diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/secp256k1')
42 files changed, 2928 insertions, 284 deletions
diff --git a/src/secp256k1/.gitignore b/src/secp256k1/.gitignore index cb4331aa90..ccdef02b29 100644 --- a/src/secp256k1/.gitignore +++ b/src/secp256k1/.gitignore @@ -1,9 +1,9 @@ bench_inv bench_ecdh bench_ecmult +bench_schnorrsig bench_sign bench_verify -bench_schnorr_verify bench_recover bench_internal tests @@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ libtool *.lo *.o *~ +*.log +*.trs src/libsecp256k1-config.h src/libsecp256k1-config.h.in src/ecmult_static_context.h diff --git a/src/secp256k1/.travis.yml b/src/secp256k1/.travis.yml index a6ad6fb27e..e1a88c4051 100644 --- a/src/secp256k1/.travis.yml +++ b/src/secp256k1/.travis.yml @@ -17,19 +17,19 @@ compiler: - gcc env: global: - - FIELD=auto BIGNUM=auto SCALAR=auto ENDOMORPHISM=no STATICPRECOMPUTATION=yes ECMULTGENPRECISION=auto ASM=no BUILD=check EXTRAFLAGS= HOST= ECDH=no RECOVERY=no EXPERIMENTAL=no CTIMETEST=yes BENCH=yes ITERS=2 + - WIDEMUL=auto BIGNUM=auto ENDOMORPHISM=no STATICPRECOMPUTATION=yes ECMULTGENPRECISION=auto ASM=no BUILD=check EXTRAFLAGS= HOST= ECDH=no RECOVERY=no SCHNORRSIG=no EXPERIMENTAL=no CTIMETEST=yes BENCH=yes ITERS=2 matrix: - - SCALAR=32bit RECOVERY=yes - - SCALAR=32bit FIELD=32bit ECDH=yes EXPERIMENTAL=yes - - SCALAR=64bit - - FIELD=64bit RECOVERY=yes - - FIELD=64bit ENDOMORPHISM=yes - - FIELD=64bit ENDOMORPHISM=yes ECDH=yes EXPERIMENTAL=yes - - FIELD=64bit ASM=x86_64 - - FIELD=64bit ENDOMORPHISM=yes ASM=x86_64 - - FIELD=32bit ENDOMORPHISM=yes + - WIDEMUL=int64 RECOVERY=yes + - WIDEMUL=int64 ECDH=yes EXPERIMENTAL=yes SCHNORRSIG=yes + - WIDEMUL=int64 ENDOMORPHISM=yes + - WIDEMUL=int128 + - WIDEMUL=int128 RECOVERY=yes EXPERIMENTAL=yes SCHNORRSIG=yes + - WIDEMUL=int128 ENDOMORPHISM=yes + - WIDEMUL=int128 ENDOMORPHISM=yes ECDH=yes EXPERIMENTAL=yes SCHNORRSIG=yes + - WIDEMUL=int128 ASM=x86_64 + - WIDEMUL=int128 ENDOMORPHISM=yes ASM=x86_64 - BIGNUM=no - - BIGNUM=no ENDOMORPHISM=yes RECOVERY=yes EXPERIMENTAL=yes + - BIGNUM=no ENDOMORPHISM=yes RECOVERY=yes EXPERIMENTAL=yes SCHNORRSIG=yes - BIGNUM=no STATICPRECOMPUTATION=no - BUILD=distcheck CTIMETEST= BENCH= - CPPFLAGS=-DDETERMINISTIC @@ -83,6 +83,10 @@ matrix: - valgrind - libtool-bin - libc6-dbg:i386 + # S390x build (big endian system) + - compiler: gcc + env: HOST=s390x-unknown-linux-gnu ECDH=yes RECOVERY=yes EXPERIMENTAL=yes CTIMETEST= + arch: s390x # We use this to install macOS dependencies instead of the built in `homebrew` plugin, # because in xcode earlier than 11 they have a bug requiring updating the system which overall takes ~8 minutes. diff --git a/src/secp256k1/Makefile.am b/src/secp256k1/Makefile.am index d8c1c79e8c..023fa6067f 100644 --- a/src/secp256k1/Makefile.am +++ b/src/secp256k1/Makefile.am @@ -34,9 +34,11 @@ noinst_HEADERS += src/field_5x52.h noinst_HEADERS += src/field_5x52_impl.h noinst_HEADERS += src/field_5x52_int128_impl.h noinst_HEADERS += src/field_5x52_asm_impl.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/assumptions.h noinst_HEADERS += src/util.h noinst_HEADERS += src/scratch.h noinst_HEADERS += src/scratch_impl.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/selftest.h noinst_HEADERS += src/testrand.h noinst_HEADERS += src/testrand_impl.h noinst_HEADERS += src/hash.h @@ -99,7 +101,7 @@ if VALGRIND_ENABLED tests_CPPFLAGS += -DVALGRIND noinst_PROGRAMS += valgrind_ctime_test valgrind_ctime_test_SOURCES = src/valgrind_ctime_test.c -valgrind_ctime_test_LDADD = libsecp256k1.la $(SECP_LIBS) $(SECP_TEST_LIBS) $(COMMON_LIB) +valgrind_ctime_test_LDADD = libsecp256k1.la $(SECP_LIBS) $(SECP_LIBS) $(COMMON_LIB) endif if !ENABLE_COVERAGE tests_CPPFLAGS += -DVERIFY @@ -152,3 +154,11 @@ endif if ENABLE_MODULE_RECOVERY include src/modules/recovery/Makefile.am.include endif + +if ENABLE_MODULE_EXTRAKEYS +include src/modules/extrakeys/Makefile.am.include +endif + +if ENABLE_MODULE_SCHNORRSIG +include src/modules/schnorrsig/Makefile.am.include +endif diff --git a/src/secp256k1/TODO b/src/secp256k1/TODO deleted file mode 100644 index a300e1c5eb..0000000000 --- a/src/secp256k1/TODO +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ -* Unit tests for fieldelem/groupelem, including ones intended to - trigger fieldelem's boundary cases. -* Complete constant-time operations for signing/keygen diff --git a/src/secp256k1/build-aux/m4/bitcoin_secp.m4 b/src/secp256k1/build-aux/m4/bitcoin_secp.m4 index 1b2b71e6ab..57595f4499 100644 --- a/src/secp256k1/build-aux/m4/bitcoin_secp.m4 +++ b/src/secp256k1/build-aux/m4/bitcoin_secp.m4 @@ -1,8 +1,3 @@ -dnl libsecp25k1 helper checks -AC_DEFUN([SECP_INT128_CHECK],[ -has_int128=$ac_cv_type___int128 -]) - dnl escape "$0x" below using the m4 quadrigaph @S|@, and escape it again with a \ for the shell. AC_DEFUN([SECP_64BIT_ASM_CHECK],[ AC_MSG_CHECKING(for x86_64 assembly availability) diff --git a/src/secp256k1/configure.ac b/src/secp256k1/configure.ac index 6021b760b5..6fe8984f4d 100644 --- a/src/secp256k1/configure.ac +++ b/src/secp256k1/configure.ac @@ -136,20 +136,28 @@ AC_ARG_ENABLE(module_recovery, [enable_module_recovery=$enableval], [enable_module_recovery=no]) +AC_ARG_ENABLE(module_extrakeys, + AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-module-extrakeys],[enable extrakeys module (experimental)]), + [enable_module_extrakeys=$enableval], + [enable_module_extrakeys=no]) + +AC_ARG_ENABLE(module_schnorrsig, + AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-module-schnorrsig],[enable schnorrsig module (experimental)]), + [enable_module_schnorrsig=$enableval], + [enable_module_schnorrsig=no]) + AC_ARG_ENABLE(external_default_callbacks, AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-external-default-callbacks],[enable external default callback functions [default=no]]), [use_external_default_callbacks=$enableval], [use_external_default_callbacks=no]) -AC_ARG_WITH([field], [AS_HELP_STRING([--with-field=64bit|32bit|auto], -[finite field implementation to use [default=auto]])],[req_field=$withval], [req_field=auto]) +dnl Test-only override of the (autodetected by the C code) "widemul" setting. +dnl Legal values are int64 (for [u]int64_t), int128 (for [unsigned] __int128), and auto (the default). +AC_ARG_WITH([test-override-wide-multiply], [] ,[set_widemul=$withval], [set_widemul=auto]) AC_ARG_WITH([bignum], [AS_HELP_STRING([--with-bignum=gmp|no|auto], [bignum implementation to use [default=auto]])],[req_bignum=$withval], [req_bignum=auto]) -AC_ARG_WITH([scalar], [AS_HELP_STRING([--with-scalar=64bit|32bit|auto], -[scalar implementation to use [default=auto]])],[req_scalar=$withval], [req_scalar=auto]) - AC_ARG_WITH([asm], [AS_HELP_STRING([--with-asm=x86_64|arm|no|auto], [assembly optimizations to use (experimental: arm) [default=auto]])],[req_asm=$withval], [req_asm=auto]) @@ -170,8 +178,6 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([ecmult-gen-precision], [AS_HELP_STRING([--with-ecmult-gen-precision )], [req_ecmult_gen_precision=$withval], [req_ecmult_gen_precision=auto]) -AC_CHECK_TYPES([__int128]) - AC_CHECK_HEADER([valgrind/memcheck.h], [enable_valgrind=yes], [enable_valgrind=no], []) AM_CONDITIONAL([VALGRIND_ENABLED],[test "$enable_valgrind" = "yes"]) @@ -265,63 +271,6 @@ else esac fi -if test x"$req_field" = x"auto"; then - if test x"set_asm" = x"x86_64"; then - set_field=64bit - fi - if test x"$set_field" = x; then - SECP_INT128_CHECK - if test x"$has_int128" = x"yes"; then - set_field=64bit - fi - fi - if test x"$set_field" = x; then - set_field=32bit - fi -else - set_field=$req_field - case $set_field in - 64bit) - if test x"$set_asm" != x"x86_64"; then - SECP_INT128_CHECK - if test x"$has_int128" != x"yes"; then - AC_MSG_ERROR([64bit field explicitly requested but neither __int128 support or x86_64 assembly available]) - fi - fi - ;; - 32bit) - ;; - *) - AC_MSG_ERROR([invalid field implementation selection]) - ;; - esac -fi - -if test x"$req_scalar" = x"auto"; then - SECP_INT128_CHECK - if test x"$has_int128" = x"yes"; then - set_scalar=64bit - fi - if test x"$set_scalar" = x; then - set_scalar=32bit - fi -else - set_scalar=$req_scalar - case $set_scalar in - 64bit) - SECP_INT128_CHECK - if test x"$has_int128" != x"yes"; then - AC_MSG_ERROR([64bit scalar explicitly requested but __int128 support not available]) - fi - ;; - 32bit) - ;; - *) - AC_MSG_ERROR([invalid scalar implementation selected]) - ;; - esac -fi - if test x"$req_bignum" = x"auto"; then SECP_GMP_CHECK if test x"$has_gmp" = x"yes"; then @@ -365,16 +314,18 @@ no) ;; esac -# select field implementation -case $set_field in -64bit) - AC_DEFINE(USE_FIELD_5X52, 1, [Define this symbol to use the FIELD_5X52 implementation]) +# select wide multiplication implementation +case $set_widemul in +int128) + AC_DEFINE(USE_FORCE_WIDEMUL_INT128, 1, [Define this symbol to force the use of the (unsigned) __int128 based wide multiplication implementation]) + ;; +int64) + AC_DEFINE(USE_FORCE_WIDEMUL_INT64, 1, [Define this symbol to force the use of the (u)int64_t based wide multiplication implementation]) ;; -32bit) - AC_DEFINE(USE_FIELD_10X26, 1, [Define this symbol to use the FIELD_10X26 implementation]) +auto) ;; *) - AC_MSG_ERROR([invalid field implementation]) + AC_MSG_ERROR([invalid wide multiplication implementation]) ;; esac @@ -396,19 +347,6 @@ no) ;; esac -#select scalar implementation -case $set_scalar in -64bit) - AC_DEFINE(USE_SCALAR_4X64, 1, [Define this symbol to use the 4x64 scalar implementation]) - ;; -32bit) - AC_DEFINE(USE_SCALAR_8X32, 1, [Define this symbol to use the 8x32 scalar implementation]) - ;; -*) - AC_MSG_ERROR([invalid scalar implementation]) - ;; -esac - #set ecmult window size if test x"$req_ecmult_window" = x"auto"; then set_ecmult_window=15 @@ -493,7 +431,16 @@ if test x"$enable_module_recovery" = x"yes"; then AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_MODULE_RECOVERY, 1, [Define this symbol to enable the ECDSA pubkey recovery module]) fi -AC_C_BIGENDIAN() +if test x"$enable_module_schnorrsig" = x"yes"; then + AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_MODULE_SCHNORRSIG, 1, [Define this symbol to enable the schnorrsig module]) + enable_module_extrakeys=yes +fi + +# Test if extrakeys is set after the schnorrsig module to allow the schnorrsig +# module to set enable_module_extrakeys=yes +if test x"$enable_module_extrakeys" = x"yes"; then + AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_MODULE_EXTRAKEYS, 1, [Define this symbol to enable the extrakeys module]) +fi if test x"$use_external_asm" = x"yes"; then AC_DEFINE(USE_EXTERNAL_ASM, 1, [Define this symbol if an external (non-inline) assembly implementation is used]) @@ -508,11 +455,19 @@ if test x"$enable_experimental" = x"yes"; then AC_MSG_NOTICE([WARNING: experimental build]) AC_MSG_NOTICE([Experimental features do not have stable APIs or properties, and may not be safe for production use.]) AC_MSG_NOTICE([Building ECDH module: $enable_module_ecdh]) + AC_MSG_NOTICE([Building extrakeys module: $enable_module_extrakeys]) + AC_MSG_NOTICE([Building schnorrsig module: $enable_module_schnorrsig]) AC_MSG_NOTICE([******]) else if test x"$enable_module_ecdh" = x"yes"; then AC_MSG_ERROR([ECDH module is experimental. Use --enable-experimental to allow.]) fi + if test x"$enable_module_extrakeys" = x"yes"; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([extrakeys module is experimental. Use --enable-experimental to allow.]) + fi + if test x"$enable_module_schnorrsig" = x"yes"; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([schnorrsig module is experimental. Use --enable-experimental to allow.]) + fi if test x"$set_asm" = x"arm"; then AC_MSG_ERROR([ARM assembly optimization is experimental. Use --enable-experimental to allow.]) fi @@ -531,6 +486,8 @@ AM_CONDITIONAL([USE_BENCHMARK], [test x"$use_benchmark" = x"yes"]) AM_CONDITIONAL([USE_ECMULT_STATIC_PRECOMPUTATION], [test x"$set_precomp" = x"yes"]) AM_CONDITIONAL([ENABLE_MODULE_ECDH], [test x"$enable_module_ecdh" = x"yes"]) AM_CONDITIONAL([ENABLE_MODULE_RECOVERY], [test x"$enable_module_recovery" = x"yes"]) +AM_CONDITIONAL([ENABLE_MODULE_EXTRAKEYS], [test x"$enable_module_extrakeys" = x"yes"]) +AM_CONDITIONAL([ENABLE_MODULE_SCHNORRSIG], [test x"$enable_module_schnorrsig" = x"yes"]) AM_CONDITIONAL([USE_EXTERNAL_ASM], [test x"$use_external_asm" = x"yes"]) AM_CONDITIONAL([USE_ASM_ARM], [test x"$set_asm" = x"arm"]) @@ -550,13 +507,17 @@ echo " with benchmarks = $use_benchmark" echo " with coverage = $enable_coverage" echo " module ecdh = $enable_module_ecdh" echo " module recovery = $enable_module_recovery" +echo " module extrakeys = $enable_module_extrakeys" +echo " module schnorrsig = $enable_module_schnorrsig" echo echo " asm = $set_asm" echo " bignum = $set_bignum" -echo " field = $set_field" -echo " scalar = $set_scalar" echo " ecmult window size = $set_ecmult_window" echo " ecmult gen prec. bits = $set_ecmult_gen_precision" +dnl Hide test-only options unless they're used. +if test x"$set_widemul" != xauto; then +echo " wide multiplication = $set_widemul" +fi echo echo " valgrind = $enable_valgrind" echo " CC = $CC" diff --git a/src/secp256k1/contrib/lax_der_parsing.c b/src/secp256k1/contrib/lax_der_parsing.c index e177a0562d..f71db4b535 100644 --- a/src/secp256k1/contrib/lax_der_parsing.c +++ b/src/secp256k1/contrib/lax_der_parsing.c @@ -112,7 +112,6 @@ int ecdsa_signature_parse_der_lax(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_ecdsa_ return 0; } spos = pos; - pos += slen; /* Ignore leading zeroes in R */ while (rlen > 0 && input[rpos] == 0) { diff --git a/src/secp256k1/contrib/travis.sh b/src/secp256k1/contrib/travis.sh index 3909d16a27..b0b55b44b8 100755 --- a/src/secp256k1/contrib/travis.sh +++ b/src/secp256k1/contrib/travis.sh @@ -3,10 +3,6 @@ set -e set -x -if [ -n "$HOST" ] -then - export USE_HOST="--host=$HOST" -fi if [ "$HOST" = "i686-linux-gnu" ] then export CC="$CC -m32" @@ -18,9 +14,11 @@ fi ./configure \ --enable-experimental="$EXPERIMENTAL" --enable-endomorphism="$ENDOMORPHISM" \ - --with-field="$FIELD" --with-bignum="$BIGNUM" --with-asm="$ASM" --with-scalar="$SCALAR" \ + --with-test-override-wide-multiply="$WIDEMUL" --with-bignum="$BIGNUM" --with-asm="$ASM" \ --enable-ecmult-static-precomputation="$STATICPRECOMPUTATION" --with-ecmult-gen-precision="$ECMULTGENPRECISION" \ - --enable-module-ecdh="$ECDH" --enable-module-recovery="$RECOVERY" "$EXTRAFLAGS" "$USE_HOST" + --enable-module-ecdh="$ECDH" --enable-module-recovery="$RECOVERY" \ + --enable-module-schnorrsig="$SCHNORRSIG" \ + --host="$HOST" $EXTRAFLAGS if [ -n "$BUILD" ] then diff --git a/src/secp256k1/include/secp256k1.h b/src/secp256k1/include/secp256k1.h index 2ba2dca388..2178c8e2d6 100644 --- a/src/secp256k1/include/secp256k1.h +++ b/src/secp256k1/include/secp256k1.h @@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ typedef int (*secp256k1_nonce_function)( # else # define SECP256K1_API # endif -# elif defined(__GNUC__) && defined(SECP256K1_BUILD) +# elif defined(__GNUC__) && (__GNUC__ >= 4) && defined(SECP256K1_BUILD) # define SECP256K1_API __attribute__ ((visibility ("default"))) # else # define SECP256K1_API diff --git a/src/secp256k1/include/secp256k1_extrakeys.h b/src/secp256k1/include/secp256k1_extrakeys.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0c5dff2c94 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/secp256k1/include/secp256k1_extrakeys.h @@ -0,0 +1,236 @@ +#ifndef SECP256K1_EXTRAKEYS_H +#define SECP256K1_EXTRAKEYS_H + +#include "secp256k1.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** Opaque data structure that holds a parsed and valid "x-only" public key. + * An x-only pubkey encodes a point whose Y coordinate is even. It is + * serialized using only its X coordinate (32 bytes). See BIP-340 for more + * information about x-only pubkeys. + * + * The exact representation of data inside is implementation defined and not + * guaranteed to be portable between different platforms or versions. It is + * however guaranteed to be 64 bytes in size, and can be safely copied/moved. + * If you need to convert to a format suitable for storage, transmission, or + * comparison, use secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_serialize and + * secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_parse. + */ +typedef struct { + unsigned char data[64]; +} secp256k1_xonly_pubkey; + +/** Opaque data structure that holds a keypair consisting of a secret and a + * public key. + * + * The exact representation of data inside is implementation defined and not + * guaranteed to be portable between different platforms or versions. It is + * however guaranteed to be 96 bytes in size, and can be safely copied/moved. + */ +typedef struct { + unsigned char data[96]; +} secp256k1_keypair; + +/** Parse a 32-byte sequence into a xonly_pubkey object. + * + * Returns: 1 if the public key was fully valid. + * 0 if the public key could not be parsed or is invalid. + * + * Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object (cannot be NULL). + * Out: pubkey: pointer to a pubkey object. If 1 is returned, it is set to a + * parsed version of input. If not, it's set to an invalid value. + * (cannot be NULL). + * In: input32: pointer to a serialized xonly_pubkey (cannot be NULL) + */ +SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_parse( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + secp256k1_xonly_pubkey* pubkey, + const unsigned char *input32 +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); + +/** Serialize an xonly_pubkey object into a 32-byte sequence. + * + * Returns: 1 always. + * + * Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object (cannot be NULL). + * Out: output32: a pointer to a 32-byte array to place the serialized key in + * (cannot be NULL). + * In: pubkey: a pointer to a secp256k1_xonly_pubkey containing an + * initialized public key (cannot be NULL). + */ +SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_serialize( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + unsigned char *output32, + const secp256k1_xonly_pubkey* pubkey +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); + +/** Converts a secp256k1_pubkey into a secp256k1_xonly_pubkey. + * + * Returns: 1 if the public key was successfully converted + * 0 otherwise + * + * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object (cannot be NULL) + * Out: xonly_pubkey: pointer to an x-only public key object for placing the + * converted public key (cannot be NULL) + * pk_parity: pointer to an integer that will be set to 1 if the point + * encoded by xonly_pubkey is the negation of the pubkey and + * set to 0 otherwise. (can be NULL) + * In: pubkey: pointer to a public key that is converted (cannot be NULL) + */ +SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + secp256k1_xonly_pubkey *xonly_pubkey, + int *pk_parity, + const secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4); + +/** Tweak an x-only public key by adding the generator multiplied with tweak32 + * to it. + * + * Note that the resulting point can not in general be represented by an x-only + * pubkey because it may have an odd Y coordinate. Instead, the output_pubkey + * is a normal secp256k1_pubkey. + * + * Returns: 0 if the arguments are invalid or the resulting public key would be + * invalid (only when the tweak is the negation of the corresponding + * secret key). 1 otherwise. + * + * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object initialized for verification + * (cannot be NULL) + * Out: output_pubkey: pointer to a public key to store the result. Will be set + * to an invalid value if this function returns 0 (cannot + * be NULL) + * In: internal_pubkey: pointer to an x-only pubkey to apply the tweak to. + * (cannot be NULL). + * tweak32: pointer to a 32-byte tweak. If the tweak is invalid + * according to secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify, this function + * returns 0. For uniformly random 32-byte arrays the + * chance of being invalid is negligible (around 1 in + * 2^128) (cannot be NULL). + */ +SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + secp256k1_pubkey *output_pubkey, + const secp256k1_xonly_pubkey *internal_pubkey, + const unsigned char *tweak32 +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4); + +/** Checks that a tweaked pubkey is the result of calling + * secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add with internal_pubkey and tweak32. + * + * The tweaked pubkey is represented by its 32-byte x-only serialization and + * its pk_parity, which can both be obtained by converting the result of + * tweak_add to a secp256k1_xonly_pubkey. + * + * Note that this alone does _not_ verify that the tweaked pubkey is a + * commitment. If the tweak is not chosen in a specific way, the tweaked pubkey + * can easily be the result of a different internal_pubkey and tweak. + * + * Returns: 0 if the arguments are invalid or the tweaked pubkey is not the + * result of tweaking the internal_pubkey with tweak32. 1 otherwise. + * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object initialized for verification + * (cannot be NULL) + * In: tweaked_pubkey32: pointer to a serialized xonly_pubkey (cannot be NULL) + * tweaked_pk_parity: the parity of the tweaked pubkey (whose serialization + * is passed in as tweaked_pubkey32). This must match the + * pk_parity value that is returned when calling + * secp256k1_xonly_pubkey with the tweaked pubkey, or + * this function will fail. + * internal_pubkey: pointer to an x-only public key object to apply the + * tweak to (cannot be NULL) + * tweak32: pointer to a 32-byte tweak (cannot be NULL) + */ +SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + const unsigned char *tweaked_pubkey32, + int tweaked_pk_parity, + const secp256k1_xonly_pubkey *internal_pubkey, + const unsigned char *tweak32 +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(5); + +/** Compute the keypair for a secret key. + * + * Returns: 1: secret was valid, keypair is ready to use + * 0: secret was invalid, try again with a different secret + * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object, initialized for signing (cannot be NULL) + * Out: keypair: pointer to the created keypair (cannot be NULL) + * In: seckey: pointer to a 32-byte secret key (cannot be NULL) + */ +SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_keypair_create( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + secp256k1_keypair *keypair, + const unsigned char *seckey +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); + +/** Get the public key from a keypair. + * + * Returns: 0 if the arguments are invalid. 