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-rw-r--r--src/net_processing.cpp96
1 files changed, 53 insertions, 43 deletions
diff --git a/src/net_processing.cpp b/src/net_processing.cpp
index f678b73a42..f1a89a8936 100644
--- a/src/net_processing.cpp
+++ b/src/net_processing.cpp
@@ -13,10 +13,9 @@
#include <consensus/validation.h>
#include <hash.h>
#include <index/blockfilterindex.h>
-#include <validation.h>
#include <merkleblock.h>
-#include <netmessagemaker.h>
#include <netbase.h>
+#include <netmessagemaker.h>
#include <policy/fees.h>
#include <policy/policy.h>
#include <primitives/block.h>
@@ -26,16 +25,14 @@
#include <scheduler.h>
#include <tinyformat.h>
#include <txmempool.h>
-#include <util/system.h>
+#include <util/check.h> // For NDEBUG compile time check
#include <util/strencodings.h>
+#include <util/system.h>
+#include <validation.h>
#include <memory>
#include <typeinfo>
-#if defined(NDEBUG)
-# error "Bitcoin cannot be compiled without assertions."
-#endif
-
/** Expiration time for orphan transactions in seconds */
static constexpr int64_t ORPHAN_TX_EXPIRE_TIME = 20 * 60;
/** Minimum time between orphan transactions expire time checks in seconds */
@@ -189,7 +186,7 @@ namespace {
* We use this to avoid requesting transactions that have already been
* confirnmed.
*/
- RecursiveMutex g_cs_recent_confirmed_transactions;
+ Mutex g_cs_recent_confirmed_transactions;
std::unique_ptr<CRollingBloomFilter> g_recent_confirmed_transactions GUARDED_BY(g_cs_recent_confirmed_transactions);
/** Blocks that are in flight, and that are in the queue to be downloaded. */
@@ -252,8 +249,8 @@ struct CNodeState {
bool fCurrentlyConnected;
//! Accumulated misbehaviour score for this peer.
int nMisbehavior;
- //! Whether this peer should be disconnected and banned (unless whitelisted).
- bool fShouldBan;
+ //! Whether this peer should be disconnected and marked as discouraged (unless whitelisted with noban).
+ bool m_should_discourage;
//! String name of this peer (debugging/logging purposes).
const std::string name;
//! The best known block we know this peer has announced.
@@ -404,7 +401,7 @@ struct CNodeState {
{
fCurrentlyConnected = false;
nMisbehavior = 0;
- fShouldBan = false;
+ m_should_discourage = false;
pindexBestKnownBlock = nullptr;
hashLastUnknownBlock.SetNull();
pindexLastCommonBlock = nullptr;
@@ -1019,7 +1016,7 @@ unsigned int LimitOrphanTxSize(unsigned int nMaxOrphans)
}
/**
- * Mark a misbehaving peer to be banned depending upon the value of `-banscore`.
+ * Increment peer's misbehavior score. If the new value surpasses banscore (specified on startup or by default), mark node to be discouraged, meaning the peer might be disconnected & added to the discouragement filter.
*/
void Misbehaving(NodeId pnode, int howmuch, const std::string& message) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main)
{
@@ -1035,14 +1032,14 @@ void Misbehaving(NodeId pnode, int howmuch, const std::string& message) EXCLUSIV
std::string message_prefixed = message.empty() ? "" : (": " + message);
if (state->nMisbehavior >= banscore && state->nMisbehavior - howmuch < banscore)
{
- LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "%s: %s peer=%d (%d -> %d) BAN THRESHOLD EXCEEDED%s\n", __func__, state->name, pnode, state->nMisbehavior-howmuch, state->nMisbehavior, message_prefixed);
- state->fShouldBan = true;
+ LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "%s: %s peer=%d (%d -> %d) DISCOURAGE THRESHOLD EXCEEDED%s\n", __func__, state->name, pnode, state->nMisbehavior-howmuch, state->nMisbehavior, message_prefixed);
+ state->m_should_discourage = true;
} else
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "%s: %s peer=%d (%d -> %d)%s\n", __func__, state->name, pnode, state->nMisbehavior-howmuch, state->nMisbehavior, message_prefixed);
}
/**
- * Potentially ban a node based on the contents of a BlockValidationState object
+ * Potentially mark a node discouraged based on the contents of a BlockValidationState object
*
* @param[in] via_compact_block this bool is passed in because net_processing should
* punish peers differently depending on whether the data was provided in a compact
@@ -1072,7 +1069,7 @@ static bool MaybePunishNodeForBlock(NodeId nodeid, const BlockValidationState& s
break;
}
- // Ban outbound (but not inbound) peers if on an invalid chain.
+ // Discourage outbound (but not inbound) peers if on an invalid chain.
// Exempt HB compact block peers and manual connections.
if (!via_compact_block && !node_state->m_is_inbound && !node_state->m_is_manual_connection) {
Misbehaving(nodeid, 100, message);
@@ -1107,7 +1104,7 @@ static bool MaybePunishNodeForBlock(NodeId nodeid, const BlockValidationState& s
}
/**
- * Potentially ban a node based on the contents of a TxValidationState object
+ * Potentially disconnect and discourage a node based on the contents of a TxValidationState object
*
* @return Returns true if the peer was punished (probably disconnected)
*/
@@ -1340,7 +1337,7 @@ void PeerLogicValidation::UpdatedBlockTip(const CBlockIndex *pindexNew, const CB
}
/**
- * Handle invalid block rejection and consequent peer banning, maintain which
+ * Handle invalid block rejection and consequent peer discouragement, maintain which
* peers announce compact blocks.
