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-rw-r--r--src/ecdsa_impl.h18
-rw-r--r--src/ecmult_const_impl.h2
-rw-r--r--src/ecmult_gen_impl.h2
-rw-r--r--src/ecmult_impl.h23
-rw-r--r--src/field.h7
-rw-r--r--src/field_impl.h2
-rw-r--r--src/group.h4
-rw-r--r--src/group_impl.h78
-rw-r--r--src/java/org/bitcoin/NativeSecp256k1.java34
-rw-r--r--src/java/org/bitcoin/NativeSecp256k1Test.java21
-rw-r--r--src/java/org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1.c34
-rw-r--r--src/java/org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1.h8
-rwxr-xr-x[-rw-r--r--]src/modules/recovery/main_impl.h4
-rw-r--r--src/modules/schnorr/Makefile.am.include10
-rw-r--r--src/modules/schnorr/main_impl.h164
-rw-r--r--src/modules/schnorr/schnorr.h20
-rw-r--r--src/modules/schnorr/schnorr_impl.h207
-rw-r--r--src/modules/schnorr/tests_impl.h175
-rw-r--r--src/scalar.h4
-rw-r--r--src/scalar_4x64_impl.h26
-rw-r--r--src/scalar_impl.h39
-rw-r--r--src/scalar_low.h15
-rw-r--r--src/scalar_low_impl.h114
-rwxr-xr-x[-rw-r--r--]src/secp256k1.c4
-rw-r--r--src/tests.c20
-rw-r--r--src/tests_exhaustive.c329
26 files changed, 641 insertions, 723 deletions
diff --git a/src/ecdsa_impl.h b/src/ecdsa_impl.h
index d110b4bb1d..9a42e519bd 100644
--- a/src/ecdsa_impl.h
+++ b/src/ecdsa_impl.h
@@ -203,7 +203,9 @@ static int secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_serialize(unsigned char *sig, size_t *size, const
static int secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_verify(const secp256k1_ecmult_context *ctx, const secp256k1_scalar *sigr, const secp256k1_scalar *sigs, const secp256k1_ge *pubkey, const secp256k1_scalar *message) {
unsigned char c[32];
secp256k1_scalar sn, u1, u2;
+#if !defined(EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER)
secp256k1_fe xr;
+#endif
secp256k1_gej pubkeyj;
secp256k1_gej pr;
@@ -219,6 +221,21 @@ static int secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_verify(const secp256k1_ecmult_context *ctx, const
if (secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&pr)) {
return 0;
}
+
+#if defined(EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER)
+{
+ secp256k1_scalar computed_r;
+ int overflow = 0;
+ secp256k1_ge pr_ge;
+ secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&pr_ge, &pr);
+ secp256k1_fe_normalize(&pr_ge.x);
+
+ secp256k1_fe_get_b32(c, &pr_ge.x);
+ secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&computed_r, c, &overflow);
+ /* we fully expect overflow */
+ return secp256k1_scalar_eq(sigr, &computed_r);
+}
+#else
secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(c, sigr);
secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&xr, c);
@@ -252,6 +269,7 @@ static int secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_verify(const secp256k1_ecmult_context *ctx, const
return 1;
}
return 0;
+#endif
}
static int secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_sign(const secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context *ctx, secp256k1_scalar *sigr, secp256k1_scalar *sigs, const secp256k1_scalar *seckey, const secp256k1_scalar *message, const secp256k1_scalar *nonce, int *recid) {
diff --git a/src/ecmult_const_impl.h b/src/ecmult_const_impl.h
index 7a6a25318c..0db314c48e 100644
--- a/src/ecmult_const_impl.h
+++ b/src/ecmult_const_impl.h
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ static int secp256k1_wnaf_const(int *wnaf, secp256k1_scalar s, int w) {
/* Negative numbers will be negated to keep their bit representation below the maximum width */
flip = secp256k1_scalar_is_high(&s);
/* We add 1 to even numbers, 2 to odd ones, noting that negation flips parity */
- bit = flip ^ (s.d[0] & 1);
+ bit = flip ^ !secp256k1_scalar_is_even(&s);
/* We check for negative one, since adding 2 to it will cause an overflow */
secp256k1_scalar_negate(&neg_s, &s);
not_neg_one = !secp256k1_scalar_is_one(&neg_s);
diff --git a/src/ecmult_gen_impl.h b/src/ecmult_gen_impl.h
index b63c4d8662..35f2546077 100644
--- a/src/ecmult_gen_impl.h
+++ b/src/ecmult_gen_impl.h
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ static void secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_build(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context *ctx
secp256k1_gej_add_var(&numsbase, &numsbase, &nums_gej, NULL);
}
}
- secp256k1_ge_set_all_gej_var(1024, prec, precj, cb);
+ secp256k1_ge_set_all_gej_var(prec, precj, 1024, cb);
}
for (j = 0; j < 64; j++) {
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
diff --git a/src/ecmult_impl.h b/src/ecmult_impl.h
index 81ae08e100..4e40104ad4 100644
--- a/src/ecmult_impl.h
+++ b/src/ecmult_impl.h
@@ -7,15 +7,29 @@
#ifndef _SECP256K1_ECMULT_IMPL_H_
#define _SECP256K1_ECMULT_IMPL_H_
+#include <string.h>
+
#include "group.h"
#include "scalar.h"
#include "ecmult.h"
-#include <string.h>
-
+#if defined(EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER)
+/* We need to lower these values for exhaustive tests because
+ * the tables cannot have infinities in them (this breaks the
+ * affine-isomorphism stuff which tracks z-ratios) */
+# if EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER > 128
+# define WINDOW_A 5
+# define WINDOW_G 8
+# elif EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER > 8
+# define WINDOW_A 4
+# define WINDOW_G 4
+# else
+# define WINDOW_A 2
+# define WINDOW_G 2
+# endif
+#else
/* optimal for 128-bit and 256-bit exponents. */
#define WINDOW_A 5
-
/** larger numbers may result in slightly better performance, at the cost of
exponentially larger precomputed tables. */
#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM
@@ -25,6 +39,7 @@
/** One table for window size 16: 1.375 MiB. */
#define WINDOW_G 16
#endif
+#endif
/** The number of entries a table with precomputed multiples needs to have. */
#define ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(w) (1 << ((w)-2))
@@ -103,7 +118,7 @@ static void secp256k1_ecmult_odd_multiples_table_storage_var(int n, secp256k1_ge
/* Compute the odd multiples in Jacobian form. */
secp256k1_ecmult_odd_multiples_table(n, prej, zr, a);
/* Convert them in batch to affine coordinates. */
- secp256k1_ge_set_table_gej_var(n, prea, prej, zr);
+ secp256k1_ge_set_table_gej_var(prea, prej, zr, n);
/* Convert them to compact storage form. */
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
secp256k1_ge_to_storage(&pre[i], &prea[i]);
diff --git a/src/field.h b/src/field.h
index c5ba074244..bbb1ee866c 100644
--- a/src/field.h
+++ b/src/field.h
@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@
#error "Please select field implementation"
#endif
+#include "util.h"
+
/** Normalize a field element. */
static void secp256k1_fe_normalize(secp256k1_fe *r);
@@ -50,6 +52,9 @@ static int secp256k1_fe_normalizes_to_zero_var(secp256k1_fe *r);
/** Set a field element equal to a small integer. Resulting field element is normalized. */
static void secp256k1_fe_set_int(secp256k1_fe *r, int a);
+/** Sets a field element equal to zero, initializing all fields. */
+static void secp256k1_fe_clear(secp256k1_fe *a);
+
/** Verify whether a field element is zero. Requires the input to be normalized. */
static int secp256k1_fe_is_zero(const secp256k1_fe *a);
@@ -110,7 +115,7 @@ static void secp256k1_fe_inv_var(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe *a);
/** Calculate the (modular) inverses of a batch of field elements. Requires the inputs' magnitudes to be
* at most 8. The output magnitudes are 1 (but not guaranteed to be normalized). The inputs and
* outputs must not overlap in memory. */
-static void secp256k1_fe_inv_all_var(size_t len, secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe *a);
+static void secp256k1_fe_inv_all_var(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe *a, size_t len);
/** Convert a field element to the storage type. */
static void secp256k1_fe_to_storage(secp256k1_fe_storage *r, const secp256k1_fe *a);
diff --git a/src/field_impl.h b/src/field_impl.h
index 52cd902eb3..5127b279bc 100644
--- a/src/field_impl.h
+++ b/src/field_impl.h
@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ static void secp256k1_fe_inv_var(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe *a) {
#endif
}
-static void secp256k1_fe_inv_all_var(size_t len, secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe *a) {
+static void secp256k1_fe_inv_all_var(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe *a, size_t len) {
secp256k1_fe u;
size_t i;
if (len < 1) {
diff --git a/src/group.h b/src/group.h
index d515716744..4957b248fe 100644
--- a/src/group.h
+++ b/src/group.h
@@ -65,12 +65,12 @@ static void secp256k1_ge_neg(secp256k1_ge *r, const secp256k1_ge *a);
static void secp256k1_ge_set_gej(secp256k1_ge *r, secp256k1_gej *a);
/** Set a batch of group elements equal to the inputs given in jacobian coordinates */
-static void secp256k1_ge_set_all_gej_var(size_t len, secp256k1_ge *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, const secp256k1_callback *cb);
+static void secp256k1_ge_set_all_gej_var(secp256k1_ge *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, size_t len, const secp256k1_callback *cb);
/** Set a batch of group elements equal to the inputs given in jacobian
* coordinates (with known z-ratios). zr must contain the known z-ratios such
* that mul(a[i].z, zr[i+1]) == a[i+1].z. zr[0] is ignored. */
-static void secp256k1_ge_set_table_gej_var(size_t len, secp256k1_ge *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, const secp256k1_fe *zr);
+static void secp256k1_ge_set_table_gej_var(secp256k1_ge *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, const secp256k1_fe *zr, size_t len);
/** Bring a batch inputs given in jacobian coordinates (with known z-ratios) to
* the same global z "denominator". zr must contain the known z-ratios such
diff --git a/src/group_impl.h b/src/group_impl.h
index 3e9c4c410d..2e192b62fd 100644
--- a/src/group_impl.h
+++ b/src/group_impl.h
@@ -11,6 +11,53 @@
#include "field.h"
#include "group.h"
+/* These points can be generated in sage as follows:
+ *
+ * 0. Setup a worksheet with the following parameters.
