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-rw-r--r--src/Makefile.am1
-rw-r--r--src/compat/glibc_sanity.cpp19
-rw-r--r--src/compat/glibc_sanity_fdelt.cpp26
-rw-r--r--src/consensus/tx_check.cpp2
-rw-r--r--src/net_processing.cpp2
-rw-r--r--src/qt/bitcoinstrings.cpp2
-rw-r--r--src/qt/locale/bitcoin_en.ts297
-rw-r--r--src/rpc/rawtransaction.cpp62
-rw-r--r--src/script/interpreter.cpp4
-rw-r--r--src/test/data/script_tests.json7
-rw-r--r--src/test/merkle_tests.cpp100
-rw-r--r--src/validation.cpp848
12 files changed, 896 insertions, 474 deletions
diff --git a/src/Makefile.am b/src/Makefile.am
index 8fc7f61d4b..1ef62a656d 100644
--- a/src/Makefile.am
+++ b/src/Makefile.am
@@ -484,6 +484,7 @@ libbitcoin_util_a_SOURCES = \
support/lockedpool.cpp \
chainparamsbase.cpp \
clientversion.cpp \
+ compat/glibc_sanity_fdelt.cpp \
compat/glibc_sanity.cpp \
compat/glibcxx_sanity.cpp \
compat/strnlen.cpp \
diff --git a/src/compat/glibc_sanity.cpp b/src/compat/glibc_sanity.cpp
index 1ef66e27b4..cc74f28899 100644
--- a/src/compat/glibc_sanity.cpp
+++ b/src/compat/glibc_sanity.cpp
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2009-2018 The Bitcoin Core developers
+// Copyright (c) 2009-2019 The Bitcoin Core developers
// Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying
// file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
#include <cstddef>
#if defined(HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H)
-#include <sys/select.h>
+bool sanity_test_fdelt();
#endif
extern "C" void* memcpy(void* a, const void* b, size_t c);
@@ -41,21 +41,6 @@ bool sanity_test_memcpy()
}
return true;
}
-
-#if defined(HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H)
-// trigger: Call FD_SET to trigger __fdelt_chk. FORTIFY_SOURCE must be defined
-// as >0 and optimizations must be set to at least -O2.
-// test: Add a file descriptor to an empty fd_set. Verify that it has been
-// correctly added.
-bool sanity_test_fdelt()
-{
- fd_set fds;
- FD_ZERO(&fds);
- FD_SET(0, &fds);
- return FD_ISSET(0, &fds);
-}
-#endif
-
} // namespace
bool glibc_sanity_test()
diff --git a/src/compat/glibc_sanity_fdelt.cpp b/src/compat/glibc_sanity_fdelt.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..87140d0c71
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/compat/glibc_sanity_fdelt.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2009-2019 The Bitcoin Core developers
+// Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying
+// file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
+
+#if defined(HAVE_CONFIG_H)
+#include <config/bitcoin-config.h>
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H)
+#ifdef HAVE_CSTRING_DEPENDENT_FD_ZERO
+#include <cstring>
+#endif
+#include <sys/select.h>
+
+// trigger: Call FD_SET to trigger __fdelt_chk. FORTIFY_SOURCE must be defined
+// as >0 and optimizations must be set to at least -O2.
+// test: Add a file descriptor to an empty fd_set. Verify that it has been
+// correctly added.
+bool sanity_test_fdelt()
+{
+ fd_set fds;
+ FD_ZERO(&fds);
+ FD_SET(0, &fds);
+ return FD_ISSET(0, &fds);
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/src/consensus/tx_check.cpp b/src/consensus/tx_check.cpp
index 23ed3ecb53..00ebbbd1ab 100644
--- a/src/consensus/tx_check.cpp
+++ b/src/consensus/tx_check.cpp
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ bool CheckTransaction(const CTransaction& tx, CValidationState &state, bool fChe
if (::GetSerializeSize(tx, PROTOCOL_VERSION | SERIALIZE_TRANSACTION_NO_WITNESS) * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR > MAX_BLOCK_WEIGHT)
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-oversize");
- // Check for negative or overflow output values
+ // Check for negative or overflow output values (see CVE-2010-5139)
CAmount nValueOut = 0;
for (const auto& txout : tx.vout)
{
diff --git a/src/net_processing.cpp b/src/net_processing.cpp
index 93a98974eb..34d349e8e9 100644
--- a/src/net_processing.cpp
+++ b/src/net_processing.cpp
@@ -2559,7 +2559,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr
}
AddOrphanTx(ptx, pfrom->GetId());
- // DoS prevention: do not allow mapOrphanTransactions to grow unbounded
+ // DoS prevention: do not allow mapOrphanTransactions to grow unbounded (see CVE-2012-3789)
unsigned int nMaxOrphanTx = (unsigned int)std::max((int64_t)0, gArgs.GetArg("-maxorphantx", DEFAULT_MAX_ORPHAN_TRANSACTIONS));
unsigned int nEvicted = LimitOrphanTxSize(nMaxOrphanTx);
if (nEvicted > 0) {
diff --git a/src/qt/bitcoinstrings.cpp b/src/qt/bitcoinstrings.cpp
index 5cde21eec6..3d40ee7823 100644
--- a/src/qt/bitcoinstrings.cpp
+++ b/src/qt/bitcoinstrings.cpp
@@ -178,6 +178,8 @@ QT_TRANSLATE_NOOP("bitcoin-core", "Unable to generate initial keys"),
QT_TRANSLATE_NOOP("bitcoin-core", "Unable to generate keys"),
QT_TRANSLATE_NOOP("bitcoin-core", "Unable to start HTTP server. See debug log for details."),
QT_TRANSLATE_NOOP("bitcoin-core", "Unknown -blockfilterindex value %s."),
+QT_TRANSLATE_NOOP("bitcoin-core", "Unknown address type '%s'"),
+QT_TRANSLATE_NOOP("bitcoin-core", "Unknown change type '%s'"),
QT_TRANSLATE_NOOP("bitcoin-core", "Unknown network specified in -onlynet: '%s'"),
QT_TRANSLATE_NOOP("bitcoin-core", "Unsupported logging category %s=%s."),
QT_TRANSLATE_NOOP("bitcoin-core", "Upgrading UTXO database"),
diff --git a/src/qt/locale/bitcoin_en.ts b/src/qt/locale/bitcoin_en.ts
index 7864f97f31..7d9e7eab4e 100644
--- a/src/qt/locale/bitcoin_en.ts
+++ b/src/qt/locale/bitcoin_en.ts
@@ -171,16 +171,11 @@
</message>
<message>
<location line="+14"/>
- <source>Show password</source>
+ <source>Show passphrase</source>
<translation type="unfinished"></translation>
</message>
<message>
- <location filename="../askpassphrasedialog.cpp" line="+46"/>
- <source>Enter the new passphrase to the wallet.&lt;br/&gt;Please use a passphrase of &lt;b&gt;ten or more random characters&lt;/b&gt;, or &lt;b&gt;eight or more words&lt;/b&gt;.</source>
- <translation type="unfinished"></translation>
- </message>
- <message>
- <location line="+3"/>
+ <location filename="../askpassphrasedialog.cpp" line="+50"/>
<source>Encrypt wallet</source>
<translation type="unfinished"></translation>
</message>
@@ -210,12 +205,7 @@
<translation type="unfinished"></translation>
</message>
<message>
- <location line="+1"/>
- <source>Enter the old passphrase and new passphrase to the wallet.</source>
- <translation type="unfinished"></translation>
- </message>
- <message>
- <location line="+45"/>
+ <location line="+46"/>
<source>Confirm wallet encryption</source>
<translation type="unfinished"></translation>
</message>
@@ -230,36 +220,61 @@
<translation type="unfinished"></translation>
</message>
<message>
- <location line="+9"/>
- <location line="+58"/>
+ <location line="+19"/>
+ <location line="+57"/>
<source>Wallet encrypted</source>
<translation type="unfinished"></translation>
</message>
<message>
- <location line="-56"/>
- <source>Your wallet is now encrypted. Remember that encrypting your wallet cannot fully protect your bitcoins from being stolen by malware infecting your computer.</source>
+ <location line="-145"/>
+ <source>Enter the new passphrase for the wallet.&lt;br/&gt;Please use a passphrase of &lt;b&gt;ten or more random characters&lt;/b&gt;, or &lt;b&gt;eight or more words&lt;/b&gt;.</source>
+ <translation type="unfinished"></translation>
+ </message>
+ <message>
+ <location line="+23"/>
+ <source>Enter the old passphrase and new passphrase for the wallet.</source>
+ <translation type="unfinished"></translation>
+ </message>
+ <message>
+ <location line="+53"/>
+ <source>Remember that encrypting your wallet cannot fully protect your bitcoins from being stolen by malware infecting your computer.</source>
<translation type="unfinished"></translation>
</message>
<message>
<location line="+4"/>
+ <source>Wallet to be encrypted</source>
+ <translation type="unfinished"></translation>
+ </message>
+ <message>
+ <location line="+2"/>
+ <source>Your wallet is about to be encrypted. </source>
+ <translation type="unfinished"></translation>
+ </message>
+ <message>
+ <location line="+8"/>
+ <source>Your wallet is now encrypted. </source>
+ <translation type="unfinished"></translation>
+ </message>
+ <message>
+ <location line="+2"/>
<source>IMPORTANT: Any previous backups you have made of your wallet file should be replaced with the newly generated, encrypted wallet file. For security reasons, previous backups of the unencrypted wallet file will become useless as soon as you start using the new, encrypted wallet.</source>
<translation type="unfinished"></translation>
</message>
<message>
<location line="+8"/>
- <location line="+7"/>
+ <location line="+8"/>
<location line="+43"/>
<location line="+6"/>
<source>Wallet encryption failed</source>
<translation type="unfinished"></translation>
</message>
<message>
- <location line="-55"/>
+ <location line="-56"/>
<source>Wallet encryption failed due to an internal error. Your wallet was not encrypted.</source>
<translation type="unfinished"></translation>
</message>
<message>
- <location line="+7"/>
+ <location line="+8"/>
<location line="+49"/>
<source>The supplied passphrases do not match.</source>
<translation type="unfinished"></translation>
@@ -310,17 +325,17 @@
<context>
<name>BitcoinGUI</name>
<message>
- <location filename="../bitcoingui.cpp" line="+315"/>
+ <location filename="../bitcoingui.cpp" line="+316"/>
<source>Sign &amp;message...</source>
<translation>Sign &amp;message...</translation>
</message>
<message>
- <location line="+637"/>
+ <location line="+623"/>
<source>Synchronizing with network...</source>
<translation>Synchronizing with network...</translation>
</message>
<message>
- <location line="-715"/>
+ <location line="-701"/>
<source>&amp;Overview</source>
<translation>&amp;Overview</translation>
</message>
@@ -400,7 +415,17 @@
<translation type="unfinished"></translation>
</message>
<message>
- <location line="+216"/>
+ <location line="+11"/>
+ <source>Create Wallet...</source>
+ <translation type="unfinished"></translation>
+ </message>
+ <message>
+ <location line="+1"/>
+ <source>Create a new wallet</source>
+ <translation type="unfinished"></translation>
+ </message>
+ <message>
+ <location line="+190"/>
<source>Wallet:</source>
<translation type="unfinished"></translation>
</message>
@@ -435,7 +460,7 @@
<translation type="unfinished"></translation>
</message>
<message>
- <location line="-1035"/>
+ <location line="-1021"/>
<source>Send coins to a Bitcoin address</source>
<translation>Send coins to a Bitcoin address</translation>
</message>
@@ -500,17 +525,17 @@
<translation>Verify messages to ensure they were signed with specified Bitcoin addresses</translation>
</message>
<message>
- <location line="+117"/>
+ <location line="+110"/>
<source>&amp;File</source>
