4 files changed, 27 insertions, 26 deletions
diff --git a/src/policy/feerate.h b/src/policy/feerate.h
index 565da6c154..3449cdd699 100644
--- a/src/policy/feerate.h
+++ b/src/policy/feerate.h
@@ -20,13 +20,17 @@ class CFeeRate
 {
 private:
     CAmount nSatoshisPerK; // unit is satoshis-per-1,000-bytes
+
 public:
     /** Fee rate of 0 satoshis per kB */
     CFeeRate() : nSatoshisPerK(0) { }
-    explicit CFeeRate(const CAmount& _nSatoshisPerK): nSatoshisPerK(_nSatoshisPerK) { }
+    template<typename I>
+    CFeeRate(const I _nSatoshisPerK): nSatoshisPerK(_nSatoshisPerK) {
+        // We've previously had bugs creep in from silent double->int conversion...
+        static_assert(std::is_integral<I>::value, "CFeeRate should be used without floats");
+    }
     /** Constructor for a fee rate in satoshis per kB. The size in bytes must not exceed (2^63 - 1)*/
     CFeeRate(const CAmount& nFeePaid, size_t nBytes);
-    CFeeRate(const CFeeRate& other) { nSatoshisPerK = other.nSatoshisPerK; }
     /**
      * Return the fee in satoshis for the given size in bytes.
      */
diff --git a/src/policy/fees.cpp b/src/policy/fees.cpp
index 5c92a0eb41..dcf49de5f1 100644
--- a/src/policy/fees.cpp
+++ b/src/policy/fees.cpp
@@ -715,7 +715,7 @@ CFeeRate CBlockPolicyEstimator::estimateRawFee(int confTarget, double successThr
     if (median < 0)
         return CFeeRate(0);
 
-    return CFeeRate(median);
+    return CFeeRate(llround(median));
 }
 
 unsigned int CBlockPolicyEstimator::HighestTargetTracked(FeeEstimateHorizon horizon) const
@@ -902,7 +902,7 @@ CFeeRate CBlockPolicyEstimator::estimateSmartFee(int confTarget, FeeCalculation
 
     if (median < 0) return CFeeRate(0); // error condition
 
-    return CFeeRate(median);
+    return CFeeRate(llround(median));
 }
 
 
@@ -1044,5 +1044,5 @@ CAmount FeeFilterRounder::round(CAmount currentMinFee)
     if ((it != feeset.begin() && insecure_rand.rand32() % 3 != 0) || it == feeset.end()) {
         it--;
     }
-    return *it;
+    return static_cast<CAmount>(*it);
 }
diff --git a/src/policy/policy.cpp b/src/policy/policy.cpp
index 605e3e0696..b2fb284508 100644
--- a/src/policy/policy.cpp
+++ b/src/policy/policy.cpp
@@ -54,23 +54,6 @@ bool IsDust(const CTxOut& txout, const CFeeRate& dustRelayFeeIn)
     return (txout.nValue < GetDustThreshold(txout, dustRelayFeeIn));
 }
 
-    /**
-     * Check transaction inputs to mitigate two
-     * potential denial-of-service attacks:
-     * 
-     * 1. scriptSigs with extra data stuffed into them,
-     *    not consumed by scriptPubKey (or P2SH script)
-     * 2. P2SH scripts with a crazy number of expensive
-     *    CHECKSIG/CHECKMULTISIG operations
-     *
-     * Why bother? To avoid denial-of-service attacks; an attacker
-     * can submit a standard HASH... OP_EQUAL transaction,
-     * which will get accepted into blocks. The redemption
-     * script can be anything; an attacker could use a very
-     * expensive-to-check-upon-redemption script like:
-     *   DUP CHECKSIG DROP ... repeated 100 times... OP_1
-     */
-
 bool IsStandard(const CScript& scriptPubKey, txnouttype& whichType, const bool witnessEnabled)
 {
     std::vector<std::vector<unsigned char> > vSolutions;
@@ -93,7 +76,7 @@ bool IsStandard(const CScript& scriptPubKey, txnouttype& whichType, const bool w
     else if (!witnessEnabled && (whichType == TX_WITNESS_V0_KEYHASH || whichType == TX_WITNESS_V0_SCRIPTHASH))
         return false;
 
-    return whichType != TX_NONSTANDARD;
+    return whichType != TX_NONSTANDARD && whichType != TX_WITNESS_UNKNOWN;
 }
 
 bool IsStandardTx(const CTransaction& tx, std::string& reason, const bool witnessEnabled)
@@ -160,6 +143,22 @@ bool IsStandardTx(const CTransaction& tx, std::string& reason, const bool witnes
     return true;
 }
 
+/**
+ * Check transaction inputs to mitigate two
+ * potential denial-of-service attacks:
+ *
+ * 1. scriptSigs with extra data stuffed into them,
+ *    not consumed by scriptPubKey (or P2SH script)
+ * 2. P2SH scripts with a crazy number of expensive
+ *    CHECKSIG/CHECKMULTISIG operations
+ *
+ * Why bother? To avoid denial-of-service attacks; an attacker
+ * can submit a standard HASH... OP_EQUAL transaction,
+ * which will get accepted into blocks. The redemption
+ * script can be anything; an attacker could use a very
+ * expensive-to-check-upon-redemption script like:
+ *   DUP CHECKSIG DROP ... repeated 100 times... OP_1
+ */
 bool AreInputsStandard(const CTransaction& tx, const CCoinsViewCache& mapInputs)
 {
     if (tx.IsCoinBase())
diff --git a/src/policy/policy.h b/src/policy/policy.h
index c06820f84e..ef71dd73bc 100644
--- a/src/policy/policy.h
+++ b/src/policy/policy.h
@@ -16,10 +16,8 @@
 class CCoinsViewCache;
 class CTxOut;
 
-/** Default for -blockmaxsize, which controls the maximum size of block the mining code will create **/
-static const unsigned int DEFAULT_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE = 750000;
 /** Default for -blockmaxweight, which controls the range of block weights the mining code will create **/
-static const unsigned int DEFAULT_BLOCK_MAX_WEIGHT = 3000000;
+static const unsigned int DEFAULT_BLOCK_MAX_WEIGHT = MAX_BLOCK_WEIGHT - 4000;
 /** Default for -blockmintxfee, which sets the minimum feerate for a transaction in blocks created by mining code **/
 static const unsigned int DEFAULT_BLOCK_MIN_TX_FEE = 1000;
 /** The maximum weight for transactions we're willing to relay/mine */