+ * b = 4 # whatever CURVE_B will be set to
+ * F = FiniteField (0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEFFFFFC2F)
+ * C = EllipticCurve ([F (0), F (b)])
+ *
+ * 1. Determine all the small orders available to you. (If there are
+ * no satisfactory ones, go back and change b.)
+ * print C.order().factor(limit=1000)
+ *
+ * 2. Choose an order as one of the prime factors listed in the above step.
+ * (You can also multiply some to get a composite order, though the
+ * tests will crash trying to invert scalars during signing.) We take a
+ * random point and scale it to drop its order to the desired value.
+ * There is some probability this won't work; just try again.
+ * order = 199
+ * P = C.random_point()
+ * P = (int(P.order()) / int(order)) * P
+ * assert(P.order() == order)
+ *
+ * 3. Print the values. You'll need to use a vim macro or something to
+ * split the hex output into 4-byte chunks.
+ * print "%x %x" % P.xy()
+ */
+#if defined(EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER)
+# if EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER == 199
+const secp256k1_ge secp256k1_ge_const_g = SECP256K1_GE_CONST(
+ 0xFA7CC9A7, 0x0737F2DB, 0xA749DD39, 0x2B4FB069,
+ 0x3B017A7D, 0xA808C2F1, 0xFB12940C, 0x9EA66C18,
+ 0x78AC123A, 0x5ED8AEF3, 0x8732BC91, 0x1F3A2868,
+ 0x48DF246C, 0x808DAE72, 0xCFE52572, 0x7F0501ED
+);
+
+const int CURVE_B = 4;
+# elif EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER == 13
+const secp256k1_ge secp256k1_ge_const_g = SECP256K1_GE_CONST(
+ 0xedc60018, 0xa51a786b, 0x2ea91f4d, 0x4c9416c0,
+ 0x9de54c3b, 0xa1316554, 0x6cf4345c, 0x7277ef15,
+ 0x54cb1b6b, 0xdc8c1273, 0x087844ea, 0x43f4603e,
+ 0x0eaf9a43, 0xf6effe55, 0x939f806d, 0x37adf8ac
+);
+const int CURVE_B = 2;
+# else
+# error No known generator for the specified exhaustive test group order.
+# endif
+#else
/** Generator for secp256k1, value 'g' defined in
* "Standards for Efficient Cryptography" (SEC2) 2.7.1.
*/
@@ -21,8 +68,11 @@ static const secp256k1_ge secp256k1_ge_const_g = SECP256K1_GE_CONST(
0xFD17B448UL, 0xA6855419UL, 0x9C47D08FUL, 0xFB10D4B8UL
);
+const int CURVE_B = 7;
+#endif
+
static void secp256k1_ge_set_gej_zinv(secp256k1_ge *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, const secp256k1_fe *zi) {
- secp256k1_fe zi2;
+ secp256k1_fe zi2;
secp256k1_fe zi3;
secp256k1_fe_sqr(&zi2, zi);
secp256k1_fe_mul(&zi3, &zi2, zi);
@@ -76,7 +126,7 @@ static void secp256k1_ge_set_gej_var(secp256k1_ge *r, secp256k1_gej *a) {
r->y = a->y;
}
-static void secp256k1_ge_set_all_gej_var(size_t len, secp256k1_ge *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, const secp256k1_callback *cb) {
+static void secp256k1_ge_set_all_gej_var(secp256k1_ge *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, size_t len, const secp256k1_callback *cb) {
secp256k1_fe *az;
secp256k1_fe *azi;
size_t i;
@@ -89,7 +139,7 @@ static void secp256k1_ge_set_all_gej_var(size_t len, secp256k1_ge *r, const secp
}
azi = (secp256k1_fe *)checked_malloc(cb, sizeof(secp256k1_fe) * count);
- secp256k1_fe_inv_all_var(count, azi, az);
+ secp256k1_fe_inv_all_var(azi, az, count);
free(az);
count = 0;
@@ -102,7 +152,7 @@ static void secp256k1_ge_set_all_gej_var(size_t len, secp256k1_ge *r, const secp
free(azi);
}
-static void secp256k1_ge_set_table_gej_var(size_t len, secp256k1_ge *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, const secp256k1_fe *zr) {
+static void secp256k1_ge_set_table_gej_var(secp256k1_ge *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, const secp256k1_fe *zr, size_t len) {
size_t i = len - 1;
secp256k1_fe zi;
@@ -145,9 +195,15 @@ static void secp256k1_ge_globalz_set_table_gej(size_t len, secp256k1_ge *r, secp
static void secp256k1_gej_set_infinity(secp256k1_gej *r) {
r->infinity = 1;
- secp256k1_fe_set_int(&r->x, 0);
- secp256k1_fe_set_int(&r->y, 0);
- secp256k1_fe_set_int(&r->z, 0);
+ secp256k1_fe_clear(&r->x);
+ secp256k1_fe_clear(&r->y);
+ secp256k1_fe_clear(&r->z);
+}
+
+static void secp256k1_ge_set_infinity(secp256k1_ge *r) {
+ r->infinity = 1;
+ secp256k1_fe_clear(&r->x);
+ secp256k1_fe_clear(&r->y);
}
static void secp256k1_gej_clear(secp256k1_gej *r) {
@@ -169,7 +225,7 @@ static int secp256k1_ge_set_xquad(secp256k1_ge *r, const secp256k1_fe *x) {
secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x2, x);
secp256k1_fe_mul(&x3, x, &x2);
r->infinity = 0;
- secp256k1_fe_set_int(&c, 7);
+ secp256k1_fe_set_int(&c, CURVE_B);
secp256k1_fe_add(&c, &x3);
return secp256k1_fe_sqrt(&r->y, &c);
}
@@ -228,7 +284,7 @@ static int secp256k1_gej_is_valid_var(const secp256k1_gej *a) {
secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x3, &a->x); secp256k1_fe_mul(&x3, &x3, &a->x);
secp256k1_fe_sqr(&z2, &a->z);
secp256k1_fe_sqr(&z6, &z2); secp256k1_fe_mul(&z6, &z6, &z2);
- secp256k1_fe_mul_int(&z6, 7);
+ secp256k1_fe_mul_int(&z6, CURVE_B);
secp256k1_fe_add(&x3, &z6);
secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&x3);
return secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&y2, &x3);
@@ -242,7 +298,7 @@ static int secp256k1_ge_is_valid_var(const secp256k1_ge *a) {
/* y^2 = x^3 + 7 */
secp256k1_fe_sqr(&y2, &a->y);
secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x3, &a->x); secp256k1_fe_mul(&x3, &x3, &a->x);
- secp256k1_fe_set_int(&c, 7);
+ secp256k1_fe_set_int(&c, CURVE_B);
secp256k1_fe_add(&x3, &c);
secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&x3);
return secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&y2, &x3);
@@ -260,7 +316,7 @@ static void secp256k1_gej_double_var(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, s
/** For secp256k1, 2Q is infinity if and only if Q is infinity. This is because if 2Q = infinity,
* Q must equal -Q, or that Q.y == -(Q.y), or Q.y is 0. For a point on y^2 = x^3 + 7 to have
* y=0, x^3 must be -7 mod p. However, -7 has no cube root mod p.
