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-rw-r--r--src/valgrind_ctime_test.c119
1 files changed, 119 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/valgrind_ctime_test.c b/src/valgrind_ctime_test.c
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+++ b/src/valgrind_ctime_test.c
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+/**********************************************************************
+ * Copyright (c) 2020 Gregory Maxwell *
+ * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying *
+ * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.*
+ **********************************************************************/
+
+#include <valgrind/memcheck.h>
+#include "include/secp256k1.h"
+#include "util.h"
+
+#if ENABLE_MODULE_ECDH
+# include "include/secp256k1_ecdh.h"
+#endif
+
+#if ENABLE_MODULE_RECOVERY
+# include "include/secp256k1_recovery.h"
+#endif
+
+int main(void) {
+ secp256k1_context* ctx;
+ secp256k1_ecdsa_signature signature;
+ secp256k1_pubkey pubkey;
+ size_t siglen = 74;
+ size_t outputlen = 33;
+ int i;
+ int ret;
+ unsigned char msg[32];
+ unsigned char key[32];
+ unsigned char sig[74];
+ unsigned char spubkey[33];
+#if ENABLE_MODULE_RECOVERY
+ secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature recoverable_signature;
+ int recid;
+#endif
+
+ if (!RUNNING_ON_VALGRIND) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "This test can only usefully be run inside valgrind.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "Usage: libtool --mode=execute valgrind ./valgrind_ctime_test\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ /** In theory, testing with a single secret input should be sufficient:
+ * If control flow depended on secrets the tool would generate an error.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
+ key[i] = i + 65;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
+ msg[i] = i + 1;
+ }
+
+ ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN | SECP256K1_CONTEXT_DECLASSIFY);
+
+ /* Test keygen. */
+ VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_UNDEFINED(key, 32);
+ ret = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pubkey, key);
+ VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED(&pubkey, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey));
+ VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED(&ret, sizeof(ret));
+ CHECK(ret);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(ctx, spubkey, &outputlen, &pubkey, SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED) == 1);
+
+ /* Test signing. */
+ VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_UNDEFINED(key, 32);
+ ret = secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(ctx, &signature, msg, key, NULL, NULL);
+ VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED(&signature, sizeof(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature));
+ VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED(&ret, sizeof(ret));
+ CHECK(ret);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_der(ctx, sig, &siglen, &signature));
+
+#if ENABLE_MODULE_ECDH
+ /* Test ECDH. */
+ VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_UNDEFINED(key, 32);
+ ret = secp256k1_ecdh(ctx, msg, &pubkey, key, NULL, NULL);
+ VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED(&ret, sizeof(ret));
+ CHECK(ret == 1);
+#endif
+
+#if ENABLE_MODULE_RECOVERY
+ /* Test signing a recoverable signature. */
+ VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_UNDEFINED(key, 32);
+ ret = secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable(ctx, &recoverable_signature, msg, key, NULL, NULL);
+ VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED(&recoverable_signature, sizeof(recoverable_signature));
+ VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED(&ret, sizeof(ret));
+ CHECK(ret);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_serialize_compact(ctx, sig, &recid, &recoverable_signature));
+ CHECK(recid >= 0 && recid <= 3);
+#endif
+
+ VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_UNDEFINED(key, 32);
+ ret = secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, key);
+ VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED(&ret, sizeof(ret));
+ CHECK(ret == 1);
+
+ VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_UNDEFINED(key, 32);
+ ret = secp256k1_ec_seckey_negate(ctx, key);
+ VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED(&ret, sizeof(ret));
+ CHECK(ret == 1);
+
+ VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_UNDEFINED(key, 32);
+ VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_UNDEFINED(msg, 32);
+ ret = secp256k1_ec_seckey_tweak_add(ctx, key, msg);
+ VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED(&ret, sizeof(ret));
+ CHECK(ret == 1);
+
+ VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_UNDEFINED(key, 32);
+ VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_UNDEFINED(msg, 32);
+ ret = secp256k1_ec_seckey_tweak_mul(ctx, key, msg);
+ VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED(&ret, sizeof(ret));
+ CHECK(ret == 1);
+
+ /* Test context randomisation. Do this last because it leaves the context tainted. */
+ VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_UNDEFINED(key, 32);
+ ret = secp256k1_context_randomize(ctx, key);
+ VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED(&ret, sizeof(ret));
+ CHECK(ret);
+
+ secp256k1_context_destroy(ctx);
+ return 0;
+}