<translation>&amp;File</translation>
</message>
<message>
- <location line="+14"/>
+ <location line="+15"/>
<source>&amp;Settings</source>
<translation>&amp;Settings</translation>
</message>
<message>
- <location line="+66"/>
+ <location line="+58"/>
<source>&amp;Help</source>
<translation>&amp;Help</translation>
</message>
@@ -520,7 +545,7 @@
<translation>Tabs toolbar</translation>
</message>
<message>
- <location line="-270"/>
+ <location line="-256"/>
<source>Request payments (generates QR codes and bitcoin: URIs)</source>
<translation type="unfinished"></translation>
</message>
@@ -540,12 +565,12 @@
<translation type="unfinished"></translation>
</message>
<message>
- <location line="+10"/>
+ <location line="+13"/>
<source>&amp;Command-line options</source>
<translation type="unfinished"></translation>
</message>
<message numerus="yes">
- <location line="+539"/>
+ <location line="+522"/>
<source>%n active connection(s) to Bitcoin network</source>
<translation>
<numerusform>%n active connection to Bitcoin network</numerusform>
@@ -606,7 +631,7 @@
<translation>Up to date</translation>
</message>
<message>
- <location line="-656"/>
+ <location line="-642"/>
<source>&amp;Sending addresses</source>
<translation type="unfinished"></translation>
</message>
@@ -636,7 +661,7 @@
<translation type="unfinished"></translation>
</message>
<message>
- <location line="+4"/>
+ <location line="+7"/>
<source>Show the %1 help message to get a list with possible Bitcoin command-line options</source>
<translation type="unfinished"></translation>
</message>
@@ -646,22 +671,12 @@
<translation type="unfinished"></translation>
</message>
<message>
- <location line="+13"/>
- <source>Opening Wallet &lt;b&gt;%1&lt;/b&gt;...</source>
- <translation type="unfinished"></translation>
- </message>
- <message>
- <location line="+9"/>
- <source>Open Wallet Failed</source>
- <translation type="unfinished"></translation>
- </message>
- <message>
- <location line="+15"/>
+ <location line="+21"/>
<source>No wallets available</source>
<translation type="unfinished"></translation>
</message>
<message>
- <location line="+48"/>
+ <location line="+55"/>
<source>&amp;Window</source>
<translation type="unfinished">&amp;Window</translation>
</message>
@@ -676,12 +691,7 @@
<translation type="unfinished"></translation>
</message>
<message>
- <location line="+14"/>
- <source>Restore</source>
- <translation type="unfinished"></translation>
- </message>
- <message>
- <location line="+12"/>
+ <location line="+18"/>
<source>Main Window</source>
<translation type="unfinished"></translation>
</message>
@@ -782,7 +792,7 @@
<translation>Wallet is &lt;b&gt;encrypted&lt;/b&gt; and currently &lt;b&gt;locked&lt;/b&gt;</translation>
</message>
<message>
- <location filename="../bitcoin.cpp" line="+382"/>
+ <location filename="../bitcoin.cpp" line="+386"/>
<source>A fatal error occurred. Bitcoin can no longer continue safely and will quit.</source>
<translation type="unfinished"></translation>
</message>
@@ -978,6 +988,72 @@
</message>
</context>
<context>
+ <name>CreateWalletActivity</name>
+ <message>
+ <location filename="../walletcontroller.cpp" line="+201"/>
+ <source>Creating Wallet &lt;b&gt;%1&lt;/b&gt;...</source>
+ <translation type="unfinished"></translation>
+ </message>
+ <message>
+ <location line="+26"/>
+ <source>Create wallet failed</source>
+ <translation type="unfinished"></translation>
+ </message>
+ <message>
+ <location line="+2"/>
+ <source>Create wallet warning</source>
+ <translation type="unfinished"></translation>
+ </message>
+</context>
+<context>
+ <name>CreateWalletDialog</name>
+ <message>
+ <location filename="../forms/createwalletdialog.ui" line="+14"/>
+ <source>Create Wallet</source>
+ <translation type="unfinished"></translation>
+ </message>
+ <message>
+ <location line="+38"/>
+ <source>Wallet Name</source>
+ <translation type="unfinished"></translation>
+ </message>
+ <message>
+ <location line="+13"/>
+ <source>Encrypt the wallet. The wallet will be encrypted with a passphrase of your choice.</source>
+ <translation type="unfinished"></translation>
+ </message>
+ <message>
+ <location line="+3"/>
+ <source>Encrypt Wallet</source>
+ <translation type="unfinished"></translation>
+ </message>
+ <message>
+ <location line="+19"/>
+ <source>Disable private keys for this wallet. Wallets with private keys disabled will have no private keys and cannot have an HD seed or imported private keys. This is ideal for watch-only wallets.</source>
+ <translation type="unfinished"></translation>
+ </message>
+ <message>
+ <location line="+3"/>
+ <source>Disable Private Keys</source>
+ <translation type="unfinished"></translation>
+ </message>
+ <message>
+ <location line="+13"/>
+ <source>Make a blank wallet. Blank wallets do not initially have private keys or scripts. Private keys and addresses can be imported, or an HD seed can be set, at a later time.</source>
+ <translation type="unfinished"></translation>
+ </message>
+ <message>
+ <location line="+3"/>
+ <source>Make Blank Wallet</source>
+ <translation type="unfinished"></translation>
+ </message>
+ <message>
+ <location filename="../createwalletdialog.cpp" line="+19"/>
+ <source>Create</source>
+ <translation type="unfinished"></translation>
+ </message>
+</context>
+<context>
<name>EditAddressDialog</name>
<message>
<location filename="../forms/editaddressdialog.ui" line="+14"/>
@@ -1121,6 +1197,11 @@
</message>
<message>
<location line="+10"/>
+ <source>Reverting this setting requires re-downloading the entire blockchain. It is faster to download the full chain first and prune it later. Disables some advanced features.</source>
+ <translation type="unfinished"></translation>
+ </message>
+ <message>
+ <location line="+10"/>
<source>This initial synchronisation is very demanding, and may expose hardware problems with your computer that had previously gone unnoticed. Each time you run %1, it will continue downloading where it left off.</source>
<translation type="unfinished"></translation>
</message>
@@ -1130,7 +1211,7 @@
<translation type="unfinished"></translation>
</message>
<message>
- <location line="-160"/>
+ <location line="-170"/>
<source>Use the default data directory</source>
<translation>Use the default data directory</translation>
</message>
@@ -1145,7 +1226,12 @@
<translation type="unfinished">Bitcoin</translation>
</message>
<message>
- <location line="+6"/>
+ <location line="+9"/>
+ <source>Discard blocks after verification, except most recent %1 GB (prune)</source>
+ <translation type="unfinished"></translation>
+ </message>
+ <message>
+ <location line="+2"/>
<source>At least %1 GB of data will be stored in this directory, and it will grow over time.</source>
<translation type="unfinished"></translation>
</message>
@@ -1165,12 +1251,12 @@
<translation type="unfinished"></translation>
</message>
<message>
- <location line="+75"/>
+ <location line="+78"/>
<source>Error: Specified data directory &quot;%1&quot; cannot be created.</source>
<translation type="unfinished"></translation>
</message>
<message>
- <location line="+27"/>
+ <location line="+30"/>
<source>Error</source>
<translation>Error</translation>
</message>
@@ -1190,6 +1276,14 @@
<numerusform>(of %n GB needed)</numerusform>
</translation>
</message>
+ <message numerus="yes">
+ <location line="+4"/>
+ <source>(%n GB needed for full chain)</source>
+ <translation type="unfinished">
+ <numerusform></numerusform>
+ <numerusform></numerusform>
+ </translation>
+ </message>
</context>
<context>
<name>ModalOverlay</name>
@@ -1286,6 +1380,29 @@
</message>
</context>
<context>
+ <name>OpenWalletActivity</name>
+ <message>
+ <location filename="../walletcontroller.cpp" line="+39"/>
+ <source>Open wallet failed</source>
+ <translation type="unfinished"></translation>
+ </message>
+ <message>
+ <location line="+2"/>
+ <source>Open wallet warning</source>
+ <translation type="unfinished"></translation>
+ </message>
+ <message>
+ <location line="+10"/>
+ <source>default wallet</source>
+ <translation type="unfinished"></translation>
+ </message>
+ <message>
+ <location line="+2"/>
+ <source>Opening Wallet &lt;b&gt;%1&lt;/b&gt;...</source>
+ <translation type="unfinished"></translation>
+ </message>
+</context>
+<context>
<name>OptionsDialog</name>
<message>
<location filename="../forms/optionsdialog.ui" line="+14"/>
@@ -1734,7 +1851,7 @@
<name>PaymentServer</name>
<message>
<location filename="../paymentserver.cpp" line="+226"/>
- <location line="+346"/>
+ <location line="+350"/>
<location line="+42"/>
<location line="+108"/>
<location line="+14"/>
@@ -1743,7 +1860,7 @@
<translation type="unfinished"></translation>
</message>
<message>
- <location line="-527"/>
+ <location line="-531"/>
<source>Cannot start bitcoin: click-to-pay handler</source>
<translation type="unfinished"></translation>
</message>
@@ -1752,13 +1869,13 @@
<location line="+9"/>
<location line="+16"/>
<location line="+16"/>
- <location line="+5"/>
+ <location line="+7"/>
<location line="+7"/>
<source>URI handling</source>
<translation type="unfinished"></translation>
</message>
<message>
- <location line="-53"/>
+ <location line="-55"/>
<source>&apos;bitcoin://&apos; is not a valid URI. Use &apos;bitcoin:&apos; instead.</source>
<translation type="unfinished"></translation>
</message>
@@ -1774,12 +1891,24 @@
</message>
<message>
<location line="+16"/>
- <location line="+36"/>
+ <location line="+38"/>
<source>Cannot process payment request because BIP70 support was not compiled in.</source>
<translation type="unfinished"></translation>
</message>
<message>
- <location line="-32"/>
+ <location line="-37"/>
+ <location line="+38"/>
+ <source>Due to widespread security flaws in BIP70 it&apos;s strongly recommended that any merchant instructions to switch wallets be ignored.</source>
+ <translation type="unfinished"></translation>
+ </message>
+ <message>
+ <location line="-37"/>
+ <location line="+38"/>
+ <source>If you are receiving this error you should request the merchant provide a BIP21 compatible URI.</source>
+ <translation type="unfinished"></translation>
+ </message>
+ <message>
+ <location line="-34"/>
<source>Invalid payment address %1</source>
<translation type="unfinished"></translation>
</message>
@@ -1800,7 +1929,7 @@
<translation type="unfinished"></translation>
</message>
<message>
- <location line="+199"/>
+ <location line="+201"/>
<location line="+9"/>
<location line="+31"/>
<location line="+10"/>
@@ -2032,7 +2161,7 @@
<translation type="unfinished"></translation>
</message>
<message>
- <location filename="../bitcoin.cpp" line="+116"/>
+ <location filename="../bitcoin.cpp" line="+118"/>
<source>Error: Specified data directory &quot;%1&quot; does not exist.</source>
<translation type="unfinished"></translation>
</message>
@@ -2047,7 +2176,7 @@