- *
+ *
* Having said this, if this function receives a point on a sextic twist, e.g. by
* a fault attack, it is possible for y to be 0. This happens for y^2 = x^3 + 6,
* since -6 does have a cube root mod p. For this point, this function will not set
diff --git a/src/java/org/bitcoin/NativeSecp256k1.java b/src/java/org/bitcoin/NativeSecp256k1.java
index be67048fbe..1c67802fba 100644
--- a/src/java/org/bitcoin/NativeSecp256k1.java
+++ b/src/java/org/bitcoin/NativeSecp256k1.java
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ import static org.bitcoin.NativeSecp256k1Util.*;
* <p>You can find an example library that can be used for this at https://github.com/bitcoin/secp256k1</p>
*
* <p>To build secp256k1 for use with bitcoinj, run
- * `./configure --enable-jni --enable-experimental --enable-module-schnorr --enable-module-ecdh`
+ * `./configure --enable-jni --enable-experimental --enable-module-ecdh`
* and `make` then copy `.libs/libsecp256k1.so` to your system library path
* or point the JVM to the folder containing it with -Djava.library.path
* </p>
@@ -417,36 +417,6 @@ public class NativeSecp256k1 {
}
}
- public static byte[] schnorrSign(byte[] data, byte[] sec) throws AssertFailException {
- Preconditions.checkArgument(data.length == 32 && sec.length <= 32);
-
- ByteBuffer byteBuff = nativeECDSABuffer.get();
- if (byteBuff == null) {
- byteBuff = ByteBuffer.allocateDirect(32 + 32);
- byteBuff.order(ByteOrder.nativeOrder());
- nativeECDSABuffer.set(byteBuff);
- }
- byteBuff.rewind();
- byteBuff.put(data);
- byteBuff.put(sec);
-
- byte[][] retByteArray;
-
- r.lock();
- try {
- retByteArray = secp256k1_schnorr_sign(byteBuff, Secp256k1Context.getContext());
- } finally {
- r.unlock();
- }
-
- byte[] sigArr = retByteArray[0];
- int retVal = new BigInteger(new byte[] { retByteArray[1][0] }).intValue();
-
- assertEquals(sigArr.length, 64, "Got bad signature length.");
-
- return retVal == 0 ? new byte[0] : sigArr;
- }
-
private static native long secp256k1_ctx_clone(long context);
private static native int secp256k1_context_randomize(ByteBuffer byteBuff, long context);
@@ -471,8 +441,6 @@ public class NativeSecp256k1 {
private static native byte[][] secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(ByteBuffer byteBuff, long context, int inputLen);
- private static native byte[][] secp256k1_schnorr_sign(ByteBuffer byteBuff, long context);
-
private static native byte[][] secp256k1_ecdh(ByteBuffer byteBuff, long context, int inputLen);
}
diff --git a/src/java/org/bitcoin/NativeSecp256k1Test.java b/src/java/org/bitcoin/NativeSecp256k1Test.java
index f18ce95810..c00d08899b 100644
--- a/src/java/org/bitcoin/NativeSecp256k1Test.java
+++ b/src/java/org/bitcoin/NativeSecp256k1Test.java
@@ -167,22 +167,6 @@ public class NativeSecp256k1Test {
assertEquals( result, true, "testRandomize");
}
- /**
- * This tests signSchnorr() for a valid secretkey
- */
- public static void testSchnorrSign() throws AssertFailException{
-
- byte[] data = BaseEncoding.base16().lowerCase().decode("CF80CD8AED482D5D1527D7DC72FCEFF84E6326592848447D2DC0B0E87DFC9A90".toLowerCase()); //sha256hash of "testing"
- byte[] sec = BaseEncoding.base16().lowerCase().decode("67E56582298859DDAE725F972992A07C6C4FB9F62A8FFF58CE3CA926A1063530".toLowerCase());
-
- byte[] resultArr = NativeSecp256k1.schnorrSign(data, sec);
- String sigString = javax.xml.bind.DatatypeConverter.printHexBinary(resultArr);
- assertEquals( sigString, "C5E929AA058B982048760422D3B563749B7D0E50C5EBD8CD2FFC23214BD6A2F1B072C13880997EBA847CF20F2F90FCE07C1CA33A890A4127095A351127F8D95F" , "testSchnorrSign");
- }
-
- /**
- * This tests signSchnorr() for a valid secretkey
- */
public static void testCreateECDHSecret() throws AssertFailException{
byte[] sec = BaseEncoding.base16().lowerCase().decode("67E56582298859DDAE725F972992A07C6C4FB9F62A8FFF58CE3CA926A1063530".toLowerCase());
@@ -216,11 +200,6 @@ public class NativeSecp256k1Test {
testSignPos();
testSignNeg();
- //Test Schnorr (partial support) //TODO
- testSchnorrSign();
- //testSchnorrVerify
- //testSchnorrRecovery
-
//Test privKeyTweakAdd() 1
testPrivKeyTweakAdd_1();
diff --git a/src/java/org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1.c b/src/java/org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1.c
index dba9524dd4..bcef7b32ce 100644
--- a/src/java/org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1.c
+++ b/src/java/org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1.c
@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@
#include "include/secp256k1.h"
#include "include/secp256k1_ecdh.h"
#include "include/secp256k1_recovery.h"
-#include "include/secp256k1_schnorr.h"
SECP256K1_API jlong JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1ctx_1clone
@@ -333,39 +332,6 @@ SECP256K1_API jlong JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1ecdsa_1p
return 0;
}
-SECP256K1_API jobjectArray JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1schnorr_1sign
- (JNIEnv* env, jclass classObject, jobject byteBufferObject, jlong ctx_l)
-{
- secp256k1_context *ctx = (secp256k1_context*)(uintptr_t)ctx_l;
- unsigned char* data = (unsigned char*) (*env)->GetDirectBufferAddress(env, byteBufferObject);
- unsigned char* secKey = (unsigned char*) (data + 32);
-
- jobjectArray retArray;
- jbyteArray sigArray, intsByteArray;
- unsigned char intsarray[1];
- unsigned char sig[64];
-
- int ret = secp256k1_schnorr_sign(ctx, sig, data, secKey, NULL, NULL);
-
- intsarray[0] = ret;
-
- retArray = (*env)->NewObjectArray(env, 2,
- (*env)->FindClass(env, "[B"),
- (*env)->NewByteArray(env, 1));
-
- sigArray = (*env)->NewByteArray(env, 64);
- (*env)->SetByteArrayRegion(env, sigArray, 0, 64, (jbyte*)sig);
- (*env)->SetObjectArrayElement(env, retArray, 0, sigArray);
-
- intsByteArray = (*env)->NewByteArray(env, 1);
- (*env)->SetByteArrayRegion(env, intsByteArray, 0, 1, (jbyte*)intsarray);
- (*env)->SetObjectArrayElement(env, retArray, 1, intsByteArray);
-
- (void)classObject;
-
- return retArray;
-}
-
SECP256K1_API jobjectArray JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1ecdh
(JNIEnv* env, jclass classObject, jobject byteBufferObject, jlong ctx_l, jint publen)
{
diff --git a/src/java/org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1.h b/src/java/org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1.h
index 4125a1f523..fe613c9e9e 100644
--- a/src/java/org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1.h
+++ b/src/java/org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1.h
@@ -106,14 +106,6 @@ SECP256K1_API jobjectArray JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1e
/*
* Class: org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1
- * Method: secp256k1_schnorr_sign
- * Signature: (Ljava/nio/ByteBuffer;JI)[[B
- */
-SECP256K1_API jobjectArray JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1schnorr_1sign
- (JNIEnv* env, jclass classObject, jobject byteBufferObject, jlong ctx_l);
-
-/*
- * Class: org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1
* Method: secp256k1_ecdh
* Signature: (Ljava/nio/ByteBuffer;JI)[[B
*/
diff --git a/src/modules/recovery/main_impl.h b/src/modules/recovery/main_impl.h
index ec42f4bb6c..86f2f0cb2b 100644..100755
--- a/src/modules/recovery/main_impl.h
+++ b/src/modules/recovery/main_impl.h
@@ -138,16 +138,15 @@ int secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_ecd
secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&sec, seckey, &overflow);
/* Fail if the secret key is invalid. */
if (!overflow && !secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&sec)) {
+ unsigned char nonce32[32];
unsigned int count = 0;
secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&msg, msg32, NULL);
while (1) {
- unsigned char nonce32[32];
ret = noncefp(nonce32, msg32, seckey, NULL, (void*)noncedata, count);
if (!ret) {
break;
}
secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&non, nonce32, &overflow);
- memset(nonce32, 0, 32);
if (!secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&non) && !overflow) {
if (secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_sign(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &r, &s, &sec, &msg, &non, &recid)) {
break;
@@ -155,6 +154,7 @@ int secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_ecd
}
count++;
}
+ memset(nonce32, 0, 32);
secp256k1_scalar_clear(&msg);
secp256k1_scalar_clear(&non);
secp256k1_scalar_clear(&sec);
diff --git a/src/modules/schnorr/Makefile.am.include b/src/modules/schnorr/Makefile.am.include
deleted file mode 100644
index f1af8e8325..0000000000
--- a/src/modules/schnorr/Makefile.am.include
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
-include_HEADERS += include/secp256k1_schnorr.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/schnorr/main_impl.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/schnorr/schnorr.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/schnorr/schnorr_impl.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/schnorr/tests_impl.h
-if USE_BENCHMARK
-noinst_PROGRAMS += bench_schnorr_verify
-bench_schnorr_verify_SOURCES = src/bench_schnorr_verify.c
-bench_schnorr_verify_LDADD = libsecp256k1.la $(SECP_LIBS) $(COMMON_LIB)
-endif
diff --git a/src/modules/schnorr/main_impl.h b/src/modules/schnorr/main_impl.h
deleted file mode 100644
index fa176a1767..0000000000
--- a/src/modules/schnorr/main_impl.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,164 +0,0 @@
-/**********************************************************************
- * Copyright (c) 2014-2015 Pieter Wuille *
- * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying *
- * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.*
- **********************************************************************/
-
-#ifndef SECP256K1_MODULE_SCHNORR_MAIN
-#define SECP256K1_MODULE_SCHNORR_MAIN
-
-#include "include/secp256k1_schnorr.h"
-#include "modules/schnorr/schnorr_impl.h"
-
-static void secp256k1_schnorr_msghash_sha256(unsigned char *h32, const unsigned char *r32, const unsigned char *msg32) {
- secp256k1_sha256_t sha;
- secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha);
- secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha, r32, 32);
- secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha, msg32, 32);
- secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha, h32);
-}
-
-static const unsigned char secp256k1_schnorr_algo16[17] = "Schnorr+SHA256 ";
-
-int secp256k1_schnorr_sign(const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char *sig64, const unsigned char *msg32, const unsigned char *seckey, secp256k1_nonce_function noncefp, const void* noncedata) {
- secp256k1_scalar sec, non;
- int ret = 0;
- int overflow = 0;