1 otherwise. + * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object (cannot be NULL) + * Out: pubkey: pointer to a pubkey object. If 1 is returned, it is set to + * the keypair public key. If not, it's set to an invalid value. + * (cannot be NULL) + * In: keypair: pointer to a keypair (cannot be NULL) + */ +SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_keypair_pub( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey, + const secp256k1_keypair *keypair +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); + +/** Get the x-only public key from a keypair. + * + * This is the same as calling secp256k1_keypair_pub and then + * secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey. + * + * Returns: 0 if the arguments are invalid. 1 otherwise. + * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object (cannot be NULL) + * Out: pubkey: pointer to an xonly_pubkey object. If 1 is returned, it is set + * to the keypair public key after converting it to an + * xonly_pubkey. If not, it's set to an invalid value (cannot be + * NULL). + * pk_parity: pointer to an integer that will be set to the pk_parity + * argument of secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey (can be NULL). + * In: keypair: pointer to a keypair (cannot be NULL) + */ +SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + secp256k1_xonly_pubkey *pubkey, + int *pk_parity, + const secp256k1_keypair *keypair +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4); + +/** Tweak a keypair by adding tweak32 to the secret key and updating the public + * key accordingly. + * + * Calling this function and then secp256k1_keypair_pub results in the same + * public key as calling secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub and then + * secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add. + * + * Returns: 0 if the arguments are invalid or the resulting keypair would be + * invalid (only when the tweak is the negation of the keypair's + * secret key). 1 otherwise. + * + * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object initialized for verification + * (cannot be NULL) + * In/Out: keypair: pointer to a keypair to apply the tweak to. Will be set to + * an invalid value if this function returns 0 (cannot be + * NULL). + * In: tweak32: pointer to a 32-byte tweak. If the tweak is invalid according + * to secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify, this function returns 0. For + * uniformly random 32-byte arrays the chance of being invalid + * is negligible (around 1 in 2^128) (cannot be NULL). + */ +SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_keypair_xonly_tweak_add( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + secp256k1_keypair *keypair, + const unsigned char *tweak32 +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* SECP256K1_EXTRAKEYS_H */ diff --git a/src/secp256k1/include/secp256k1_schnorrsig.h b/src/secp256k1/include/secp256k1_schnorrsig.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0150cd3395 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/secp256k1/include/secp256k1_schnorrsig.h @@ -0,0 +1,111 @@ +#ifndef SECP256K1_SCHNORRSIG_H +#define SECP256K1_SCHNORRSIG_H + +#include "secp256k1.h" +#include "secp256k1_extrakeys.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** This module implements a variant of Schnorr signatures compliant with + * Bitcoin Improvement Proposal 340 "Schnorr Signatures for secp256k1" + * (https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0340.mediawiki). + */ + +/** A pointer to a function to deterministically generate a nonce. + * + * Same as secp256k1_nonce function with the exception of accepting an + * additional pubkey argument and not requiring an attempt argument. The pubkey + * argument can protect signature schemes with key-prefixed challenge hash + * inputs against reusing the nonce when signing with the wrong precomputed + * pubkey. + * + * Returns: 1 if a nonce was successfully generated. 0 will cause signing to + * return an error. + * Out: nonce32: pointer to a 32-byte array to be filled by the function. + * In: msg32: the 32-byte message hash being verified (will not be NULL) + * key32: pointer to a 32-byte secret key (will not be NULL) + * xonly_pk32: the 32-byte serialized xonly pubkey corresponding to key32 + * (will not be NULL) + * algo16: pointer to a 16-byte array describing the signature + * algorithm (will not be NULL). + * data: Arbitrary data pointer that is passed through. + * + * Except for test cases, this function should compute some cryptographic hash of + * the message, the key, the pubkey, the algorithm description, and data. + */ +typedef int (*secp256k1_nonce_function_hardened)( + unsigned char *nonce32, + const unsigned char *msg32, + const unsigned char *key32, + const unsigned char *xonly_pk32, + const unsigned char *algo16, + void *data +); + +/** An implementation of the nonce generation function as defined in Bitcoin + * Improvement Proposal 340 "Schnorr Signatures for secp256k1" + * (https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0340.mediawiki). + * + * If a data pointer is passed, it is assumed to be a pointer to 32 bytes of + * auxiliary random data as defined in BIP-340. If the data pointer is NULL, + * schnorrsig_sign does not produce BIP-340 compliant signatures. The algo16 + * argument must be non-NULL, otherwise the function will fail and return 0. + * The hash will be tagged with algo16 after removing all terminating null + * bytes. Therefore, to create BIP-340 compliant signatures, algo16 must be set + * to "BIP0340/nonce\0\0\0" + */ +SECP256K1_API extern const secp256k1_nonce_function_hardened secp256k1_nonce_function_bip340; + +/** Create a Schnorr signature. + * + * Does _not_ strictly follow BIP-340 because it does not verify the resulting + * signature. Instead, you can manually use secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify and + * abort if it fails. + * + * Otherwise BIP-340 compliant if the noncefp argument is NULL or + * secp256k1_nonce_function_bip340 and the ndata argument is 32-byte auxiliary + * randomness. + * + * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. + * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object, initialized for signing (cannot be NULL) + * Out: sig64: pointer to a 64-byte array to store the serialized signature (cannot be NULL) + * In: msg32: the 32-byte message being signed (cannot be NULL) + * keypair: pointer to an initialized keypair (cannot be NULL) + * noncefp: pointer to a nonce generation function. If NULL, secp256k1_nonce_function_bip340 is used + * ndata: pointer to arbitrary data used by the nonce generation + * function (can be NULL). If it is non-NULL and + * secp256k1_nonce_function_bip340 is used, then ndata must be a + * pointer to 32-byte auxiliary randomness as per BIP-340. + */ +SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + unsigned char *sig64, + const unsigned char *msg32, + const secp256k1_keypair *keypair, + secp256k1_nonce_function_hardened noncefp, + void *ndata +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4); + +/** Verify a Schnorr signature. + * + * Returns: 1: correct signature + * 0: incorrect signature + * Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object, initialized for verification. + * In: sig64: pointer to the 64-byte signature to verify (cannot be NULL) + * msg32: the 32-byte message being verified (cannot be NULL) + * pubkey: pointer to an x-only public key to verify with (cannot be NULL) + */ +SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + const unsigned char *sig64, + const unsigned char *msg32, + const secp256k1_xonly_pubkey *pubkey +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* SECP256K1_SCHNORRSIG_H */ diff --git a/src/secp256k1/src/assumptions.h b/src/secp256k1/src/assumptions.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f9d4e8e793 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/secp256k1/src/assumptions.h @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2020 Pieter Wuille * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef SECP256K1_ASSUMPTIONS_H +#define SECP256K1_ASSUMPTIONS_H + +#include "util.h" + +/* This library, like most software, relies on a number of compiler implementation defined (but not undefined) + behaviours. Although the behaviours we require are essentially universal we test them specifically here to + reduce the odds of experiencing an unwelcome surprise. +*/ + +struct secp256k1_assumption_checker { + /* This uses a trick to implement a static assertion in C89: a type with an array of negative size is not + allowed. */ + int dummy_array[( + /* Bytes are 8 bits. */ + CHAR_BIT == 8 && + + /* Conversions from unsigned to signed outside of the bounds of the signed type are + implementation-defined. Verify that they function as reinterpreting the lower + bits of the input in two's complement notation. Do this for conversions: + - from uint(N)_t to int(N)_t with negative result + - from uint(2N)_t to int(N)_t with negative result + - from int(2N)_t to int(N)_t with negative result + - from int(2N)_t to int(N)_t with positive result */ + + /* To int8_t. */ + ((int8_t)(uint8_t)0xAB == (int8_t)-(int8_t)0x55) && + ((int8_t)(uint16_t)0xABCD == (int8_t)-(int8_t)0x33) && + ((int8_t)(int16_t)(uint16_t)0xCDEF == (int8_t)(uint8_t)0xEF) && + ((int8_t)(int16_t)(uint16_t)0x9234 == (int8_t)(uint8_t)0x34) && + + /* To int16_t. */ + ((int16_t)(uint16_t)0xBCDE == (int16_t)-(int16_t)0x4322) && + ((int16_t)(uint32_t)0xA1B2C3D4 == (int16_t)-(int16_t)0x3C2C) && + ((int16_t)(int32_t)(uint32_t)0xC1D2E3F4 == (int16_t)(uint16_t)0xE3F4) && + ((int16_t)(int32_t)(uint32_t)0x92345678 == (int16_t)(uint16_t)0x5678) && + + /* To int32_t. */ + ((int32_t)(uint32_t)0xB2C3D4E5 == (int32_t)-(int32_t)0x4D3C2B1B) && + ((int32_t)(uint64_t)0xA123B456C789D012ULL == (int32_t)-(int32_t)0x38762FEE) && + ((int32_t)(int64_t)(uint64_t)0xC1D2E3F4A5B6C7D8ULL == (int32_t)(uint32_t)0xA5B6C7D8) && + ((int32_t)(int64_t)(uint64_t)0xABCDEF0123456789ULL == (int32_t)(uint32_t)0x23456789) && + + /* To int64_t. */ + ((int64_t)(uint64_t)0xB123C456D789E012ULL == (int64_t)-(int64_t)0x4EDC3BA928761FEEULL) && +#if defined(SECP256K1_WIDEMUL_INT128) + ((int64_t)(((uint128_t)0xA1234567B8901234ULL << 64) + 0xC5678901D2345678ULL) == (int64_t)-(int64_t)0x3A9876FE2DCBA988ULL) && + (((int64_t)(int128_t)(((uint128_t)0xB1C2D3E4F5A6B7C8ULL << 64) + 0xD9E0F1A2B3C4D5E6ULL)) == (int64_t)(uint64_t)0xD9E0F1A2B3C4D5E6ULL) && + (((int64_t)(int128_t)(((uint128_t)0xABCDEF0123456789ULL << 64) + 0x0123456789ABCDEFULL)) == (int64_t)(uint64_t)0x0123456789ABCDEFULL) && + + /* To int128_t. */ + ((int128_t)(((uint128_t)0xB1234567C8901234ULL << 64) + 0xD5678901E2345678ULL) == (int128_t)(-(int128_t)0x8E1648B3F50E80DCULL * 0x8E1648B3F50E80DDULL + 0x5EA688D5482F9464ULL)) && +#endif + + /* Right shift on negative signed values is implementation defined. Verify that it + acts as a right shift in two's complement with sign extension (i.e duplicating + the top bit into newly added bits). */ + ((((int8_t)0xE8) >> 2) == (int8_t)(uint8_t)0xFA) && + ((((int16_t)0xE9AC) >> 4) == (int16_t)(uint16_t)0xFE9A) && + ((((int32_t)0x937C918A) >> 9) == (int32_t)(uint32_t)0xFFC9BE48) && + ((((int64_t)0xA8B72231DF9CF4B9ULL) >> 19) == (int64_t)(uint64_t)0xFFFFF516E4463BF3ULL) && +#if defined(SECP256K1_WIDEMUL_INT128) + ((((int128_t)(((uint128_t)0xCD833A65684A0DBCULL << 64) + 0xB349312F71EA7637ULL)) >> 39) == (int128_t)(((uint128_t)0xFFFFFFFFFF9B0674ULL << 64) + 0xCAD0941B79669262ULL)) && +#endif + 1) * 2 - 1]; +}; + +#endif /* SECP256K1_ASSUMPTIONS_H */ diff --git a/src/secp256k1/src/basic-config.h b/src/secp256k1/src/basic-config.h index e9be39d4ca..83dbe6f25b 100644 --- a/src/secp256k1/src/basic-config.h +++ b/src/secp256k1/src/basic-config.h @@ -14,23 +14,20 @@ #undef USE_ENDOMORPHISM #undef USE_EXTERNAL_ASM #undef USE_EXTERNAL_DEFAULT_CALLBACKS -#undef USE_FIELD_10X26 -#undef USE_FIELD_5X52 #undef USE_FIELD_INV_BUILTIN #undef USE_FIELD_INV_NUM #undef USE_NUM_GMP #undef USE_NUM_NONE -#undef USE_SCALAR_4X64 -#undef USE_SCALAR_8X32 #undef USE_SCALAR_INV_BUILTIN #undef USE_SCALAR_INV_NUM +#undef USE_FORCE_WIDEMUL_INT64 +#undef USE_FORCE_WIDEMUL_INT128 #undef ECMULT_WINDOW_SIZE #define USE_NUM_NONE 1 #define USE_FIELD_INV_BUILTIN 1 #define USE_SCALAR_INV_BUILTIN 1 -#define USE_FIELD_10X26 1 -#define USE_SCALAR_8X32 1 +#define USE_WIDEMUL_64 1 #define ECMULT_WINDOW_SIZE 15 #endif /* USE_BASIC_CONFIG */ diff --git a/src/secp256k1/src/bench_internal.c b/src/secp256k1/src/bench_internal.c index 20759127d3..9687fe4482 100644 --- a/src/secp256k1/src/bench_internal.c +++ b/src/secp256k1/src/bench_internal.c @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ #include "include/secp256k1.h" +#include "assumptions.h" #include "util.h" #include "hash_impl.h" #include "num_impl.h" @@ -19,10 +20,10 @@ #include "secp256k1.c" typedef struct { - secp256k1_scalar scalar_x, scalar_y; - secp256k1_fe fe_x, fe_y; - secp256k1_ge ge_x, ge_y; - secp256k1_gej gej_x, gej_y; + secp256k1_scalar scalar[2]; + secp256k1_fe fe[4]; + secp256k1_ge ge[2]; + secp256k1_gej gej[2]; unsigned char data[64]; int wnaf[256]; } bench_inv; @@ -30,30 +31,53 @@ typedef struct { void bench_setup(void* arg) { bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; - static const unsigned char init_x[32] = { - 0x02, 0x03, 0x05, 0x07, 0x0b, 0x0d, 0x11, 0x13, - 0x17, 0x1d, 0x1f, 0x25, 0x29, 0x2b, 0x2f, 0x35, - 0x3b, 0x3d, 0x43, 0x47, 0x49, 0x4f, 0x53, 0x59, - 0x61, 0x65, 0x67, 0x6b, 0x6d, 0x71, 0x7f, 0x83 + static const unsigned char init[4][32] = { + /* Initializer for scalar[0], fe[0], first half of data, the X coordinate of ge[0], + and the (implied affine) X coordinate of gej[0]. */ + { + 0x02, 0x03, 0x05, 0x07, 0x0b, 0x0d, 0x11, 0x13, + 0x17, 0x1d, 0x1f, 0x25, 0x29, 0x2b, 0x2f, 0x35, + 0x3b, 0x3d, 0x43, 0x47, 0x49, 0x4f, 0x53, 0x59, + 0x61, 0x65, 0x67, 0x6b, 0x6d, 0x71, 0x7f, 0x83 + }, + /* Initializer for scalar[1], fe[1], first half of data, the X coordinate of ge[1], + and the (implied affine) X coordinate of gej[1]. */ + { + 0x82, 0x83, 0x85, 0x87, 0x8b, 0x8d, 0x81, 0x83, + 0x97, 0xad, 0xaf, 0xb5, 0xb9, 0xbb, 0xbf, 0xc5, + 0xdb, 0xdd, 0xe3, 0xe7, 0xe9, 0xef, 0xf3, 0xf9, + 0x11, 0x15, 0x17, 0x1b, 0x1d, 0xb1, 0xbf, 0xd3 + }, + /* Initializer for fe[2] and the Z coordinate of gej[0]. */ + { + 0x3d, 0x2d, 0xef, 0xf4, 0x25, 0x98, 0x4f, 0x5d, + 0xe2, 0xca, 0x5f, 0x41, 0x3f, 0x3f, 0xce, 0x44, + 0xaa, 0x2c, 0x53, 0x8a, 0xc6, 0x59, 0x1f, 0x38, + 0x38, 0x23, 0xe4, 0x11, 0x27, 0xc6, 0xa0, 0xe7 + }, + /* Initializer for fe[3] and the Z coordinate of gej[1]. */ + { + 0xbd, 0x21, 0xa5, 0xe1, 0x13, 0x50, 0x73, 0x2e, + 0x52, 0x98, 0xc8, 0x9e, 0xab, 0x00, 0xa2, 0x68, + 0x43, 0xf5, 0xd7, 0x49, 0x80, 0x72, 0xa7, 0xf3, + 0xd7, 0x60, 0xe6, 0xab, 0x90, 0x92, 0xdf, 0xc5 + } }; - static const unsigned char init_y[32] = { - 0x82, 0x83, 0x85, 0x87, 0x8b, 0x8d, 0x81, 0x83, - 0x97, 0xad, 0xaf, 0xb5, 0xb9, 0xbb, 0xbf, 0xc5, - 0xdb, 0xdd, 0xe3, 0xe7, 0xe9, 0xef, 0xf3, 0xf9, - 0x11, 0x15, 0x17, 0x1b, 0x1d, 0xb1, 0xbf, 0xd3 - }; - - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&data->scalar_x, init_x, NULL); - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&data->scalar_y, init_y, NULL); - secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&data->fe_x, init_x); - secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&data->fe_y, init_y); - CHECK(secp256k1_ge_set_xo_var(&data->ge_x, &data->fe_x, 0)); - CHECK(secp256k1_ge_set_xo_var(&data->ge_y, &data->fe_y, 1)); - secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&data->gej_x, &data->ge_x); - secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&data->gej_y, &data->ge_y); - memcpy(data->data, init_x, 32); - memcpy(data->data + 32, init_y, 32); + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&data->scalar[0], init[0], NULL); + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&data->scalar[1], init[1], NULL); + secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&data->fe[0], init[0]); + secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&data->fe[1], init[1]); + secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&data->fe[2], init[2]); + secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&data->fe[3], init[3]); + CHECK(secp256k1_ge_set_xo_var(&data->ge[0], &data->fe[0], 0)); + CHECK(secp256k1_ge_set_xo_var(&data->ge[1], &data->fe[1], 1)); + secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&data->gej[0], &data->ge[0]); + secp256k1_gej_rescale(&data->gej[0], &data->fe[2]); + secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&data->gej[1], &data->ge[1]); + secp256k1_gej_rescale(&data->gej[1], &data->fe[3]); + memcpy(data->data, init[0], 32); + memcpy(data->data + 32, init[1], 32); } void bench_scalar_add(void* arg, int iters) { @@ -61,7 +85,7 @@ void bench_scalar_add(void* arg, int iters) { bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; for (i = 0; i < iters; i++) { - j += secp256k1_scalar_add(&data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_y); + j += secp256k1_scalar_add(&data->scalar[0], &data->scalar[0], &data->scalar[1]); } CHECK(j <= iters); } @@ -71,7 +95,7 @@ void bench_scalar_negate(void* arg, int iters) { bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; for (i = 0; i < iters; i++) { - secp256k1_scalar_negate(&data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_x); + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&data->scalar[0], &data->scalar[0]); } } @@ -80,7 +104,7 @@ void bench_scalar_sqr(void* arg, int iters) { bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; for (i = 0; i < iters; i++) { - secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_x); + secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&data->scalar[0], &data->scalar[0]); } } @@ -89,7 +113,7 @@ void bench_scalar_mul(void* arg, int iters) { bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; for (i = 0; i < iters; i++) { - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_y); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&data->scalar[0], &data->scalar[0], &data->scalar[1]); } } @@ -99,8 +123,8 @@ void bench_scalar_split(void* arg, int iters) { bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; for (i = 0; i < iters; i++) { - secp256k1_scalar_split_lambda(&data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_y, &data->scalar_x); - j += secp256k1_scalar_add(&data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_y); + secp256k1_scalar_split_lambda(&data->scalar[0], &data->scalar[1], &data->scalar[0]); + j += secp256k1_scalar_add(&data->scalar[0], &data->scalar[0], &data->scalar[1]); } CHECK(j <= iters); } @@ -111,8 +135,8 @@ void bench_scalar_inverse(void* arg, int iters) { bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; for (i = 0; i < iters; i++) { - secp256k1_scalar_inverse(&data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_x); - j += secp256k1_scalar_add(&data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_y); + secp256k1_scalar_inverse(&data->scalar[0], &data->scalar[0]); + j += secp256k1_scalar_add(&data->scalar[0], &data->scalar[0], &data->scalar[1]); } CHECK(j <= iters); } @@ -122,8 +146,8 @@ void bench_scalar_inverse_var(void* arg, int iters) { bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; for (i = 0; i < iters; i++) { - secp256k1_scalar_inverse_var(&data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_x); - j += secp256k1_scalar_add(&data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_y); + secp256k1_scalar_inverse_var(&data->scalar[0], &data->scalar[0]); + j += secp256k1_scalar_add(&data->scalar[0], &data->scalar[0], &data->scalar[1]); } CHECK(j <= iters); } @@ -133,7 +157,7 @@ void bench_field_normalize(void* arg, int iters) { bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; for (i = 0; i < iters; i++) { - secp256k1_fe_normalize(&data->fe_x); + secp256k1_fe_normalize(&data->fe[0]); } } @@ -142,7 +166,7 @@ void bench_field_normalize_weak(void* arg, int iters) { bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; for (i = 0; i < iters; i++) { - secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&data->fe_x); + secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&data->fe[0]); } } @@ -151,7 +175,7 @@ void bench_field_mul(void* arg, int iters) { bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; for (i = 0; i < iters; i++) { - secp256k1_fe_mul(&data->fe_x, &data->fe_x, &data->fe_y); + secp256k1_fe_mul(&data->fe[0], &data->fe[0], &data->fe[1]); } } @@ -160,7 +184,7 @@ void bench_field_sqr(void* arg, int iters) { bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; for (i = 0; i < iters; i++) { - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&data->fe_x, &data->fe_x); + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&data->fe[0], &data->fe[0]); } } @@ -169,8 +193,8 @@ void bench_field_inverse(void* arg, int iters) { bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; for (i = 0; i < iters; i++) { - secp256k1_fe_inv(&data->fe_x, &data->fe_x); - secp256k1_fe_add(&data->fe_x, &data->fe_y); + secp256k1_fe_inv(&data->fe[0], &data->fe[0]); + secp256k1_fe_add(&data->fe[0], &data->fe[1]); } } @@ -179,8 +203,8 @@ void bench_field_inverse_var(void* arg, int iters) { bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; for (i = 0; i < iters; i++) { - secp256k1_fe_inv_var(&data->fe_x, &data->fe_x); - secp256k1_fe_add(&data->fe_x, &data->fe_y); + secp256k1_fe_inv_var(&data->fe[0], &data->fe[0]); + secp256k1_fe_add(&data->fe[0], &data->fe[1]); } } @@ -190,9 +214,9 @@ void bench_field_sqrt(void* arg, int iters) { secp256k1_fe t; for (i = 0; i < iters; i++) { - t = data->fe_x; - j += secp256k1_fe_sqrt(&data->fe_x, &t); - secp256k1_fe_add(&data->fe_x, &data->fe_y); + t = data->fe[0]; + j += secp256k1_fe_sqrt(&data->fe[0], &t); + secp256k1_fe_add(&data->fe[0], &data->fe[1]); } CHECK(j <= iters); } @@ -202,7 +226,7 @@ void bench_group_double_var(void* arg, int iters) { bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; for (i = 0; i < iters; i++) { - secp256k1_gej_double_var(&data->gej_x, &data->gej_x, NULL); + secp256k1_gej_double_var(&data->gej[0], &data->gej[0], NULL); } } @@ -211,7 +235,7 @@ void bench_group_add_var(void* arg, int iters) { bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; for (i = 0; i < iters; i++) { - secp256k1_gej_add_var(&data->gej_x, &data->gej_x, &data->gej_y, NULL); + secp256k1_gej_add_var(&data->gej[0], &data->gej[0], &data->gej[1], NULL); } } @@ -220,7 +244,7 @@ void bench_group_add_affine(void* arg, int iters) { bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; for (i = 0; i < iters; i++) { - secp256k1_gej_add_ge(&data->gej_x, &data->gej_x, &data->ge_y); + secp256k1_gej_add_ge(&data->gej[0], &data->gej[0], &data->ge[1]); } } @@ -229,7 +253,7 @@ void bench_group_add_affine_var(void* arg, int iters) { bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; for (i = 0; i < iters; i++) { - secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&data->gej_x, &data->gej_x, &data->ge_y, NULL); + secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&data->gej[0], &data->gej[0], &data->ge[1], NULL); } } @@ -238,9 +262,37 @@ void bench_group_jacobi_var(void* arg, int iters) { bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; for (i = 0; i < iters; i++) { - j += secp256k1_gej_has_quad_y_var(&data->gej_x); + j += secp256k1_gej_has_quad_y_var(&data->gej[0]); + /* Vary the Y and Z coordinates of the input (the X coordinate doesn't matter to + secp256k1_gej_has_quad_y_var). Note that the resulting coordinates will + generally not correspond to a point on the curve, but this is not a problem + for the code being benchmarked here. Adding and normalizing have less + overhead than EC operations (which could guarantee the point remains on the + curve). */ + secp256k1_fe_add(&data->gej[0].y, &data->fe[1]); + secp256k1_fe_add(&data->gej[0].z, &data->fe[2]); + secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&data->gej[0].y); + secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&data->gej[0].z); + } + CHECK(j <= iters); +} + +void bench_group_to_affine_var(void* arg, int iters) { + int i; + bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; + + for (i = 0; i < iters; ++i) { + secp256k1_ge_set_gej_var(&data->ge[1], &data->gej[0]); + /* Use the output affine X/Y coordinates to vary the input X/Y/Z coordinates. + Similar to bench_group_jacobi_var, this approach does not result in + coordinates of points on the curve. */ + secp256k1_fe_add(&data->gej[0].x, &data->ge[1].y); + secp256k1_fe_add(&data->gej[0].y, &data->fe[2]); + secp256k1_fe_add(&data->gej[0].z, &data->ge[1].x); + secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&data->gej[0].x); + secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&data->gej[0].y); + secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&data->gej[0].z); } - CHECK(j == iters); } void bench_ecmult_wnaf(void* arg, int iters) { @@ -248,8 +300,8 @@ void bench_ecmult_wnaf(void* arg, int iters) { bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; for (i = 0; i < iters; i++) { - bits += secp256k1_ecmult_wnaf(data->wnaf, 256, &data->scalar_x, WINDOW_A); - overflow += secp256k1_scalar_add(&data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_y); + bits += secp256k1_ecmult_wnaf(data->wnaf, 256, &data->scalar[0], WINDOW_A); + overflow += secp256k1_scalar_add(&data->scalar[0], &data->scalar[0], &data->scalar[1]); } CHECK(overflow >= 0); CHECK(bits <= 256*iters); @@ -260,8 +312,8 @@ void bench_wnaf_const(void* arg, int iters) { bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; for (i = 0; i < iters; i++) { - bits += secp256k1_wnaf_const(data->wnaf, &data->scalar_x, WINDOW_A, 256); - overflow += secp256k1_scalar_add(&data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_y); + bits += secp256k1_wnaf_const(data->wnaf, &data->scalar[0], WINDOW_A, 256); + overflow += secp256k1_scalar_add(&data->scalar[0], &data->scalar[0], &data->scalar[1]); } CHECK(overflow >= 0); CHECK(bits <= 256*iters); @@ -323,14 +375,15 @@ void bench_context_sign(void* arg, int iters) { void bench_num_jacobi(void* arg, int iters) { int i, j = 0; bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; - secp256k1_num nx, norder; + secp256k1_num nx, na, norder; - secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&nx, &data->scalar_x); + secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&nx, &data->scalar[0]); secp256k1_scalar_order_get_num(&norder); - secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&norder, &data->scalar_y); + secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&na, &data->scalar[1]); for (i = 0; i < iters; i++) { j += secp256k1_num_jacobi(&nx, &norder); + secp256k1_num_add(&nx, &nx, &na); } CHECK(j <= iters); } @@ -363,6 +416,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) { if (have_flag(argc, argv, "group") || have_flag(argc, argv, "add")) run_benchmark("group_add_affine", bench_group_add_affine, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, iters*10); if (have_flag(argc, argv, "group") || have_flag(argc, argv, "add")) run_benchmark("group_add_affine_var", bench_group_add_affine_var, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, iters*10); if (have_flag(argc, argv, "group") || have_flag(argc, argv, "jacobi")) run_benchmark("group_jacobi_var", bench_group_jacobi_var, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, iters); + if (have_flag(argc, argv, "group") || have_flag(argc, argv, "to_affine")) run_benchmark("group_to_affine_var", bench_group_to_affine_var, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, iters); if (have_flag(argc, argv, "ecmult") || have_flag(argc, argv, "wnaf")) run_benchmark("wnaf_const", bench_wnaf_const, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, iters); if (have_flag(argc, argv, "ecmult") || have_flag(argc, argv, "wnaf")) run_benchmark("ecmult_wnaf", bench_ecmult_wnaf, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, iters); diff --git a/src/secp256k1/src/bench_schnorrsig.c b/src/secp256k1/src/bench_schnorrsig.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..315f5af28e --- /dev/null +++ b/src/secp256k1/src/bench_schnorrsig.c @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2018-2020 Andrew Poelstra, Jonas Nick * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#include <string.h> +#include <stdlib.h> + + +#include "include/secp256k1.h" +#include "include/secp256k1_schnorrsig.h" +#include "util.h" +#include "bench.h" + +typedef struct { + secp256k1_context *ctx; + int n; + + const secp256k1_keypair **keypairs; + const unsigned char **pk; + const unsigned char **sigs; + const unsigned char **msgs; +} bench_schnorrsig_data; + +void bench_schnorrsig_sign(void* arg, int iters) { + bench_schnorrsig_data *data = (bench_schnorrsig_data *)arg; + int i; + unsigned char msg[32] = "benchmarkexamplemessagetemplate"; + unsigned char sig[64]; + + for (i = 0; i < iters; i++) { + msg[0] = i; + msg[1] = i >> 8; + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign(data->ctx, sig, msg, data->keypairs[i], NULL, NULL)); + } +} + +void bench_schnorrsig_verify(void* arg, int iters) { + bench_schnorrsig_data *data = (bench_schnorrsig_data *)arg; + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < iters; i++) { + secp256k1_xonly_pubkey pk; + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_parse(data->ctx, &pk, data->pk[i]) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify(data->ctx, data->sigs[i], data->msgs[i], &pk)); + } +} + +int main(void) { + int i; + bench_schnorrsig_data data; + int iters = get_iters(10000); + + data.ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY | SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN); + data.keypairs = (const secp256k1_keypair **)malloc(iters * sizeof(secp256k1_keypair *)); + data.pk = (const unsigned char **)malloc(iters * sizeof(unsigned char *)); + data.msgs = (const unsigned char **)malloc(iters * sizeof(unsigned char *)); + data.sigs = (const unsigned char **)malloc(iters * sizeof(unsigned char *)); + + for (i = 0; i < iters; i++) { + unsigned char sk[32]; + unsigned char *msg = (unsigned char *)malloc(32); + unsigned char *sig = (unsigned char *)malloc(64); + secp256k1_keypair *keypair = (secp256k1_keypair *)malloc(sizeof(*keypair)); + unsigned char *pk_char = (unsigned char *)malloc(32); + secp256k1_xonly_pubkey pk; + msg[0] = sk[0] = i; + msg[1] = sk[1] = i >> 8; + msg[2] = sk[2] = i >> 16; + msg[3] = sk[3] = i >> 24; + memset(&msg[4], 'm', 28); + memset(&sk[4], 's', 28); + + data.keypairs[i] = keypair; + data.pk[i] = pk_char; + data.msgs[i] = msg; + data.sigs[i] = sig; + + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(data.ctx, keypair, sk)); + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign(data.ctx, sig, msg, keypair, NULL, NULL)); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub(data.ctx, &pk, NULL, keypair)); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_serialize(data.ctx, pk_char, &pk) == 1); + } + + run_benchmark("schnorrsig_sign", bench_schnorrsig_sign, NULL, NULL, (void *) &data, 10, iters); + run_benchmark("schnorrsig_verify", bench_schnorrsig_verify, NULL, NULL, (void *) &data, 10, iters); + + for (i = 0; i < iters; i++) { + free((void *)data.keypairs[i]); + free((void *)data.pk[i]); + free((void *)data.msgs[i]); + free((void *)data.sigs[i]); + } + free(data.keypairs); + free(data.pk); + free(data.msgs); + free(data.sigs); + + secp256k1_context_destroy(data.ctx); + return 0; +} diff --git a/src/secp256k1/src/ecmult_const_impl.h b/src/secp256k1/src/ecmult_const_impl.h index 6d6d354aa4..55b61e4937 100644 --- a/src/secp256k1/src/ecmult_const_impl.h +++ b/src/secp256k1/src/ecmult_const_impl.h @@ -105,16 +105,22 @@ static int secp256k1_wnaf_const(int *wnaf, const secp256k1_scalar *scalar, int w /* 4 */ u_last = secp256k1_scalar_shr_int(&s, w); do { - int sign; int even; /* 4.1 4.4 */ u = secp256k1_scalar_shr_int(&s, w); /* 4.2 */ even = ((u & 1) == 0); - sign = 2 * (u_last > 0) - 1; - u += sign * even; - u_last -= sign * even * (1 << w); + /* In contrast to the original algorithm, u_last is always > 0 and + * therefore we do not need to check its sign. In particular, it's easy + * to see that u_last is never < 0 because u is never < 0. Moreover, + * u_last is never = 0 because u is never even after a loop + * iteration. The same holds analogously for the initial value of + * u_last (in the first loop iteration). */ + VERIFY_CHECK(u_last > 0); + VERIFY_CHECK((u_last & 1) == 1); + u += even; + u_last -= even * (1 << w); /* 4.3, adapted for global sign change */ wnaf[word++] = u_last * global_sign; @@ -202,7 +208,7 @@ static void secp256k1_ecmult_const(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_ge *a, cons int n; int j; for (j = 0; j < WINDOW_A - 1; ++j) { - secp256k1_gej_double_nonzero(r, r); + secp256k1_gej_double(r, r); } n = wnaf_1[i]; diff --git a/src/secp256k1/src/field.h b/src/secp256k1/src/field.h index 7993a1f11e..aca1fb72c5 100644 --- a/src/secp256k1/src/field.h +++ b/src/secp256k1/src/field.h @@ -22,16 +22,16 @@ #include "libsecp256k1-config.h" #endif -#if defined(USE_FIELD_10X26) -#include "field_10x26.h" -#elif defined(USE_FIELD_5X52) +#include "util.h" + +#if defined(SECP256K1_WIDEMUL_INT128) #include "field_5x52.h" +#elif defined(SECP256K1_WIDEMUL_INT64) +#include "field_10x26.h" #else -#error "Please select field implementation" +#error "Please select wide multiplication implementation" #endif -#include "util.h" - /** Normalize a field element. This brings the field element to a canonical representation, reduces * its magnitude to 1, and reduces it modulo field size `p`. */ diff --git a/src/secp256k1/src/field_5x52.h b/src/secp256k1/src/field_5x52.h index fc5bfe357e..6a068484c2 100644 --- a/src/secp256k1/src/field_5x52.h +++ b/src/secp256k1/src/field_5x52.h @@ -46,4 +46,10 @@ typedef struct { (d6) | (((uint64_t)(d7)) << 32) \ }} +#define SECP256K1_FE_STORAGE_CONST_GET(d) \ + (uint32_t)(d.n[3] >> 32), (uint32_t)d.n[3], \ + (uint32_t)(d.n[2] >> 32), (uint32_t)d.n[2], \ + (uint32_t)(d.n[1] >> 32), (uint32_t)d.n[1], \ + (uint32_t)(d.n[0] >> 32), (uint32_t)d.n[0] + #endif /* SECP256K1_FIELD_REPR_H */ diff --git a/src/secp256k1/src/field_impl.h b/src/secp256k1/src/field_impl.h index 485921a60e..18e4d2f30e 100644 --- a/src/secp256k1/src/field_impl.h +++ b/src/secp256k1/src/field_impl.h @@ -14,12 +14,12 @@ #include "util.h" #include "num.h" -#if defined(USE_FIELD_10X26) -#include "field_10x26_impl.h" -#elif defined(USE_FIELD_5X52) +#if defined(SECP256K1_WIDEMUL_INT128) #include "field_5x52_impl.h" +#elif defined(SECP256K1_WIDEMUL_INT64) +#include "field_10x26_impl.h" #else -#error "Please select field implementation" +#error "Please select wide multiplication implementation" #endif SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_fe_equal(const secp256k1_fe *a, const secp256k1_fe *b) { diff --git a/src/secp256k1/src/gen_context.c b/src/secp256k1/src/gen_context.c index 539f574bfd..8b7729aee4 100644 --- a/src/secp256k1/src/gen_context.c +++ b/src/secp256k1/src/gen_context.c @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ #include "basic-config.h" #include "include/secp256k1.h" +#include "assumptions.h" #include "util.h" #include "field_impl.h" #include "scalar_impl.h" diff --git a/src/secp256k1/src/group.h b/src/secp256k1/src/group.h index 863644f0f0..6185be052d 100644 --- a/src/secp256k1/src/group.h +++ b/src/secp256k1/src/group.h @@ -95,8 +95,8 @@ static int secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(const secp256k1_gej *a); /** Check whether a group element's y coordinate is a quadratic residue. */ static int secp256k1_gej_has_quad_y_var(const secp256k1_gej *a); -/** Set r equal to the double of a, a cannot be infinity. Constant time. */ -static void secp256k1_gej_double_nonzero(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_gej *a); +/** Set r equal to the double of a. Constant time. */ +static void secp256k1_gej_double(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_gej *a); /** Set r equal to the double of a. If rzr is not-NULL this sets *rzr such that r->z == a->z * *rzr (where infinity means an implicit z = 0). */ static void secp256k1_gej_double_var(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, secp256k1_fe *rzr); diff --git a/src/secp256k1/src/group_impl.h b/src/secp256k1/src/group_impl.h index 43b039becf..ccd93d3483 100644 --- a/src/secp256k1/src/group_impl.h +++ b/src/secp256k1/src/group_impl.h @@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ static int secp256k1_ge_is_valid_var(const secp256k1_ge *a) { return secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&y2, &x3); } -static SECP256K1_INLINE void secp256k1_gej_double_nonzero(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_gej *a) { +static SECP256K1_INLINE void secp256k1_gej_double(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_gej *a) { /* Operations: 3 mul, 4 sqr, 0 normalize, 12 mul_int/add/negate. * * Note that there is an implementation described at @@ -313,8 +313,7 @@ static SECP256K1_INLINE void secp256k1_gej_double_nonzero(secp256k1_gej *r, cons */ secp256k1_fe t1,t2,t3,t4; - VERIFY_CHECK(!secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(a)); - r->infinity = 0; + r->infinity = a->infinity; secp256k1_fe_mul(&r->z, &a->z, &a->y); secp256k1_fe_mul_int(&r->z, 2); /* Z' = 2*Y*Z (2) */ @@ -363,7 +362,7 @@ static void secp256k1_gej_double_var(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, s secp256k1_fe_mul_int(rzr, 2); } - secp256k1_gej_double_nonzero(r, a); + secp256k1_gej_double(r, a); } static void secp256k1_gej_add_var(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, const secp256k1_gej *b, secp256k1_fe *rzr) { @@ -400,7 +399,7 @@ static void secp256k1_gej_add_var(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, cons if (rzr != NULL) { secp256k1_fe_set_int(rzr, 0); } - r->infinity = 1; + secp256k1_gej_set_infinity(r); } return; } @@ -450,7 +449,7 @@ static void secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, c if (rzr != NULL) { secp256k1_fe_set_int(rzr, 0); } - r->infinity = 1; + secp256k1_gej_set_infinity(r); } return; } @@ -509,7 +508,7 @@ static void secp256k1_gej_add_zinv_var(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, if (secp256k1_fe_normalizes_to_zero_var(&i)) { secp256k1_gej_double_var(r, a, NULL); } else { - r->infinity = 1; + secp256k1_gej_set_infinity(r); } return; } diff --git a/src/secp256k1/src/hash_impl.h b/src/secp256k1/src/hash_impl.h index 782f97216c..409772587b 100644 --- a/src/secp256k1/src/hash_impl.h +++ b/src/secp256k1/src/hash_impl.h @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ #define SECP256K1_HASH_IMPL_H #include "hash.h" +#include "util.h" #include <stdlib.h> #include <stdint.h> @@ -27,9 +28,9 @@ (h) = t1 + t2; \ } while(0) -#ifdef WORDS_BIGENDIAN +#if defined(SECP256K1_BIG_ENDIAN) #define BE32(x) (x) -#else +#elif defined(SECP256K1_LITTLE_ENDIAN) #define BE32(p) ((((p) & 0xFF) << 24) | (((p) & 0xFF00) << 8) | (((p) & 0xFF0000) >> 8) | (((p) & 0xFF000000) >> 24)) #endif @@ -163,6 +164,19 @@ static void secp256k1_sha256_finalize(secp256k1_sha256 *hash, unsigned char *out memcpy(out32, (const unsigned char*)out, 32); } +/* Initializes a sha256 struct and writes the 64 byte string + * SHA256(tag)||SHA256(tag) into it. */ +static void secp256k1_sha256_initialize_tagged(secp256k1_sha256 *hash, const unsigned char *tag, size_t taglen) { + unsigned char buf[32]; + secp256k1_sha256_initialize(hash); + secp256k1_sha256_write(hash, tag, taglen); + secp256k1_sha256_finalize(hash, buf); + + secp256k1_sha256_initialize(hash); + secp256k1_sha256_write(hash, buf, 32); + secp256k1_sha256_write(hash, buf, 32); +} + static void secp256k1_hmac_sha256_initialize(secp256k1_hmac_sha256 *hash, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen) { size_t n; unsigned char rkey[64]; diff --git a/src/secp256k1/src/modules/extrakeys/Makefile.am.include b/src/secp256k1/src/modules/extrakeys/Makefile.am.include new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8515f92e7a --- /dev/null +++ b/src/secp256k1/src/modules/extrakeys/Makefile.am.include @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +include_HEADERS += include/secp256k1_extrakeys.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/extrakeys/tests_impl.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/extrakeys/main_impl.h diff --git a/src/secp256k1/src/modules/extrakeys/main_impl.h b/src/secp256k1/src/modules/extrakeys/main_impl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d319215355 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/secp256k1/src/modules/extrakeys/main_impl.h @@ -0,0 +1,248 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2020 Jonas Nick * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef _SECP256K1_MODULE_EXTRAKEYS_MAIN_ +#define _SECP256K1_MODULE_EXTRAKEYS_MAIN_ + +#include "include/secp256k1.h" +#include "include/secp256k1_extrakeys.h" + +static SECP256K1_INLINE int secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_load(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_ge *ge, const secp256k1_xonly_pubkey *pubkey) { + return secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, ge, (const secp256k1_pubkey *) pubkey); +} + +static SECP256K1_INLINE void secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_save(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey *pubkey, secp256k1_ge *ge) { + secp256k1_pubkey_save((secp256k1_pubkey *) pubkey, ge); +} + +int secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_parse(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_xonly_pubkey *pubkey, const unsigned char *input32) { + secp256k1_ge pk; + secp256k1_fe x; + + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(pubkey != NULL); + memset(pubkey, 0, sizeof(*pubkey)); + ARG_CHECK(input32 != NULL); + + if (!secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&x, input32)) { + return 0; + } + if (!secp256k1_ge_set_xo_var(&pk, &x, 0)) { + return 0; + } + secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_save(pubkey, &pk); + return 1; +} + +int secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_serialize(const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char *output32, const secp256k1_xonly_pubkey *pubkey) { + secp256k1_ge pk; + + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(output32 != NULL); + memset(output32, 0, 32); + ARG_CHECK(pubkey != NULL); + + if (!secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_load(ctx, &pk, pubkey)) { + return 0; + } + secp256k1_fe_get_b32(output32, &pk.x); + return 1; +} + +/** Keeps a group element as is if it has an even Y and otherwise negates it. + * y_parity is set to 0 in the former case and to 1 in the latter case. + * Requires that the coordinates of r are normalized. */ +static int secp256k1_extrakeys_ge_even_y(secp256k1_ge *r) { + int y_parity = 0; + VERIFY_CHECK(!secp256k1_ge_is_infinity(r)); + + if (secp256k1_fe_is_odd(&r->y)) { + secp256k1_fe_negate(&r->y, &r->y, 1); + y_parity = 1; + } + return y_parity; +} + +int secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_xonly_pubkey *xonly_pubkey, int *pk_parity, const secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey) { + secp256k1_ge pk; + int tmp; + + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(xonly_pubkey != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(pubkey != NULL); + + if (!secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, &pk, pubkey)) { + return 0; + } + tmp = secp256k1_extrakeys_ge_even_y(&pk); + if (pk_parity != NULL) { + *pk_parity = tmp; + } + secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_save(xonly_pubkey, &pk); + return 1; +} + +int secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_pubkey *output_pubkey, const secp256k1_xonly_pubkey *internal_pubkey, const unsigned char *tweak32) { + secp256k1_ge pk; + + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(output_pubkey != NULL); + memset(output_pubkey, 0, sizeof(*output_pubkey)); + ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_ctx)); + ARG_CHECK(internal_pubkey != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(tweak32 != NULL); + + if (!secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_load(ctx, &pk, internal_pubkey) + || !secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add_helper(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &pk, tweak32)) { + return 0; + } + secp256k1_pubkey_save(output_pubkey, &pk); + return 1; +} + +int secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check(const secp256k1_context* ctx, const unsigned char *tweaked_pubkey32, int tweaked_pk_parity, const secp256k1_xonly_pubkey *internal_pubkey, const unsigned char *tweak32) { + secp256k1_ge pk; + unsigned char pk_expected32[32]; + + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_ctx)); + ARG_CHECK(internal_pubkey != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(tweaked_pubkey32 != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(tweak32 != NULL); + + if (!secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_load(ctx, &pk, internal_pubkey) + || !secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add_helper(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &pk, tweak32)) { + return 0; + } + secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&pk.x); + secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&pk.y); + secp256k1_fe_get_b32(pk_expected32, &pk.x); + + return memcmp(&pk_expected32, tweaked_pubkey32, 32) == 0 + && secp256k1_fe_is_odd(&pk.y) == tweaked_pk_parity; +} + +static void secp256k1_keypair_save(secp256k1_keypair *keypair, const secp256k1_scalar *sk, secp256k1_ge *pk) { + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(&keypair->data[0], sk); + secp256k1_pubkey_save((secp256k1_pubkey *)&keypair->data[32], pk); +} + + +static int secp256k1_keypair_seckey_load(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_scalar *sk, const secp256k1_keypair *keypair) { + int ret; + + ret = secp256k1_scalar_set_b32_seckey(sk, &keypair->data[0]); + /* We can declassify ret here because sk is only zero if a keypair function + * failed (which zeroes the keypair) and its return value is ignored. */ + secp256k1_declassify(ctx, &ret, sizeof(ret)); + ARG_CHECK(ret); + return ret; +} + +/* Load a keypair into pk and sk (if non-NULL). This function declassifies pk + * and ARG_CHECKs that the keypair is not invalid. It always initializes sk and + * pk with dummy values. */ +static int secp256k1_keypair_load(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_scalar *sk, secp256k1_ge *pk, const secp256k1_keypair *keypair) { + int ret; + const secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey = (const secp256k1_pubkey *)&keypair->data[32]; + + /* Need to declassify the pubkey because pubkey_load ARG_CHECKs if it's + * invalid. */ + secp256k1_declassify(ctx, pubkey, sizeof(*pubkey)); + ret = secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, pk, pubkey); + if (sk != NULL) { + ret = ret && secp256k1_keypair_seckey_load(ctx, sk, keypair); + } + if (!ret) { + *pk = secp256k1_ge_const_g; + if (sk != NULL) { + *sk = secp256k1_scalar_one; + } + } + return ret; +} + +int secp256k1_keypair_create(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_keypair *keypair, const unsigned char *seckey32) { + secp256k1_scalar sk; + secp256k1_ge pk; + int ret = 0; + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(keypair != NULL); + memset(keypair, 0, sizeof(*keypair)); + ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx)); + ARG_CHECK(seckey32 != NULL); + + ret = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create_helper(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &sk, &pk, seckey32); + secp256k1_keypair_save(keypair, &sk, &pk); + memczero(keypair, sizeof(*keypair), !ret); + + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&sk); + return ret; +} + +int secp256k1_keypair_pub(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey, const secp256k1_keypair *keypair) { + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(pubkey != NULL); + memset(pubkey, 0, sizeof(*pubkey)); + ARG_CHECK(keypair != NULL); + + memcpy(pubkey->data, &keypair->data[32], sizeof(*pubkey)); + return 1; +} + +int secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_xonly_pubkey *pubkey, int *pk_parity, const secp256k1_keypair *keypair) { + secp256k1_ge pk; + int tmp; + + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(pubkey != NULL); + memset(pubkey, 0, sizeof(*pubkey)); + ARG_CHECK(keypair != NULL); + + if (!secp256k1_keypair_load(ctx, NULL, &pk, keypair)) { + return 0; + } + tmp = secp256k1_extrakeys_ge_even_y(&pk); + if (pk_parity != NULL) { + *pk_parity = tmp; + } + secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_save(pubkey, &pk); + + return 1; +} + +int secp256k1_keypair_xonly_tweak_add(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_keypair *keypair, const unsigned char *tweak32) { + secp256k1_ge pk; + secp256k1_scalar sk; + int y_parity; + int ret; + + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_ctx)); + ARG_CHECK(keypair != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(tweak32 != NULL); + + ret = secp256k1_keypair_load(ctx, &sk, &pk, keypair); + memset(keypair, 0, sizeof(*keypair)); + + y_parity = secp256k1_extrakeys_ge_even_y(&pk); + if (y_parity == 1) { + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&sk, &sk); + } + + ret &= secp256k1_ec_seckey_tweak_add_helper(&sk, tweak32); + ret &= secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add_helper(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &pk, tweak32); + + secp256k1_declassify(ctx, &ret, sizeof(ret)); + if (ret) { + secp256k1_keypair_save(keypair, &sk, &pk); + } + + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&sk); + return ret; +} + +#endif diff --git a/src/secp256k1/src/modules/extrakeys/tests_impl.h b/src/secp256k1/src/modules/extrakeys/tests_impl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..fc9d40eda1 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/secp256k1/src/modules/extrakeys/tests_impl.h @@ -0,0 +1,524 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2020 Jonas Nick * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef _SECP256K1_MODULE_EXTRAKEYS_TESTS_ +#define _SECP256K1_MODULE_EXTRAKEYS_TESTS_ + +#include "secp256k1_extrakeys.h" + +static secp256k1_context* api_test_context(int flags, int *ecount) { + secp256k1_context *ctx0 = secp256k1_context_create(flags); + secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(ctx0, counting_illegal_callback_fn, ecount); + secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(ctx0, counting_illegal_callback_fn, ecount); + return ctx0; +} + +void test_xonly_pubkey(void) { + secp256k1_pubkey pk; + secp256k1_xonly_pubkey xonly_pk, xonly_pk_tmp; + secp256k1_ge pk1; + secp256k1_ge pk2; + secp256k1_fe y; + unsigned char sk[32]; + unsigned char xy_sk[32]; + unsigned char buf32[32]; + unsigned char ones32[32]; + unsigned char zeros64[64] = { 0 }; + int pk_parity; + int i; + + int ecount; + secp256k1_context *none = api_test_context(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE, &ecount); + secp256k1_context *sign = api_test_context(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN, &ecount); + secp256k1_context *verify = api_test_context(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY, &ecount); + + secp256k1_rand256(sk); + memset(ones32, 0xFF, 32); + secp256k1_rand256(xy_sk); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(sign, &pk, sk) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(none, &xonly_pk, &pk_parity, &pk) == 1); + + /* Test xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey */ + ecount = 0; + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(none, &xonly_pk, &pk_parity, &pk) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(sign, &xonly_pk, &pk_parity, &pk) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(verify, &xonly_pk, &pk_parity, &pk) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(none, NULL, &pk_parity, &pk) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(none, &xonly_pk, NULL, &pk) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(none, &xonly_pk, &pk_parity, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + memset(&pk, 0, sizeof(pk)); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(none, &xonly_pk, &pk_parity, &pk) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 3); + + /* Choose a secret key such that the resulting pubkey and xonly_pubkey match. */ + memset(sk, 0, sizeof(sk)); + sk[0] = 1; + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pk, sk) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(ctx, &xonly_pk, &pk_parity, &pk) == 1); + CHECK(memcmp(&pk, &xonly_pk, sizeof(pk)) == 0); + CHECK(pk_parity == 0); + + /* Choose a secret key such that pubkey and xonly_pubkey are each others + * negation. */ + sk[0] = 2; + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pk, sk) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(ctx, &xonly_pk, &pk_parity, &pk) == 1); + CHECK(memcmp(&xonly_pk, &pk, sizeof(xonly_pk)) != 0); + CHECK(pk_parity == 1); + secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, &pk1, &pk); + secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, &pk2, (secp256k1_pubkey *) &xonly_pk); + CHECK(secp256k1_fe_equal(&pk1.x, &pk2.x) == 1); + secp256k1_fe_negate(&y, &pk2.y, 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_fe_equal(&pk1.y, &y) == 1); + + /* Test xonly_pubkey_serialize and xonly_pubkey_parse */ + ecount = 0; + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_serialize(none, NULL, &xonly_pk) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_serialize(none, buf32, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(memcmp(buf32, zeros64, 32) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + { + /* A pubkey filled with 0s will fail to serialize due to pubkey_load + * special casing. */ + secp256k1_xonly_pubkey pk_tmp; + memset(&pk_tmp, 0, sizeof(pk_tmp)); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_serialize(none, buf32, &pk_tmp) == 0); + } + /* pubkey_load called illegal callback */ + CHECK(ecount == 3); + + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_serialize(none, buf32, &xonly_pk) == 1); + ecount = 0; + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_parse(none, NULL, buf32) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_parse(none, &xonly_pk, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + + /* Serialization and parse roundtrip */ + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(none, &xonly_pk, NULL, &pk) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_serialize(ctx, buf32, &xonly_pk) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_parse(ctx, &xonly_pk_tmp, buf32) == 1); + CHECK(memcmp(&xonly_pk, &xonly_pk_tmp, sizeof(xonly_pk)) == 0); + + /* Test parsing invalid field elements */ + memset(&xonly_pk, 1, sizeof(xonly_pk)); + /* Overflowing field element */ + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_parse(none, &xonly_pk, ones32) == 0); + CHECK(memcmp(&xonly_pk, zeros64, sizeof(xonly_pk)) == 0); + memset(&xonly_pk, 1, sizeof(xonly_pk)); + /* There's no point with x-coordinate 0 on secp256k1 */ + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_parse(none, &xonly_pk, zeros64) == 0); + CHECK(memcmp(&xonly_pk, zeros64, sizeof(xonly_pk)) == 0); + /* If a random 32-byte string can not be parsed with ec_pubkey_parse + * (because interpreted as X coordinate it does not correspond to a point on + * the curve) then xonly_pubkey_parse should fail as well. */ + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { + unsigned char rand33[33]; + secp256k1_rand256(&rand33[1]); + rand33[0] = SECP256K1_TAG_PUBKEY_EVEN; + if (!secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(ctx, &pk, rand33, 33)) { + memset(&xonly_pk, 1, sizeof(xonly_pk)); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_parse(ctx, &xonly_pk, &rand33[1]) == 0); + CHECK(memcmp(&xonly_pk, zeros64, sizeof(xonly_pk)) == 0); + } else { + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_parse(ctx, &xonly_pk, &rand33[1]) == 1); + } + } + CHECK(ecount == 2); + + secp256k1_context_destroy(none); + secp256k1_context_destroy(sign); + secp256k1_context_destroy(verify); +} + +void test_xonly_pubkey_tweak(void) { + unsigned char zeros64[64] = { 0 }; + unsigned char overflows[32]; + unsigned char sk[32]; + secp256k1_pubkey internal_pk; + secp256k1_xonly_pubkey internal_xonly_pk; + secp256k1_pubkey output_pk; + int pk_parity; + unsigned char tweak[32]; + int i; + + int ecount; + secp256k1_context *none = api_test_context(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE, &ecount); + secp256k1_context *sign = api_test_context(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN, &ecount); + secp256k1_context *verify = api_test_context(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY, &ecount); + + memset(overflows, 0xff, sizeof(overflows)); + secp256k1_rand256(tweak); + secp256k1_rand256(sk); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &internal_pk, sk) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(none, &internal_xonly_pk, &pk_parity, &internal_pk) == 1); + + ecount = 0; + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add(none, &output_pk, &internal_xonly_pk, tweak) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add(sign, &output_pk, &internal_xonly_pk, tweak) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add(verify, &output_pk, &internal_xonly_pk, tweak) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add(verify, NULL, &internal_xonly_pk, tweak) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 3); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add(verify, &output_pk, NULL, tweak) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 4); + /* NULL internal_xonly_pk zeroes the output_pk */ + CHECK(memcmp(&output_pk, zeros64, sizeof(output_pk)) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add(verify, &output_pk, &internal_xonly_pk, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 5); + /* NULL tweak zeroes the output_pk */ + CHECK(memcmp(&output_pk, zeros64, sizeof(output_pk)) == 0); + + /* Invalid tweak zeroes the output_pk */ + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add(verify, &output_pk, &internal_xonly_pk, overflows) == 0); + CHECK(memcmp(&output_pk, zeros64, sizeof(output_pk)) == 0); + + /* A zero tweak is fine */ + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add(verify, &output_pk, &internal_xonly_pk, zeros64) == 1); + + /* Fails if the resulting key was infinity */ + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { + secp256k1_scalar scalar_tweak; + /* Because sk may be negated before adding, we need to try with tweak = + * sk as well as tweak = -sk. */ + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&scalar_tweak, sk, NULL); + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&scalar_tweak, &scalar_tweak); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(tweak, &scalar_tweak); + CHECK((secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add(verify, &output_pk, &internal_xonly_pk, sk) == 0) + || (secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add(verify, &output_pk, &internal_xonly_pk, tweak) == 0)); + CHECK(memcmp(&output_pk, zeros64, sizeof(output_pk)) == 0); + } + + /* Invalid pk with a valid tweak */ + memset(&internal_xonly_pk, 0, sizeof(internal_xonly_pk)); + secp256k1_rand256(tweak); + ecount = 0; + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add(verify, &output_pk, &internal_xonly_pk, tweak) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 1); + CHECK(memcmp(&output_pk, zeros64, sizeof(output_pk)) == 0); + + secp256k1_context_destroy(none); + secp256k1_context_destroy(sign); + secp256k1_context_destroy(verify); +} + +void test_xonly_pubkey_tweak_check(void) { + unsigned char zeros64[64] = { 0 }; + unsigned char overflows[32]; + unsigned char sk[32]; + secp256k1_pubkey internal_pk; + secp256k1_xonly_pubkey internal_xonly_pk; + secp256k1_pubkey output_pk; + secp256k1_xonly_pubkey output_xonly_pk; + unsigned char output_pk32[32]; + unsigned char buf32[32]; + int pk_parity; + unsigned char tweak[32]; + + int ecount; + secp256k1_context *none = api_test_context(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE, &ecount); + secp256k1_context *sign = api_test_context(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN, &ecount); + secp256k1_context *verify = api_test_context(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY, &ecount); + + memset(overflows, 0xff, sizeof(overflows)); + secp256k1_rand256(tweak); + secp256k1_rand256(sk); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &internal_pk, sk) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(none, &internal_xonly_pk, &pk_parity, &internal_pk) == 1); + + ecount = 0; + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add(verify, &output_pk, &internal_xonly_pk, tweak) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(verify, &output_xonly_pk, &pk_parity, &output_pk) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_serialize(ctx, buf32, &output_xonly_pk) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check(none, buf32, pk_parity, &internal_xonly_pk, tweak) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check(sign, buf32, pk_parity, &internal_xonly_pk, tweak) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check(verify, buf32, pk_parity, &internal_xonly_pk, tweak) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check(verify, NULL, pk_parity, &internal_xonly_pk, tweak) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 3); + /* invalid pk_parity value */ + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check(verify, buf32, 2, &internal_xonly_pk, tweak) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 3); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check(verify, buf32, pk_parity, NULL, tweak) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 4); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check(verify, buf32, pk_parity, &internal_xonly_pk, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 5); + + memset(tweak, 1, sizeof(tweak)); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(ctx, &internal_xonly_pk, NULL, &internal_pk) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add(ctx, &output_pk, &internal_xonly_pk, tweak) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(ctx, &output_xonly_pk, &pk_parity, &output_pk) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_serialize(ctx, output_pk32, &output_xonly_pk) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check(ctx, output_pk32, pk_parity, &internal_xonly_pk, tweak) == 1); + + /* Wrong pk_parity */ + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check(ctx, output_pk32, !pk_parity, &internal_xonly_pk, tweak) == 0); + /* Wrong public key */ + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_serialize(ctx, buf32, &internal_xonly_pk) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check(ctx, buf32, pk_parity, &internal_xonly_pk, tweak) == 0); + + /* Overflowing tweak not allowed */ + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check(ctx, output_pk32, pk_parity, &internal_xonly_pk, overflows) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add(ctx, &output_pk, &internal_xonly_pk, overflows) == 0); + CHECK(memcmp(&output_pk, zeros64, sizeof(output_pk)) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 5); + + secp256k1_context_destroy(none); + secp256k1_context_destroy(sign); + secp256k1_context_destroy(verify); +} + +/* Starts with an initial pubkey and recursively creates N_PUBKEYS - 1 + * additional pubkeys by calling tweak_add. Then verifies every tweak starting + * from the last pubkey. */ +#define N_PUBKEYS 32 +void test_xonly_pubkey_tweak_recursive(void) { + unsigned char sk[32]; + secp256k1_pubkey pk[N_PUBKEYS]; + unsigned char pk_serialized[32]; + unsigned char tweak[N_PUBKEYS - 1][32]; + int i; + + secp256k1_rand256(sk); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pk[0], sk) == 1); + /* Add tweaks */ + for (i = 0; i < N_PUBKEYS - 1; i++) { + secp256k1_xonly_pubkey xonly_pk; + memset(tweak[i], i + 1, sizeof(tweak[i])); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(ctx, &xonly_pk, NULL, &pk[i]) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add(ctx, &pk[i + 1], &xonly_pk, tweak[i]) == 1); + } + + /* Verify tweaks */ + for (i = N_PUBKEYS - 1; i > 0; i--) { + secp256k1_xonly_pubkey xonly_pk; + int pk_parity; + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(ctx, &xonly_pk, &pk_parity, &pk[i]) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_serialize(ctx, pk_serialized, &xonly_pk) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(ctx, &xonly_pk, NULL, &pk[i - 1]) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check(ctx, pk_serialized, pk_parity, &xonly_pk, tweak[i - 1]) == 1); + } +} +#undef N_PUBKEYS + +void test_keypair(void) { + unsigned char sk[32]; + unsigned char zeros96[96] = { 0 }; + unsigned char overflows[32]; + secp256k1_keypair keypair; + secp256k1_pubkey pk, pk_tmp; + secp256k1_xonly_pubkey xonly_pk, xonly_pk_tmp; + int pk_parity, pk_parity_tmp; + int ecount; + secp256k1_context *none = api_test_context(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE, &ecount); + secp256k1_context *sign = api_test_context(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN, &ecount); + secp256k1_context *verify = api_test_context(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY, &ecount); + + CHECK(sizeof(zeros96) == sizeof(keypair)); + memset(overflows, 0xFF, sizeof(overflows)); + + /* Test keypair_create */ + ecount = 0; + secp256k1_rand256(sk); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(none, &keypair, sk) == 0); + CHECK(memcmp(zeros96, &keypair, sizeof(keypair)) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(verify, &keypair, sk) == 0); + CHECK(memcmp(zeros96, &keypair, sizeof(keypair)) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(sign, &keypair, sk) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(sign, NULL, sk) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 3); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(sign, &keypair, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(memcmp(zeros96, &keypair, sizeof(keypair)) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 4); + + /* Invalid secret key */ + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(sign, &keypair, zeros96) == 0); + CHECK(memcmp(zeros96, &keypair, sizeof(keypair)) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(sign, &keypair, overflows) == 0); + CHECK(memcmp(zeros96, &keypair, sizeof(keypair)) == 0); + + /* Test keypair_pub */ + ecount = 0; + secp256k1_rand256(sk); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx, &keypair, sk) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_pub(none, &pk, &keypair) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_pub(none, NULL, &keypair) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_pub(none, &pk, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + CHECK(memcmp(zeros96, &pk, sizeof(pk)) == 0); + + /* Using an invalid keypair is fine for keypair_pub */ + memset(&keypair, 0, sizeof(keypair)); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_pub(none, &pk, &keypair) == 1); + CHECK(memcmp(zeros96, &pk, sizeof(pk)) == 0); + + /* keypair holds the same pubkey as pubkey_create */ + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(sign, &pk, sk) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(sign, &keypair, sk) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_pub(none, &pk_tmp, &keypair) == 1); + CHECK(memcmp(&pk, &pk_tmp, sizeof(pk)) == 0); + + /** Test keypair_xonly_pub **/ + ecount = 0; + secp256k1_rand256(sk); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx, &keypair, sk) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub(none, &xonly_pk, &pk_parity, &keypair) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub(none, NULL, &pk_parity, &keypair) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub(none, &xonly_pk, NULL, &keypair) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub(none, &xonly_pk, &pk_parity, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + CHECK(memcmp(zeros96, &xonly_pk, sizeof(xonly_pk)) == 0); + /* Using an invalid keypair will set the xonly_pk to 0 (first reset + * xonly_pk). */ + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub(none, &xonly_pk, &pk_parity, &keypair) == 1); + memset(&keypair, 0, sizeof(keypair)); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub(none, &xonly_pk, &pk_parity, &keypair) == 0); + CHECK(memcmp(zeros96, &xonly_pk, sizeof(xonly_pk)) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 3); + + /** keypair holds the same xonly pubkey as pubkey_create **/ + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(sign, &pk, sk) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(none, &xonly_pk, &pk_parity, &pk) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(sign, &keypair, sk) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub(none, &xonly_pk_tmp, &pk_parity_tmp, &keypair) == 1); + CHECK(memcmp(&xonly_pk, &xonly_pk_tmp, sizeof(pk)) == 0); + CHECK(pk_parity == pk_parity_tmp); + + secp256k1_context_destroy(none); + secp256k1_context_destroy(sign); + secp256k1_context_destroy(verify); +} + +void test_keypair_add(void) { + unsigned char sk[32]; + secp256k1_keypair keypair; + unsigned char overflows[32]; + unsigned char zeros96[96] = { 0 }; + unsigned char tweak[32]; + int i; + int ecount = 0; + secp256k1_context *none = api_test_context(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE, &ecount); + secp256k1_context *sign = api_test_context(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN, &ecount); + secp256k1_context *verify = api_test_context(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY, &ecount); + + CHECK(sizeof(zeros96) == sizeof(keypair)); + secp256k1_rand256(sk); + secp256k1_rand256(tweak); + memset(overflows, 0xFF, 32); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx, &keypair, sk) == 1); + + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_tweak_add(none, &keypair, tweak) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_tweak_add(sign, &keypair, tweak) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_tweak_add(verify, &keypair, tweak) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_tweak_add(verify, NULL, tweak) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 3); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_tweak_add(verify, &keypair, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 4); + /* This does not set the keypair to zeroes */ + CHECK(memcmp(&keypair, zeros96, sizeof(keypair)) != 0); + + /* Invalid tweak zeroes the keypair */ + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx, &keypair, sk) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_tweak_add(ctx, &keypair, overflows) == 0); + CHECK(memcmp(&keypair, zeros96, sizeof(keypair)) == 0); + + /* A zero tweak is fine */ + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx, &keypair, sk) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_tweak_add(ctx, &keypair, zeros96) == 1); + + /* Fails if the resulting keypair was (sk=0, pk=infinity) */ + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { + secp256k1_scalar scalar_tweak; + secp256k1_keypair keypair_tmp; + secp256k1_rand256(sk); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx, &keypair, sk) == 1); + memcpy(&keypair_tmp, &keypair, sizeof(keypair)); + /* Because sk may be negated before adding, we need to try with tweak = + * sk as well as tweak = -sk. */ + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&scalar_tweak, sk, NULL); + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&scalar_tweak, &scalar_tweak); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(tweak, &scalar_tweak); + CHECK((secp256k1_keypair_xonly_tweak_add(ctx, &keypair, sk) == 0) + || (secp256k1_keypair_xonly_tweak_add(ctx, &keypair_tmp, tweak) == 0)); + CHECK(memcmp(&keypair, zeros96, sizeof(keypair)) == 0 + || memcmp(&keypair_tmp, zeros96, sizeof(keypair_tmp)) == 0); + } + + /* Invalid keypair with a valid tweak */ + memset(&keypair, 0, sizeof(keypair)); + secp256k1_rand256(tweak); + ecount = 0; + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_tweak_add(verify, &keypair, tweak) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 1); + CHECK(memcmp(&keypair, zeros96, sizeof(keypair)) == 0); + /* Only seckey part of keypair invalid */ + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx, &keypair, sk) == 1); + memset(&keypair, 0, 32); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_tweak_add(verify, &keypair, tweak) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + /* Only pubkey part of keypair invalid */ + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx, &keypair, sk) == 1); + memset(&keypair.data[32], 0, 64); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_tweak_add(verify, &keypair, tweak) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 3); + + /* Check that the keypair_tweak_add implementation is correct */ + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx, &keypair, sk) == 1); + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { + secp256k1_xonly_pubkey internal_pk; + secp256k1_xonly_pubkey output_pk; + secp256k1_pubkey output_pk_xy; + secp256k1_pubkey output_pk_expected; + unsigned char pk32[32]; + int pk_parity; + + secp256k1_rand256(tweak); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub(ctx, &internal_pk, NULL, &keypair) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_tweak_add(ctx, &keypair, tweak) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub(ctx, &output_pk, &pk_parity, &keypair) == 1); + + /* Check that it passes xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check */ + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_serialize(ctx, pk32, &output_pk) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check(ctx, pk32, pk_parity, &internal_pk, tweak) == 1); + + /* Check that the resulting pubkey matches xonly_pubkey_tweak_add */ + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_pub(ctx, &output_pk_xy, &keypair) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add(ctx, &output_pk_expected, &internal_pk, tweak) == 1); + CHECK(memcmp(&output_pk_xy, &output_pk_expected, sizeof(output_pk_xy)) == 0); + + /* Check that the secret key in the keypair is tweaked correctly */ + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &output_pk_expected, &keypair.data[0]) == 1); + CHECK(memcmp(&output_pk_xy, &output_pk_expected, sizeof(output_pk_xy)) == 0); + } + secp256k1_context_destroy(none); + secp256k1_context_destroy(sign); + secp256k1_context_destroy(verify); +} + +void run_extrakeys_tests(void) { + /* xonly key test cases */ + test_xonly_pubkey(); + test_xonly_pubkey_tweak(); + test_xonly_pubkey_tweak_check(); + test_xonly_pubkey_tweak_recursive(); + + /* keypair tests */ + test_keypair(); + test_keypair_add(); +} + +#endif diff --git a/src/secp256k1/src/modules/schnorrsig/Makefile.am.include b/src/secp256k1/src/modules/schnorrsig/Makefile.am.include new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a82bafe43f --- /dev/null +++ b/src/secp256k1/src/modules/schnorrsig/Makefile.am.include @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +include_HEADERS += include/secp256k1_schnorrsig.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/schnorrsig/main_impl.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/schnorrsig/tests_impl.h +if USE_BENCHMARK +noinst_PROGRAMS += bench_schnorrsig +bench_schnorrsig_SOURCES = src/bench_schnorrsig.c +bench_schnorrsig_LDADD = libsecp256k1.la $(SECP_LIBS) $(COMMON_LIB) +endif diff --git a/src/secp256k1/src/modules/schnorrsig/main_impl.h b/src/secp256k1/src/modules/schnorrsig/main_impl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a0218f881a --- /dev/null +++ b/src/secp256k1/src/modules/schnorrsig/main_impl.h @@ -0,0 +1,238 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2018-2020 Andrew Poelstra, Jonas Nick * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef _SECP256K1_MODULE_SCHNORRSIG_MAIN_ +#define _SECP256K1_MODULE_SCHNORRSIG_MAIN_ + +#include "include/secp256k1.h" +#include "include/secp256k1_schnorrsig.h" +#include "hash.h" + +/* Initializes SHA256 with fixed midstate. This midstate was computed by applying + * SHA256 to SHA256("BIP0340/nonce")||SHA256("BIP0340/nonce"). */ +static void secp256k1_nonce_function_bip340_sha256_tagged(secp256k1_sha256 *sha) { + secp256k1_sha256_initialize(sha); + sha->s[0] = 0x46615b35ul; + sha->s[1] = 0xf4bfbff7ul; + sha->s[2] = 0x9f8dc671ul; + sha->s[3] = 0x83627ab3ul; + sha->s[4] = 0x60217180ul; + sha->s[5] = 0x57358661ul; + sha->s[6] = 0x21a29e54ul; + sha->s[7] = 0x68b07b4cul; + + sha->bytes = 64; +} + +/* Initializes SHA256 with fixed midstate. This midstate was computed by applying + * SHA256 to SHA256("BIP0340/aux")||SHA256("BIP0340/aux"). */ +static void secp256k1_nonce_function_bip340_sha256_tagged_aux(secp256k1_sha256 *sha) { + secp256k1_sha256_initialize(sha); + sha->s[0] = 0x24dd3219ul; + sha->s[1] = 0x4eba7e70ul; + sha->s[2] = 0xca0fabb9ul; + sha->s[3] = 0x0fa3166dul; + sha->s[4] = 0x3afbe4b1ul; + sha->s[5] = 0x4c44df97ul; + sha->s[6] = 0x4aac2739ul; + sha->s[7] = 0x249e850aul; + + sha->bytes = 64; +} + +/* algo16 argument for nonce_function_bip340 to derive the nonce exactly as stated in BIP-340 + * by using the correct tagged hash function. */ +static const unsigned char bip340_algo16[16] = "BIP0340/nonce\0\0\0"; + +static int nonce_function_bip340(unsigned char *nonce32, const unsigned char *msg32, const unsigned char *key32, const unsigned char *xonly_pk32, const unsigned char *algo16, void *data) { + secp256k1_sha256 sha; + unsigned char masked_key[32]; + int i; + + if (algo16 == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + if (data != NULL) { + secp256k1_nonce_function_bip340_sha256_tagged_aux(&sha); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha, data, 32); + secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha, masked_key); + for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) { + masked_key[i] ^= key32[i]; + } + } + + /* Tag the hash with algo16 which is important to avoid nonce reuse across + * algorithms. If this nonce function is used in BIP-340 signing as defined + * in the spec, an optimized tagging implementation is used. */ + if (memcmp(algo16, bip340_algo16, 16) == 0) { + secp256k1_nonce_function_bip340_sha256_tagged(&sha); + } else { + int algo16_len = 16; + /* Remove terminating null bytes */ + while (algo16_len > 0 && !algo16[algo16_len - 1]) { + algo16_len--; + } + secp256k1_sha256_initialize_tagged(&sha, algo16, algo16_len); + } + + /* Hash (masked-)key||pk||msg using the tagged hash as per the spec */ + if (data != NULL) { + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha, masked_key, 32); + } else { + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha, key32, 32); + } + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha, xonly_pk32, 32); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha, msg32, 32); + secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha, nonce32); + return 1; +} + +const secp256k1_nonce_function_hardened secp256k1_nonce_function_bip340 = nonce_function_bip340; + +/* Initializes SHA256 with fixed midstate. This midstate was computed by applying + * SHA256 to SHA256("BIP0340/challenge")||SHA256("BIP0340/challenge"). */ +static void secp256k1_schnorrsig_sha256_tagged(secp256k1_sha256 *sha) { + secp256k1_sha256_initialize(sha); + sha->s[0] = 0x9cecba11ul; + sha->s[1] = 0x23925381ul; + sha->s[2] = 0x11679112ul; + sha->s[3] = 0xd1627e0ful; + sha->s[4] = 0x97c87550ul; + sha->s[5] = 0x003cc765ul; + sha->s[6] = 0x90f61164ul; + sha->s[7] = 0x33e9b66aul; + sha->bytes = 64; +} + +int secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign(const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char *sig64, const unsigned char *msg32, const secp256k1_keypair *keypair, secp256k1_nonce_function_hardened noncefp, void *ndata) { + secp256k1_scalar sk; + secp256k1_scalar e; + secp256k1_scalar k; + secp256k1_gej rj; + secp256k1_ge pk; + secp256k1_ge r; + secp256k1_sha256 sha; + unsigned char buf[32] = { 0 }; + unsigned char pk_buf[32]; + unsigned char seckey[32]; + int ret = 1; + + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx)); + ARG_CHECK(sig64 != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(msg32 != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(keypair != NULL); + + if (noncefp == NULL) { + noncefp = secp256k1_nonce_function_bip340; + } + + ret &= secp256k1_keypair_load(ctx, &sk, &pk, keypair); + /* Because we are signing for a x-only pubkey, the secret key is negated + * before signing if the point corresponding to the secret key does not + * have an even Y. */ + if (secp256k1_fe_is_odd(&pk.y)) { + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&sk, &sk); + } + + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(seckey, &sk); + secp256k1_fe_get_b32(pk_buf, &pk.x); + ret &= !!noncefp(buf, msg32, seckey, pk_buf, bip340_algo16, ndata); + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&k, buf, NULL); + ret &= !secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&k); + secp256k1_scalar_cmov(&k, &secp256k1_scalar_one, !ret); + + secp256k1_ecmult_gen(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &rj, &k); + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&r, &rj); + + /* We declassify r to allow using it as a branch point. This is fine + * because r is not a secret. */ + secp256k1_declassify(ctx, &r, sizeof(r)); + secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&r.y); + if (secp256k1_fe_is_odd(&r.y)) { + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&k, &k); + } + secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&r.x); + secp256k1_fe_get_b32(&sig64[0], &r.x); + + /* tagged hash(r.x, pk.x, msg32) */ + secp256k1_schnorrsig_sha256_tagged(&sha); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha, &sig64[0], 32); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha, pk_buf, sizeof(pk_buf)); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha, msg32, 32); + secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha, buf); + + /* Set scalar e to the challenge hash modulo the curve order as per + * BIP340. */ + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&e, buf, NULL); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&e, &e, &sk); + secp256k1_scalar_add(&e, &e, &k); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(&sig64[32], &e); + + memczero(sig64, 64, !ret); + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&k); + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&sk); + memset(seckey, 0, sizeof(seckey)); + + return ret; +} + +int secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify(const secp256k1_context* ctx, const unsigned char *sig64, const unsigned char *msg32, const secp256k1_xonly_pubkey *pubkey) { + secp256k1_scalar s; + secp256k1_scalar e; + secp256k1_gej rj; + secp256k1_ge pk; + secp256k1_gej pkj; + secp256k1_fe rx; + secp256k1_ge r; + secp256k1_sha256 sha; + unsigned char buf[32]; + int overflow; + + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_ctx)); + ARG_CHECK(sig64 != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(msg32 != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(pubkey != NULL); + + if (!secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&rx, &sig64[0])) { + return 0; + } + + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&s, &sig64[32], &overflow); + if (overflow) { + return 0; + } + + if (!secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_load(ctx, &pk, pubkey)) { + return 0; + } + + secp256k1_schnorrsig_sha256_tagged(&sha); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha, &sig64[0], 32); + secp256k1_fe_get_b32(buf, &pk.x); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha, buf, sizeof(buf)); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha, msg32, 32); + secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha, buf); + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&e, buf, NULL); + + /* Compute rj = s*G + (-e)*pkj */ + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&e, &e); + secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&pkj, &pk); + secp256k1_ecmult(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &rj, &pkj, &e, &s); + + secp256k1_ge_set_gej_var(&r, &rj); + if (secp256k1_ge_is_infinity(&r)) { + return 0; + } + + secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&r.y); + return !secp256k1_fe_is_odd(&r.y) && + secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&rx, &r.x); +} + +#endif diff --git a/src/secp256k1/src/modules/schnorrsig/tests_impl.h b/src/secp256k1/src/modules/schnorrsig/tests_impl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..88d8f56404 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/secp256k1/src/modules/schnorrsig/tests_impl.h @@ -0,0 +1,806 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2018-2020 Andrew Poelstra, Jonas Nick * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef _SECP256K1_MODULE_SCHNORRSIG_TESTS_ +#define _SECP256K1_MODULE_SCHNORRSIG_TESTS_ + +#include "secp256k1_schnorrsig.h" + +/* Checks that a bit flip in the n_flip-th argument (that has n_bytes many + * bytes) changes the hash function + */ +void nonce_function_bip340_bitflip(unsigned char **args, size_t n_flip, size_t n_bytes) { + unsigned char nonces[2][32]; + CHECK(nonce_function_bip340(nonces[0], args[0], args[1], args[2], args[3], args[4]) == 1); + secp256k1_rand_flip(args[n_flip], n_bytes); + CHECK(nonce_function_bip340(nonces[1], args[0], args[1], args[2], args[3], args[4]) == 1); + CHECK(memcmp(nonces[0], nonces[1], 32) != 0); +} + +/* Tests for the equality of two sha256 structs. This function only produces a + * correct result if an integer multiple of 64 many bytes have been written + * into the hash functions. */ +void test_sha256_eq(const secp256k1_sha256 *sha1, const secp256k1_sha256 *sha2) { + /* Is buffer fully consumed? */ + CHECK((sha1->bytes & 0x3F) == 0); + + CHECK(sha1->bytes == sha2->bytes); + CHECK(memcmp(sha1->s, sha2->s, sizeof(sha1->s)) == 0); +} + +void run_nonce_function_bip340_tests(void) { + unsigned char tag[13] = "BIP0340/nonce"; + unsigned char aux_tag[11] = "BIP0340/aux"; + unsigned char algo16[16] = "BIP0340/nonce\0\0\0"; + secp256k1_sha256 sha; + secp256k1_sha256 sha_optimized; + unsigned char nonce[32]; + unsigned char msg[32]; + unsigned char key[32]; + unsigned char pk[32]; + unsigned char aux_rand[32]; + unsigned char *args[5]; + int i; + + /* Check that hash initialized by + * secp256k1_nonce_function_bip340_sha256_tagged has the expected + * state. */ + secp256k1_sha256_initialize_tagged(&sha, tag, sizeof(tag)); + secp256k1_nonce_function_bip340_sha256_tagged(&sha_optimized); + test_sha256_eq(&sha, &sha_optimized); + + /* Check that hash initialized by + * secp256k1_nonce_function_bip340_sha256_tagged_aux has the expected + * state. */ + secp256k1_sha256_initialize_tagged(&sha, aux_tag, sizeof(aux_tag)); + secp256k1_nonce_function_bip340_sha256_tagged_aux(&sha_optimized); + test_sha256_eq(&sha, &sha_optimized); + + secp256k1_rand256(msg); + secp256k1_rand256(key); + secp256k1_rand256(pk); + secp256k1_rand256(aux_rand); + + /* Check that a bitflip in an argument results in different nonces. */ + args[0] = msg; + args[1] = key; + args[2] = pk; + args[3] = algo16; + args[4] = aux_rand; + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { + nonce_function_bip340_bitflip(args, 0, 32); + nonce_function_bip340_bitflip(args, 1, 32); + nonce_function_bip340_bitflip(args, 2, 32); + /* Flip algo16 special case "BIP0340/nonce" */ + nonce_function_bip340_bitflip(args, 3, 16); + /* Flip algo16 again */ + nonce_function_bip340_bitflip(args, 3, 16); + nonce_function_bip340_bitflip(args, 4, 32); + } + + /* NULL algo16 is disallowed */ + CHECK(nonce_function_bip340(nonce, msg, key, pk, NULL, NULL) == 0); + /* Empty algo16 is fine */ + memset(algo16, 0x00, 16); + CHECK(nonce_function_bip340(nonce, msg, key, pk, algo16, NULL) == 1); + /* algo16 with terminating null bytes is fine */ + algo16[1] = 65; + CHECK(nonce_function_bip340(nonce, msg, key, pk, algo16, NULL) == 1); + /* Other algo16 is fine */ + memset(algo16, 0xFF, 16); + CHECK(nonce_function_bip340(nonce, msg, key, pk, algo16, NULL) == 1); + + /* NULL aux_rand argument is allowed. */ + CHECK(nonce_function_bip340(nonce, msg, key, pk, algo16, NULL) == 1); +} + +void test_schnorrsig_api(void) { + unsigned char sk1[32]; + unsigned char sk2[32]; + unsigned char sk3[32]; + unsigned char msg[32]; + secp256k1_keypair keypairs[3]; + secp256k1_keypair invalid_keypair = { 0 }; + secp256k1_xonly_pubkey pk[3]; + secp256k1_xonly_pubkey zero_pk; + unsigned char sig[64]; + + /** setup **/ + secp256k1_context *none = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE); + secp256k1_context *sign = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN); + secp256k1_context *vrfy = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); + secp256k1_context *both = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN | SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); + int ecount; + + secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(none, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(sign, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(vrfy, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(both, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(none, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(sign, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(vrfy, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(both, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + + secp256k1_rand256(sk1); + secp256k1_rand256(sk2); + secp256k1_rand256(sk3); + secp256k1_rand256(msg); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx, &keypairs[0], sk1) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx, &keypairs[1], sk2) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx, &keypairs[2], sk3) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub(ctx, &pk[0], NULL, &keypairs[0]) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub(ctx, &pk[1], NULL, &keypairs[1]) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub(ctx, &pk[2], NULL, &keypairs[2]) == 1); + memset(&zero_pk, 0, sizeof(zero_pk)); + + /** main test body **/ + ecount = 0; + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign(none, sig, msg, &keypairs[0], NULL, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign(vrfy, sig, msg, &keypairs[0], NULL, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign(sign, sig, msg, &keypairs[0], NULL, NULL) == 1); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign(sign, NULL, msg, &keypairs[0], NULL, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 3); + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign(sign, sig, NULL, &keypairs[0], NULL, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 4); + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign(sign, sig, msg, NULL, NULL, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 5); + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign(sign, sig, msg, &invalid_keypair, NULL, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 6); + + ecount = 0; + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign(sign, sig, msg, &keypairs[0], NULL, NULL) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify(none, sig, msg, &pk[0]) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify(sign, sig, msg, &pk[0]) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify(vrfy, sig, msg, &pk[0]) == 1); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify(vrfy, NULL, msg, &pk[0]) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 3); + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify(vrfy, sig, NULL, &pk[0]) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 4); + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify(vrfy, sig, msg, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 5); + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify(vrfy, sig, msg, &zero_pk) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 6); + + secp256k1_context_destroy(none); + secp256k1_context_destroy(sign); + secp256k1_context_destroy(vrfy); + secp256k1_context_destroy(both); +} + +/* Checks that hash initialized by secp256k1_schnorrsig_sha256_tagged has the + * expected state. */ +void test_schnorrsig_sha256_tagged(void) { + char tag[17] = "BIP0340/challenge"; + secp256k1_sha256 sha; + secp256k1_sha256 sha_optimized; + + secp256k1_sha256_initialize_tagged(&sha, (unsigned char *) tag, sizeof(tag)); + secp256k1_schnorrsig_sha256_tagged(&sha_optimized); + test_sha256_eq(&sha, &sha_optimized); +} + +/* Helper function for schnorrsig_bip_vectors + * Signs the message and checks that it's the same as expected_sig. */ +void test_schnorrsig_bip_vectors_check_signing(const unsigned char *sk, const unsigned char *pk_serialized, unsigned char *aux_rand, const unsigned char *msg, const unsigned char *expected_sig) { + unsigned char sig[64]; + secp256k1_keypair keypair; + secp256k1_xonly_pubkey pk, pk_expected; + + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx, &keypair, sk)); + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign(ctx, sig, msg, &keypair, NULL, aux_rand)); + CHECK(memcmp(sig, expected_sig, 64) == 0); + + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_parse(ctx, &pk_expected, pk_serialized)); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub(ctx, &pk, NULL, &keypair)); + CHECK(memcmp(&pk, &pk_expected, sizeof(pk)) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify(ctx, sig, msg, &pk)); +} + +/* Helper function for schnorrsig_bip_vectors + * Checks that both verify and verify_batch (TODO) return the same value as expected. */ +void test_schnorrsig_bip_vectors_check_verify(const unsigned char *pk_serialized, const unsigned char *msg32, const unsigned char *sig, int expected) { + secp256k1_xonly_pubkey pk; + + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_parse(ctx, &pk, pk_serialized)); + CHECK(expected == secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify(ctx, sig, msg32, &pk)); +} + +/* Test vectors according to BIP-340 ("Schnorr Signatures for secp256k1"). See + * https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0340/test-vectors.csv. */ +void test_schnorrsig_bip_vectors(void) { + { + /* Test vector 0 */ + const unsigned char sk[32] = { + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x03 + }; + const unsigned char pk[32] = { + 0xF9, 0x30, 0x8A, 0x01, 0x92, 0x58, 0xC3, 0x10, + 0x49, 0x34, 0x4F, 0x85, 0xF8, 0x9D, 0x52, 0x29, + 0xB5, 0x31, 0xC8, 0x45, 0x83, 0x6F, 0x99, 0xB0, + 0x86, 0x01, 0xF1, 0x13, 0xBC, 0xE0, 0x36, 0xF9 + }; + unsigned char aux_rand[32] = { + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 + }; + const unsigned char msg[32] = { + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 + }; + const unsigned char sig[64] = { + 0xE9, 0x07, 0x83, 0x1F, 0x80, 0x84, 0x8D, 0x10, + 0x69, 0xA5, 0x37, 0x1B, 0x40, 0x24, 0x10, 0x36, + 0x4B, 0xDF, 0x1C, 0x5F, 0x83, 0x07, 0xB0, 0x08, + 0x4C, 0x55, 0xF1, 0xCE, 0x2D, 0xCA, 0x82, 0x15, + 0x25, 0xF6, 0x6A, 0x4A, 0x85, 0xEA, 0x8B, 0x71, + 0xE4, 0x82, 0xA7, 0x4F, 0x38, 0x2D, 0x2C, 0xE5, + 0xEB, 0xEE, 0xE8, 0xFD, 0xB2, 0x17, 0x2F, 0x47, + 0x7D, 0xF4, 0x90, 0x0D, 0x31, 0x05, 0x36, 0xC0 + }; + test_schnorrsig_bip_vectors_check_signing(sk, pk, aux_rand, msg, sig); + test_schnorrsig_bip_vectors_check_verify(pk, msg, sig, 1); + } + { + /* Test vector 1 */ + const unsigned char sk[32] = { + 0xB7, 0xE1, 0x51, 0x62, 0x8A, 0xED, 0x2A, 0x6A, + 0xBF, 0x71, 0x58, 0x80, 0x9C, 0xF4, 0xF3, 0xC7, + 0x62, 0xE7, 0x16, 0x0F, 0x38, 0xB4, 0xDA, 0x56, + 0xA7, 0x84, 0xD9, 0x04, 0x51, 0x90, 0xCF, 0xEF + }; + const unsigned char pk[32] = { + 0xDF, 0xF1, 0xD7, 0x7F, 0x2A, 0x67, 0x1C, 0x5F, + 0x36, 0x18, 0x37, 0x26, 0xDB, 0x23, 0x41, 0xBE, + 0x58, 0xFE, 0xAE, 0x1D, 0xA2, 0xDE, 0xCE, 0xD8, + 0x43, 0x24, 0x0F, 0x7B, 0x50, 0x2B, 0xA6, 0x59 + }; + unsigned char aux_rand[32] = { + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01 + }; + const unsigned char msg[32] = { + 0x24, 0x3F, 0x6A, 0x88, 0x85, 0xA3, 0x08, 0xD3, + 0x13, 0x19, 0x8A, 0x2E, 0x03, 0x70, 0x73, 0x44, + 0xA4, 0x09, 0x38, 0x22, 0x29, 0x9F, 0x31, 0xD0, + 0x08, 0x2E, 0xFA, 0x98, 0xEC, 0x4E, 0x6C, 0x89 + }; + const unsigned char sig[64] = { + 0x68, 0x96, 0xBD, 0x60, 0xEE, 0xAE, 0x29, 0x6D, + 0xB4, 0x8A, 0x22, 0x9F, 0xF7, 0x1D, 0xFE, 0x07, + 0x1B, 0xDE, 0x41, 0x3E, 0x6D, 0x43, 0xF9, 0x17, + 0xDC, 0x8D, 0xCF, 0x8C, 0x78, 0xDE, 0x33, 0x41, + 0x89, 0x06, 0xD1, 0x1A, 0xC9, 0x76, 0xAB, 0xCC, + 0xB2, 0x0B, 0x09, 0x12, 0x92, 0xBF, 0xF4, 0xEA, + 0x89, 0x7E, 0xFC, 0xB6, 0x39, 0xEA, 0x87, 0x1C, + 0xFA, 0x95, 0xF6, 0xDE, 0x33, 0x9E, 0x4B, 0x0A + }; + test_schnorrsig_bip_vectors_check_signing(sk, pk, aux_rand, msg, sig); + test_schnorrsig_bip_vectors_check_verify(pk, msg, sig, 1); + } + { + /* Test vector 2 */ + const unsigned char sk[32] = { + 0xC9, 0x0F, 0xDA, 0xA2, 0x21, 0x68, 0xC2, 0x34, + 0xC4, 0xC6, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x80, 0xDC, 0x1C, 0xD1, + 0x29, 0x02, 0x4E, 0x08, 0x8A, 0x67, 0xCC, 0x74, + 0x02, 0x0B, 0xBE, 0xA6, 0x3B, 0x14, 0xE5, 0xC9 + }; + const unsigned char pk[32] = { + 0xDD, 0x30, 0x8A, 0xFE, 0xC5, 0x77, 0x7E, 0x13, + 0x12, 0x1F, 0xA7, 0x2B, 0x9C, 0xC1, 0xB7, 0xCC, + 0x01, 0x39, 0x71, 0x53, 0x09, 0xB0, 0x86, 0xC9, + 0x60, 0xE1, 0x8F, 0xD9, 0x69, 0x77, 0x4E, 0xB8 + }; + unsigned char aux_rand[32] = { + 0xC8, 0x7A, 0xA5, 0x38, 0x24, 0xB4, 0xD7, 0xAE, + 0x2E, 0xB0, 0x35, 0xA2, 0xB5, 0xBB, 0xBC, 0xCC, + 0x08, 0x0E, 0x76, 0xCD, 0xC6, 0xD1, 0x69, 0x2C, + 0x4B, 0x0B, 0x62, 0xD7, 0x98, 0xE6, 0xD9, 0x06 + }; + const unsigned char msg[32] = { + 0x7E, 0x2D, 0x58, 0xD8, 0xB3, 0xBC, 0xDF, 0x1A, + 0xBA, 0xDE, 0xC7, 0x82, 0x90, 0x54, 0xF9, 0x0D, + 0xDA, 0x98, 0x05, 0xAA, 0xB5, 0x6C, 0x77, 0x33, + 0x30, 0x24, 0xB9, 0xD0, 0xA5, 0x08, 0xB7, 0x5C + }; + const unsigned char sig[64] = { + 0x58, 0x31, 0xAA, 0xEE, 0xD7, 0xB4, 0x4B, 0xB7, + 0x4E, 0x5E, 0xAB, 0x94, 0xBA, 0x9D, 0x42, 0x94, + 0xC4, 0x9B, 0xCF, 0x2A, 0x60, 0x72, 0x8D, 0x8B, + 0x4C, 0x20, 0x0F, 0x50, 0xDD, 0x31, 0x3C, 0x1B, + 0xAB, 0x74, 0x58, 0x79, 0xA5, 0xAD, 0x95, 0x4A, + 0x72, 0xC4, 0x5A, 0x91, 0xC3, 0xA5, 0x1D, 0x3C, + 0x7A, 0xDE, 0xA9, 0x8D, 0x82, 0xF8, 0x48, 0x1E, + 0x0E, 0x1E, 0x03, 0x67, 0x4A, 0x6F, 0x3F, 0xB7 + }; + test_schnorrsig_bip_vectors_check_signing(sk, pk, aux_rand, msg, sig); + test_schnorrsig_bip_vectors_check_verify(pk, msg, sig, 1); + } + { + /* Test vector 3 */ + const unsigned char sk[32] = { + 0x0B, 0x43, 0x2B, 0x26, 0x77, 0x93, 0x73, 0x81, + 0xAE, 0xF0, 0x5B, 0xB0, 0x2A, 0x66, 0xEC, 0xD0, + 0x12, 0x77, 0x30, 0x62, 0xCF, 0x3F, 0xA2, 0x54, + 0x9E, 0x44, 0xF5, 0x8E, 0xD2, 0x40, 0x17, 0x10 + }; + const unsigned char pk[32] = { + 0x25, 0xD1, 0xDF, 0xF9, 0x51, 0x05, 0xF5, 0x25, + 0x3C, 0x40, 0x22, 0xF6, 0x28, 0xA9, 0x96, 0xAD, + 0x3A, 0x0D, 0x95, 0xFB, 0xF2, 0x1D, 0x46, 0x8A, + 0x1B, 0x33, 0xF8, 0xC1, 0x60, 0xD8, 0xF5, 0x17 + }; + unsigned char aux_rand[32] = { + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF + }; + const unsigned char msg[32] = { + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF + }; + const unsigned char sig[64] = { + 0x7E, 0xB0, 0x50, 0x97, 0x57, 0xE2, 0x46, 0xF1, + 0x94, 0x49, 0x88, 0x56, 0x51, 0x61, 0x1C, 0xB9, + 0x65, 0xEC, 0xC1, 0xA1, 0x87, 0xDD, 0x51, 0xB6, + 0x4F, 0xDA, 0x1E, 0xDC, 0x96, 0x37, 0xD5, 0xEC, + 0x97, 0x58, 0x2B, 0x9C, 0xB1, 0x3D, 0xB3, 0x93, + 0x37, 0x05, 0xB3, 0x2B, 0xA9, 0x82, 0xAF, 0x5A, + 0xF2, 0x5F, 0xD7, 0x88, 0x81, 0xEB, 0xB3, 0x27, + 0x71, 0xFC, 0x59, 0x22, 0xEF, 0xC6, 0x6E, 0xA3 + }; + test_schnorrsig_bip_vectors_check_signing(sk, pk, aux_rand, msg, sig); + test_schnorrsig_bip_vectors_check_verify(pk, msg, sig, 1); + } + { + /* Test vector 4 */ + const unsigned char pk[32] = { + 0xD6, 0x9C, 0x35, 0x09, 0xBB, 0x99, 0xE4, 0x12, + 0xE6, 0x8B, 0x0F, 0xE8, 0x54, 0x4E, 0x72, 0x83, + 0x7D, 0xFA, 0x30, 0x74, 0x6D, 0x8B, 0xE2, 0xAA, + 0x65, 0x97, 0x5F, 0x29, 0xD2, 0x2D, 0xC7, 0xB9 + }; + const unsigned char msg[32] = { + 0x4D, 0xF3, 0xC3, 0xF6, 0x8F, 0xCC, 0x83, 0xB2, + 0x7E, 0x9D, 0x42, 0xC9, 0x04, 0x31, 0xA7, 0x24, + 0x99, 0xF1, 0x78, 0x75, 0xC8, 0x1A, 0x59, 0x9B, + 0x56, 0x6C, 0x98, 0x89, 0xB9, 0x69, 0x67, 0x03 + }; + const unsigned char sig[64] = { + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x3B, 0x78, 0xCE, 0x56, 0x3F, + 0x89, 0xA0, 0xED, 0x94, 0x14, 0xF5, 0xAA, 0x28, + 0xAD, 0x0D, 0x96, 0xD6, 0x79, 0x5F, 0x9C, 0x63, + 0x76, 0xAF, 0xB1, 0x54, 0x8A, 0xF6, 0x03, 0xB3, + 0xEB, 0x45, 0xC9, 0xF8, 0x20, 0x7D, 0xEE, 0x10, + 0x60, 0xCB, 0x71, 0xC0, 0x4E, 0x80, 0xF5, 0x93, + 0x06, 0x0B, 0x07, 0xD2, 0x83, 0x08, 0xD7, 0xF4 + }; + test_schnorrsig_bip_vectors_check_verify(pk, msg, sig, 1); + } + { + /* Test vector 5 */ + const unsigned char pk[32] = { + 0xEE, 0xFD, 0xEA, 0x4C, 0xDB, 0x67, 0x77, 0x50, + 0xA4, 0x20, 0xFE, 0xE8, 0x07, 0xEA, 0xCF, 0x21, + 0xEB, 0x98, 0x98, 0xAE, 0x79, 0xB9, 0x76, 0x87, + 0x66, 0xE4, 0xFA, 0xA0, 0x4A, 0x2D, 0x4A, 0x34 + }; + secp256k1_xonly_pubkey pk_parsed; + /* No need to check the signature of the test vector as parsing the pubkey already fails */ + CHECK(!secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_parse(ctx, &pk_parsed, pk)); + } + { + /* Test vector 6 */ + const unsigned char pk[32] = { + 0xDF, 0xF1, 0xD7, 0x7F, 0x2A, 0x67, 0x1C, 0x5F, + 0x36, 0x18, 0x37, 0x26, 0xDB, 0x23, 0x41, 0xBE, + 0x58, 0xFE, 0xAE, 0x1D, 0xA2, 0xDE, 0xCE, 0xD8, + 0x43, 0x24, 0x0F, 0x7B, 0x50, 0x2B, 0xA6, 0x59 + }; + const unsigned char msg[32] = { + 0x24, 0x3F, 0x6A, 0x88, 0x85, 0xA3, 0x08, 0xD3, + 0x13, 0x19, 0x8A, 0x2E, 0x03, 0x70, 0x73, 0x44, + 0xA4, 0x09, 0x38, 0x22, 0x29, 0x9F, 0x31, 0xD0, + 0x08, 0x2E, 0xFA, 0x98, 0xEC, 0x4E, 0x6C, 0x89 + }; + const unsigned char sig[64] = { + 0xFF, 0xF9, 0x7B, 0xD5, 0x75, 0x5E, 0xEE, 0xA4, + 0x20, 0x45, 0x3A, 0x14, 0x35, 0x52, 0x35, 0xD3, + 0x82, 0xF6, 0x47, 0x2F, 0x85, 0x68, 0xA1, 0x8B, + 0x2F, 0x05, 0x7A, 0x14, 0x60, 0x29, 0x75, 0x56, + 0x3C, 0xC2, 0x79, 0x44, 0x64, 0x0A, 0xC6, 0x07, + 0xCD, 0x10, 0x7A, 0xE1, 0x09, 0x23, 0xD9, 0xEF, + 0x7A, 0x73, 0xC6, 0x43, 0xE1, 0x66, 0xBE, 0x5E, + 0xBE, 0xAF, 0xA3, 0x4B, 0x1A, 0xC5, 0x53, 0xE2 + }; + test_schnorrsig_bip_vectors_check_verify(pk, msg, sig, 0); + } + { + /* Test vector 7 */ + const unsigned char pk[32] = { + 0xDF, 0xF1, 0xD7, 0x7F, 0x2A, 0x67, 0x1C, 0x5F, + 0x36, 0x18, 0x37, 0x26, 0xDB, 0x23, 0x41, 0xBE, + 0x58, 0xFE, 0xAE, 0x1D, 0xA2, 0xDE, 0xCE, 0xD8, + 0x43, 0x24, 0x0F, 0x7B, 0x50, 0x2B, 0xA6, 0x59 + }; + const unsigned char msg[32] = { + 0x24, 0x3F, 0x6A, 0x88, 0x85, 0xA3, 0x08, 0xD3, + 0x13, 0x19, 0x8A, 0x2E, 0x03, 0x70, 0x73, 0x44, + 0xA4, 0x09, 0x38, 0x22, 0x29, 0x9F, 0x31, 0xD0, + 0x08, 0x2E, 0xFA, 0x98, 0xEC, 0x4E, 0x6C, 0x89 + }; + const unsigned char sig[64] = { + 0x1F, 0xA6, 0x2E, 0x33, 0x1E, 0xDB, 0xC2, 0x1C, + 0x39, 0x47, 0x92, 0xD2, 0xAB, 0x11, 0x00, 0xA7, + 0xB4, 0x32, 0xB0, 0x13, 0xDF, 0x3F, 0x6F, 0xF4, + 0xF9, 0x9F, 0xCB, 0x33, 0xE0, 0xE1, 0x51, 0x5F, + 0x28, 0x89, 0x0B, 0x3E, 0xDB, 0x6E, 0x71, 0x89, + 0xB6, 0x30, 0x44, 0x8B, 0x51, 0x5C, 0xE4, 0xF8, + 0x62, 0x2A, 0x95, 0x4C, 0xFE, 0x54, 0x57, 0x35, + 0xAA, 0xEA, 0x51, 0x34, 0xFC, 0xCD, 0xB2, 0xBD + }; + test_schnorrsig_bip_vectors_check_verify(pk, msg, sig, 0); + } + { + /* Test vector 8 */ + const unsigned char pk[32] = { + 0xDF, 0xF1, 0xD7, 0x7F, 0x2A, 0x67, 0x1C, 0x5F, + 0x36, 0x18, 0x37, 0x26, 0xDB, 0x23, 0x41, 0xBE, + 0x58, 0xFE, 0xAE, 0x1D, 0xA2, 0xDE, 0xCE, 0xD8, + 0x43, 0x24, 0x0F, 0x7B, 0x50, 0x2B, 0xA6, 0x59 + }; + const unsigned char msg[32] = { + 0x24, 0x3F, 0x6A, 0x88, 0x85, 0xA3, 0x08, 0xD3, + 0x13, 0x19, 0x8A, 0x2E, 0x03, 0x70, 0x73, 0x44, + 0xA4, 0x09, 0x38, 0x22, 0x29, 0x9F, 0x31, 0xD0, + 0x08, 0x2E, 0xFA, 0x98, 0xEC, 0x4E, 0x6C, 0x89 + }; + const unsigned char sig[64] = { + 0x6C, 0xFF, 0x5C, 0x3B, 0xA8, 0x6C, 0x69, 0xEA, + 0x4B, 0x73, 0x76, 0xF3, 0x1A, 0x9B, 0xCB, 0x4F, + 0x74, 0xC1, 0x97, 0x60, 0x89, 0xB2, 0xD9, 0x96, + 0x3D, 0xA2, 0xE5, 0x54, 0x3E, 0x17, 0x77, 0x69, + 0x96, 0x17, 0x64, 0xB3, 0xAA, 0x9B, 0x2F, 0xFC, + 0xB6, 0xEF, 0x94, 0x7B, 0x68, 0x87, 0xA2, 0x26, + 0xE8, 0xD7, 0xC9, 0x3E, 0x00, 0xC5, 0xED, 0x0C, + 0x18, 0x34, 0xFF, 0x0D, 0x0C, 0x2E, 0x6D, 0xA6 + }; + test_schnorrsig_bip_vectors_check_verify(pk, msg, sig, 0); + } + { + /* Test vector 9 */ + const unsigned char pk[32] = { + 0xDF, 0xF1, 0xD7, 0x7F, 0x2A, 0x67, 0x1C, 0x5F, + 0x36, 0x18, 0x37, 0x26, 0xDB, 0x23, 0x41, 0xBE, + 0x58, 0xFE, 0xAE, 0x1D, 0xA2, 0xDE, 0xCE, 0xD8, + 0x43, 0x24, 0x0F, 0x7B, 0x50, 0x2B, 0xA6, 0x59 + }; + const unsigned char msg[32] = { + 0x24, 0x3F, 0x6A, 0x88, 0x85, 0xA3, 0x08, 0xD3, + 0x13, 0x19, 0x8A, 0x2E, 0x03, 0x70, 0x73, 0x44, + 0xA4, 0x09, 0x38, 0x22, 0x29, 0x9F, 0x31, 0xD0, + 0x08, 0x2E, 0xFA, 0x98, 0xEC, 0x4E, 0x6C, 0x89 + }; + const unsigned char sig[64] = { + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x12, 0x3D, 0xDA, 0x83, 0x28, 0xAF, 0x9C, 0x23, + 0xA9, 0x4C, 0x1F, 0xEE, 0xCF, 0xD1, 0x23, 0xBA, + 0x4F, 0xB7, 0x34, 0x76, 0xF0, 0xD5, 0x94, 0xDC, + 0xB6, 0x5C, 0x64, 0x25, 0xBD, 0x18, 0x60, 0x51 + }; + test_schnorrsig_bip_vectors_check_verify(pk, msg, sig, 0); + } + { + /* Test vector 10 */ + const unsigned char pk[32] = { + 0xDF, 0xF1, 0xD7, 0x7F, 0x2A, 0x67, 0x1C, 0x5F, + 0x36, 0x18, 0x37, 0x26, 0xDB, 0x23, 0x41, 0xBE, + 0x58, 0xFE, 0xAE, 0x1D, 0xA2, 0xDE, 0xCE, 0xD8, + 0x43, 0x24, 0x0F, 0x7B, 0x50, 0x2B, 0xA6, 0x59 + }; + const unsigned char msg[32] = { + 0x24, 0x3F, 0x6A, 0x88, 0x85, 0xA3, 0x08, 0xD3, + 0x13, 0x19, 0x8A, 0x2E, 0x03, 0x70, 0x73, 0x44, + 0xA4, 0x09, 0x38, 0x22, 0x29, 0x9F, 0x31, 0xD0, + 0x08, 0x2E, 0xFA, 0x98, 0xEC, 0x4E, 0x6C, 0x89 + }; + const unsigned char sig[64] = { + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, + 0x76, 0x15, 0xFB, 0xAF, 0x5A, 0xE2, 0x88, 0x64, + 0x01, 0x3C, 0x09, 0x97, 0x42, 0xDE, 0xAD, 0xB4, + 0xDB, 0xA8, 0x7F, 0x11, 0xAC, 0x67, 0x54, 0xF9, + 0x37, 0x80, 0xD5, 0xA1, 0x83, 0x7C, 0xF1, 0x97 + }; + test_schnorrsig_bip_vectors_check_verify(pk, msg, sig, 0); + } + { + /* Test vector 11 */ + const unsigned char pk[32] = { + 0xDF, 0xF1, 0xD7, 0x7F, 0x2A, 0x67, 0x1C, 0x5F, + 0x36, 0x18, 0x37, 0x26, 0xDB, 0x23, 0x41, 0xBE, + 0x58, 0xFE, 0xAE, 0x1D, 0xA2, 0xDE, 0xCE, 0xD8, + 0x43, 0x24, 0x0F, 0x7B, 0x50, 0x2B, 0xA6, 0x59 + }; + const unsigned char msg[32] = { + 0x24, 0x3F, 0x6A, 0x88, 0x85, 0xA3, 0x08, 0xD3, + 0x13, 0x19, 0x8A, 0x2E, 0x03, 0x70, 0x73, 0x44, + 0xA4, 0x09, 0x38, 0x22, 0x29, 0x9F, 0x31, 0xD0, + 0x08, 0x2E, 0xFA, 0x98, 0xEC, 0x4E, 0x6C, 0x89 + }; + const unsigned char sig[64] = { + 0x4A, 0x29, 0x8D, 0xAC, 0xAE, 0x57, 0x39, 0x5A, + 0x15, 0xD0, 0x79, 0x5D, 0xDB, 0xFD, 0x1D, 0xCB, + 0x56, 0x4D, 0xA8, 0x2B, 0x0F, 0x26, 0x9B, 0xC7, + 0x0A, 0x74, 0xF8, 0x22, 0x04, 0x29, 0xBA, 0x1D, + 0x69, 0xE8, 0x9B, 0x4C, 0x55, 0x64, 0xD0, 0x03, + 0x49, 0x10, 0x6B, 0x84, 0x97, 0x78, 0x5D, 0xD7, + 0xD1, 0xD7, 0x13, 0xA8, 0xAE, 0x82, 0xB3, 0x2F, + 0xA7, 0x9D, 0x5F, 0x7F, 0xC4, 0x07, 0xD3, 0x9B + }; + test_schnorrsig_bip_vectors_check_verify(pk, msg, sig, 0); + } + { + /* Test vector 12 */ + const unsigned char pk[32] = { + 0xDF, 0xF1, 0xD7, 0x7F, 0x2A, 0x67, 0x1C, 0x5F, + 0x36, 0x18, 0x37, 0x26, 0xDB, 0x23, 0x41, 0xBE, + 0x58, 0xFE, 0xAE, 0x1D, 0xA2, 0xDE, 0xCE, 0xD8, + 0x43, 0x24, 0x0F, 0x7B, 0x50, 0x2B, 0xA6, 0x59 + }; + const unsigned char msg[32] = { + 0x24, 0x3F, 0x6A, 0x88, 0x85, 0xA3, 0x08, 0xD3, + 0x13, 0x19, 0x8A, 0x2E, 0x03, 0x70, 0x73, 0x44, + 0xA4, 0x09, 0x38, 0x22, 0x29, 0x9F, 0x31, 0xD0, + 0x08, 0x2E, 0xFA, 0x98, 0xEC, 0x4E, 0x6C, 0x89 + }; + const unsigned char sig[64] = { + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC, 0x2F, + 0x69, 0xE8, 0x9B, 0x4C, 0x55, 0x64, 0xD0, 0x03, + 0x49, 0x10, 0x6B, 0x84, 0x97, 0x78, 0x5D, 0xD7, + 0xD1, 0xD7, 0x13, 0xA8, 0xAE, 0x82, 0xB3, 0x2F, + 0xA7, 0x9D, 0x5F, 0x7F, 0xC4, 0x07, 0xD3, 0x9B + }; + test_schnorrsig_bip_vectors_check_verify(pk, msg, sig, 0); + } + { + /* Test vector 13 */ + const unsigned char pk[32] = { + 0xDF, 0xF1, 0xD7, 0x7F, 0x2A, 0x67, 0x1C, 0x5F, + 0x36, 0x18, 0x37, 0x26, 0xDB, 0x23, 0x41, 0xBE, + 0x58, 0xFE, 0xAE, 0x1D, 0xA2, 0xDE, 0xCE, 0xD8, + 0x43, 0x24, 0x0F, 0x7B, 0x50, 0x2B, 0xA6, 0x59 + }; + const unsigned char msg[32] = { + 0x24, 0x3F, 0x6A, 0x88, 0x85, 0xA3, 0x08, 0xD3, + 0x13, 0x19, 