<translation type="unfinished"></translation>
</message>
<message>
- <location line="+59"/>
+ <location line="+64"/>
<source>%1 didn&apos;t yet exit safely...</source>
<translation type="unfinished"></translation>
</message>
@@ -3434,14 +3563,6 @@ Note: Since the fee is calculated on a per-byte basis, a fee of &quot;100 satos
</message>
</context>
<context>
- <name>SplashScreen</name>
- <message>
- <location filename="../networkstyle.cpp" line="+19"/>
- <source>[testnet]</source>
- <translation>[testnet]</translation>
- </message>
-</context>
-<context>
<name>TrafficGraphWidget</name>
<message>
<location filename="../trafficgraphwidget.cpp" line="+81"/>
@@ -4036,13 +4157,13 @@ Note: Since the fee is calculated on a per-byte basis, a fee of &quot;100 satos
<context>
<name>WalletController</name>
<message>
- <location filename="../walletcontroller.cpp" line="+73"/>
+ <location filename="../walletcontroller.cpp" line="-205"/>
<source>Close wallet</source>
<translation type="unfinished"></translation>
</message>
<message>
<location line="+1"/>
- <source>Are you sure you wish to close wallet &lt;i&gt;%1&lt;/i&gt;?</source>
+ <source>Are you sure you wish to close the wallet &lt;i&gt;%1&lt;/i&gt;?</source>
<translation type="unfinished"></translation>
</message>
<message>
@@ -4410,12 +4531,22 @@ Note: Since the fee is calculated on a per-byte basis, a fee of &quot;100 satos
<translation type="unfinished"></translation>
</message>
<message>
- <location line="+25"/>
+ <location line="+22"/>
+ <source>Unknown address type &apos;%s&apos;</source>
+ <translation type="unfinished"></translation>
+ </message>
+ <message>
+ <location line="+1"/>
+ <source>Unknown change type &apos;%s&apos;</source>
+ <translation type="unfinished"></translation>
+ </message>
+ <message>
+ <location line="+4"/>
<source>Upgrading txindex database</source>
<translation type="unfinished"></translation>
</message>
<message>
- <location line="-44"/>
+ <location line="-46"/>
<source>Loading P2P addresses...</source>
<translation type="unfinished"></translation>
</message>
@@ -4475,7 +4606,7 @@ Note: Since the fee is calculated on a per-byte basis, a fee of &quot;100 satos
<translation type="unfinished"></translation>
</message>
<message>
- <location line="+4"/>
+ <location line="+6"/>
<source>Unsupported logging category %s=%s.</source>
<translation type="unfinished"></translation>
</message>
@@ -4500,7 +4631,7 @@ Note: Since the fee is calculated on a per-byte basis, a fee of &quot;100 satos
<translation type="unfinished"></translation>
</message>
<message>
- <location line="-154"/>
+ <location line="-156"/>
<source>Error: Listening for incoming connections failed (listen returned error %s)</source>
<translation type="unfinished"></translation>
</message>
@@ -4641,7 +4772,7 @@ Note: Since the fee is calculated on a per-byte basis, a fee of &quot;100 satos
<translation type="unfinished"></translation>
</message>
<message>
- <location line="+7"/>
+ <location line="+9"/>
<source>Verifying wallet(s)...</source>
<translation type="unfinished"></translation>
</message>
@@ -4656,7 +4787,7 @@ Note: Since the fee is calculated on a per-byte basis, a fee of &quot;100 satos
<translation type="unfinished"></translation>
</message>
<message>
- <location line="-177"/>
+ <location line="-179"/>
<source>-maxtxfee is set very high! Fees this large could be paid on a single transaction.</source>
<translation type="unfinished"></translation>
</message>
@@ -4726,12 +4857,12 @@ Note: Since the fee is calculated on a per-byte basis, a fee of &quot;100 satos
<translation type="unfinished"></translation>
</message>
<message>
- <location line="+9"/>
+ <location line="+11"/>
<source>Unknown network specified in -onlynet: &apos;%s&apos;</source>
<translation>Unknown network specified in -onlynet: &apos;%s&apos;</translation>
</message>
<message>
- <location line="-50"/>
+ <location line="-52"/>
<source>Insufficient funds</source>
<translation>Insufficient funds</translation>
</message>
diff --git a/src/rpc/rawtransaction.cpp b/src/rpc/rawtransaction.cpp
index fb8ea8c227..461e8025da 100644
--- a/src/rpc/rawtransaction.cpp
+++ b/src/rpc/rawtransaction.cpp
@@ -14,9 +14,11 @@
#include <node/coin.h>
#include <node/psbt.h>
#include <node/transaction.h>
+#include <policy/policy.h>
#include <policy/rbf.h>
#include <primitives/transaction.h>
#include <psbt.h>
+#include <random.h>
#include <rpc/rawtransaction_util.h>
#include <rpc/server.h>
#include <rpc/util.h>
@@ -37,11 +39,11 @@
#include <univalue.h>
-/** High fee for sendrawtransaction and testmempoolaccept.
- * By default, transaction with a fee higher than this will be rejected by the
- * RPCs. This can be overridden with the maxfeerate argument.
+/** High fee rate for sendrawtransaction and testmempoolaccept.
+ * By default, transaction with a fee rate higher than this will be rejected by
+ * the RPCs. This can be overridden with the maxfeerate argument.
*/
-constexpr static CAmount DEFAULT_MAX_RAW_TX_FEE{COIN / 10};
+static const CFeeRate DEFAULT_MAX_RAW_TX_FEE_RATE{COIN / 10};
static void TxToJSON(const CTransaction& tx, const uint256 hashBlock, UniValue& entry)
{
@@ -774,7 +776,7 @@ static UniValue sendrawtransaction(const JSONRPCRequest& request)
"\nAlso see createrawtransaction and signrawtransactionwithkey calls.\n",
{
{"hexstring", RPCArg::Type::STR_HEX, RPCArg::Optional::NO, "The hex string of the raw transaction"},
- {"maxfeerate", RPCArg::Type::AMOUNT, /* default */ FormatMoney(DEFAULT_MAX_RAW_TX_FEE),
+ {"maxfeerate", RPCArg::Type::AMOUNT, /* default */ FormatMoney(DEFAULT_MAX_RAW_TX_FEE_RATE.GetFeePerK()),
"Reject transactions whose fee rate is higher than the specified value, expressed in " + CURRENCY_UNIT +
"/kB.\nSet to 0 to accept any fee rate.\n"},
},
@@ -804,19 +806,17 @@ static UniValue sendrawtransaction(const JSONRPCRequest& request)
throw JSONRPCError(RPC_DESERIALIZATION_ERROR, "TX decode failed");
CTransactionRef tx(MakeTransactionRef(std::move(mtx)));
- CAmount max_raw_tx_fee = DEFAULT_MAX_RAW_TX_FEE;
+ CFeeRate max_raw_tx_fee_rate = DEFAULT_MAX_RAW_TX_FEE_RATE;
// TODO: temporary migration code for old clients. Remove in v0.20
if (request.params[1].isBool()) {
throw JSONRPCError(RPC_INVALID_PARAMETER, "Second argument must be numeric (maxfeerate) and no longer supports a boolean. To allow a transaction with high fees, set maxfeerate to 0.");
} else if (!request.params[1].isNull()) {
- size_t weight = GetTransactionWeight(*tx);
- CFeeRate fr(AmountFromValue(request.params[1]));
- // the +3/4 part rounds the value up, and is the same formula used when
- // calculating the fee for a transaction
- // (see GetVirtualTransactionSize)
- max_raw_tx_fee = fr.GetFee((weight+3)/4);
+ max_raw_tx_fee_rate = CFeeRate(AmountFromValue(request.params[1]));
}
+ int64_t virtual_size = GetVirtualTransactionSize(*tx);
+ CAmount max_raw_tx_fee = max_raw_tx_fee_rate.GetFee(virtual_size);
+
std::string err_string;
AssertLockNotHeld(cs_main);
const TransactionError err = BroadcastTransaction(tx, err_string, max_raw_tx_fee, /*relay*/ true, /*wait_callback*/ true);
@@ -840,7 +840,7 @@ static UniValue testmempoolaccept(const JSONRPCRequest& request)
{"rawtx", RPCArg::Type::STR_HEX, RPCArg::Optional::OMITTED, ""},
},
},
- {"maxfeerate", RPCArg::Type::AMOUNT, /* default */ FormatMoney(DEFAULT_MAX_RAW_TX_FEE), "Reject transactions whose fee rate is higher than the specified value, expressed in " + CURRENCY_UNIT + "/kB\n"},
+ {"maxfeerate", RPCArg::Type::AMOUNT, /* default */ FormatMoney(DEFAULT_MAX_RAW_TX_FEE_RATE.GetFeePerK()), "Reject transactions whose fee rate is higher than the specified value, expressed in " + CURRENCY_UNIT + "/kB\n"},
},
RPCResult{
"[ (array) The result of the mempool acceptance test for each raw transaction in the input array.\n"
@@ -880,19 +880,17 @@ static UniValue testmempoolaccept(const JSONRPCRequest& request)
CTransactionRef tx(MakeTransactionRef(std::move(mtx)));
const uint256& tx_hash = tx->GetHash();
- CAmount max_raw_tx_fee = DEFAULT_MAX_RAW_TX_FEE;
+ CFeeRate max_raw_tx_fee_rate = DEFAULT_MAX_RAW_TX_FEE_RATE;
// TODO: temporary migration code for old clients. Remove in v0.20
if (request.params[1].isBool()) {
throw JSONRPCError(RPC_INVALID_PARAMETER, "Second argument must be numeric (maxfeerate) and no longer supports a boolean. To allow a transaction with high fees, set maxfeerate to 0.");
} else if (!request.params[1].isNull()) {
- size_t weight = GetTransactionWeight(*tx);
- CFeeRate fr(AmountFromValue(request.params[1]));
- // the +3/4 part rounds the value up, and is the same formula used when
- // calculating the fee for a transaction
- // (see GetVirtualTransactionSize)
- max_raw_tx_fee = fr.GetFee((weight+3)/4);
+ max_raw_tx_fee_rate = CFeeRate(AmountFromValue(request.params[1]));
}
+ int64_t virtual_size = GetVirtualTransactionSize(*tx);
+ CAmount max_raw_tx_fee = max_raw_tx_fee_rate.GetFee(virtual_size);
+
UniValue result(UniValue::VARR);
UniValue result_0(UniValue::VOBJ);
result_0.pushKV("txid", tx_hash.GetHex());
@@ -1615,8 +1613,30 @@ UniValue joinpsbts(const JSONRPCRequest& request)
merged_psbt.unknown.insert(psbt.unknown.begin(), psbt.unknown.end());
}
+ // Generate list of shuffled indices for shuffling inputs and outputs of the merged PSBT
+ std::vector<int> input_indices(merged_psbt.inputs.size());
+ std::iota(input_indices.begin(), input_indices.end(), 0);
+ std::vector<int> output_indices(merged_psbt.outputs.size());
+ std::iota(output_indices.begin(), output_indices.end(), 0);
+
+ // Shuffle input and output indicies lists
+ Shuffle(input_indices.begin(), input_indices.end(), FastRandomContext());
+ Shuffle(output_indices.begin(), output_indices.end(), FastRandomContext());
+
+ PartiallySignedTransaction shuffled_psbt;
+ shuffled_psbt.tx = CMutableTransaction();
+ shuffled_psbt.tx->nVersion = merged_psbt.tx->nVersion;
+ shuffled_psbt.tx->nLockTime = merged_psbt.tx->nLockTime;
+ for (int i : input_indices) {
+ shuffled_psbt.AddInput(merged_psbt.tx->vin[i], merged_psbt.inputs[i]);
+ }
+ for (int i : output_indices) {
+ shuffled_psbt.AddOutput(merged_psbt.tx->vout[i], merged_psbt.outputs[i]);
+ }
+ shuffled_psbt.unknown.insert(merged_psbt.unknown.begin(), merged_psbt.unknown.end());
+
CDataStream ssTx(SER_NETWORK, PROTOCOL_VERSION);
- ssTx << merged_psbt;
+ ssTx << shuffled_psbt;
return EncodeBase64((unsigned char*)ssTx.data(), ssTx.size());
}
diff --git a/src/script/interpreter.cpp b/src/script/interpreter.cpp
index f8701b6d01..20fae2eebf 100644
--- a/src/script/interpreter.cpp
+++ b/src/script/interpreter.cpp
@@ -334,7 +334,7 @@ bool EvalScript(std::vector<std::vector<unsigned char> >& stack, const CScript&
opcode == OP_MOD ||
opcode == OP_LSHIFT ||
opcode == OP_RSHIFT)
- return set_error(serror, SCRIPT_ERR_DISABLED_OPCODE); // Disabled opcodes.