- unsigned int count = 0;
- VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL);
- ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx));
- ARG_CHECK(msg32 != NULL);
- ARG_CHECK(sig64 != NULL);
- ARG_CHECK(seckey != NULL);
- if (noncefp == NULL) {
- noncefp = secp256k1_nonce_function_default;
- }
-
- secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&sec, seckey, NULL);
- while (1) {
- unsigned char nonce32[32];
- ret = noncefp(nonce32, msg32, seckey, secp256k1_schnorr_algo16, (void*)noncedata, count);
- if (!ret) {
- break;
- }
- secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&non, nonce32, &overflow);
- memset(nonce32, 0, 32);
- if (!secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&non) && !overflow) {
- if (secp256k1_schnorr_sig_sign(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, sig64, &sec, &non, NULL, secp256k1_schnorr_msghash_sha256, msg32)) {
- break;
- }
- }
- count++;
- }
- if (!ret) {
- memset(sig64, 0, 64);
- }
- secp256k1_scalar_clear(&non);
- secp256k1_scalar_clear(&sec);
- return ret;
-}
-
-int secp256k1_schnorr_verify(const secp256k1_context* ctx, const unsigned char *sig64, const unsigned char *msg32, const secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey) {
- secp256k1_ge q;
- VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL);
- ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_ctx));
- ARG_CHECK(msg32 != NULL);
- ARG_CHECK(sig64 != NULL);
- ARG_CHECK(pubkey != NULL);
-
- secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, &q, pubkey);
- return secp256k1_schnorr_sig_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, sig64, &q, secp256k1_schnorr_msghash_sha256, msg32);
-}
-
-int secp256k1_schnorr_recover(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey, const unsigned char *sig64, const unsigned char *msg32) {
- secp256k1_ge q;
-
- VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL);
- ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_ctx));
- ARG_CHECK(msg32 != NULL);
- ARG_CHECK(sig64 != NULL);
- ARG_CHECK(pubkey != NULL);
-
- if (secp256k1_schnorr_sig_recover(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, sig64, &q, secp256k1_schnorr_msghash_sha256, msg32)) {
- secp256k1_pubkey_save(pubkey, &q);
- return 1;
- } else {
- memset(pubkey, 0, sizeof(*pubkey));
- return 0;
- }
-}
-
-int secp256k1_schnorr_generate_nonce_pair(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_pubkey *pubnonce, unsigned char *privnonce32, const unsigned char *sec32, const unsigned char *msg32, secp256k1_nonce_function noncefp, const void* noncedata) {
- int count = 0;
- int ret = 1;
- secp256k1_gej Qj;
- secp256k1_ge Q;
- secp256k1_scalar sec;
-
- VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL);
- ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx));
- ARG_CHECK(msg32 != NULL);
- ARG_CHECK(sec32 != NULL);
- ARG_CHECK(pubnonce != NULL);
- ARG_CHECK(privnonce32 != NULL);
-
- if (noncefp == NULL) {
- noncefp = secp256k1_nonce_function_default;
- }
-
- do {
- int overflow;
- ret = noncefp(privnonce32, sec32, msg32, secp256k1_schnorr_algo16, (void*)noncedata, count++);
- if (!ret) {
- break;
- }
- secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&sec, privnonce32, &overflow);
- if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&sec)) {
- continue;
- }
- secp256k1_ecmult_gen(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &Qj, &sec);
- secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&Q, &Qj);
-
- secp256k1_pubkey_save(pubnonce, &Q);
- break;
- } while(1);
-
- secp256k1_scalar_clear(&sec);
- if (!ret) {
- memset(pubnonce, 0, sizeof(*pubnonce));
- }
- return ret;
-}
-
-int secp256k1_schnorr_partial_sign(const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char *sig64, const unsigned char *msg32, const unsigned char *sec32, const secp256k1_pubkey *pubnonce_others, const unsigned char *secnonce32) {
- int overflow = 0;
- secp256k1_scalar sec, non;
- secp256k1_ge pubnon;
- VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL);
- ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx));
- ARG_CHECK(msg32 != NULL);
- ARG_CHECK(sig64 != NULL);
- ARG_CHECK(sec32 != NULL);
- ARG_CHECK(secnonce32 != NULL);
- ARG_CHECK(pubnonce_others != NULL);
-
- secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&sec, sec32, &overflow);
- if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&sec)) {
- return -1;
- }
- secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&non, secnonce32, &overflow);
- if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&non)) {
- return -1;
- }
- secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, &pubnon, pubnonce_others);
- return secp256k1_schnorr_sig_sign(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, sig64, &sec, &non, &pubnon, secp256k1_schnorr_msghash_sha256, msg32);
-}
-
-int secp256k1_schnorr_partial_combine(const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char *sig64, const unsigned char * const *sig64sin, size_t n) {
- ARG_CHECK(sig64 != NULL);
- ARG_CHECK(n >= 1);
- ARG_CHECK(sig64sin != NULL);
- return secp256k1_schnorr_sig_combine(sig64, n, sig64sin);
-}
-
-#endif
diff --git a/src/modules/schnorr/schnorr.h b/src/modules/schnorr/schnorr.h
deleted file mode 100644
index de18147bd5..0000000000
--- a/src/modules/schnorr/schnorr.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-/***********************************************************************
- * Copyright (c) 2014-2015 Pieter Wuille *
- * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying *
- * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php. *
- ***********************************************************************/
-
-#ifndef _SECP256K1_MODULE_SCHNORR_H_
-#define _SECP256K1_MODULE_SCHNORR_H_
-
-#include "scalar.h"
-#include "group.h"
-
-typedef void (*secp256k1_schnorr_msghash)(unsigned char *h32, const unsigned char *r32, const unsigned char *msg32);
-
-static int secp256k1_schnorr_sig_sign(const secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context* ctx, unsigned char *sig64, const secp256k1_scalar *key, const secp256k1_scalar *nonce, const secp256k1_ge *pubnonce, secp256k1_schnorr_msghash hash, const unsigned char *msg32);
-static int secp256k1_schnorr_sig_verify(const secp256k1_ecmult_context* ctx, const unsigned char *sig64, const secp256k1_ge *pubkey, secp256k1_schnorr_msghash hash, const unsigned char *msg32);
-static int secp256k1_schnorr_sig_recover(const secp256k1_ecmult_context* ctx, const unsigned char *sig64, secp256k1_ge *pubkey, secp256k1_schnorr_msghash hash, const unsigned char *msg32);
-static int secp256k1_schnorr_sig_combine(unsigned char *sig64, size_t n, const unsigned char * const *sig64ins);
-
-#endif
diff --git a/src/modules/schnorr/schnorr_impl.h b/src/modules/schnorr/schnorr_impl.h
deleted file mode 100644
index e13ab6db7c..0000000000
--- a/src/modules/schnorr/schnorr_impl.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,207 +0,0 @@
-/***********************************************************************
- * Copyright (c) 2014-2015 Pieter Wuille *
- * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying *
- * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php. *
- ***********************************************************************/
-
-#ifndef _SECP256K1_SCHNORR_IMPL_H_
-#define _SECP256K1_SCHNORR_IMPL_H_
-
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include "schnorr.h"
-#include "num.h"
-#include "field.h"
-#include "group.h"
-#include "ecmult.h"
-#include "ecmult_gen.h"
-
-/**
- * Custom Schnorr-based signature scheme. They support multiparty signing, public key
- * recovery and batch validation.
- *
- * Rationale for verifying R's y coordinate:
- * In order to support batch validation and public key recovery, the full R point must
- * be known to verifiers, rather than just its x coordinate. In order to not risk
- * being more strict in batch validation than normal validation, validators must be
- * required to reject signatures with incorrect y coordinate. This is only possible
- * by including a (relatively slow) field inverse, or a field square root. However,
- * batch validation offers potentially much higher benefits than this cost.
- *
- * Rationale for having an implicit y coordinate oddness:
- * If we commit to having the full R point known to verifiers, there are two mechanism.
- * Either include its oddness in the signature, or give it an implicit fixed value.
- * As the R y coordinate can be flipped by a simple negation of the nonce, we choose the
- * latter, as it comes with nearly zero impact on signing or validation performance, and
- * saves a byte in the signature.
- *
- * Signing:
- * Inputs: 32-byte message m, 32-byte scalar key x (!=0), 32-byte scalar nonce k (!=0)
- *
- * Compute point R = k * G. Reject nonce if R's y coordinate is odd (or negate nonce).
- * Compute 32-byte r, the serialization of R's x coordinate.
- * Compute scalar h = Hash(r || m). Reject nonce if h == 0 or h >= order.
- * Compute scalar s = k - h * x.
- * The signature is (r, s).
- *
- *
- * Verification:
- * Inputs: 32-byte message m, public key point Q, signature: (32-byte r, scalar s)
- *
- * Signature is invalid if s >= order.
- * Signature is invalid if r >= p.
- * Compute scalar h = Hash(r || m). Signature is invalid if h == 0 or h >= order.
- * Option 1 (faster for single verification):
- * Compute point R = h * Q + s * G. Signature is invalid if R is infinity or R's y coordinate is odd.
- * Signature is valid if the serialization of R's x coordinate equals r.
- * Option 2 (allows batch validation and pubkey recovery):
- * Decompress x coordinate r into point R, with odd y coordinate. Fail if R is not on the curve.
- * Signature is valid if R + h * Q + s * G == 0.
- */
-
-static int secp256k1_schnorr_sig_sign(const secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context* ctx, unsigned char *sig64, const secp256k1_scalar *key, const secp256k1_scalar *nonce, const secp256k1_ge *pubnonce, secp256k1_schnorr_msghash hash, const unsigned char *msg32) {
- secp256k1_gej Rj;
- secp256k1_ge Ra;
- unsigned char h32[32];
- secp256k1_scalar h, s;
- int overflow;
- secp256k1_scalar n;
-
- if (secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(key) || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(nonce)) {
- return 0;
- }
- n = *nonce;
-
- secp256k1_ecmult_gen(ctx, &Rj, &n);
- if (pubnonce != NULL) {
- secp256k1_gej_add_ge(&Rj, &Rj, pubnonce);
- }
- secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&Ra, &Rj);
- secp256k1_fe_normalize(&Ra.y);
- if (secp256k1_fe_is_odd(&Ra.y)) {
- /* R's y coordinate is odd, which is not allowed (see rationale above).