0x8A, 0x2E, 0x03, 0x70, 0x73, 0x44, + 0xA4, 0x09, 0x38, 0x22, 0x29, 0x9F, 0x31, 0xD0, + 0x08, 0x2E, 0xFA, 0x98, 0xEC, 0x4E, 0x6C, 0x89 + }; + const unsigned char sig[64] = { + 0x6C, 0xFF, 0x5C, 0x3B, 0xA8, 0x6C, 0x69, 0xEA, + 0x4B, 0x73, 0x76, 0xF3, 0x1A, 0x9B, 0xCB, 0x4F, + 0x74, 0xC1, 0x97, 0x60, 0x89, 0xB2, 0xD9, 0x96, + 0x3D, 0xA2, 0xE5, 0x54, 0x3E, 0x17, 0x77, 0x69, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, + 0xBA, 0xAE, 0xDC, 0xE6, 0xAF, 0x48, 0xA0, 0x3B, + 0xBF, 0xD2, 0x5E, 0x8C, 0xD0, 0x36, 0x41, 0x41 + }; + test_schnorrsig_bip_vectors_check_verify(pk, msg, sig, 0); + } + { + /* Test vector 14 */ + const unsigned char pk[32] = { + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC, 0x30 + }; + secp256k1_xonly_pubkey pk_parsed; + /* No need to check the signature of the test vector as parsing the pubkey already fails */ + CHECK(!secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_parse(ctx, &pk_parsed, pk)); + } +} + +/* Nonce function that returns constant 0 */ +static int nonce_function_failing(unsigned char *nonce32, const unsigned char *msg32, const unsigned char *key32, const unsigned char *xonly_pk32, const unsigned char *algo16, void *data) { + (void) msg32; + (void) key32; + (void) xonly_pk32; + (void) algo16; + (void) data; + (void) nonce32; + return 0; +} + +/* Nonce function that sets nonce to 0 */ +static int nonce_function_0(unsigned char *nonce32, const unsigned char *msg32, const unsigned char *key32, const unsigned char *xonly_pk32, const unsigned char *algo16, void *data) { + (void) msg32; + (void) key32; + (void) xonly_pk32; + (void) algo16; + (void) data; + + memset(nonce32, 0, 32); + return 1; +} + +/* Nonce function that sets nonce to 0xFF...0xFF */ +static int nonce_function_overflowing(unsigned char *nonce32, const unsigned char *msg32, const unsigned char *key32, const unsigned char *xonly_pk32, const unsigned char *algo16, void *data) { + (void) msg32; + (void) key32; + (void) xonly_pk32; + (void) algo16; + (void) data; + + memset(nonce32, 0xFF, 32); + return 1; +} + +void test_schnorrsig_sign(void) { + unsigned char sk[32]; + secp256k1_keypair keypair; + const unsigned char msg[32] = "this is a msg for a schnorrsig.."; + unsigned char sig[64]; + unsigned char zeros64[64] = { 0 }; + + secp256k1_rand256(sk); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx, &keypair, sk)); + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign(ctx, sig, msg, &keypair, NULL, NULL) == 1); + + /* Test different nonce functions */ + memset(sig, 1, sizeof(sig)); + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign(ctx, sig, msg, &keypair, nonce_function_failing, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(memcmp(sig, zeros64, sizeof(sig)) == 0); + memset(&sig, 1, sizeof(sig)); + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign(ctx, sig, msg, &keypair, nonce_function_0, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(memcmp(sig, zeros64, sizeof(sig)) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign(ctx, sig, msg, &keypair, nonce_function_overflowing, NULL) == 1); + CHECK(memcmp(sig, zeros64, sizeof(sig)) != 0); +} + +#define N_SIGS 3 +/* Creates N_SIGS valid signatures and verifies them with verify and + * verify_batch (TODO). Then flips some bits and checks that verification now + * fails. */ +void test_schnorrsig_sign_verify(void) { + unsigned char sk[32]; + unsigned char msg[N_SIGS][32]; + unsigned char sig[N_SIGS][64]; + size_t i; + secp256k1_keypair keypair; + secp256k1_xonly_pubkey pk; + secp256k1_scalar s; + + secp256k1_rand256(sk); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx, &keypair, sk)); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub(ctx, &pk, NULL, &keypair)); + + for (i = 0; i < N_SIGS; i++) { + secp256k1_rand256(msg[i]); + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign(ctx, sig[i], msg[i], &keypair, NULL, NULL)); + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify(ctx, sig[i], msg[i], &pk)); + } + + { + /* Flip a few bits in the signature and in the message and check that + * verify and verify_batch (TODO) fail */ + size_t sig_idx = secp256k1_rand_int(N_SIGS); + size_t byte_idx = secp256k1_rand_int(32); + unsigned char xorbyte = secp256k1_rand_int(254)+1; + sig[sig_idx][byte_idx] ^= xorbyte; + CHECK(!secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify(ctx, sig[sig_idx], msg[sig_idx], &pk)); + sig[sig_idx][byte_idx] ^= xorbyte; + + byte_idx = secp256k1_rand_int(32); + sig[sig_idx][32+byte_idx] ^= xorbyte; + CHECK(!secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify(ctx, sig[sig_idx], msg[sig_idx], &pk)); + sig[sig_idx][32+byte_idx] ^= xorbyte; + + byte_idx = secp256k1_rand_int(32); + msg[sig_idx][byte_idx] ^= xorbyte; + CHECK(!secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify(ctx, sig[sig_idx], msg[sig_idx], &pk)); + msg[sig_idx][byte_idx] ^= xorbyte; + + /* Check that above bitflips have been reversed correctly */ + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify(ctx, sig[sig_idx], msg[sig_idx], &pk)); + } + + /* Test overflowing s */ + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign(ctx, sig[0], msg[0], &keypair, NULL, NULL)); + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify(ctx, sig[0], msg[0], &pk)); + memset(&sig[0][32], 0xFF, 32); + CHECK(!secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify(ctx, sig[0], msg[0], &pk)); + + /* Test negative s */ + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign(ctx, sig[0], msg[0], &keypair, NULL, NULL)); + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify(ctx, sig[0], msg[0], &pk)); + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&s, &sig[0][32], NULL); + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&s, &s); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(&sig[0][32], &s); + CHECK(!secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify(ctx, sig[0], msg[0], &pk)); +} +#undef N_SIGS + +void test_schnorrsig_taproot(void) { + unsigned char sk[32]; + secp256k1_keypair keypair; + secp256k1_xonly_pubkey internal_pk; + unsigned char internal_pk_bytes[32]; + secp256k1_xonly_pubkey output_pk; + unsigned char output_pk_bytes[32]; + unsigned char tweak[32]; + int pk_parity; + unsigned char msg[32]; + unsigned char sig[64]; + + /* Create output key */ + secp256k1_rand256(sk); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx, &keypair, sk) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub(ctx, &internal_pk, NULL, &keypair) == 1); + /* In actual taproot the tweak would be hash of internal_pk */ + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_serialize(ctx, tweak, &internal_pk) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_tweak_add(ctx, &keypair, tweak) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub(ctx, &output_pk, &pk_parity, &keypair) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_serialize(ctx, output_pk_bytes, &output_pk) == 1); + + /* Key spend */ + secp256k1_rand256(msg); + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign(ctx, sig, msg, &keypair, NULL, NULL) == 1); + /* Verify key spend */ + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_parse(ctx, &output_pk, output_pk_bytes) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify(ctx, sig, msg, &output_pk) == 1); + + /* Script spend */ + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_serialize(ctx, internal_pk_bytes, &internal_pk) == 1); + /* Verify script spend */ + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_parse(ctx, &internal_pk, internal_pk_bytes) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check(ctx, output_pk_bytes, pk_parity, &internal_pk, tweak) == 1); +} + +void run_schnorrsig_tests(void) { + int i; + run_nonce_function_bip340_tests(); + + test_schnorrsig_api(); + test_schnorrsig_sha256_tagged(); + test_schnorrsig_bip_vectors(); + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { + test_schnorrsig_sign(); + test_schnorrsig_sign_verify(); + } + test_schnorrsig_taproot(); +} + +#endif diff --git a/src/secp256k1/src/scalar.h b/src/secp256k1/src/scalar.h index 2a74703523..95d3e326c9 100644 --- a/src/secp256k1/src/scalar.h +++ b/src/secp256k1/src/scalar.h @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ #define SECP256K1_SCALAR_H #include "num.h" +#include "util.h" #if defined HAVE_CONFIG_H #include "libsecp256k1-config.h" @@ -15,12 +16,12 @@ #if defined(EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER) #include "scalar_low.h" -#elif defined(USE_SCALAR_4X64) +#elif defined(SECP256K1_WIDEMUL_INT128) #include "scalar_4x64.h" -#elif defined(USE_SCALAR_8X32) +#elif defined(SECP256K1_WIDEMUL_INT64) #include "scalar_8x32.h" #else -#error "Please select scalar implementation" +#error "Please select wide multiplication implementation" #endif /** Clear a scalar to prevent the leak of sensitive data. */ diff --git a/src/secp256k1/src/scalar_4x64_impl.h b/src/secp256k1/src/scalar_4x64_impl.h index 8f539c4bc6..7f39927861 100644 --- a/src/secp256k1/src/scalar_4x64_impl.h +++ b/src/secp256k1/src/scalar_4x64_impl.h @@ -192,9 +192,9 @@ static int secp256k1_scalar_cond_negate(secp256k1_scalar *r, int flag) { tl = t; \ } \ c0 += tl; /* overflow is handled on the next line */ \ - th += (c0 < tl) ? 1 : 0; /* at most 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF */ \ + th += (c0 < tl); /* at most 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF */ \ c1 += th; /* overflow is handled on the next line */ \ - c2 += (c1 < th) ? 1 : 0; /* never overflows by contract (verified in the next line) */ \ + c2 += (c1 < th); /* never overflows by contract (verified in the next line) */ \ VERIFY_CHECK((c1 >= th) || (c2 != 0)); \ } @@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ static int secp256k1_scalar_cond_negate(secp256k1_scalar *r, int flag) { tl = t; \ } \ c0 += tl; /* overflow is handled on the next line */ \ - th += (c0 < tl) ? 1 : 0; /* at most 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF */ \ + th += (c0 < tl); /* at most 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF */ \ c1 += th; /* never overflows by contract (verified in the next line) */ \ VERIFY_CHECK(c1 >= th); \ } @@ -221,16 +221,16 @@ static int secp256k1_scalar_cond_negate(secp256k1_scalar *r, int flag) { tl = t; \ } \ th2 = th + th; /* at most 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE (in case th was 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFF) */ \ - c2 += (th2 < th) ? 1 : 0; /* never overflows by contract (verified the next line) */ \ + c2 += (th2 < th); /* never overflows by contract (verified the next line) */ \ VERIFY_CHECK((th2 >= th) || (c2 != 0)); \ tl2 = tl + tl; /* at most 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE (in case the lowest 63 bits of tl were 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFF) */ \ - th2 += (tl2 < tl) ? 1 : 0; /* at most 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF */ \ + th2 += (tl2 < tl); /* at most 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF */ \ c0 += tl2; /* overflow is handled on the next line */ \ - th2 += (c0 < tl2) ? 1 : 0; /* second overflow is handled on the next line */ \ + th2 += (c0 < tl2); /* second overflow is handled on the next line */ \ c2 += (c0 < tl2) & (th2 == 0); /* never overflows by contract (verified the next line) */ \ VERIFY_CHECK((c0 >= tl2) || (th2 != 0) || (c2 != 0)); \ c1 += th2; /* overflow is handled on the next line */ \ - c2 += (c1 < th2) ? 1 : 0; /* never overflows by contract (verified the next line) */ \ + c2 += (c1 < th2); /* never overflows by contract (verified the next line) */ \ VERIFY_CHECK((c1 >= th2) || (c2 != 0)); \ } @@ -238,15 +238,15 @@ static int secp256k1_scalar_cond_negate(secp256k1_scalar *r, int flag) { #define sumadd(a) { \ unsigned int over; \ c0 += (a); /* overflow is handled on the next line */ \ - over = (c0 < (a)) ? 1 : 0; \ + over = (c0 < (a)); \ c1 += over; /* overflow is handled on the next line */ \ - c2 += (c1 < over) ? 1 : 0; /* never overflows by contract */ \ + c2 += (c1 < over); /* never overflows by contract */ \ } /** Add a to the number defined by (c0,c1). c1 must never overflow, c2 must be zero. */ #define sumadd_fast(a) { \ c0 += (a); /* overflow is handled on the next line */ \ - c1 += (c0 < (a)) ? 1 : 0; /* never overflows by contract (verified the next line) */ \ + c1 += (c0 < (a)); /* never overflows by contract (verified the next line) */ \ VERIFY_CHECK((c1 != 0) | (c0 >= (a))); \ VERIFY_CHECK(c2 == 0); \ } diff --git a/src/secp256k1/src/scalar_8x32_impl.h b/src/secp256k1/src/scalar_8x32_impl.h index 3c372f34fe..f8c7fa7efa 100644 --- a/src/secp256k1/src/scalar_8x32_impl.h +++ b/src/secp256k1/src/scalar_8x32_impl.h @@ -271,9 +271,9 @@ static int secp256k1_scalar_cond_negate(secp256k1_scalar *r, int flag) { tl = t; \ } \ c0 += tl; /* overflow is handled on the next line */ \ - th += (c0 < tl) ? 1 : 0; /* at most 0xFFFFFFFF */ \ + th += (c0 < tl); /* at most 0xFFFFFFFF */ \ c1 += th; /* overflow is handled on the next line */ \ - c2 += (c1 < th) ? 1 : 0; /* never overflows by contract (verified in the next line) */ \ + c2 += (c1 < th); /* never overflows by contract (verified in the next line) */ \ VERIFY_CHECK((c1 >= th) || (c2 != 0)); \ } @@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ static int secp256k1_scalar_cond_negate(secp256k1_scalar *r, int flag) { tl = t; \ } \ c0 += tl; /* overflow is handled on the next line */ \ - th += (c0 < tl) ? 1 : 0; /* at most 0xFFFFFFFF */ \ + th += (c0 < tl); /* at most 0xFFFFFFFF */ \ c1 += th; /* never overflows by contract (verified in the next line) */ \ VERIFY_CHECK(c1 >= th); \ } @@ -300,16 +300,16 @@ static int secp256k1_scalar_cond_negate(secp256k1_scalar *r, int flag) { tl = t; \ } \ th2 = th + th; /* at most 0xFFFFFFFE (in case th was 0x7FFFFFFF) */ \ - c2 += (th2 < th) ? 1 : 0; /* never overflows by contract (verified the next line) */ \ + c2 += (th2 < th); /* never overflows by contract (verified the next line) */ \ VERIFY_CHECK((th2 >= th) || (c2 != 0)); \ tl2 = tl + tl; /* at most 0xFFFFFFFE (in case the lowest 63 bits of tl were 0x7FFFFFFF) */ \ - th2 += (tl2 < tl) ? 1 : 0; /* at most 0xFFFFFFFF */ \ + th2 += (tl2 < tl); /* at most 0xFFFFFFFF */ \ c0 += tl2; /* overflow is handled on the next line */ \ - th2 += (c0 < tl2) ? 1 : 0; /* second overflow is handled on the next line */ \ + th2 += (c0 < tl2); /* second overflow is handled on the next line */ \ c2 += (c0 < tl2) & (th2 == 0); /* never overflows by contract (verified the next line) */ \ VERIFY_CHECK((c0 >= tl2) || (th2 != 0) || (c2 != 0)); \ c1 += th2; /* overflow is handled on the next line */ \ - c2 += (c1 < th2) ? 1 : 0; /* never overflows by contract (verified the next line) */ \ + c2 += (c1 < th2); /* never overflows by contract (verified the next line) */ \ VERIFY_CHECK((c1 >= th2) || (c2 != 0)); \ } @@ -317,15 +317,15 @@ static int secp256k1_scalar_cond_negate(secp256k1_scalar *r, int flag) { #define sumadd(a) { \ unsigned int over; \ c0 += (a); /* overflow is handled on the next line */ \ - over = (c0 < (a)) ? 1 : 0; \ + over = (c0 < (a)); \ c1 += over; /* overflow is handled on the next line */ \ - c2 += (c1 < over) ? 1 : 0; /* never overflows by contract */ \ + c2 += (c1 < over); /* never overflows by contract */ \ } /** Add a to the number defined by (c0,c1). c1 must never overflow, c2 must be zero. */ #define sumadd_fast(a) { \ c0 += (a); /* overflow is handled on the next line */ \ - c1 += (c0 < (a)) ? 1 : 0; /* never overflows by contract (verified the next line) */ \ + c1 += (c0 < (a)); /* never overflows by contract (verified the next line) */ \ VERIFY_CHECK((c1 != 0) | (c0 >= (a))); \ VERIFY_CHECK(c2 == 0); \ } diff --git a/src/secp256k1/src/scalar_impl.h b/src/secp256k1/src/scalar_impl.h index 70cd73db06..2ec04b1ae9 100644 --- a/src/secp256k1/src/scalar_impl.h +++ b/src/secp256k1/src/scalar_impl.h @@ -16,12 +16,12 @@ #if defined(EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER) #include "scalar_low_impl.h" -#elif defined(USE_SCALAR_4X64) +#elif defined(SECP256K1_WIDEMUL_INT128) #include "scalar_4x64_impl.h" -#elif defined(USE_SCALAR_8X32) +#elif defined(SECP256K1_WIDEMUL_INT64) #include "scalar_8x32_impl.h" #else -#error "Please select scalar implementation" +#error "Please select wide multiplication implementation" #endif static const secp256k1_scalar secp256k1_scalar_one = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1); diff --git a/src/secp256k1/src/scratch_impl.h b/src/secp256k1/src/scratch_impl.h index 4cee700001..b205620224 100644 --- a/src/secp256k1/src/scratch_impl.h +++ b/src/secp256k1/src/scratch_impl.h @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ #include "scratch.h" static secp256k1_scratch* secp256k1_scratch_create(const secp256k1_callback* error_callback, size_t size) { - const size_t base_alloc = ((sizeof(secp256k1_scratch) + ALIGNMENT - 1) / ALIGNMENT) * ALIGNMENT; + const size_t base_alloc = ROUND_TO_ALIGN(sizeof(secp256k1_scratch)); void *alloc = checked_malloc(error_callback, base_alloc + size); secp256k1_scratch* ret = (secp256k1_scratch *)alloc; if (ret != NULL) { @@ -60,6 +60,10 @@ static size_t secp256k1_scratch_max_allocation(const secp256k1_callback* error_c secp256k1_callback_call(error_callback, "invalid scratch space"); return 0; } + /* Ensure that multiplication will not wrap around */ + if (ALIGNMENT > 1 && objects > SIZE_MAX/(ALIGNMENT - 1)) { + return 0; + } if (scratch->max_size - scratch->alloc_size <= objects * (ALIGNMENT - 1)) { return 0; } @@ -68,7 +72,14 @@ static size_t secp256k1_scratch_max_allocation(const secp256k1_callback* error_c static void *secp256k1_scratch_alloc(const secp256k1_callback* error_callback, secp256k1_scratch* scratch, size_t size) { void *ret; - size = ROUND_TO_ALIGN(size); + size_t rounded_size; + + rounded_size = ROUND_TO_ALIGN(size); + /* Check that rounding did not wrap around */ + if (rounded_size < size) { + return NULL; + } + size = rounded_size; if (memcmp(scratch->magic, "scratch", 8) != 0) { secp256k1_callback_call(error_callback, "invalid scratch space"); diff --git a/src/secp256k1/src/secp256k1.c b/src/secp256k1/src/secp256k1.c index b03a6e6345..eaafb3a21d 100644 --- a/src/secp256k1/src/secp256k1.c +++ b/src/secp256k1/src/secp256k1.c @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ #include "include/secp256k1.h" #include "include/secp256k1_preallocated.h" +#include "assumptions.h" #include "util.h" #include "num_impl.h" #include "field_impl.h" @@ -19,6 +20,7 @@ #include "eckey_impl.h" #include "hash_impl.h" #include "scratch_impl.h" +#include "selftest.h" #if defined(VALGRIND) # include <valgrind/memcheck.h> @@ -117,6 +119,9 @@ secp256k1_context* secp256k1_context_preallocated_create(void* prealloc, unsigne size_t prealloc_size; secp256k1_context* ret; + if (!secp256k1_selftest()) { + secp256k1_callback_call(&default_error_callback, "self test failed"); + } VERIFY_CHECK(prealloc != NULL); prealloc_size = secp256k1_context_preallocated_size(flags); ret = (secp256k1_context*)manual_alloc(&prealloc, sizeof(secp256k1_context), base, prealloc_size); @@ -226,7 +231,7 @@ void secp256k1_scratch_space_destroy(const secp256k1_context *ctx, secp256k1_scr * of the software. This is setup for use with valgrind but could be substituted with * the appropriate instrumentation for other analysis tools. */ -static SECP256K1_INLINE void secp256k1_declassify(const secp256k1_context* ctx, void *p, size_t len) { +static SECP256K1_INLINE void secp256k1_declassify(const secp256k1_context* ctx, const void *p, size_t len) { #if defined(VALGRIND) if (EXPECT(ctx->declassify,0)) VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED(p, len); #else @@ -291,7 +296,7 @@ int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char *o VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); ARG_CHECK(outputlen != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(*outputlen >= ((flags & SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_COMPRESSION) ? 33 : 65)); + ARG_CHECK(*outputlen >= ((flags & SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_COMPRESSION) ? 