+ return set_error(serror, SCRIPT_ERR_DISABLED_OPCODE); // Disabled opcodes (CVE-2010-5137).
// With SCRIPT_VERIFY_CONST_SCRIPTCODE, OP_CODESEPARATOR in non-segwit script is rejected even in an unexecuted branch
if (opcode == OP_CODESEPARATOR && sigversion == SigVersion::BASE && (flags & SCRIPT_VERIFY_CONST_SCRIPTCODE))
@@ -1483,6 +1483,8 @@ bool VerifyScript(const CScript& scriptSig, const CScript& scriptPubKey, const C
return set_error(serror, SCRIPT_ERR_SIG_PUSHONLY);
}
+ // scriptSig and scriptPubKey must be evaluated sequentially on the same stack
+ // rather than being simply concatenated (see CVE-2010-5141)
std::vector<std::vector<unsigned char> > stack, stackCopy;
if (!EvalScript(stack, scriptSig, flags, checker, SigVersion::BASE, serror))
// serror is set
diff --git a/src/test/data/script_tests.json b/src/test/data/script_tests.json
index 9b320b6943..3241f32f56 100644
--- a/src/test/data/script_tests.json
+++ b/src/test/data/script_tests.json
@@ -829,15 +829,16 @@
["NOP", "2SWAP 1", "P2SH,STRICTENC", "INVALID_STACK_OPERATION"],
["1", "2 3 2SWAP 1", "P2SH,STRICTENC", "INVALID_STACK_OPERATION"],
+
+["NOP", "SIZE 1", "P2SH,STRICTENC", "INVALID_STACK_OPERATION"],
+
+["TEST DISABLED OP CODES (CVE-2010-5137)"],
["'a' 'b'", "CAT", "P2SH,STRICTENC", "DISABLED_OPCODE", "CAT disabled"],
["'a' 'b' 0", "IF CAT ELSE 1 ENDIF", "P2SH,STRICTENC", "DISABLED_OPCODE", "CAT disabled"],
["'abc' 1 1", "SUBSTR", "P2SH,STRICTENC", "DISABLED_OPCODE", "SUBSTR disabled"],
["'abc' 1 1 0", "IF SUBSTR ELSE 1 ENDIF", "P2SH,STRICTENC", "DISABLED_OPCODE", "SUBSTR disabled"],
["'abc' 2 0", "IF LEFT ELSE 1 ENDIF", "P2SH,STRICTENC", "DISABLED_OPCODE", "LEFT disabled"],
["'abc' 2 0", "IF RIGHT ELSE 1 ENDIF", "P2SH,STRICTENC", "DISABLED_OPCODE", "RIGHT disabled"],
-
-["NOP", "SIZE 1", "P2SH,STRICTENC", "INVALID_STACK_OPERATION"],
-
["'abc'", "IF INVERT ELSE 1 ENDIF", "P2SH,STRICTENC", "DISABLED_OPCODE", "INVERT disabled"],
["1 2 0 IF AND ELSE 1 ENDIF", "NOP", "P2SH,STRICTENC", "DISABLED_OPCODE", "AND disabled"],
["1 2 0 IF OR ELSE 1 ENDIF", "NOP", "P2SH,STRICTENC", "DISABLED_OPCODE", "OR disabled"],
diff --git a/src/test/merkle_tests.cpp b/src/test/merkle_tests.cpp
index 1684258c9f..dc38a1a818 100644
--- a/src/test/merkle_tests.cpp
+++ b/src/test/merkle_tests.cpp
@@ -249,4 +249,104 @@ BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(merkle_test)
}
}
+
+BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(merkle_test_empty_block)
+{
+ bool mutated = false;
+ CBlock block;
+ uint256 root = BlockMerkleRoot(block, &mutated);
+
+ BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(root.IsNull(), true);
+ BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(mutated, false);
+}
+
+BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(merkle_test_oneTx_block)
+{
+ bool mutated = false;
+ CBlock block;
+
+ block.vtx.resize(1);
+ CMutableTransaction mtx;
+ mtx.nLockTime = 0;
+ block.vtx[0] = MakeTransactionRef(std::move(mtx));
+ uint256 root = BlockMerkleRoot(block, &mutated);
+ BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(root, block.vtx[0]->GetHash());
+ BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(mutated, false);
+}
+
+BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(merkle_test_OddTxWithRepeatedLastTx_block)
+{
+ bool mutated;
+ CBlock block, blockWithRepeatedLastTx;
+
+ block.vtx.resize(3);
+
+ for (std::size_t pos = 0; pos < block.vtx.size(); pos++) {
+ CMutableTransaction mtx;
+ mtx.nLockTime = pos;
+ block.vtx[pos] = MakeTransactionRef(std::move(mtx));
+ }
+
+ blockWithRepeatedLastTx = block;
+ blockWithRepeatedLastTx.vtx.push_back(blockWithRepeatedLastTx.vtx.back());
+
+ uint256 rootofBlock = BlockMerkleRoot(block, &mutated);
+ BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(mutated, false);
+
+ uint256 rootofBlockWithRepeatedLastTx = BlockMerkleRoot(blockWithRepeatedLastTx, &mutated);
+ BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(rootofBlock, rootofBlockWithRepeatedLastTx);
+ BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(mutated, true);
+}
+
+BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(merkle_test_LeftSubtreeRightSubtree)
+{
+ CBlock block, leftSubtreeBlock, rightSubtreeBlock;
+
+ block.vtx.resize(4);
+ std::size_t pos;
+ for (pos = 0; pos < block.vtx.size(); pos++) {
+ CMutableTransaction mtx;
+ mtx.nLockTime = pos;
+ block.vtx[pos] = MakeTransactionRef(std::move(mtx));
+ }
+
+ for (pos = 0; pos < block.vtx.size() / 2; pos++)
+ leftSubtreeBlock.vtx.push_back(block.vtx[pos]);
+
+ for (pos = block.vtx.size() / 2; pos < block.vtx.size(); pos++)
+ rightSubtreeBlock.vtx.push_back(block.vtx[pos]);
+
+ uint256 root = BlockMerkleRoot(block);
+ uint256 rootOfLeftSubtree = BlockMerkleRoot(leftSubtreeBlock);
+ uint256 rootOfRightSubtree = BlockMerkleRoot(rightSubtreeBlock);
+ std::vector<uint256> leftRight;
+ leftRight.push_back(rootOfLeftSubtree);
+ leftRight.push_back(rootOfRightSubtree);
+ uint256 rootOfLR = ComputeMerkleRoot(leftRight);
+
+ BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(root, rootOfLR);
+}
+
+BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(merkle_test_BlockWitness)
+{
+ CBlock block;
+
+ block.vtx.resize(2);
+ for (std::size_t pos = 0; pos < block.vtx.size(); pos++) {
+ CMutableTransaction mtx;
+ mtx.nLockTime = pos;
+ block.vtx[pos] = MakeTransactionRef(std::move(mtx));
+ }
+
+ uint256 blockWitness = BlockWitnessMerkleRoot(block);
+
+ std::vector<uint256> hashes;
+ hashes.resize(block.vtx.size());
+ hashes[0].SetNull();
+ hashes[1] = block.vtx[1]->GetHash();
+
+ uint256 merkelRootofHashes = ComputeMerkleRoot(hashes);
+
+ BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(merkelRootofHashes, blockWitness);
+}
BOOST_AUTO_TEST_SUITE_END()
diff --git a/src/validation.cpp b/src/validation.cpp
index 5b195bf7da..39780e1c6d 100644
--- a/src/validation.cpp
+++ b/src/validation.cpp
@@ -428,21 +428,134 @@ static bool CheckInputsFromMempoolAndCache(const CTransaction& tx, CValidationSt
return CheckInputs(tx, state, view, flags, cacheSigStore, true, txdata);
}
-/**
- * @param[out] coins_to_uncache Return any outpoints which were not previously present in the
- * coins cache, but were added as a result of validating the tx
- * for mempool acceptance. This allows the caller to optionally
- * remove the cache additions if the associated transaction ends
- * up being rejected by the mempool.
- */
-static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool& pool, CValidationState& state, const CTransactionRef& ptx,
- bool* pfMissingInputs, int64_t nAcceptTime, std::list<CTransactionRef>* plTxnReplaced,
- bool bypass_limits, const CAmount& nAbsurdFee, std::vector<COutPoint>& coins_to_uncache, bool test_accept) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main)
+namespace {
+
+class MemPoolAccept
{
- const CTransaction& tx = *ptx;
- const uint256 hash = tx.GetHash();
- AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
- LOCK(pool.cs); // mempool "read lock" (held through GetMainSignals().TransactionAddedToMempool())
+public:
+ MemPoolAccept(CTxMemPool& mempool) : m_pool(mempool), m_view(&m_dummy), m_viewmempool(&::ChainstateActive().CoinsTip(), m_pool),
+ m_limit_ancestors(gArgs.GetArg("-limitancestorcount", DEFAULT_ANCESTOR_LIMIT)),
+ m_limit_ancestor_size(gArgs.GetArg("-limitancestorsize", DEFAULT_ANCESTOR_SIZE_LIMIT)*1000),
+ m_limit_descendants(gArgs.GetArg("-limitdescendantcount", DEFAULT_DESCENDANT_LIMIT)),
+ m_limit_descendant_size(gArgs.GetArg("-limitdescendantsize", DEFAULT_DESCENDANT_SIZE_LIMIT)*1000) {}
+
+ // We put the arguments we're handed into a struct, so we can pass them
+ // around easier.
+ struct ATMPArgs {
+ const CChainParams& m_chainparams;
+ CValidationState &m_state;
+ bool* m_missing_inputs;
+ const int64_t m_accept_time;
+ std::list<CTransactionRef>* m_replaced_transactions;
+ const bool m_bypass_limits;
+ const CAmount& m_absurd_fee;
+ /*
+ * Return any outpoints which were not previously present in the coins
+ * cache, but were added as a result of validating the tx for mempool
+ * acceptance. This allows the caller to optionally remove the cache
+ * additions if the associated transaction ends up being rejected by
+ * the mempool.