- Force it to be even by negating the nonce. Note that this even works
- for multiparty signing, as the R point is known to all participants,
- which can all decide to flip the sign in unison, resulting in the
- overall R point to be negated too. */
- secp256k1_scalar_negate(&n, &n);
- }
- secp256k1_fe_normalize(&Ra.x);
- secp256k1_fe_get_b32(sig64, &Ra.x);
- hash(h32, sig64, msg32);
- overflow = 0;
- secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&h, h32, &overflow);
- if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&h)) {
- secp256k1_scalar_clear(&n);
- return 0;
- }
- secp256k1_scalar_mul(&s, &h, key);
- secp256k1_scalar_negate(&s, &s);
- secp256k1_scalar_add(&s, &s, &n);
- secp256k1_scalar_clear(&n);
- secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(sig64 + 32, &s);
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int secp256k1_schnorr_sig_verify(const secp256k1_ecmult_context* ctx, const unsigned char *sig64, const secp256k1_ge *pubkey, secp256k1_schnorr_msghash hash, const unsigned char *msg32) {
- secp256k1_gej Qj, Rj;
- secp256k1_ge Ra;
- secp256k1_fe Rx;
- secp256k1_scalar h, s;
- unsigned char hh[32];
- int overflow;
-
- if (secp256k1_ge_is_infinity(pubkey)) {
- return 0;
- }
- hash(hh, sig64, msg32);
- overflow = 0;
- secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&h, hh, &overflow);
- if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&h)) {
- return 0;
- }
- overflow = 0;
- secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&s, sig64 + 32, &overflow);
- if (overflow) {
- return 0;
- }
- if (!secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&Rx, sig64)) {
- return 0;
- }
- secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&Qj, pubkey);
- secp256k1_ecmult(ctx, &Rj, &Qj, &h, &s);
- if (secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&Rj)) {
- return 0;
- }
- secp256k1_ge_set_gej_var(&Ra, &Rj);
- secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&Ra.y);
- if (secp256k1_fe_is_odd(&Ra.y)) {
- return 0;
- }
- return secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&Rx, &Ra.x);
-}
-
-static int secp256k1_schnorr_sig_recover(const secp256k1_ecmult_context* ctx, const unsigned char *sig64, secp256k1_ge *pubkey, secp256k1_schnorr_msghash hash, const unsigned char *msg32) {
- secp256k1_gej Qj, Rj;
- secp256k1_ge Ra;
- secp256k1_fe Rx;
- secp256k1_scalar h, s;
- unsigned char hh[32];
- int overflow;
-
- hash(hh, sig64, msg32);
- overflow = 0;
- secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&h, hh, &overflow);
- if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&h)) {
- return 0;
- }
- overflow = 0;
- secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&s, sig64 + 32, &overflow);
- if (overflow) {
- return 0;
- }
- if (!secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&Rx, sig64)) {
- return 0;
- }
- if (!secp256k1_ge_set_xo_var(&Ra, &Rx, 0)) {
- return 0;
- }
- secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&Rj, &Ra);
- secp256k1_scalar_inverse_var(&h, &h);
- secp256k1_scalar_negate(&s, &s);
- secp256k1_scalar_mul(&s, &s, &h);
- secp256k1_ecmult(ctx, &Qj, &Rj, &h, &s);
- if (secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&Qj)) {
- return 0;
- }
- secp256k1_ge_set_gej(pubkey, &Qj);
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int secp256k1_schnorr_sig_combine(unsigned char *sig64, size_t n, const unsigned char * const *sig64ins) {
- secp256k1_scalar s = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
- size_t i;
- for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
- secp256k1_scalar si;
- int overflow;
- secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&si, sig64ins[i] + 32, &overflow);
- if (overflow) {
- return -1;
- }
- if (i) {
- if (memcmp(sig64ins[i - 1], sig64ins[i], 32) != 0) {
- return -1;
- }
- }
- secp256k1_scalar_add(&s, &s, &si);
- }
- if (secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&s)) {
- return 0;
- }
- memcpy(sig64, sig64ins[0], 32);
- secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(sig64 + 32, &s);
- secp256k1_scalar_clear(&s);
- return 1;
-}
-
-#endif
diff --git a/src/modules/schnorr/tests_impl.h b/src/modules/schnorr/tests_impl.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 5bd14a03e3..0000000000
--- a/src/modules/schnorr/tests_impl.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,175 +0,0 @@
-/**********************************************************************
- * Copyright (c) 2014-2015 Pieter Wuille *
- * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying *
- * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.*
- **********************************************************************/
-
-#ifndef SECP256K1_MODULE_SCHNORR_TESTS
-#define SECP256K1_MODULE_SCHNORR_TESTS
-
-#include "include/secp256k1_schnorr.h"
-
-void test_schnorr_end_to_end(void) {
- unsigned char privkey[32];
- unsigned char message[32];
- unsigned char schnorr_signature[64];
- secp256k1_pubkey pubkey, recpubkey;
-
- /* Generate a random key and message. */
- {
- secp256k1_scalar key;
- random_scalar_order_test(&key);
- secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(privkey, &key);
- secp256k1_rand256_test(message);
- }
-
- /* Construct and verify corresponding public key. */
- CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, privkey) == 1);
- CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pubkey, privkey) == 1);
-
- /* Schnorr sign. */
- CHECK(secp256k1_schnorr_sign(ctx, schnorr_signature, message, privkey, NULL, NULL) == 1);
- CHECK(secp256k1_schnorr_verify(ctx, schnorr_signature, message, &pubkey) == 1);
- CHECK(secp256k1_schnorr_recover(ctx, &recpubkey, schnorr_signature, message) == 1);
- CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, &recpubkey, sizeof(pubkey)) == 0);
- /* Destroy signature and verify again. */
- schnorr_signature[secp256k1_rand_bits(6)] += 1 + secp256k1_rand_int(255);
- CHECK(secp256k1_schnorr_verify(ctx, schnorr_signature, message, &pubkey) == 0);
- CHECK(secp256k1_schnorr_recover(ctx, &recpubkey, schnorr_signature, message) != 1 ||
- memcmp(&pubkey, &recpubkey, sizeof(pubkey)) != 0);
-}
-
-/** Horribly broken hash function. Do not use for anything but tests. */
-void test_schnorr_hash(unsigned char *h32, const unsigned char *r32, const unsigned char *msg32) {
- int i;
- for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
- h32[i] = r32[i] ^ msg32[i];
- }
-}
-
-void test_schnorr_sign_verify(void) {
- unsigned char msg32[32];
- unsigned char sig64[3][64];
- secp256k1_gej pubkeyj[3];
- secp256k1_ge pubkey[3];
- secp256k1_scalar nonce[3], key[3];
- int i = 0;
- int k;
-
- secp256k1_rand256_test(msg32);
-
- for (k = 0; k < 3; k++) {
- random_scalar_order_test(&key[k]);
-
- do {
- random_scalar_order_test(&nonce[k]);
- if (secp256k1_schnorr_sig_sign(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, sig64[k], &key[k], &nonce[k], NULL, &test_schnorr_hash, msg32)) {
- break;
- }
- } while(1);
-
- secp256k1_ecmult_gen(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &pubkeyj[k], &key[k]);
- secp256k1_ge_set_gej_var(&pubkey[k], &pubkeyj[k]);
- CHECK(secp256k1_schnorr_sig_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, sig64[k], &pubkey[k], &test_schnorr_hash, msg32));
-
- for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
- int pos = secp256k1_rand_bits(6);
- int mod = 1 + secp256k1_rand_int(255);
- sig64[k][pos] ^= mod;
- CHECK(secp256k1_schnorr_sig_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, sig64[k], &pubkey[k], &test_schnorr_hash, msg32) == 0);
- sig64[k][pos] ^= mod;
- }
- }
-}
-
-void test_schnorr_threshold(void) {
- unsigned char msg[32];
- unsigned char sec[5][32];
- secp256k1_pubkey pub[5];
- unsigned char nonce[5][32];
- secp256k1_pubkey pubnonce[5];
- unsigned char sig[5][64];
- const unsigned char* sigs[5];
- unsigned char allsig[64];
- const secp256k1_pubkey* pubs[5];
- secp256k1_pubkey allpub;
- int n, i;
- int damage;
- int ret = 0;
-
- damage = secp256k1_rand_bits(1) ? (1 + secp256k1_rand_int(4)) : 0;
- secp256k1_rand256_test(msg);
- n = 2 + secp256k1_rand_int(4);
- for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
- do {
- secp256k1_rand256_test(sec[i]);
- } while (!secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, sec[i]));
- CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pub[i], sec[i]));
- CHECK(secp256k1_schnorr_generate_nonce_pair(ctx, &pubnonce[i], nonce[i], msg, sec[i], NULL, NULL));
- pubs[i] = &pub[i];
- }
- if (damage == 1) {
- nonce[secp256k1_rand_int(n)][secp256k1_rand_int(32)] ^= 1 + secp256k1_rand_int(255);
