nFees)) { LogPrintf("ERROR: %s: accumulated fee in the block out of range.\n", __func__); - return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, false, "bad-txns-accumulated-fee-outofrange"); + return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "bad-txns-accumulated-fee-outofrange"); } // Check that transaction is BIP68 final @@ -2119,7 +2119,7 @@ bool CChainState::ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& state, if (!SequenceLocks(tx, nLockTimeFlags, &prevheights, *pindex)) { LogPrintf("ERROR: %s: contains a non-BIP68-final transaction\n", __func__); - return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, false, "bad-txns-nonfinal"); + return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "bad-txns-nonfinal"); } } @@ -2130,7 +2130,7 @@ bool CChainState::ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& state, nSigOpsCost += GetTransactionSigOpCost(tx, view, flags); if (nSigOpsCost > MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS_COST) { LogPrintf("ERROR: ConnectBlock(): too many sigops\n"); - return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, false, "bad-blk-sigops"); + return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "bad-blk-sigops"); } txdata.emplace_back(tx); @@ -2141,7 +2141,7 @@ bool CChainState::ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& state, TxValidationState tx_state; if (fScriptChecks && !CheckInputs(tx, tx_state, view, flags, fCacheResults, fCacheResults, txdata[i], nScriptCheckThreads ? &vChecks : nullptr)) { // Any transaction validation failure in ConnectBlock is a block consensus failure - state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, false, + state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, tx_state.GetRejectReason(), tx_state.GetDebugMessage()); return error("ConnectBlock(): CheckInputs on %s failed with %s", tx.GetHash().ToString(), FormatStateMessage(state)); @@ -2161,12 +2161,12 @@ bool CChainState::ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& state, CAmount blockReward = nFees + GetBlockSubsidy(pindex->nHeight, chainparams.GetConsensus()); if (block.vtx[0]->GetValueOut() > blockReward) { LogPrintf("ERROR: ConnectBlock(): coinbase pays too much (actual=%d vs limit=%d)\n", block.vtx[0]->GetValueOut(), blockReward); - return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, false, "bad-cb-amount"); + return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "bad-cb-amount"); } if (!control.Wait()) { LogPrintf("ERROR: %s: CheckQueue failed\n", __func__); - return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, false, "block-validation-failed"); + return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "block-validation-failed"); } int64_t nTime4 = GetTimeMicros(); nTimeVerify += nTime4 - nTime2; LogPrint(BCLog::BENCH, " - Verify %u txins: %.2fms (%.3fms/txin) [%.2fs (%.2fms/blk)]\n", nInputs - 1, MILLI * (nTime4 - nTime2), nInputs <= 1 ? 0 : MILLI * (nTime4 - nTime2) / (nInputs-1), nTimeVerify * MICRO, nTimeVerify * MILLI / nBlocksTotal); @@ -3244,7 +3244,7 @@ static bool CheckBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, BlockValidationState& st { // Check proof of work matches claimed amount if (fCheckPOW && !CheckProofOfWork(block.GetHash(), block.nBits, consensusParams)) - return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER, false, "high-hash", "proof of work failed"); + return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER, "high-hash", "proof of work failed"); return true; } @@ -3266,13 +3266,13 @@ bool CheckBlock(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& state, const Consensu bool mutated; uint256 hashMerkleRoot2 = BlockMerkleRoot(block, &mutated); if (block.hashMerkleRoot != hashMerkleRoot2) - return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, false, "bad-txnmrklroot", "hashMerkleRoot mismatch"); + return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, "bad-txnmrklroot", "hashMerkleRoot mismatch"); // Check for merkle tree malleability (CVE-2012-2459): repeating sequences // of transactions in a block without affecting the merkle root of a block, // while still invalidating it. if (mutated) - return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, false, "bad-txns-duplicate", "duplicate transaction"); + return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, "bad-txns-duplicate", "duplicate transaction"); } // All potential-corruption validation must be done before we do any @@ -3283,14 +3283,14 @@ bool CheckBlock(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& state, const Consensu // Size limits if (block.vtx.empty() || block.vtx.size() * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR > MAX_BLOCK_WEIGHT || ::GetSerializeSize(block, PROTOCOL_VERSION | SERIALIZE_TRANSACTION_NO_WITNESS) * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR > MAX_BLOCK_WEIGHT) - return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, false, "bad-blk-length", "size limits failed"); + return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "bad-blk-length", "size limits failed"); // First transaction must be coinbase, the rest must not be if (block.vtx.empty() || !block.vtx[0]->IsCoinBase()) - return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, false, "bad-cb-missing", "first tx is not coinbase"); + return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "bad-cb-missing", "first tx is not coinbase"); for (unsigned int i = 1; i < block.vtx.size(); i++) if (block.vtx[i]->IsCoinBase()) - return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, false, "bad-cb-multiple", "more than one coinbase"); + return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "bad-cb-multiple", "more than one coinbase"); // Check transactions // Must check for duplicate inputs (see CVE-2018-17144) @@ -3300,7 +3300,7 @@ bool CheckBlock(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& state, const Consensu // CheckBlock() does context-free validation checks. The only // possible failures are consensus failures. assert(tx_state.GetResult() == TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS); - return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, false, tx_state.GetRejectReason(), + return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, tx_state.GetRejectReason(), strprintf("Transaction check failed (tx hash %s) %s", tx->GetHash().ToString(), tx_state.GetDebugMessage())); } } @@ -3310,7 +3310,7 @@ bool CheckBlock(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& state, const Consensu nSigOps += GetLegacySigOpCount(*tx); } if (nSigOps * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR > MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS_COST) - return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, false, "bad-blk-sigops", "out-of-bounds SigOpCount"); + return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "bad-blk-sigops", "out-of-bounds SigOpCount"); if (fCheckPOW && fCheckMerkleRoot) block.fChecked = true; @@ -3411,7 +3411,7 @@ static bool ContextualCheckBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, BlockValidatio // Check proof of work const Consensus::Params& consensusParams = params.GetConsensus(); if (block.nBits != GetNextWorkRequired(pindexPrev, &block, consensusParams)) - return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER, false, "bad-diffbits", "incorrect proof of work"); + return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER, "bad-diffbits", "incorrect proof of work"); // Check against checkpoints if (fCheckpointsEnabled) { @@ -3421,24 +3421,24 @@ static bool ContextualCheckBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, BlockValidatio CBlockIndex* pcheckpoint = GetLastCheckpoint(params.Checkpoints()); if (pcheckpoint && nHeight < pcheckpoint->nHeight) { LogPrintf("ERROR: %s: forked chain older than last checkpoint (height %d)\n", __func__, nHeight); - return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CHECKPOINT, false, "bad-fork-prior-to-checkpoint"); + return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CHECKPOINT, "bad-fork-prior-to-checkpoint"); } } // Check timestamp against prev if (block.GetBlockTime() <= pindexPrev->GetMedianTimePast()) - return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER, false, "time-too-old", "block's timestamp is too early"); + return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER, "time-too-old", "block's timestamp is too early"); // Check timestamp if (block.GetBlockTime() > nAdjustedTime + MAX_FUTURE_BLOCK_TIME) - return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_TIME_FUTURE, false, "time-too-new", "block timestamp too far in the future"); + return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_TIME_FUTURE, "time-too-new", "block timestamp too far in the future"); // Reject outdated version blocks when 95% (75% on testnet) of the network has upgraded: // check for version 2, 3 and 4 upgrades if((block.nVersion < 2 && nHeight >= consensusParams.BIP34Height) || (block.nVersion < 3 && nHeight >= consensusParams.BIP66Height) || (block.nVersion < 4 && nHeight >= consensusParams.BIP65Height)) - return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER, false, strprintf("bad-version(0x%08x)", block.nVersion), + return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER, strprintf("bad-version(0x%08x)", block.nVersion), strprintf("rejected nVersion=0x%08x block", block.nVersion)); return true; @@ -3468,7 +3468,7 @@ static bool ContextualCheckBlock(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& stat // Check that all transactions are finalized for (const auto& tx : block.vtx) { if (!IsFinalTx(*tx, nHeight, nLockTimeCutoff)) { - return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, false, "bad-txns-nonfinal", "non-final