+ */
+ std::vector<COutPoint>& m_coins_to_uncache;
+ const bool m_test_accept;
+ };
+
+ // Single transaction acceptance
+ bool AcceptSingleTransaction(const CTransactionRef& ptx, ATMPArgs& args) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main);
+
+private:
+ // All the intermediate state that gets passed between the various levels
+ // of checking a given transaction.
+ struct Workspace {
+ Workspace(const CTransactionRef& ptx) : m_ptx(ptx), m_hash(ptx->GetHash()) {}
+ std::set<uint256> m_conflicts;
+ CTxMemPool::setEntries m_all_conflicting;
+ CTxMemPool::setEntries m_ancestors;
+ std::unique_ptr<CTxMemPoolEntry> m_entry;
+
+ bool m_replacement_transaction;
+ CAmount m_modified_fees;
+ CAmount m_conflicting_fees;
+ size_t m_conflicting_size;
+
+ const CTransactionRef& m_ptx;
+ const uint256& m_hash;
+ };
+
+ // Run the policy checks on a given transaction, excluding any script checks.
+ // Looks up inputs, calculates feerate, considers replacement, evaluates
+ // package limits, etc. As this function can be invoked for "free" by a peer,
+ // only tests that are fast should be done here (to avoid CPU DoS).
+ bool PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main, m_pool.cs);
+
+ // Run the script checks using our policy flags. As this can be slow, we should
+ // only invoke this on transactions that have otherwise passed policy checks.
+ bool PolicyScriptChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws, PrecomputedTransactionData& txdata) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main);
+
+ // Re-run the script checks, using consensus flags, and try to cache the
+ // result in the scriptcache. This should be done after
+ // PolicyScriptChecks(). This requires that all inputs either be in our
+ // utxo set or in the mempool.
+ bool ConsensusScriptChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws, PrecomputedTransactionData &txdata) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main);
+
+ // Try to add the transaction to the mempool, removing any conflicts first.
+ // Returns true if the transaction is in the mempool after any size
+ // limiting is performed, false otherwise.
+ bool Finalize(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main, m_pool.cs);
+
+ // Compare a package's feerate against minimum allowed.
+ bool CheckFeeRate(size_t package_size, CAmount package_fee, CValidationState& state)
+ {
+ CAmount mempoolRejectFee = m_pool.GetMinFee(gArgs.GetArg("-maxmempool", DEFAULT_MAX_MEMPOOL_SIZE) * 1000000).GetFee(package_size);
+ if (mempoolRejectFee > 0 && package_fee < mempoolRejectFee) {
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "mempool min fee not met", strprintf("%d < %d", package_fee, mempoolRejectFee));
+ }
+
+ if (package_fee < ::minRelayTxFee.GetFee(package_size)) {
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "min relay fee not met", strprintf("%d < %d", package_fee, ::minRelayTxFee.GetFee(package_size)));
+ }
+ return true;
+ }
+
+private:
+ CTxMemPool& m_pool;
+ CCoinsViewCache m_view;
+ CCoinsViewMemPool m_viewmempool;
+ CCoinsView m_dummy;
+
+ // The package limits in effect at the time of invocation.
+ const size_t m_limit_ancestors;
+ const size_t m_limit_ancestor_size;
+ // These may be modified while evaluating a transaction (eg to account for
+ // in-mempool conflicts; see below).
+ size_t m_limit_descendants;
+ size_t m_limit_descendant_size;
+};
+
+bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws)
+{
+ const CTransactionRef& ptx = ws.m_ptx;
+ const CTransaction& tx = *ws.m_ptx;
+ const uint256& hash = ws.m_hash;
+
+ // Copy/alias what we need out of args
+ CValidationState &state = args.m_state;
+ bool* pfMissingInputs = args.m_missing_inputs;
+ const int64_t nAcceptTime = args.m_accept_time;
+ const bool bypass_limits = args.m_bypass_limits;
+ const CAmount& nAbsurdFee = args.m_absurd_fee;
+ std::vector<COutPoint>& coins_to_uncache = args.m_coins_to_uncache;
+
+ // Alias what we need out of ws
+ std::set<uint256>& setConflicts = ws.m_conflicts;
+ CTxMemPool::setEntries& allConflicting = ws.m_all_conflicting;
+ CTxMemPool::setEntries& setAncestors = ws.m_ancestors;
+ std::unique_ptr<CTxMemPoolEntry>& entry = ws.m_entry;
+ bool& fReplacementTransaction = ws.m_replacement_transaction;
+ CAmount& nModifiedFees = ws.m_modified_fees;
+ CAmount& nConflictingFees = ws.m_conflicting_fees;
+ size_t& nConflictingSize = ws.m_conflicting_size;
+
if (pfMissingInputs) {
*pfMissingInputs = false;
}
@@ -473,15 +586,14 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_PREMATURE_SPEND, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "non-final");
// is it already in the memory pool?
- if (pool.exists(hash)) {
+ if (m_pool.exists(hash)) {
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_CONFLICT, false, REJECT_DUPLICATE, "txn-already-in-mempool");
}
// Check for conflicts with in-memory transactions
- std::set<uint256> setConflicts;
for (const CTxIn &txin : tx.vin)
{
- const CTransaction* ptxConflicting = pool.GetConflictTx(txin.prevout);
+ const CTransaction* ptxConflicting = m_pool.GetConflictTx(txin.prevout);
if (ptxConflicting) {
if (!setConflicts.count(ptxConflicting->GetHash()))
{
@@ -515,395 +627,436 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool
}
}
- {
- CCoinsView dummy;
- CCoinsViewCache view(&dummy);
-
- LockPoints lp;
- CCoinsViewCache& coins_cache = ::ChainstateActive().CoinsTip();
- CCoinsViewMemPool viewMemPool(&coins_cache, pool);
- view.SetBackend(viewMemPool);
-
- // do all inputs exist?
- for (const CTxIn& txin : tx.vin) {
- if (!coins_cache.HaveCoinInCache(txin.prevout)) {
- coins_to_uncache.push_back(txin.prevout);
- }
+ LockPoints lp;
+ m_view.SetBackend(m_viewmempool);
- // Note: this call may add txin.prevout to the coins cache
- // (CoinsTip().cacheCoins) by way of FetchCoin(). It should be removed
- // later (via coins_to_uncache) if this tx turns out to be invalid.
- if (!view.HaveCoin(txin.prevout)) {
- // Are inputs missing because we already have the tx?
- for (size_t out = 0; out < tx.vout.size(); out++) {
- // Optimistically just do efficient check of cache for outputs
- if (coins_cache.HaveCoinInCache(COutPoint(hash, out))) {
- return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_CONFLICT, false, REJECT_DUPLICATE, "txn-already-known");
- }
- }
- // Otherwise assume this might be an orphan tx for which we just haven't seen parents yet
- if (pfMissingInputs) {
- *pfMissingInputs = true;
+ CCoinsViewCache& coins_cache = ::ChainstateActive().CoinsTip();
+ // do all inputs exist?
+ for (const CTxIn& txin : tx.vin) {
+ if (!coins_cache.HaveCoinInCache(txin.prevout)) {
+ coins_to_uncache.push_back(txin.prevout);
+ }
+
+ // Note: this call may add txin.prevout to the coins cache
+ // (coins_cache.cacheCoins) by way of FetchCoin(). It should be removed
+ // later (via coins_to_uncache) if this tx turns out to be invalid.
+ if (!m_view.HaveCoin(txin.prevout)) {
+ // Are inputs missing because we already have the tx?
+ for (size_t out = 0; out < tx.vout.size(); out++) {
+ // Optimistically just do efficient check of cache for outputs
+ if (coins_cache.HaveCoinInCache(COutPoint(hash, out))) {
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_CONFLICT, false, REJECT_DUPLICATE, "txn-already-known");
}
- return false; // fMissingInputs and !state.IsInvalid() is used to detect this condition, don't set state.Invalid()
}
+ // Otherwise assume this might be an orphan tx for which we just haven't seen parents yet
+ if (pfMissingInputs) {
+ *pfMissingInputs = true;
+ }
+ return false; // fMissingInputs and !state.IsInvalid() is used to detect this condition, don't set state.Invalid()
}
+ }
- // Bring the best block into scope
- view.GetBestBlock();
+ // Bring the best block into scope
+ m_view.GetBestBlock();
- // we have all inputs cached now, so switch back to dummy, so we don't need to keep lock on mempool
- view.SetBackend(dummy);
+ // we have all inputs cached now, so switch back to dummy (to protect
+ // against bugs where we pull more inputs from disk that miss being added
+ // to coins_to_uncache)
+ m_view.SetBackend(m_dummy);
- // Only accept BIP68 sequence locked transactions that can be mined in the next
- // block; we don't want our mempool filled up with transactions that can't
- // be mined yet.
- // Must keep pool.cs for this unless we change CheckSequenceLocks to take a
- // CoinsViewCache instead of create its own
- if (!CheckSequenceLocks(pool, tx, STANDARD_LOCKTIME_VERIFY_FLAGS, &lp))
- return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_PREMATURE_SPEND, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "non-BIP68-final");
+ // Only accept BIP68 sequence locked transactions that can be mined in the next
+ // block; we don't want our mempool filled up with transactions that can't
+ // be mined yet.
+ // Must keep pool.cs for this unless we change CheckSequenceLocks to take a
+ // CoinsViewCache instead of create its own
+ if (!CheckSequenceLocks(m_pool, tx, STANDARD_LOCKTIME_VERIFY_FLAGS, &lp))
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_PREMATURE_SPEND, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "non-BIP68-final");
- CAmount nFees = 0;
- if (!Consensus::CheckTxInputs(tx, state, view, GetSpendHeight(view), nFees)) {
- return error("%s: Consensus::CheckTxInputs: %s, %s", __func__, tx.GetHash().ToString(), FormatStateMessage(state));
- }
+ CAmount nFees = 0;
+ if (!Consensus::CheckTxInputs(tx, state, m_view, GetSpendHeight(m_view), nFees)) {
+ return error("%s: Consensus::CheckTxInputs: %s, %s", __func__, tx.GetHash().ToString(), FormatStateMessage(state));
+ }
- // Check for non-standard pay-to-script-hash in inputs
- if (fRequireStandard && !AreInputsStandard(tx, view))
- return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_NOT_STANDARD, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "bad-txns-nonstandard-inputs");
+ // Check for non-standard pay-to-script-hash in inputs
+ if (fRequireStandard && !AreInputsStandard(tx, m_view))
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_NOT_STANDARD, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "bad-txns-nonstandard-inputs");
- // Check for non-standard witness in P2WSH
- if (tx.HasWitness() && fRequireStandard && !IsWitnessStandard(tx, view))
- return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_WITNESS_MUTATED, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "bad-witness-nonstandard");
+ // Check for non-standard witness in P2WSH
+ if (tx.HasWitness() && fRequireStandard && !IsWitnessStandard(tx, m_view))
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_WITNESS_MUTATED, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "bad-witness-nonstandard");
- int64_t nSigOpsCost = GetTransactionSigOpCost(tx, view, STANDARD_SCRIPT_VERIFY_FLAGS);
+ int64_t nSigOpsCost = GetTransactionSigOpCost(tx, m_view, STANDARD_SCRIPT_VERIFY_FLAGS);
- // nModifiedFees includes any fee deltas from PrioritiseTransaction
- CAmount nModifiedFees = nFees;
- pool.ApplyDelta(hash, nModifiedFees);
+ // nModifiedFees includes any fee deltas from PrioritiseTransaction
+ nModifiedFees = nFees;
+ m_pool.ApplyDelta(hash, nModifiedFees);
- // Keep track of transactions that spend a coinbase, which we re-scan
- // during reorgs to ensure COINBASE_MATURITY is still met.