- } else if (damage == 2) {
- sec[secp256k1_rand_int(n)][secp256k1_rand_int(32)] ^= 1 + secp256k1_rand_int(255);
- }
- for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
- secp256k1_pubkey allpubnonce;
- const secp256k1_pubkey *pubnonces[4];
- int j;
- for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
- pubnonces[j] = &pubnonce[j];
- }
- for (j = i + 1; j < n; j++) {
- pubnonces[j - 1] = &pubnonce[j];
- }
- CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_combine(ctx, &allpubnonce, pubnonces, n - 1));
- ret |= (secp256k1_schnorr_partial_sign(ctx, sig[i], msg, sec[i], &allpubnonce, nonce[i]) != 1) * 1;
- sigs[i] = sig[i];
- }
- if (damage == 3) {
- sig[secp256k1_rand_int(n)][secp256k1_rand_bits(6)] ^= 1 + secp256k1_rand_int(255);
- }
- ret |= (secp256k1_ec_pubkey_combine(ctx, &allpub, pubs, n) != 1) * 2;
- if ((ret & 1) == 0) {
- ret |= (secp256k1_schnorr_partial_combine(ctx, allsig, sigs, n) != 1) * 4;
- }
- if (damage == 4) {
- allsig[secp256k1_rand_int(32)] ^= 1 + secp256k1_rand_int(255);
- }
- if ((ret & 7) == 0) {
- ret |= (secp256k1_schnorr_verify(ctx, allsig, msg, &allpub) != 1) * 8;
- }
- CHECK((ret == 0) == (damage == 0));
-}
-
-void test_schnorr_recovery(void) {
- unsigned char msg32[32];
- unsigned char sig64[64];
- secp256k1_ge Q;
-
- secp256k1_rand256_test(msg32);
- secp256k1_rand256_test(sig64);
- secp256k1_rand256_test(sig64 + 32);
- if (secp256k1_schnorr_sig_recover(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, sig64, &Q, &test_schnorr_hash, msg32) == 1) {
- CHECK(secp256k1_schnorr_sig_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, sig64, &Q, &test_schnorr_hash, msg32) == 1);
- }
-}
-
-void run_schnorr_tests(void) {
- int i;
- for (i = 0; i < 32*count; i++) {
- test_schnorr_end_to_end();
- }
- for (i = 0; i < 32 * count; i++) {
- test_schnorr_sign_verify();
- }
- for (i = 0; i < 16 * count; i++) {
- test_schnorr_recovery();
- }
- for (i = 0; i < 10 * count; i++) {
- test_schnorr_threshold();
- }
-}
-
-#endif
diff --git a/src/scalar.h b/src/scalar.h
index b590ccd6dd..27e9d8375e 100644
--- a/src/scalar.h
+++ b/src/scalar.h
@@ -13,7 +13,9 @@
#include "libsecp256k1-config.h"
#endif
-#if defined(USE_SCALAR_4X64)
+#if defined(EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER)
+#include "scalar_low.h"
+#elif defined(USE_SCALAR_4X64)
#include "scalar_4x64.h"
#elif defined(USE_SCALAR_8X32)
#include "scalar_8x32.h"
diff --git a/src/scalar_4x64_impl.h b/src/scalar_4x64_impl.h
index aa2703dd23..56e7bd82af 100644
--- a/src/scalar_4x64_impl.h
+++ b/src/scalar_4x64_impl.h
@@ -282,8 +282,8 @@ static void secp256k1_scalar_reduce_512(secp256k1_scalar *r, const uint64_t *l)
"movq 56(%%rsi), %%r14\n"
/* Initialize r8,r9,r10 */
"movq 0(%%rsi), %%r8\n"
- "movq $0, %%r9\n"
- "movq $0, %%r10\n"
+ "xorq %%r9, %%r9\n"
+ "xorq %%r10, %%r10\n"
/* (r8,r9) += n0 * c0 */
"movq %8, %%rax\n"
"mulq %%r11\n"
@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ static void secp256k1_scalar_reduce_512(secp256k1_scalar *r, const uint64_t *l)
"adcq %%rdx, %%r9\n"
/* extract m0 */
"movq %%r8, %q0\n"
- "movq $0, %%r8\n"
+ "xorq %%r8, %%r8\n"
/* (r9,r10) += l1 */
"addq 8(%%rsi), %%r9\n"
"adcq $0, %%r10\n"
@@ -309,7 +309,7 @@ static void secp256k1_scalar_reduce_512(secp256k1_scalar *r, const uint64_t *l)
"adcq $0, %%r8\n"
/* extract m1 */
"movq %%r9, %q1\n"
- "movq $0, %%r9\n"
+ "xorq %%r9, %%r9\n"
/* (r10,r8,r9) += l2 */
"addq 16(%%rsi), %%r10\n"
"adcq $0, %%r8\n"
@@ -332,7 +332,7 @@ static void secp256k1_scalar_reduce_512(secp256k1_scalar *r, const uint64_t *l)
"adcq $0, %%r9\n"
/* extract m2 */
"movq %%r10, %q2\n"
- "movq $0, %%r10\n"
+ "xorq %%r10, %%r10\n"
/* (r8,r9,r10) += l3 */
"addq 24(%%rsi), %%r8\n"
"adcq $0, %%r9\n"
@@ -355,7 +355,7 @@ static void secp256k1_scalar_reduce_512(secp256k1_scalar *r, const uint64_t *l)
"adcq $0, %%r10\n"
/* extract m3 */
"movq %%r8, %q3\n"
- "movq $0, %%r8\n"
+ "xorq %%r8, %%r8\n"
/* (r9,r10,r8) += n3 * c1 */
"movq %9, %%rax\n"
"mulq %%r14\n"
@@ -387,8 +387,8 @@ static void secp256k1_scalar_reduce_512(secp256k1_scalar *r, const uint64_t *l)
"movq %q11, %%r13\n"
/* Initialize (r8,r9,r10) */
"movq %q5, %%r8\n"
- "movq $0, %%r9\n"
- "movq $0, %%r10\n"
+ "xorq %%r9, %%r9\n"
+ "xorq %%r10, %%r10\n"
/* (r8,r9) += m4 * c0 */
"movq %12, %%rax\n"
"mulq %%r11\n"
@@ -396,7 +396,7 @@ static void secp256k1_scalar_reduce_512(secp256k1_scalar *r, const uint64_t *l)
"adcq %%rdx, %%r9\n"
/* extract p0 */
"movq %%r8, %q0\n"
- "movq $0, %%r8\n"
+ "xorq %%r8, %%r8\n"
/* (r9,r10) += m1 */
"addq %q6, %%r9\n"
"adcq $0, %%r10\n"
@@ -414,7 +414,7 @@ static void secp256k1_scalar_reduce_512(secp256k1_scalar *r, const uint64_t *l)
"adcq $0, %%r8\n"
/* extract p1 */
"movq %%r9, %q1\n"
- "movq $0, %%r9\n"
+ "xorq %%r9, %%r9\n"
/* (r10,r8,r9) += m2 */
"addq %q7, %%r10\n"
"adcq $0, %%r8\n"
@@ -472,7 +472,7 @@ static void secp256k1_scalar_reduce_512(secp256k1_scalar *r, const uint64_t *l)
"movq %%rax, 0(%q6)\n"
/* Move to (r8,r9) */
"movq %%rdx, %%r8\n"
- "movq $0, %%r9\n"
+ "xorq %%r9, %%r9\n"
/* (r8,r9) += p1 */
"addq %q2, %%r8\n"
"adcq $0, %%r9\n"
@@ -483,7 +483,7 @@ static void secp256k1_scalar_reduce_512(secp256k1_scalar *r, const uint64_t *l)
"adcq %%rdx, %%r9\n"
/* Extract r1 */
"movq %%r8, 8(%q6)\n"
- "movq $0, %%r8\n"
+ "xorq %%r8, %%r8\n"
/* (r9,r8) += p4 */
"addq %%r10, %%r9\n"
"adcq $0, %%r8\n"
@@ -492,7 +492,7 @@ static void secp256k1_scalar_reduce_512(secp256k1_scalar *r, const uint64_t *l)
"adcq $0, %%r8\n"
/* Extract r2 */
"movq %%r9, 16(%q6)\n"
- "movq $0, %%r9\n"
+ "xorq %%r9, %%r9\n"
/* (r8,r9) += p3 */
"addq %q4, %%r8\n"
"adcq $0, %%r9\n"
diff --git a/src/scalar_impl.h b/src/scalar_impl.h
index c5baf4df41..f5b2376407 100644
--- a/src/scalar_impl.h
+++ b/src/scalar_impl.h
@@ -14,7 +14,9 @@
#include "libsecp256k1-config.h"
#endif
-#if defined(USE_SCALAR_4X64)
+#if defined(EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER)
+#include "scalar_low_impl.h"
+#elif defined(USE_SCALAR_4X64)
#include "scalar_4x64_impl.h"
#elif defined(USE_SCALAR_8X32)
#include "scalar_8x32_impl.h"
@@ -31,17 +33,37 @@ static void secp256k1_scalar_get_num(secp256k1_num *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a
/** secp256k1 curve order, see secp256k1_ecdsa_const_order_as_fe in ecdsa_impl.h */
static void secp256k1_scalar_order_get_num(secp256k1_num *r) {
+#if defined(EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER)
+ static const unsigned char order[32] = {
+ 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,
+ 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,
+ 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,
+ 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER
+ };
+#else
static const unsigned char order[32] = {
0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,
0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFE,
0xBA,0xAE,0xDC,0xE6,0xAF,0x48,0xA0,0x3B,
0xBF,0xD2,0x5E,0x8C,0xD0,0x36,0x41,0x41
};
+#endif
secp256k1_num_set_bin(r, order, 32);
}
#endif
static void secp256k1_scalar_inverse(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *x) {
+#if defined(EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER)
+ int i;
+ *r = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; i++)
+ if ((i * *x) % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER == 1)
+ *r = i;
+ /* If this VERIFY_CHECK triggers we were given a noninvertible scalar (and thus
+ * have a composite group order; fix it in exhaustive_tests.c). */
+ VERIFY_CHECK(*r != 0);
+}
+#else
secp256k1_scalar *t;
int i;
/* First compute x ^ (2^N - 1) for some values of N. */
@@ -233,9 +255,9 @@ static void secp256k1_scalar_inverse(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar
}
SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_scalar_is_even(const secp256k1_scalar *a) {
- /* d[0] is present and is the lowest word for all representations */
return !(a->d[0] & 1);
}
+#endif
static void secp256k1_scalar_inverse_var(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *x) {
#if defined(USE_SCALAR_INV_BUILTIN)
@@ -259,6 +281,18 @@ static void secp256k1_scalar_inverse_var(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_sc
}
#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM
+#if defined(EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER)
+/**
+ * Find k1 and k2 given k, such that k1 + k2 * lambda == k mod n; unlike in the
+ * full case we don't bother making k1 and k2 be small, we just want them to be
+ * nontrivial to get full test coverage for the exhaustive tests. We therefore
+ * (arbitrarily) set k2 = k + 5 and k1 = k - k2 * lambda.