transaction"); + return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "bad-txns-nonfinal", "non-final transaction"); } } @@ -3478,7 +3478,7 @@ static bool ContextualCheckBlock(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& stat CScript expect = CScript() << nHeight; if (block.vtx[0]->vin[0].scriptSig.size() < expect.size() || !std::equal(expect.begin(), expect.end(), block.vtx[0]->vin[0].scriptSig.begin())) { - return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, false, "bad-cb-height", "block height mismatch in coinbase"); + return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "bad-cb-height", "block height mismatch in coinbase"); } } @@ -3500,11 +3500,11 @@ static bool ContextualCheckBlock(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& stat // already does not permit it, it is impossible to trigger in the // witness tree. if (block.vtx[0]->vin[0].scriptWitness.stack.size() != 1 || block.vtx[0]->vin[0].scriptWitness.stack[0].size() != 32) { - return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, false, "bad-witness-nonce-size", strprintf("%s : invalid witness reserved value size", __func__)); + return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, "bad-witness-nonce-size", strprintf("%s : invalid witness reserved value size", __func__)); } CHash256().Write(hashWitness.begin(), 32).Write(&block.vtx[0]->vin[0].scriptWitness.stack[0][0], 32).Finalize(hashWitness.begin()); if (memcmp(hashWitness.begin(), &block.vtx[0]->vout[commitpos].scriptPubKey[6], 32)) { - return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, false, "bad-witness-merkle-match", strprintf("%s : witness merkle commitment mismatch", __func__)); + return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, "bad-witness-merkle-match", strprintf("%s : witness merkle commitment mismatch", __func__)); } fHaveWitness = true; } @@ -3514,7 +3514,7 @@ static bool ContextualCheckBlock(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& stat if (!fHaveWitness) { for (const auto& tx : block.vtx) { if (tx->HasWitness()) { - return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, false, "unexpected-witness", strprintf("%s : unexpected witness data found", __func__)); + return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, "unexpected-witness", strprintf("%s : unexpected witness data found", __func__)); } } } @@ -3526,7 +3526,7 @@ static bool ContextualCheckBlock(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& stat // the block hash, so we couldn't mark the block as permanently // failed). if (GetBlockWeight(block) > MAX_BLOCK_WEIGHT) { - return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, false, "bad-blk-weight", strprintf("%s : weight limit failed", __func__)); + return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "bad-blk-weight", strprintf("%s : weight limit failed", __func__)); } return true; @@ -3547,7 +3547,7 @@ bool BlockManager::AcceptBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, BlockValidationS *ppindex = pindex; if (pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_FAILED_MASK) { LogPrintf("ERROR: %s: block %s is marked invalid\n", __func__, hash.ToString()); - return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CACHED_INVALID, false, "duplicate"); + return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CACHED_INVALID, "duplicate"); } return true; } @@ -3560,12 +3560,12 @@ bool BlockManager::AcceptBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, BlockValidationS BlockMap::iterator mi = m_block_index.find(block.hashPrevBlock); if (mi == m_block_index.end()) { LogPrintf("ERROR: %s: prev block not found\n", __func__); - return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MISSING_PREV, false, "prev-blk-not-found"); + return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MISSING_PREV, "prev-blk-not-found"); } pindexPrev = (*mi).second; if (pindexPrev->nStatus & BLOCK_FAILED_MASK) { LogPrintf("ERROR: %s: prev block invalid\n", __func__); - return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_INVALID_PREV, false, "bad-prevblk"); + return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_INVALID_PREV, "bad-prevblk"); } if (!ContextualCheckBlockHeader(block, state, chainparams, pindexPrev, GetAdjustedTime())) return error("%s: Consensus::ContextualCheckBlockHeader: %s, %s", __func__, hash.ToString(), FormatStateMessage(state)); @@ -3604,7 +3604,7 @@ bool BlockManager::AcceptBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, BlockValidationS invalid_walk = invalid_walk->pprev; } LogPrintf("ERROR: %s: prev block invalid\n", __func__); - return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_INVALID_PREV, false, "bad-prevblk"); + return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_INVALID_PREV, "bad-prevblk"); } } } |