- bool fSpendsCoinbase = false;
- for (const CTxIn &txin : tx.vin) {
- const Coin &coin = view.AccessCoin(txin.prevout);
- if (coin.IsCoinBase()) {
- fSpendsCoinbase = true;
- break;
- }
+ // Keep track of transactions that spend a coinbase, which we re-scan
+ // during reorgs to ensure COINBASE_MATURITY is still met.
+ bool fSpendsCoinbase = false;
+ for (const CTxIn &txin : tx.vin) {
+ const Coin &coin = m_view.AccessCoin(txin.prevout);
+ if (coin.IsCoinBase()) {
+ fSpendsCoinbase = true;
+ break;
}
+ }
- CTxMemPoolEntry entry(ptx, nFees, nAcceptTime, ::ChainActive().Height(),
- fSpendsCoinbase, nSigOpsCost, lp);
- unsigned int nSize = entry.GetTxSize();
+ entry.reset(new CTxMemPoolEntry(ptx, nFees, nAcceptTime, ::ChainActive().Height(),
+ fSpendsCoinbase, nSigOpsCost, lp));
+ unsigned int nSize = entry->GetTxSize();
- if (nSigOpsCost > MAX_STANDARD_TX_SIGOPS_COST)
- return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_NOT_STANDARD, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "bad-txns-too-many-sigops",
+ if (nSigOpsCost > MAX_STANDARD_TX_SIGOPS_COST)
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_NOT_STANDARD, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "bad-txns-too-many-sigops",
strprintf("%d", nSigOpsCost));
- CAmount mempoolRejectFee = pool.GetMinFee(gArgs.GetArg("-maxmempool", DEFAULT_MAX_MEMPOOL_SIZE) * 1000000).GetFee(nSize);
- if (!bypass_limits && mempoolRejectFee > 0 && nModifiedFees < mempoolRejectFee) {
- return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "mempool min fee not met", strprintf("%d < %d", nModifiedFees, mempoolRejectFee));
- }
-
- // No transactions are allowed below minRelayTxFee except from disconnected blocks
- if (!bypass_limits && nModifiedFees < ::minRelayTxFee.GetFee(nSize)) {
- return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "min relay fee not met", strprintf("%d < %d", nModifiedFees, ::minRelayTxFee.GetFee(nSize)));
- }
+ // No transactions are allowed below minRelayTxFee except from disconnected
+ // blocks
+ if (!bypass_limits && !CheckFeeRate(nSize, nModifiedFees, state)) return false;
- if (nAbsurdFee && nFees > nAbsurdFee)
- return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_NOT_STANDARD, false,
+ if (nAbsurdFee && nFees > nAbsurdFee)
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_NOT_STANDARD, false,
REJECT_HIGHFEE, "absurdly-high-fee",
strprintf("%d > %d", nFees, nAbsurdFee));
- const CTxMemPool::setEntries setIterConflicting = pool.GetIterSet(setConflicts);
- // Calculate in-mempool ancestors, up to a limit.
- CTxMemPool::setEntries setAncestors;
- size_t nLimitAncestors = gArgs.GetArg("-limitancestorcount", DEFAULT_ANCESTOR_LIMIT);
- size_t nLimitAncestorSize = gArgs.GetArg("-limitancestorsize", DEFAULT_ANCESTOR_SIZE_LIMIT)*1000;
- size_t nLimitDescendants = gArgs.GetArg("-limitdescendantcount", DEFAULT_DESCENDANT_LIMIT);
- size_t nLimitDescendantSize = gArgs.GetArg("-limitdescendantsize", DEFAULT_DESCENDANT_SIZE_LIMIT)*1000;
-
- if (setConflicts.size() == 1) {
- // In general, when we receive an RBF transaction with mempool conflicts, we want to know whether we
- // would meet the chain limits after the conflicts have been removed. However, there isn't a practical
- // way to do this short of calculating the ancestor and descendant sets with an overlay cache of
- // changed mempool entries. Due to both implementation and runtime complexity concerns, this isn't
- // very realistic, thus we only ensure a limited set of transactions are RBF'able despite mempool
- // conflicts here. Importantly, we need to ensure that some transactions which were accepted using
- // the below carve-out are able to be RBF'ed, without impacting the security the carve-out provides
- // for off-chain contract systems (see link in the comment below).
- //
- // Specifically, the subset of RBF transactions which we allow despite chain limits are those which
- // conflict directly with exactly one other transaction (but may evict children of said transaction),
- // and which are not adding any new mempool dependencies. Note that the "no new mempool dependencies"
- // check is accomplished later, so we don't bother doing anything about it here, but if BIP 125 is
- // amended, we may need to move that check to here instead of removing it wholesale.
- //
- // Such transactions are clearly not merging any existing packages, so we are only concerned with
- // ensuring that (a) no package is growing past the package size (not count) limits and (b) we are
- // not allowing something to effectively use the (below) carve-out spot when it shouldn't be allowed
- // to.
- //
- // To check these we first check if we meet the RBF criteria, above, and increment the descendant
- // limits by the direct conflict and its descendants (as these are recalculated in
- // CalculateMempoolAncestors by assuming the new transaction being added is a new descendant, with no
- // removals, of each parent's existing dependant set). The ancestor count limits are unmodified (as
- // the ancestor limits should be the same for both our new transaction and any conflicts).
- // We don't bother incrementing nLimitDescendants by the full removal count as that limit never comes
- // into force here (as we're only adding a single transaction).
- assert(setIterConflicting.size() == 1);
- CTxMemPool::txiter conflict = *setIterConflicting.begin();
-
- nLimitDescendants += 1;
- nLimitDescendantSize += conflict->GetSizeWithDescendants();
- }
-
- std::string errString;
- if (!pool.CalculateMemPoolAncestors(entry, setAncestors, nLimitAncestors, nLimitAncestorSize, nLimitDescendants, nLimitDescendantSize, errString)) {
- setAncestors.clear();
- // If CalculateMemPoolAncestors fails second time, we want the original error string.
- std::string dummy_err_string;
- // Contracting/payment channels CPFP carve-out:
- // If the new transaction is relatively small (up to 40k weight)
- // and has at most one ancestor (ie ancestor limit of 2, including
- // the new transaction), allow it if its parent has exactly the
- // descendant limit descendants.
- //
- // This allows protocols which rely on distrusting counterparties
- // being able to broadcast descendants of an unconfirmed transaction
- // to be secure by simply only having two immediately-spendable
- // outputs - one for each counterparty. For more info on the uses for
- // this, see https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2018-November/016518.html
- if (nSize > EXTRA_DESCENDANT_TX_SIZE_LIMIT ||
- !pool.CalculateMemPoolAncestors(entry, setAncestors, 2, nLimitAncestorSize, nLimitDescendants + 1, nLimitDescendantSize + EXTRA_DESCENDANT_TX_SIZE_LIMIT, dummy_err_string)) {
- return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "too-long-mempool-chain", errString);
- }
- }
-
- // A transaction that spends outputs that would be replaced by it is invalid. Now
- // that we have the set of all ancestors we can detect this
- // pathological case by making sure setConflicts and setAncestors don't
- // intersect.
- for (CTxMemPool::txiter ancestorIt : setAncestors)
+ const CTxMemPool::setEntries setIterConflicting = m_pool.GetIterSet(setConflicts);
+ // Calculate in-mempool ancestors, up to a limit.
+ if (setConflicts.size() == 1) {
+ // In general, when we receive an RBF transaction with mempool conflicts, we want to know whether we
+ // would meet the chain limits after the conflicts have been removed. However, there isn't a practical
+ // way to do this short of calculating the ancestor and descendant sets with an overlay cache of
+ // changed mempool entries. Due to both implementation and runtime complexity concerns, this isn't
+ // very realistic, thus we only ensure a limited set of transactions are RBF'able despite mempool
+ // conflicts here. Importantly, we need to ensure that some transactions which were accepted using
+ // the below carve-out are able to be RBF'ed, without impacting the security the carve-out provides
+ // for off-chain contract systems (see link in the comment below).
+ //
+ // Specifically, the subset of RBF transactions which we allow despite chain limits are those which
+ // conflict directly with exactly one other transaction (but may evict children of said transaction),
+ // and which are not adding any new mempool dependencies. Note that the "no new mempool dependencies"
+ // check is accomplished later, so we don't bother doing anything about it here, but if BIP 125 is
+ // amended, we may need to move that check to here instead of removing it wholesale.
+ //
+ // Such transactions are clearly not merging any existing packages, so we are only concerned with
+ // ensuring that (a) no package is growing past the package size (not count) limits and (b) we are
+ // not allowing something to effectively use the (below) carve-out spot when it shouldn't be allowed
+ // to.
+ //
+ // To check these we first check if we meet the RBF criteria, above, and increment the descendant
+ // limits by the direct conflict and its descendants (as these are recalculated in
+ // CalculateMempoolAncestors by assuming the new transaction being added is a new descendant, with no
+ // removals, of each parent's existing dependant set). The ancestor count limits are unmodified (as
+ // the ancestor limits should be the same for both our new transaction and any conflicts).
+ // We don't bother incrementing m_limit_descendants by the full removal count as that limit never comes
+ // into force here (as we're only adding a single transaction).
+ assert(setIterConflicting.size() == 1);
+ CTxMemPool::txiter conflict = *setIterConflicting.begin();
+
+ m_limit_descendants += 1;
+ m_limit_descendant_size += conflict->GetSizeWithDescendants();
+ }
+
+ std::string errString;
+ if (!m_pool.CalculateMemPoolAncestors(*entry, setAncestors, m_limit_ancestors, m_limit_ancestor_size, m_limit_descendants, m_limit_descendant_size, errString)) {
+ setAncestors.clear();
+ // If CalculateMemPoolAncestors fails second time, we want the original error string.
+ std::string dummy_err_string;
+ // Contracting/payment channels CPFP carve-out:
+ // If the new transaction is relatively small (up to 40k weight)
+ // and has at most one ancestor (ie ancestor limit of 2, including
+ // the new transaction), allow it if its parent has exactly the
+ // descendant limit descendants.
+ //
+ // This allows protocols which rely on distrusting counterparties
+ // being able to broadcast descendants of an unconfirmed transaction
+ // to be secure by simply only having two immediately-spendable
+ // outputs - one for each counterparty. For more info on the uses for
+ // this, see https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2018-November/016518.html
+ if (nSize > EXTRA_DESCENDANT_TX_SIZE_LIMIT ||
+ !m_pool.CalculateMemPoolAncestors(*entry, setAncestors, 2, m_limit_ancestor_size, m_limit_descendants + 1, m_limit_descendant_size + EXTRA_DESCENDANT_TX_SIZE_LIMIT, dummy_err_string)) {
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "too-long-mempool-chain", errString);
+ }
+ }
+
+ // A transaction that spends outputs that would be replaced by it is invalid. Now
+ // that we have the set of all ancestors we can detect this
+ // pathological case by making sure setConflicts and setAncestors don't
+ // intersect.