+ */
+static void secp256k1_scalar_split_lambda(secp256k1_scalar *r1, secp256k1_scalar *r2, const secp256k1_scalar *a) {
+ *r2 = (*a + 5) % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER;
+ *r1 = (*a + (EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER - *r2) * EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_LAMBDA) % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER;
+}
+#else
/**
* The Secp256k1 curve has an endomorphism, where lambda * (x, y) = (beta * x, y), where
* lambda is {0x53,0x63,0xad,0x4c,0xc0,0x5c,0x30,0xe0,0xa5,0x26,0x1c,0x02,0x88,0x12,0x64,0x5a,
@@ -331,5 +365,6 @@ static void secp256k1_scalar_split_lambda(secp256k1_scalar *r1, secp256k1_scalar
secp256k1_scalar_add(r1, r1, a);
}
#endif
+#endif
#endif
diff --git a/src/scalar_low.h b/src/scalar_low.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5574c44c7a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/scalar_low.h
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+/**********************************************************************
+ * Copyright (c) 2015 Andrew Poelstra *
+ * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying *
+ * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.*
+ **********************************************************************/
+
+#ifndef _SECP256K1_SCALAR_REPR_
+#define _SECP256K1_SCALAR_REPR_
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+/** A scalar modulo the group order of the secp256k1 curve. */
+typedef uint32_t secp256k1_scalar;
+
+#endif
diff --git a/src/scalar_low_impl.h b/src/scalar_low_impl.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4f94441f49
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/scalar_low_impl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+/**********************************************************************
+ * Copyright (c) 2015 Andrew Poelstra *
+ * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying *
+ * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.*
+ **********************************************************************/
+
+#ifndef _SECP256K1_SCALAR_REPR_IMPL_H_
+#define _SECP256K1_SCALAR_REPR_IMPL_H_
+
+#include "scalar.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_scalar_is_even(const secp256k1_scalar *a) {
+ return !(*a & 1);
+}
+
+SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_scalar_clear(secp256k1_scalar *r) { *r = 0; }
+SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_scalar_set_int(secp256k1_scalar *r, unsigned int v) { *r = v; }
+
+SECP256K1_INLINE static unsigned int secp256k1_scalar_get_bits(const secp256k1_scalar *a, unsigned int offset, unsigned int count) {
+ if (offset < 32)
+ return ((*a >> offset) & ((((uint32_t)1) << count) - 1));
+ else
+ return 0;
+}
+
+SECP256K1_INLINE static unsigned int secp256k1_scalar_get_bits_var(const secp256k1_scalar *a, unsigned int offset, unsigned int count) {
+ return secp256k1_scalar_get_bits(a, offset, count);
+}
+
+SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_scalar_check_overflow(const secp256k1_scalar *a) { return *a >= EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; }
+
+static int secp256k1_scalar_add(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a, const secp256k1_scalar *b) {
+ *r = (*a + *b) % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER;
+ return *r < *b;
+}
+
+static void secp256k1_scalar_cadd_bit(secp256k1_scalar *r, unsigned int bit, int flag) {
+ if (flag && bit < 32)
+ *r += (1 << bit);
+#ifdef VERIFY
+ VERIFY_CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_check_overflow(r) == 0);
+#endif
+}
+
+static void secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(secp256k1_scalar *r, const unsigned char *b32, int *overflow) {
+ const int base = 0x100 % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER;
+ int i;
+ *r = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
+ *r = ((*r * base) + b32[i]) % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER;
+ }
+ /* just deny overflow, it basically always happens */
+ if (overflow) *overflow = 0;
+}
+
+static void secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(unsigned char *bin, const secp256k1_scalar* a) {
+ memset(bin, 0, 32);
+ bin[28] = *a >> 24; bin[29] = *a >> 16; bin[30] = *a >> 8; bin[31] = *a;
+}
+
+SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(const secp256k1_scalar *a) {
+ return *a == 0;
+}
+
+static void secp256k1_scalar_negate(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a) {
+ if (*a == 0) {
+ *r = 0;
+ } else {
+ *r = EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER - *a;
+ }
+}
+
+SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_scalar_is_one(const secp256k1_scalar *a) {
+ return *a == 1;
+}
+
+static int secp256k1_scalar_is_high(const secp256k1_scalar *a) {
+ return *a > EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER / 2;
+}
+
+static int secp256k1_scalar_cond_negate(secp256k1_scalar *r, int flag) {
+ if (flag) secp256k1_scalar_negate(r, r);
+ return flag ? -1 : 1;
+}
+
+static void secp256k1_scalar_mul(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a, const secp256k1_scalar *b) {
+ *r = (*a * *b) % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER;
+}
+
+static int secp256k1_scalar_shr_int(secp256k1_scalar *r, int n) {
+ int ret;
+ VERIFY_CHECK(n > 0);
+ VERIFY_CHECK(n < 16);
+ ret = *r & ((1 << n) - 1);
+ *r >>= n;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void secp256k1_scalar_sqr(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a) {
+ *r = (*a * *a) % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER;
+}
+
+static void secp256k1_scalar_split_128(secp256k1_scalar *r1, secp256k1_scalar *r2, const secp256k1_scalar *a) {
+ *r1 = *a;
+ *r2 = 0;
+}
+
+SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_scalar_eq(const secp256k1_scalar *a, const secp256k1_scalar *b) {
+ return *a == *b;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/src/secp256k1.c b/src/secp256k1.c
index 7973d60c36..fb8b882faa 100644..100755
--- a/src/secp256k1.c
+++ b/src/secp256k1.c
@@ -359,16 +359,15 @@ int secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_ecdsa_signature
secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&sec, seckey, &overflow);
/* Fail if the secret key is invalid. */
if (!overflow && !secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&sec)) {
+ unsigned char nonce32[32];
unsigned int count = 0;
secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&msg, msg32, NULL);
while (1) {
- unsigned char nonce32[32];
ret = noncefp(nonce32, msg32, seckey, NULL, (void*)noncedata, count);
if (!ret) {
break;
}
secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&non, nonce32, &overflow);
- memset(nonce32, 0, 32);
if (!overflow && !secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&non)) {
if (secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_sign(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &r, &s, &sec, &msg, &non, NULL)) {
break;
@@ -376,6 +375,7 @@ int secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_ecdsa_signature
}
count++;
}
+ memset(nonce32, 0, 32);
secp256k1_scalar_clear(&msg);
secp256k1_scalar_clear(&non);
secp256k1_scalar_clear(&sec);
diff --git a/src/tests.c b/src/tests.c
index b32cb90813..9ae7d30281 100644
--- a/src/tests.c
+++ b/src/tests.c
@@ -520,7 +520,7 @@ void test_num_mod(void) {
secp256k1_num order, n;
/* check that 0 mod anything is 0 */
- random_scalar_order_test(&s);
+ random_scalar_order_test(&s);
secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&order, &s);
secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&s, 0);
secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&n, &s);
@@ -535,7 +535,7 @@ void test_num_mod(void) {
CHECK(secp256k1_num_is_zero(&n));
/* check that increasing the number past 2^256 does not break this */
- random_scalar_order_test(&s);
+ random_scalar_order_test(&s);
secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&n, &s);
/* multiply by 2^8, which'll test this case with high probability */
for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i) {
@@ -568,7 +568,7 @@ void test_num_jacobi(void) {
/* we first need a scalar which is not a multiple of 5 */
do {
secp256k1_num fiven;
- random_scalar_order_test(&sqr);
+ random_scalar_order_test(&sqr);
secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&fiven, &five);
secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&n, &sqr);
secp256k1_num_mod(&n, &fiven);
@@ -587,7 +587,7 @@ void test_num_jacobi(void) {
/** test with secp group order as order */
secp256k1_scalar_order_get_num(&order);
- random_scalar_order_test(&sqr);
+ random_scalar_order_test(&sqr);
secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&sqr, &sqr);
/* test residue */
secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&n, &sqr);
@@ -1733,18 +1733,18 @@ void run_field_inv_all_var(void) {
secp256k1_fe x[16], xi[16], xii[16];
int i;
/* Check it's safe to call for 0 elements */
- secp256k1_fe_inv_all_var(0, xi, x);
+ secp256k1_fe_inv_all_var(xi, x, 0);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
size_t j;
size_t len = secp256k1_rand_int(15) + 1;
for (j = 0; j < len; j++) {
random_fe_non_zero(&x[j]);
}
- secp256k1_fe_inv_all_var(len, xi, x);
+ secp256k1_fe_inv_all_var(xi, x, len);
for (j = 0; j < len; j++) {
CHECK(check_fe_inverse(&x[j], &xi[j]));
}
- secp256k1_fe_inv_all_var(len, xii, xi);
+ secp256k1_fe_inv_all_var(xii, xi, len);
for (j = 0; j < len; j++) {
CHECK(check_fe_equal(&x[j], &xii[j]));
}
@@ -1930,7 +1930,7 @@ void test_ge(void) {
zs[i] = gej[i].z;
}
}
- secp256k1_fe_inv_all_var(4 * runs + 1, zinv, zs);
+ secp256k1_fe_inv_all_var(zinv, zs, 4 * runs + 1);
free(zs);
}
@@ -2050,8 +2050,8 @@ void test_ge(void) {
secp256k1_fe_mul(&zr[i + 1], &zinv[i], &gej[i + 1].z);
}
}
- secp256k1_ge_set_table_gej_var(4 * runs + 1, ge_set_table, gej, zr);
- secp256k1_ge_set_all_gej_var(4 * runs + 1, ge_set_all, gej, &ctx->error_callback);
+ secp256k1_ge_set_table_gej_var(ge_set_table, gej, zr, 4 * runs + 1);
+ secp256k1_ge_set_all_gej_var(ge_set_all, gej, 4 * runs + 1, &ctx->error_callback);
for (i = 0; i < 4 * runs + 1; i++) {
secp256k1_fe s;
random_fe_non_zero(&s);
diff --git a/src/tests_exhaustive.c b/src/tests_exhaustive.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..bda6ee475c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/tests_exhaustive.c
@@ -0,0 +1,329 @@
+/***********************************************************************
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Andrew Poelstra *
+ * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying *
+ * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.*
+ **********************************************************************/
+
+#if defined HAVE_CONFIG_H
+#include "libsecp256k1-config.h"
+#endif
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#include <time.h>
+
+#undef USE_ECMULT_STATIC_PRECOMPUTATION
+
+#ifndef EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER
+/* see group_impl.h for allowable values */
+#define EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER 13
+#define EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_LAMBDA 9 /* cube root of 1 mod 13 */
+#endif
+
+#include "include/secp256k1.h"
+#include "group.h"
+#include "secp256k1.c"
+#include "testrand_impl.h"
+
+/** stolen from tests.c */
+void ge_equals_ge(const secp256k1_ge *a, const secp256k1_ge *b) {
+ CHECK(a->infinity == b->infinity);
+ if (a->infinity) {
+ return;
+ }
+ CHECK(secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&a->x, &b->x));
+ CHECK(secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&a->y, &b->y));
+}
+
+void ge_equals_gej(const secp256k1_ge *a, const secp256k1_gej *b) {
+ secp256k1_fe z2s;
+ secp256k1_fe u1, u2, s1, s2;
+ CHECK(a->infinity == b->infinity);
+ if (a->infinity) {
+ return;
+ }
+ /* Check a.x * b.z^2 == b.x && a.y * b.z^3 == b.y, to avoid inverses. */
+ secp256k1_fe_sqr(&z2s, &b->z);
+ secp256k1_fe_mul(&u1, &a->x, &z2s);
+ u2 = b->x; secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&u2);
+ secp256k1_fe_mul(&s1, &a->y, &z2s); secp256k1_fe_mul(&s1, &s1, &b->z);
+ s2 = b->y; secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&s2);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&u1, &u2));
+ CHECK(secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&s1, &s2));
+}
+
+void random_fe(secp256k1_fe *x) {
+ unsigned char bin[32];
+ do {
+ secp256k1_rand256(bin);
+ if (secp256k1_fe_set_b32(x, bin)) {
+ return;
+ }
+ } while(1);
+}
+/** END stolen from tests.c */
+
+int secp256k1_nonce_function_smallint(unsigned char *nonce32, const unsigned char *msg32,
+ const unsigned char *key32, const unsigned char *algo16,
+ void *data, unsigned int attempt) {
+ secp256k1_scalar s;
+ int *idata = data;
+ (void)msg32;
+ (void)key32;
+ (void)algo16;
+ /* Some nonces cannot be used because they'd cause s and/or r to be zero.