33u : 65u)); len = *outputlen; *outputlen = 0; ARG_CHECK(output != NULL); @@ -548,10 +553,21 @@ int secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(const secp256k1_context* ctx, const unsigned char return ret; } -int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey, const unsigned char *seckey) { +static int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create_helper(const secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context *ecmult_gen_ctx, secp256k1_scalar *seckey_scalar, secp256k1_ge *p, const unsigned char *seckey) { secp256k1_gej pj; + int ret; + + ret = secp256k1_scalar_set_b32_seckey(seckey_scalar, seckey); + secp256k1_scalar_cmov(seckey_scalar, &secp256k1_scalar_one, !ret); + + secp256k1_ecmult_gen(ecmult_gen_ctx, &pj, seckey_scalar); + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(p, &pj); + return ret; +} + +int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey, const unsigned char *seckey) { secp256k1_ge p; - secp256k1_scalar sec; + secp256k1_scalar seckey_scalar; int ret = 0; VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); ARG_CHECK(pubkey != NULL); @@ -559,15 +575,11 @@ int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_pubkey *p ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx)); ARG_CHECK(seckey != NULL); - ret = secp256k1_scalar_set_b32_seckey(&sec, seckey); - secp256k1_scalar_cmov(&sec, &secp256k1_scalar_one, !ret); - - secp256k1_ecmult_gen(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &pj, &sec); - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&p, &pj); + ret = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create_helper(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &seckey_scalar, &p, seckey); secp256k1_pubkey_save(pubkey, &p); memczero(pubkey, sizeof(*pubkey), !ret); - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&sec); + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&seckey_scalar); return ret; } @@ -605,24 +617,31 @@ int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_negate(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_pubkey *p return ret; } -int secp256k1_ec_seckey_tweak_add(const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char *seckey, const unsigned char *tweak) { + +static int secp256k1_ec_seckey_tweak_add_helper(secp256k1_scalar *sec, const unsigned char *tweak) { secp256k1_scalar term; + int overflow = 0; + int ret = 0; + + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&term, tweak, &overflow); + ret = (!overflow) & secp256k1_eckey_privkey_tweak_add(sec, &term); + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&term); + return ret; +} + +int secp256k1_ec_seckey_tweak_add(const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char *seckey, const unsigned char *tweak) { secp256k1_scalar sec; int ret = 0; - int overflow = 0; VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); ARG_CHECK(seckey != NULL); ARG_CHECK(tweak != NULL); - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&term, tweak, &overflow); ret = secp256k1_scalar_set_b32_seckey(&sec, seckey); - - ret &= (!overflow) & secp256k1_eckey_privkey_tweak_add(&sec, &term); + ret &= secp256k1_ec_seckey_tweak_add_helper(&sec, tweak); secp256k1_scalar_cmov(&sec, &secp256k1_scalar_zero, !ret); secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(seckey, &sec); secp256k1_scalar_clear(&sec); - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&term); return ret; } @@ -630,25 +649,26 @@ int secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_add(const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char * return secp256k1_ec_seckey_tweak_add(ctx, seckey, tweak); } +static int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add_helper(const secp256k1_ecmult_context* ecmult_ctx, secp256k1_ge *p, const unsigned char *tweak) { + secp256k1_scalar term; + int overflow = 0; + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&term, tweak, &overflow); + return !overflow && secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_tweak_add(ecmult_ctx, p, &term); +} + int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey, const unsigned char *tweak) { secp256k1_ge p; - secp256k1_scalar term; int ret = 0; - int overflow = 0; VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_ctx)); ARG_CHECK(pubkey != NULL); ARG_CHECK(tweak != NULL); - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&term, tweak, &overflow); - ret = !overflow && secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, &p, pubkey); + ret = secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, &p, pubkey); memset(pubkey, 0, sizeof(*pubkey)); + ret = ret && secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add_helper(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &p, tweak); if (ret) { - if (secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_tweak_add(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &p, &term)) { - secp256k1_pubkey_save(pubkey, &p); - } else { - ret = 0; - } + secp256k1_pubkey_save(pubkey, &p); } return ret; @@ -741,3 +761,11 @@ int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_combine(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_pubkey * #ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_RECOVERY # include "modules/recovery/main_impl.h" #endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_EXTRAKEYS +# include "modules/extrakeys/main_impl.h" +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_SCHNORRSIG +# include "modules/schnorrsig/main_impl.h" +#endif diff --git a/src/secp256k1/src/selftest.h b/src/secp256k1/src/selftest.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..885983aa20 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/secp256k1/src/selftest.h @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2020 Pieter Wuille * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef SECP256K1_SELFTEST_H +#define SECP256K1_SELFTEST_H + +#include "hash.h" + +#include <string.h> + +static int secp256k1_selftest_sha256(void) { + static const char *input63 = "For this sample, this 63-byte string will be used as input data"; + static const unsigned char output32[32] = { + 0xf0, 0x8a, 0x78, 0xcb, 0xba, 0xee, 0x08, 0x2b, 0x05, 0x2a, 0xe0, 0x70, 0x8f, 0x32, 0xfa, 0x1e, + 0x50, 0xc5, 0xc4, 0x21, 0xaa, 0x77, 0x2b, 0xa5, 0xdb, 0xb4, 0x06, 0xa2, 0xea, 0x6b, 0xe3, 0x42, + }; + unsigned char out[32]; + secp256k1_sha256 hasher; + secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&hasher); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&hasher, (const unsigned char*)input63, 63); + secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&hasher, out); + return memcmp(out, output32, 32) == 0; +} + +static int secp256k1_selftest(void) { + return secp256k1_selftest_sha256(); +} + +#endif /* SECP256K1_SELFTEST_H */ diff --git a/src/secp256k1/src/testrand.h b/src/secp256k1/src/testrand.h index f1f9be077e..bcbe15a6f1 100644 --- a/src/secp256k1/src/testrand.h +++ b/src/secp256k1/src/testrand.h @@ -35,4 +35,7 @@ static void secp256k1_rand256_test(unsigned char *b32); /** Generate pseudorandom bytes with long sequences of zero and one bits. */ static void secp256k1_rand_bytes_test(unsigned char *bytes, size_t len); +/** Flip a single random bit in a byte array */ +static void secp256k1_rand_flip(unsigned char *b, size_t len); + #endif /* SECP256K1_TESTRAND_H */ diff --git a/src/secp256k1/src/testrand_impl.h b/src/secp256k1/src/testrand_impl.h index 30a91e5296..dfb658d9c6 100644 --- a/src/secp256k1/src/testrand_impl.h +++ b/src/secp256k1/src/testrand_impl.h @@ -107,4 +107,8 @@ static void secp256k1_rand256_test(unsigned char *b32) { secp256k1_rand_bytes_test(b32, 32); } +static void secp256k1_rand_flip(unsigned char *b, size_t len) { + b[secp256k1_rand_int(len)] ^= (1 << secp256k1_rand_int(8)); +} + #endif /* SECP256K1_TESTRAND_IMPL_H */ diff --git a/src/secp256k1/src/tests.c b/src/secp256k1/src/tests.c index 374ed7dc12..4780e9319b 100644 --- a/src/secp256k1/src/tests.c +++ b/src/secp256k1/src/tests.c @@ -182,8 +182,10 @@ void run_context_tests(int use_prealloc) { ecount2 = 10; secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(vrfy, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(sign, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount2); - secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(sign, counting_illegal_callback_fn, NULL); - CHECK(vrfy->error_callback.fn != sign->error_callback.fn); + /* set error callback (to a function that still aborts in case malloc() fails in secp256k1_context_clone() below) */ + secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(sign, secp256k1_default_illegal_callback_fn, NULL); + CHECK(sign->error_callback.fn != vrfy->error_callback.fn); + CHECK(sign->error_callback.fn == secp256k1_default_illegal_callback_fn); /* check if sizes for cloning are consistent */ CHECK(secp256k1_context_preallocated_clone_size(none) == secp256k1_context_preallocated_size(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE)); @@ -239,7 +241,8 @@ void run_context_tests(int use_prealloc) { } /* Verify that the error callback makes it across the clone. */ - CHECK(vrfy->error_callback.fn != sign->error_callback.fn); + CHECK(sign->error_callback.fn != vrfy->error_callback.fn); + CHECK(sign->error_callback.fn == secp256k1_default_illegal_callback_fn); /* And that it resets back to default. */ secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(sign, NULL, NULL); CHECK(vrfy->error_callback.fn == sign->error_callback.fn); @@ -361,8 +364,8 @@ void run_scratch_tests(void) { CHECK(scratch->alloc_size != 0); CHECK(scratch->alloc_size % ALIGNMENT == 0); - /* Allocating another 500 bytes fails */ - CHECK(secp256k1_scratch_alloc(&none->error_callback, scratch, 500) == NULL); + /* Allocating another 501 bytes fails */ + CHECK(secp256k1_scratch_alloc(&none->error_callback, scratch, 501) == NULL); CHECK(secp256k1_scratch_max_allocation(&none->error_callback, scratch, 0) == 1000 - adj_alloc); CHECK(secp256k1_scratch_max_allocation(&none->error_callback, scratch, 1) == 1000 - adj_alloc - (ALIGNMENT - 1)); CHECK(scratch->alloc_size != 0); @@ -395,6 +398,18 @@ void run_scratch_tests(void) { secp256k1_scratch_space_destroy(none, scratch); CHECK(ecount == 5); + /* Test that large integers do not wrap around in a bad way */ + scratch = secp256k1_scratch_space_create(none, 1000); + /* Try max allocation with a large number of objects. Only makes sense if + * ALIGNMENT is greater than 1 because otherwise the objects take no extra + * space. */ + CHECK(ALIGNMENT <= 1 || !secp256k1_scratch_max_allocation(&none->error_callback, scratch, (SIZE_MAX / (ALIGNMENT - 1)) + 1)); + /* Try allocating SIZE_MAX to test wrap around which only happens if + * ALIGNMENT > 1, otherwise it returns NULL anyway because the scratch + * space is too small. */ + CHECK(secp256k1_scratch_alloc(&none->error_callback, scratch, SIZE_MAX) == NULL); + secp256k1_scratch_space_destroy(none, scratch); + /* cleanup */ secp256k1_scratch_space_destroy(none, NULL); /* no-op */ secp256k1_context_destroy(none); @@ -2215,6 +2230,9 @@ void test_ge(void) { /* Normal doubling. */ secp256k1_gej_double_var(&resj, &gej[i2], NULL); ge_equals_gej(&ref, &resj); + /* Constant-time doubling. */ + secp256k1_gej_double(&resj, &gej[i2]); + ge_equals_gej(&ref, &resj); } /* Test adding opposites. */ @@ -2300,6 +2318,39 @@ void test_ge(void) { free(zinv); } + +void test_intialized_inf(void) { + secp256k1_ge p; + secp256k1_gej pj, npj, infj1, infj2, infj3; + secp256k1_fe zinv; + + /* Test that adding P+(-P) results in a fully initalized infinity*/ + random_group_element_test(&p); + secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&pj, &p); + secp256k1_gej_neg(&npj, &pj); + + secp256k1_gej_add_var(&infj1, &pj, &npj, NULL); + CHECK(secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&infj1)); + CHECK(secp256k1_fe_is_zero(&infj1.x)); + CHECK(secp256k1_fe_is_zero(&infj1.y)); + CHECK(secp256k1_fe_is_zero(&infj1.z)); + + secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&infj2, &npj, &p, NULL); + CHECK(secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&infj2)); + CHECK(secp256k1_fe_is_zero(&infj2.x)); + CHECK(secp256k1_fe_is_zero(&infj2.y)); + CHECK(secp256k1_fe_is_zero(&infj2.z)); + + secp256k1_fe_set_int(&zinv, 1); + secp256k1_gej_add_zinv_var(&infj3, &npj, &p, &zinv); + CHECK(secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&infj3)); + CHECK(secp256k1_fe_is_zero(&infj3.x)); + CHECK(secp256k1_fe_is_zero(&infj3.y)); + CHECK(secp256k1_fe_is_zero(&infj3.z)); + + +} + void test_add_neg_y_diff_x(void) { /* The point of this test is to check that we can add two points * whose y-coordinates are negatives of each other but whose x @@ -2373,6 +2424,7 @@ void run_ge(void) { test_ge(); } test_add_neg_y_diff_x(); + test_intialized_inf(); } void test_ec_combine(void) { @@ -2967,14 +3019,16 @@ void test_ecmult_multi(secp256k1_scratch *scratch, secp256k1_ecmult_multi_func e void test_ecmult_multi_batch_single(secp256k1_ecmult_multi_func ecmult_multi) { secp256k1_scalar szero; - secp256k1_scalar sc[32]; - secp256k1_ge pt[32]; + secp256k1_scalar sc; + secp256k1_ge pt; secp256k1_gej r; ecmult_multi_data data; secp256k1_scratch *scratch_empty; - data.sc = sc; - data.pt = pt; + random_group_element_test(&pt); + random_scalar_order(&sc); + data.sc = ≻ + data.pt = &pt; secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&szero, 0); /* Try to multiply 1 point, but scratch space is empty.*/ @@ -3232,6 +3286,7 @@ void test_constant_wnaf(const secp256k1_scalar *number, int w) { int skew; int bits = 256; secp256k1_scalar num = *number; + secp256k1_scalar scalar_skew; secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&x, 0); secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&shift, 1 << w); @@ -3262,7 +3317,8 @@ void test_constant_wnaf(const secp256k1_scalar *number, int w) { secp256k1_scalar_add(&x, &x, &t); } /* Skew num because when encoding numbers as odd we use an offset */ - secp256k1_scalar_cadd_bit(&num, skew == 2, 1); + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&scalar_skew, 1 << (skew == 2)); + secp256k1_scalar_add(&num, &num, &scalar_skew); CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&x, &num)); } @@ -3374,13 +3430,32 @@ void run_wnaf(void) { int i; secp256k1_scalar n = {{0}}; + test_constant_wnaf(&n, 4); /* Sanity check: 1 and 2 are the smallest odd and even numbers and should * have easier-to-diagnose failure modes */ n.d[0] = 1; test_constant_wnaf(&n, 4); n.d[0] = 2; test_constant_wnaf(&n, 4); - /* Test 0 */ + /* Test -1, because it's a special case in wnaf_const */ + n = secp256k1_scalar_one; + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&n, &n); + test_constant_wnaf(&n, 4); + + /* Test -2, which may not lead to overflows in wnaf_const */ + secp256k1_scalar_add(&n, &secp256k1_scalar_one, &secp256k1_scalar_one); + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&n, &n); + test_constant_wnaf(&n, 4); + + /* Test (1/2) - 1 = 1/-2 and 1/2 = (1/-2) + 1 + as corner cases of negation handling in wnaf_const */ + secp256k1_scalar_inverse(&n, &n); + test_constant_wnaf(&n, 4); + + secp256k1_scalar_add(&n, &n, &secp256k1_scalar_one); + test_constant_wnaf(&n, 4); + + /* Test 0 for fixed wnaf */ test_fixed_wnaf_small(); /* Random tests */ for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { @@ -5277,6 +5352,14 @@ void run_ecdsa_openssl(void) { # include "modules/recovery/tests_impl.h" #endif +#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_EXTRAKEYS +# include "modules/extrakeys/tests_impl.h" +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_SCHNORRSIG +# include "modules/schnorrsig/tests_impl.h" +#endif + void run_memczero_test(void) { unsigned char buf1[6] = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}; unsigned char buf2[sizeof(buf1)]; @@ -5583,6 +5666,14 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) { run_recovery_tests(); #endif +#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_EXTRAKEYS + run_extrakeys_tests(); +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_SCHNORRSIG + run_schnorrsig_tests(); +#endif + /* util tests */ run_memczero_test(); diff --git a/src/secp256k1/src/tests_exhaustive.c b/src/secp256k1/src/tests_exhaustive.c index 8cca1cef21..681ed80bd0 100644 --- a/src/secp256k1/src/tests_exhaustive.c +++ b/src/secp256k1/src/tests_exhaustive.c @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ #endif #include "include/secp256k1.h" +#include "assumptions.h" #include "group.h" #include "secp256k1.c" #include "testrand_impl.h" @@ -141,10 +142,8 @@ void test_exhaustive_addition(const secp256k1_ge *group, const secp256k1_gej *gr /* Check doubling */ for (i = 0; i < order; i++) { secp256k1_gej tmp; - if (i > 0) { - secp256k1_gej_double_nonzero(&tmp, &groupj[i]); - ge_equals_gej(&group[(2 * i) % order], &tmp); - } + secp256k1_gej_double(&tmp, &groupj[i]); + ge_equals_gej(&group[(2 * i) % order], &tmp); secp256k1_gej_double_var(&tmp, &groupj[i], NULL); ge_equals_gej(&group[(2 * i) % order], &tmp); } diff --git a/src/secp256k1/src/util.h b/src/secp256k1/src/util.h index 8289e23e0c..a5cbe03ef5 100644 --- a/src/secp256k1/src/util.h +++ b/src/secp256k1/src/util.h @@ -170,13 +170,35 @@ static SECP256K1_INLINE void *manual_alloc(void** prealloc_ptr, size_t alloc_siz # define I64uFORMAT "llu" #endif -#if defined(HAVE___INT128) -# if defined(__GNUC__) -# define SECP256K1_GNUC_EXT __extension__ -# else -# define SECP256K1_GNUC_EXT +#if defined(__GNUC__) +# define SECP256K1_GNUC_EXT __extension__ +#else +# define SECP256K1_GNUC_EXT +#endif + +/* If SECP256K1_{LITTLE,BIG}_ENDIAN is not explicitly provided, infer from various other system macros. */ +#if !defined(SECP256K1_LITTLE_ENDIAN) && !defined(SECP256K1_BIG_ENDIAN) +/* Inspired by https://github.com/rofl0r/endianness.h/blob/9853923246b065a3b52d2c43835f3819a62c7199/endianness.h#L52L73 */ +# if (defined(__BYTE_ORDER__) && defined(__ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__) && __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__) || \ + defined(_X86_) || defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__i386__) || \ + defined(__i486__) || defined(__i586__) || defined(__i686__) || \ + defined(__MIPSEL) || defined(_MIPSEL) || defined(MIPSEL) || \ + defined(__ARMEL__) || defined(__AARCH64EL__) || \ + (defined(__LITTLE_ENDIAN__) && __LITTLE_ENDIAN__ == 1) || \ + (defined(_LITTLE_ENDIAN) && _LITTLE_ENDIAN == 1) || \ + defined(_M_IX86) || defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_ARM) /* MSVC */ +# define SECP256K1_LITTLE_ENDIAN # endif -SECP256K1_GNUC_EXT typedef unsigned __int128 uint128_t; +# if (defined(__BYTE_ORDER__) && defined(__ORDER_BIG_ENDIAN__) && __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_BIG_ENDIAN__) || \ + defined(__MIPSEB) || defined(_MIPSEB) || defined(MIPSEB) || \ + defined(__MICROBLAZEEB__) || defined(__ARMEB__) || defined(__AARCH64EB__) || \ + (defined(__BIG_ENDIAN__) && __BIG_ENDIAN__ == 1) || \ + (defined(_BIG_ENDIAN) && _BIG_ENDIAN == 1) +# define SECP256K1_BIG_ENDIAN +# endif +#endif +#if defined(SECP256K1_LITTLE_ENDIAN) == defined(SECP256K1_BIG_ENDIAN) +# error Please make sure that either SECP256K1_LITTLE_ENDIAN or SECP256K1_BIG_ENDIAN is set, see src/util.h. #endif /* Zero memory if flag == 1. Flag must be 0 or 1. Constant time. */ @@ -197,10 +219,15 @@ static SECP256K1_INLINE void memczero(void *s, size_t len, int flag) { /** If flag is true, set *r equal to *a; otherwise leave it. Constant-time. Both *r and *a must be initialized and non-negative.*/ static SECP256K1_INLINE void secp256k1_int_cmov(int *r, const int *a, int flag) { unsigned int mask0, mask1, r_masked, a_masked; + /* Access flag with a volatile-qualified lvalue. + This prevents clang from figuring out (after inlining) that flag can + take only be 0 or 1, which leads to variable time code. */ + volatile int vflag = flag; + /* Casting a negative int to unsigned and back to int is implementation defined behavior */ VERIFY_CHECK(*r >= 0 && *a >= 0); - mask0 = (unsigned int)flag + ~0u; + mask0 = (unsigned int)vflag + ~0u; mask1 = ~mask0; r_masked = ((unsigned int)*r & mask0); a_masked = ((unsigned int)*a & mask1); @@ -208,4 +235,21 @@ static SECP256K1_INLINE void secp256k1_int_cmov(int *r, const int *a, int flag) *r = (int)(r_masked | a_masked); } +/* If USE_FORCE_WIDEMUL_{INT128,INT64} is set, use that wide multiplication implementation. + * Otherwise use the presence of __SIZEOF_INT128__ to decide. + */ +#if defined(USE_FORCE_WIDEMUL_INT128) +# define SECP256K1_WIDEMUL_INT128 1 +#elif defined(USE_FORCE_WIDEMUL_INT64) +# define SECP256K1_WIDEMUL_INT64 1 +#elif defined(__SIZEOF_INT128__) +# define SECP256K1_WIDEMUL_INT128 1 +#else +# define SECP256K1_WIDEMUL_INT64 1 +#endif +#if defined(SECP256K1_WIDEMUL_INT128) +SECP256K1_GNUC_EXT typedef unsigned __int128 uint128_t; +SECP256K1_GNUC_EXT typedef __int128 int128_t; +#endif + #endif /* SECP256K1_UTIL_H */ diff --git a/src/secp256k1/src/valgrind_ctime_test.c b/src/secp256k1/src/valgrind_ctime_test.c index 60a82d599e..e676a8326c 100644 --- a/src/secp256k1/src/valgrind_ctime_test.c +++ b/src/secp256k1/src/valgrind_ctime_test.c @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ #include <valgrind/memcheck.h> #include "include/secp256k1.h" +#include "assumptions.h" #include "util.h" #if ENABLE_MODULE_ECDH @@ -16,6 +17,14 @@ # include "include/secp256k1_recovery.h" #endif +#if ENABLE_MODULE_EXTRAKEYS +# include "include/secp256k1_extrakeys.h" +#endif + +#if ENABLE_MODULE_SCHNORRSIG +#include "include/secp256k1_schnorrsig.h" +#endif + int main(void) { secp256k1_context* ctx; secp256k1_ecdsa_signature signature; @@ -32,6 +41,9 @@ int main(void) { secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature recoverable_signature; int recid; #endif +#if ENABLE_MODULE_EXTRAKEYS + secp256k1_keypair keypair; +#endif if (!RUNNING_ON_VALGRIND) { fprintf(stderr, "This test can only usefully be run inside valgrind.\n"); @@ -49,7 +61,9 @@ int main(void) { msg[i] = i + 1; } - ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN | SECP256K1_CONTEXT_DECLASSIFY); + ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN + | SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY + | SECP256K1_CONTEXT_DECLASSIFY); /* Test keygen. */ VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_UNDEFINED(key, 32); @@ -114,6 +128,30 @@ int main(void) { VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED(&ret, sizeof(ret)); CHECK(ret); + /* Test keypair_create and keypair_xonly_tweak_add. */ +#if ENABLE_MODULE_EXTRAKEYS + VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_UNDEFINED(key, 32); + ret = secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx, &keypair, key); + VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED(&ret, sizeof(ret)); + CHECK(ret == 1); + + /* The tweak is not treated as a secret in keypair_tweak_add */ + VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED(msg, 32); + ret = secp256k1_keypair_xonly_tweak_add(ctx, &keypair, msg); + VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED(&ret, sizeof(ret)); + CHECK(ret == 1); +#endif + +#if ENABLE_MODULE_SCHNORRSIG + VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_UNDEFINED(key, 32); + ret = secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx, &keypair, key); + VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED(&ret, sizeof(ret)); + CHECK(ret == 1); + ret = secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign(ctx, sig, msg, &keypair, NULL, NULL); + VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED(&ret, sizeof(ret)); + CHECK(ret == 1); +#endif + secp256k1_context_destroy(ctx); return 0; } |