+ for (CTxMemPool::txiter ancestorIt : setAncestors)
+ {
+ const uint256 &hashAncestor = ancestorIt->GetTx().GetHash();
+ if (setConflicts.count(hashAncestor))
{
- const uint256 &hashAncestor = ancestorIt->GetTx().GetHash();
- if (setConflicts.count(hashAncestor))
- {
- return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-spends-conflicting-tx",
- strprintf("%s spends conflicting transaction %s",
- hash.ToString(),
- hashAncestor.ToString()));
- }
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-spends-conflicting-tx",
+ strprintf("%s spends conflicting transaction %s",
+ hash.ToString(),
+ hashAncestor.ToString()));
}
+ }
- // Check if it's economically rational to mine this transaction rather
- // than the ones it replaces.
- CAmount nConflictingFees = 0;
- size_t nConflictingSize = 0;
- uint64_t nConflictingCount = 0;
- CTxMemPool::setEntries allConflicting;
-
- // If we don't hold the lock allConflicting might be incomplete; the
- // subsequent RemoveStaged() and addUnchecked() calls don't guarantee
- // mempool consistency for us.
- const bool fReplacementTransaction = setConflicts.size();
- if (fReplacementTransaction)
- {
- CFeeRate newFeeRate(nModifiedFees, nSize);
- std::set<uint256> setConflictsParents;
- const int maxDescendantsToVisit = 100;
- for (const auto& mi : setIterConflicting) {
- // Don't allow the replacement to reduce the feerate of the
- // mempool.
- //
- // We usually don't want to accept replacements with lower
- // feerates than what they replaced as that would lower the
- // feerate of the next block. Requiring that the feerate always
- // be increased is also an easy-to-reason about way to prevent
- // DoS attacks via replacements.
- //
- // We only consider the feerates of transactions being directly
- // replaced, not their indirect descendants. While that does
- // mean high feerate children are ignored when deciding whether
- // or not to replace, we do require the replacement to pay more
- // overall fees too, mitigating most cases.
- CFeeRate oldFeeRate(mi->GetModifiedFee(), mi->GetTxSize());
- if (newFeeRate <= oldFeeRate)
- {
- return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "insufficient fee",
- strprintf("rejecting replacement %s; new feerate %s <= old feerate %s",
- hash.ToString(),
- newFeeRate.ToString(),
- oldFeeRate.ToString()));
- }
-
- for (const CTxIn &txin : mi->GetTx().vin)
- {
- setConflictsParents.insert(txin.prevout.hash);
- }
+ // Check if it's economically rational to mine this transaction rather
+ // than the ones it replaces.
+ nConflictingFees = 0;
+ nConflictingSize = 0;
+ uint64_t nConflictingCount = 0;
- nConflictingCount += mi->GetCountWithDescendants();
- }
- // This potentially overestimates the number of actual descendants
- // but we just want to be conservative to avoid doing too much
- // work.
- if (nConflictingCount <= maxDescendantsToVisit) {
- // If not too many to replace, then calculate the set of
- // transactions that would have to be evicted
- for (CTxMemPool::txiter it : setIterConflicting) {
- pool.CalculateDescendants(it, allConflicting);
- }
- for (CTxMemPool::txiter it : allConflicting) {
- nConflictingFees += it->GetModifiedFee();
- nConflictingSize += it->GetTxSize();
- }
- } else {
- return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "too many potential replacements",
- strprintf("rejecting replacement %s; too many potential replacements (%d > %d)\n",
+ // If we don't hold the lock allConflicting might be incomplete; the
+ // subsequent RemoveStaged() and addUnchecked() calls don't guarantee
+ // mempool consistency for us.
+ fReplacementTransaction = setConflicts.size();
+ if (fReplacementTransaction)
+ {
+ CFeeRate newFeeRate(nModifiedFees, nSize);
+ std::set<uint256> setConflictsParents;
+ const int maxDescendantsToVisit = 100;
+ for (const auto& mi : setIterConflicting) {
+ // Don't allow the replacement to reduce the feerate of the
+ // mempool.
+ //
+ // We usually don't want to accept replacements with lower
+ // feerates than what they replaced as that would lower the
+ // feerate of the next block. Requiring that the feerate always
+ // be increased is also an easy-to-reason about way to prevent
+ // DoS attacks via replacements.
+ //
+ // We only consider the feerates of transactions being directly
+ // replaced, not their indirect descendants. While that does
+ // mean high feerate children are ignored when deciding whether
+ // or not to replace, we do require the replacement to pay more
+ // overall fees too, mitigating most cases.
+ CFeeRate oldFeeRate(mi->GetModifiedFee(), mi->GetTxSize());
+ if (newFeeRate <= oldFeeRate)
+ {
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "insufficient fee",
+ strprintf("rejecting replacement %s; new feerate %s <= old feerate %s",
hash.ToString(),
- nConflictingCount,
- maxDescendantsToVisit));
+ newFeeRate.ToString(),
+ oldFeeRate.ToString()));
}
- for (unsigned int j = 0; j < tx.vin.size(); j++)
+ for (const CTxIn &txin : mi->GetTx().vin)
{
- // We don't want to accept replacements that require low
- // feerate junk to be mined first. Ideally we'd keep track of
- // the ancestor feerates and make the decision based on that,
- // but for now requiring all new inputs to be confirmed works.
- //
- // Note that if you relax this to make RBF a little more useful,
- // this may break the CalculateMempoolAncestors RBF relaxation,
- // above. See the comment above the first CalculateMempoolAncestors
- // call for more info.
- if (!setConflictsParents.count(tx.vin[j].prevout.hash))
- {
- // Rather than check the UTXO set - potentially expensive -
- // it's cheaper to just check if the new input refers to a
- // tx that's in the mempool.
- if (pool.exists(tx.vin[j].prevout.hash)) {
- return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "replacement-adds-unconfirmed",
- strprintf("replacement %s adds unconfirmed input, idx %d",
- hash.ToString(), j));
- }
- }
+ setConflictsParents.insert(txin.prevout.hash);
}
- // The replacement must pay greater fees than the transactions it
- // replaces - if we did the bandwidth used by those conflicting
- // transactions would not be paid for.
- if (nModifiedFees < nConflictingFees)
- {
- return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "insufficient fee",
- strprintf("rejecting replacement %s, less fees than conflicting txs; %s < %s",
- hash.ToString(), FormatMoney(nModifiedFees), FormatMoney(nConflictingFees)));
+ nConflictingCount += mi->GetCountWithDescendants();
+ }
+ // This potentially overestimates the number of actual descendants
+ // but we just want to be conservative to avoid doing too much
+ // work.
+ if (nConflictingCount <= maxDescendantsToVisit) {
+ // If not too many to replace, then calculate the set of
+ // transactions that would have to be evicted
+ for (CTxMemPool::txiter it : setIterConflicting) {
+ m_pool.CalculateDescendants(it, allConflicting);
}
-
- // Finally in addition to paying more fees than the conflicts the
- // new transaction must pay for its own bandwidth.
- CAmount nDeltaFees = nModifiedFees - nConflictingFees;
- if (nDeltaFees < ::incrementalRelayFee.GetFee(nSize))
- {
- return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "insufficient fee",
- strprintf("rejecting replacement %s, not enough additional fees to relay; %s < %s",
- hash.ToString(),
- FormatMoney(nDeltaFees),
- FormatMoney(::incrementalRelayFee.GetFee(nSize))));
+ for (CTxMemPool::txiter it : allConflicting) {
+ nConflictingFees += it->GetModifiedFee();
+ nConflictingSize += it->GetTxSize();
}
+ } else {
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "too many potential replacements",
+ strprintf("rejecting replacement %s; too many potential replacements (%d > %d)\n",
+ hash.ToString(),
+ nConflictingCount,
+ maxDescendantsToVisit));
}
- constexpr unsigned int scriptVerifyFlags = STANDARD_SCRIPT_VERIFY_FLAGS;
-
- // Check against previous transactions
- // The first loop above does all the inexpensive checks.
- // Only if ALL inputs pass do we perform expensive ECDSA signature checks.
- // Helps prevent CPU exhaustion denial-of-service attacks.
- PrecomputedTransactionData txdata(tx);
- if (!CheckInputs(tx, state, view, scriptVerifyFlags, true, false, txdata)) {
- // SCRIPT_VERIFY_CLEANSTACK requires SCRIPT_VERIFY_WITNESS, so we
- // need to turn both off, and compare against just turning off CLEANSTACK
- // to see if the failure is specifically due to witness validation.
- CValidationState stateDummy; // Want reported failures to be from first CheckInputs
- if (!tx.HasWitness() && CheckInputs(tx, stateDummy, view, scriptVerifyFlags & ~(SCRIPT_VERIFY_WITNESS | SCRIPT_VERIFY_CLEANSTACK), true, false, txdata) &&
- !CheckInputs(tx, stateDummy, view, scriptVerifyFlags & ~SCRIPT_VERIFY_CLEANSTACK, true, false, txdata)) {
- // Only the witness is missing, so the transaction itself may be fine.
- state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_WITNESS_MUTATED, false,
- state.GetRejectCode(), state.GetRejectReason(), state.GetDebugMessage());
+ for (unsigned int j = 0; j < tx.vin.size(); j++)
+ {
+ // We don't want to accept replacements that require low
+ // feerate junk to be mined first. Ideally we'd keep track of
+ // the ancestor feerates and make the decision based on that,
+ // but for now requiring all new inputs to be confirmed works.
+ //
+ // Note that if you relax this to make RBF a little more useful,
+ // this may break the CalculateMempoolAncestors RBF relaxation,
+ // above. See the comment above the first CalculateMempoolAncestors
+ // call for more info.
+ if (!setConflictsParents.count(tx.vin[j].prevout.hash))
+ {
+ // Rather than check the UTXO set - potentially expensive -
+ // it's cheaper to just check if the new input refers to a
+ // tx that's in the mempool.
+ if (m_pool.exists(tx.vin[j].prevout.hash)) {
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "replacement-adds-unconfirmed",
+ strprintf("replacement %s adds unconfirmed input, idx %d",
+ hash.ToString(), j));
+ }
}
- assert(IsTransactionReason(state.GetReason()));
- return false; // state filled in by CheckInputs
- }
-
- // Check again against the current block tip's script verification
- // flags to cache our script execution flags. This is, of course,
- // useless if the next block has different script flags from the
- // previous one, but because the cache tracks script flags for us it
- // will auto-invalidate and we'll just have a few blocks of extra
- // misses on soft-fork activation.
- //
- // This is also useful in case of bugs in the standard flags that cause
- // transactions to pass as valid when they're actually invalid. For
- // instance the STRICTENC flag was incorrectly allowing certain
- // CHECKSIG NOT scripts to pass, even though they were invalid.
- //
- // There is a similar check in CreateNewBlock() to prevent creating
- // invalid blocks (using TestBlockValidity), however allowing such
- // transactions into the mempool can be exploited as a DoS attack.
- unsigned int currentBlockScriptVerifyFlags = GetBlockScriptFlags(::ChainActive().Tip(), chainparams.GetConsensus());
- if (!CheckInputsFromMempoolAndCache(tx, state, view, pool, currentBlockScriptVerifyFlags, true, txdata)) {
- return error("%s: BUG! PLEASE REPORT THIS! CheckInputs failed against latest-block but not STANDARD flags %s, %s",
- __func__, hash.ToString(), FormatStateMessage(state));
}
- if (test_accept) {
- // Tx was accepted, but not added
- return true;
+ // The replacement must pay greater fees than the transactions it
+ // replaces - if we did the bandwidth used by those conflicting
+ // transactions would not be paid for.