+ * The signing function has retry logic here that just re-calls the nonce
+ * function with an increased `attempt`. So if attempt > 0 this means we
+ * need to change the nonce to avoid an infinite loop. */
+ if (attempt > 0) {
+ (*idata)++;
+ }
+ secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&s, *idata);
+ secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(nonce32, &s);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM
+void test_exhaustive_endomorphism(const secp256k1_ge *group, int order) {
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < order; i++) {
+ secp256k1_ge res;
+ secp256k1_ge_mul_lambda(&res, &group[i]);
+ ge_equals_ge(&group[i * EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_LAMBDA % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER], &res);
+ }
+}
+#endif
+
+void test_exhaustive_addition(const secp256k1_ge *group, const secp256k1_gej *groupj, int order) {
+ int i, j;
+
+ /* Sanity-check (and check infinity functions) */
+ CHECK(secp256k1_ge_is_infinity(&group[0]));
+ CHECK(secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&groupj[0]));
+ for (i = 1; i < order; i++) {
+ CHECK(!secp256k1_ge_is_infinity(&group[i]));
+ CHECK(!secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&groupj[i]));
+ }
+
+ /* Check all addition formulae */
+ for (j = 0; j < order; j++) {
+ secp256k1_fe fe_inv;
+ secp256k1_fe_inv(&fe_inv, &groupj[j].z);
+ for (i = 0; i < order; i++) {
+ secp256k1_ge zless_gej;
+ secp256k1_gej tmp;
+ /* add_var */
+ secp256k1_gej_add_var(&tmp, &groupj[i], &groupj[j], NULL);
+ ge_equals_gej(&group[(i + j) % order], &tmp);
+ /* add_ge */
+ if (j > 0) {
+ secp256k1_gej_add_ge(&tmp, &groupj[i], &group[j]);
+ ge_equals_gej(&group[(i + j) % order], &tmp);
+ }
+ /* add_ge_var */
+ secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&tmp, &groupj[i], &group[j], NULL);
+ ge_equals_gej(&group[(i + j) % order], &tmp);
+ /* add_zinv_var */
+ zless_gej.infinity = groupj[j].infinity;
+ zless_gej.x = groupj[j].x;
+ zless_gej.y = groupj[j].y;
+ secp256k1_gej_add_zinv_var(&tmp, &groupj[i], &zless_gej, &fe_inv);
+ ge_equals_gej(&group[(i + j) % order], &tmp);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Check doubling */
+ for (i = 0; i < order; i++) {
+ secp256k1_gej tmp;
+ if (i > 0) {
+ secp256k1_gej_double_nonzero(&tmp, &groupj[i], NULL);
+ ge_equals_gej(&group[(2 * i) % order], &tmp);
+ }
+ secp256k1_gej_double_var(&tmp, &groupj[i], NULL);
+ ge_equals_gej(&group[(2 * i) % order], &tmp);
+ }
+
+ /* Check negation */
+ for (i = 1; i < order; i++) {
+ secp256k1_ge tmp;
+ secp256k1_gej tmpj;
+ secp256k1_ge_neg(&tmp, &group[i]);
+ ge_equals_ge(&group[order - i], &tmp);
+ secp256k1_gej_neg(&tmpj, &groupj[i]);
+ ge_equals_gej(&group[order - i], &tmpj);
+ }
+}
+
+void test_exhaustive_ecmult(const secp256k1_context *ctx, const secp256k1_ge *group, const secp256k1_gej *groupj, int order) {
+ int i, j, r_log;
+ for (r_log = 1; r_log < order; r_log++) {
+ for (j = 0; j < order; j++) {
+ for (i = 0; i < order; i++) {
+ secp256k1_gej tmp;
+ secp256k1_scalar na, ng;
+ secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&na, i);
+ secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&ng, j);
+
+ secp256k1_ecmult(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &tmp, &groupj[r_log], &na, &ng);
+ ge_equals_gej(&group[(i * r_log + j) % order], &tmp);
+
+ if (i > 0) {
+ secp256k1_ecmult_const(&tmp, &group[i], &ng);
+ ge_equals_gej(&group[(i * j) % order], &tmp);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+void r_from_k(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_ge *group, int k) {
+ secp256k1_fe x;
+ unsigned char x_bin[32];
+ k %= EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER;
+ x = group[k].x;
+ secp256k1_fe_normalize(&x);
+ secp256k1_fe_get_b32(x_bin, &x);
+ secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(r, x_bin, NULL);
+}
+
+void test_exhaustive_verify(const secp256k1_context *ctx, const secp256k1_ge *group, int order) {
+ int s, r, msg, key;
+ for (s = 1; s < order; s++) {
+ for (r = 1; r < order; r++) {
+ for (msg = 1; msg < order; msg++) {
+ for (key = 1; key < order; key++) {
+ secp256k1_ge nonconst_ge;
+ secp256k1_ecdsa_signature sig;
+ secp256k1_pubkey pk;
+ secp256k1_scalar sk_s, msg_s, r_s, s_s;
+ secp256k1_scalar s_times_k_s, msg_plus_r_times_sk_s;
+ int k, should_verify;
+ unsigned char msg32[32];
+
+ secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&s_s, s);
+ secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&r_s, r);
+ secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&msg_s, msg);
+ secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&sk_s, key);
+
+ /* Verify by hand */
+ /* Run through every k value that gives us this r and check that *one* works.
+ * Note there could be none, there could be multiple, ECDSA is weird. */
+ should_verify = 0;
+ for (k = 0; k < order; k++) {
+ secp256k1_scalar check_x_s;
+ r_from_k(&check_x_s, group, k);
+ if (r_s == check_x_s) {
+ secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&s_times_k_s, k);
+ secp256k1_scalar_mul(&s_times_k_s, &s_times_k_s, &s_s);
+ secp256k1_scalar_mul(&msg_plus_r_times_sk_s, &r_s, &sk_s);
+ secp256k1_scalar_add(&msg_plus_r_times_sk_s, &msg_plus_r_times_sk_s, &msg_s);
+ should_verify |= secp256k1_scalar_eq(&s_times_k_s, &msg_plus_r_times_sk_s);
+ }
+ }
+ /* nb we have a "high s" rule */
+ should_verify &= !secp256k1_scalar_is_high(&s_s);
+
+ /* Verify by calling verify */
+ secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_save(&sig, &r_s, &s_s);
+ memcpy(&nonconst_ge, &group[sk_s], sizeof(nonconst_ge));
+ secp256k1_pubkey_save(&pk, &nonconst_ge);
+ secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(msg32, &msg_s);
+ CHECK(should_verify ==
+ secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &sig, msg32, &pk));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+void test_exhaustive_sign(const secp256k1_context *ctx, const secp256k1_ge *group, int order) {
+ int i, j, k;
+
+ /* Loop */
+ for (i = 1; i < order; i++) { /* message */
+ for (j = 1; j < order; j++) { /* key */
+ for (k = 1; k < order; k++) { /* nonce */
+ secp256k1_ecdsa_signature sig;
+ secp256k1_scalar sk, msg, r, s, expected_r;
+ unsigned char sk32[32], msg32[32];
+ secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&msg, i);
+ secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&sk, j);
+ secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(sk32, &sk);
+ secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(msg32, &msg);
+
+ secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(ctx, &sig, msg32, sk32, secp256k1_nonce_function_smallint, &k);
+
+ secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_load(ctx, &r, &s, &sig);
+ /* Note that we compute expected_r *after* signing -- this is important
+ * because our nonce-computing function function might change k during
+ * signing. */
+ r_from_k(&expected_r, group, k);
+ CHECK(r == expected_r);
+ CHECK((k * s) % order == (i + r * j) % order ||
+ (k * (EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER - s)) % order == (i + r * j) % order);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* We would like to verify zero-knowledge here by counting how often every
+ * possible (s, r) tuple appears, but because the group order is larger
+ * than the field order, when coercing the x-values to scalar values, some
+ * appear more often than others, so we are actually not zero-knowledge.
+ * (This effect also appears in the real code, but the difference is on the
+ * order of 1/2^128th the field order, so the deviation is not useful to a
+ * computationally bounded attacker.)
+ */
+}
+
+int main(void) {
+ int i;
+ secp256k1_gej groupj[EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER];
+ secp256k1_ge group[EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER];
+
+ /* Build context */
+ secp256k1_context *ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN | SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY);
+
+ /* TODO set z = 1, then do num_tests runs with random z values */
+
+ /* Generate the entire group */
+ secp256k1_gej_set_infinity(&groupj[0]);
+ secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&group[0], &groupj[0]);
+ for (i = 1; i < EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; i++) {
+ /* Set a different random z-value for each Jacobian point */
+ secp256k1_fe z;
+ random_fe(&z);
+
+ secp256k1_gej_add_ge(&groupj[i], &groupj[i - 1], &secp256k1_ge_const_g);
+ secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&group[i], &groupj[i]);
+ secp256k1_gej_rescale(&groupj[i], &z);
+
+ /* Verify against ecmult_gen */
+ {
+ secp256k1_scalar scalar_i;
+ secp256k1_gej generatedj;
+ secp256k1_ge generated;
+
+ secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&scalar_i, i);
+ secp256k1_ecmult_gen(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &generatedj, &scalar_i);
+ secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&generated, &generatedj);
+
+ CHECK(group[i].infinity == 0);
+ CHECK(generated.infinity == 0);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&generated.x, &group[i].x));
+ CHECK(secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&generated.y, &group[i].y));
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Run the tests */
+#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM
+ test_exhaustive_endomorphism(group, EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER);
+#endif
+ test_exhaustive_addition(group, groupj, EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER);
+ test_exhaustive_ecmult(ctx, group, groupj, EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER);
+ test_exhaustive_sign(ctx, group, EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER);
+ test_exhaustive_verify(ctx, group, EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+