+ if (nModifiedFees < nConflictingFees)
+ {
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "insufficient fee",
+ strprintf("rejecting replacement %s, less fees than conflicting txs; %s < %s",
+ hash.ToString(), FormatMoney(nModifiedFees), FormatMoney(nConflictingFees)));
}
- // Remove conflicting transactions from the mempool
- for (CTxMemPool::txiter it : allConflicting)
+ // Finally in addition to paying more fees than the conflicts the
+ // new transaction must pay for its own bandwidth.
+ CAmount nDeltaFees = nModifiedFees - nConflictingFees;
+ if (nDeltaFees < ::incrementalRelayFee.GetFee(nSize))
{
- LogPrint(BCLog::MEMPOOL, "replacing tx %s with %s for %s BTC additional fees, %d delta bytes\n",
- it->GetTx().GetHash().ToString(),
- hash.ToString(),
- FormatMoney(nModifiedFees - nConflictingFees),
- (int)nSize - (int)nConflictingSize);
- if (plTxnReplaced)
- plTxnReplaced->push_back(it->GetSharedTx());
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "insufficient fee",
+ strprintf("rejecting replacement %s, not enough additional fees to relay; %s < %s",
+ hash.ToString(),
+ FormatMoney(nDeltaFees),
+ FormatMoney(::incrementalRelayFee.GetFee(nSize))));
}
- pool.RemoveStaged(allConflicting, false, MemPoolRemovalReason::REPLACED);
+ }
+ return true;
+}
+
+bool MemPoolAccept::PolicyScriptChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws, PrecomputedTransactionData& txdata)
+{
+ const CTransaction& tx = *ws.m_ptx;
- // This transaction should only count for fee estimation if:
- // - it isn't a BIP 125 replacement transaction (may not be widely supported)
- // - it's not being re-added during a reorg which bypasses typical mempool fee limits
- // - the node is not behind
- // - the transaction is not dependent on any other transactions in the mempool
- bool validForFeeEstimation = !fReplacementTransaction && !bypass_limits && IsCurrentForFeeEstimation() && pool.HasNoInputsOf(tx);
+ CValidationState &state = args.m_state;
- // Store transaction in memory
- pool.addUnchecked(entry, setAncestors, validForFeeEstimation);
+ constexpr unsigned int scriptVerifyFlags = STANDARD_SCRIPT_VERIFY_FLAGS;
- // trim mempool and check if tx was trimmed
- if (!bypass_limits) {
- LimitMempoolSize(pool, gArgs.GetArg("-maxmempool", DEFAULT_MAX_MEMPOOL_SIZE) * 1000000, gArgs.GetArg("-mempoolexpiry", DEFAULT_MEMPOOL_EXPIRY) * 60 * 60);
- if (!pool.exists(hash))
- return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "mempool full");
+ // Check against previous transactions
+ // This is done last to help prevent CPU exhaustion denial-of-service attacks.
+ if (!CheckInputs(tx, state, m_view, scriptVerifyFlags, true, false, txdata)) {
+ // SCRIPT_VERIFY_CLEANSTACK requires SCRIPT_VERIFY_WITNESS, so we
+ // need to turn both off, and compare against just turning off CLEANSTACK
+ // to see if the failure is specifically due to witness validation.
+ CValidationState stateDummy; // Want reported failures to be from first CheckInputs
+ if (!tx.HasWitness() && CheckInputs(tx, stateDummy, m_view, scriptVerifyFlags & ~(SCRIPT_VERIFY_WITNESS | SCRIPT_VERIFY_CLEANSTACK), true, false, txdata) &&
+ !CheckInputs(tx, stateDummy, m_view, scriptVerifyFlags & ~SCRIPT_VERIFY_CLEANSTACK, true, false, txdata)) {
+ // Only the witness is missing, so the transaction itself may be fine.
+ state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_WITNESS_MUTATED, false,
+ state.GetRejectCode(), state.GetRejectReason(), state.GetDebugMessage());
}
+ assert(IsTransactionReason(state.GetReason()));
+ return false; // state filled in by CheckInputs
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+bool MemPoolAccept::ConsensusScriptChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws, PrecomputedTransactionData& txdata)
+{
+ const CTransaction& tx = *ws.m_ptx;
+ const uint256& hash = ws.m_hash;
+
+ CValidationState &state = args.m_state;
+ const CChainParams& chainparams = args.m_chainparams;
+
+ // Check again against the current block tip's script verification
+ // flags to cache our script execution flags. This is, of course,
+ // useless if the next block has different script flags from the
+ // previous one, but because the cache tracks script flags for us it
+ // will auto-invalidate and we'll just have a few blocks of extra
+ // misses on soft-fork activation.
+ //
+ // This is also useful in case of bugs in the standard flags that cause
+ // transactions to pass as valid when they're actually invalid. For
+ // instance the STRICTENC flag was incorrectly allowing certain
+ // CHECKSIG NOT scripts to pass, even though they were invalid.
+ //
+ // There is a similar check in CreateNewBlock() to prevent creating
+ // invalid blocks (using TestBlockValidity), however allowing such
+ // transactions into the mempool can be exploited as a DoS attack.
+ unsigned int currentBlockScriptVerifyFlags = GetBlockScriptFlags(::ChainActive().Tip(), chainparams.GetConsensus());
+ if (!CheckInputsFromMempoolAndCache(tx, state, m_view, m_pool, currentBlockScriptVerifyFlags, true, txdata)) {
+ return error("%s: BUG! PLEASE REPORT THIS! CheckInputs failed against latest-block but not STANDARD flags %s, %s",
+ __func__, hash.ToString(), FormatStateMessage(state));
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+bool MemPoolAccept::Finalize(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws)
+{
+ const CTransaction& tx = *ws.m_ptx;
+ const uint256& hash = ws.m_hash;
+ CValidationState &state = args.m_state;
+ const bool bypass_limits = args.m_bypass_limits;
+
+ CTxMemPool::setEntries& allConflicting = ws.m_all_conflicting;
+ CTxMemPool::setEntries& setAncestors = ws.m_ancestors;
+ const CAmount& nModifiedFees = ws.m_modified_fees;
+ const CAmount& nConflictingFees = ws.m_conflicting_fees;
+ const size_t& nConflictingSize = ws.m_conflicting_size;
+ const bool fReplacementTransaction = ws.m_replacement_transaction;
+ std::unique_ptr<CTxMemPoolEntry>& entry = ws.m_entry;
+
+ // Remove conflicting transactions from the mempool
+ for (CTxMemPool::txiter it : allConflicting)
+ {
+ LogPrint(BCLog::MEMPOOL, "replacing tx %s with %s for %s BTC additional fees, %d delta bytes\n",
+ it->GetTx().GetHash().ToString(),
+ hash.ToString(),
+ FormatMoney(nModifiedFees - nConflictingFees),
+ (int)entry->GetTxSize() - (int)nConflictingSize);
+ if (args.m_replaced_transactions)
+ args.m_replaced_transactions->push_back(it->GetSharedTx());
+ }
+ m_pool.RemoveStaged(allConflicting, false, MemPoolRemovalReason::REPLACED);
+
+ // This transaction should only count for fee estimation if:
+ // - it isn't a BIP 125 replacement transaction (may not be widely supported)
+ // - it's not being re-added during a reorg which bypasses typical mempool fee limits
+ // - the node is not behind
+ // - the transaction is not dependent on any other transactions in the mempool
+ bool validForFeeEstimation = !fReplacementTransaction && !bypass_limits && IsCurrentForFeeEstimation() && m_pool.HasNoInputsOf(tx);
+
+ // Store transaction in memory
+ m_pool.addUnchecked(*entry, setAncestors, validForFeeEstimation);
+
+ // trim mempool and check if tx was trimmed
+ if (!bypass_limits) {
+ LimitMempoolSize(m_pool, gArgs.GetArg("-maxmempool", DEFAULT_MAX_MEMPOOL_SIZE) * 1000000, gArgs.GetArg("-mempoolexpiry", DEFAULT_MEMPOOL_EXPIRY) * 60 * 60);
+ if (!m_pool.exists(hash))
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "mempool full");
}
+ return true;
+}
+
+bool MemPoolAccept::AcceptSingleTransaction(const CTransactionRef& ptx, ATMPArgs& args)
+{
+ AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
+ LOCK(m_pool.cs); // mempool "read lock" (held through GetMainSignals().TransactionAddedToMempool())
+
+ Workspace workspace(ptx);
+
+ if (!PreChecks(args, workspace)) return false;
+
+ // Only compute the precomputed transaction data if we need to verify
+ // scripts (ie, other policy checks pass). We perform the inexpensive
+ // checks first and avoid hashing and signature verification unless those
+ // checks pass, to mitigate CPU exhaustion denial-of-service attacks.
+ PrecomputedTransactionData txdata(*ptx);
+
+ if (!PolicyScriptChecks(args, workspace, txdata)) return false;
+
+ if (!ConsensusScriptChecks(args, workspace, txdata)) return false;
+
+ // Tx was accepted, but not added
+ if (args.m_test_accept) return true;
+
+ if (!Finalize(args, workspace)) return false;
GetMainSignals().TransactionAddedToMempool(ptx);
return true;
}
+} // anon namespace
+
/** (try to) add transaction to memory pool with a specified acceptance time **/
static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWithTime(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool& pool, CValidationState &state, const CTransactionRef &tx,
bool* pfMissingInputs, int64_t nAcceptTime, std::list<CTransactionRef>* plTxnReplaced,
bool bypass_limits, const CAmount nAbsurdFee, bool test_accept) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main)
{
std::vector<COutPoint> coins_to_uncache;
- bool res = AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(chainparams, pool, state, tx, pfMissingInputs, nAcceptTime, plTxnReplaced, bypass_limits, nAbsurdFee, coins_to_uncache, test_accept);
+ MemPoolAccept::ATMPArgs args { chainparams, state, pfMissingInputs, nAcceptTime, plTxnReplaced, bypass_limits, nAbsurdFee, coins_to_uncache, test_accept };
+ bool res = MemPoolAccept(pool).AcceptSingleTransaction(tx, args);
if (!res) {
// Remove coins that were not present in the coins cache before calling ATMPW;
// this is to prevent memory DoS in case we receive a large number of
@@ -1829,7 +1982,7 @@ bool CChainState::ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, CBl
// If such overwrites are allowed, coinbases and transactions depending upon those
// can be duplicated to remove the ability to spend the first instance -- even after
// being sent to another address.
- // See BIP30 and http://r6.ca/blog/20120206T005236Z.html for more information.
+ // See BIP30, CVE-2012-1909, and http://r6.ca/blog/20120206T005236Z.html for more information.
// This logic is not necessary for memory pool transactions, as AcceptToMemoryPool
// already refuses previously-known transaction ids entirely.
// This rule was originally applied to all blocks with a timestamp after March 15, 2012, 0:00 UTC.
@@ -3101,6 +3254,7 @@ bool CheckBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, const Consensus::P
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-cb-multiple", "more than one coinbase");
// Check transactions
+ // Must check for duplicate inputs (see CVE-2018-17144)
for (const auto& tx : block.vtx)
if (!CheckTransaction(*tx, state, true))
return state.Invalid(state.GetReason(), false, state.GetRejectCode(), state.GetRejectReason(),