*/
void PeerLogicValidation::BlockChecked(const CBlock& block, const BlockValidationState& state) {
@@ -2455,7 +2452,7 @@ void ProcessMessage(
if (vAddr.size() > 1000)
{
LOCK(cs_main);
- Misbehaving(pfrom.GetId(), 20, strprintf("message addr size() = %u", vAddr.size()));
+ Misbehaving(pfrom.GetId(), 20, strprintf("addr message size = %u", vAddr.size()));
return;
}
@@ -2477,7 +2474,8 @@ void ProcessMessage(
if (addr.nTime <= 100000000 || addr.nTime > nNow + 10 * 60)
addr.nTime = nNow - 5 * 24 * 60 * 60;
pfrom.AddAddressKnown(addr);
- if (banman->IsBanned(addr)) continue; // Do not process banned addresses beyond remembering we received them
+ if (banman->IsDiscouraged(addr)) continue; // Do not process banned/discouraged addresses beyond remembering we received them
+ if (banman->IsBanned(addr)) continue;
bool fReachable = IsReachable(addr);
if (addr.nTime > nSince && !pfrom.fGetAddr && vAddr.size() <= 10 && addr.IsRoutable())
{
@@ -2531,7 +2529,7 @@ void ProcessMessage(
if (vInv.size() > MAX_INV_SZ)
{
LOCK(cs_main);
- Misbehaving(pfrom.GetId(), 20, strprintf("message inv size() = %u", vInv.size()));
+ Misbehaving(pfrom.GetId(), 20, strprintf("inv message size = %u", vInv.size()));
return;
}
@@ -2577,7 +2575,7 @@ void ProcessMessage(
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "transaction (%s) inv sent in violation of protocol, disconnecting peer=%d\n", inv.hash.ToString(), pfrom.GetId());
pfrom.fDisconnect = true;
return;
- } else if (!fAlreadyHave && !fImporting && !fReindex && !::ChainstateActive().IsInitialBlockDownload()) {
+ } else if (!fAlreadyHave && !chainman.ActiveChainstate().IsInitialBlockDownload()) {
RequestTx(State(pfrom.GetId()), inv.hash, current_time);
}
}
@@ -2597,7 +2595,7 @@ void ProcessMessage(
if (vInv.size() > MAX_INV_SZ)
{
LOCK(cs_main);
- Misbehaving(pfrom.GetId(), 20, strprintf("message getdata size() = %u", vInv.size()));
+ Misbehaving(pfrom.GetId(), 20, strprintf("getdata message size = %u", vInv.size()));
return;
}
@@ -3119,7 +3117,7 @@ void ProcessMessage(
// relayed before full validation (see BIP 152), so we don't want to disconnect
// the peer if the header turns out to be for an invalid block.
// Note that if a peer tries to build on an invalid chain, that
- // will be detected and the peer will be banned.
+ // will be detected and the peer will be disconnected/discouraged.
return ProcessHeadersMessage(pfrom, connman, chainman, mempool, {cmpctblock.header}, chainparams, /*via_compact_block=*/true);
}
@@ -3205,7 +3203,7 @@ void ProcessMessage(
// 3. the block is otherwise invalid (eg invalid coinbase,
// block is too big, too many legacy sigops, etc).
// So if CheckBlock failed, #3 is the only possibility.
- // Under BIP 152, we don't DoS-ban unless proof of work is
+ // Under BIP 152, we don't discourage the peer unless proof of work is
// invalid (we don't require all the stateless checks to have
// been run). This is handled below, so just treat this as
// though the block was successfully read, and rely on the
@@ -3330,7 +3328,7 @@ void ProcessMessage(
std::vector<CAddress> vAddr = connman->GetAddresses();
FastRandomContext insecure_rand;
for (const CAddress &addr : vAddr) {
- if (!banman->IsBanned(addr)) {
+ if (!banman->IsDiscouraged(addr) && !banman->IsBanned(addr)) {
pfrom.PushAddress(addr, insecure_rand);
}
}
@@ -3565,25 +3563,26 @@ void ProcessMessage(
return;
}
-bool PeerLogicValidation::CheckIfBanned(CNode& pnode)
+bool PeerLogicValidation::MaybeDiscourageAndDisconnect(CNode& pnode)
{
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
CNodeState &state = *State(pnode.GetId());
- if (state.fShouldBan) {
- state.fShouldBan = false;
- if (pnode.HasPermission(PF_NOBAN))
+ if (state.m_should_discourage) {
+ state.m_should_discourage = false;
+ if (pnode.HasPermission(PF_NOBAN)) {
LogPrintf("Warning: not punishing whitelisted peer %s!\n", pnode.addr.ToString());
- else if (pnode.m_manual_connection)
+ } else if (pnode.m_manual_connection) {
LogPrintf("Warning: not punishing manually-connected peer %s!\n", pnode.addr.ToString());
- else if (pnode.addr.IsLocal()) {
- // Disconnect but don't ban _this_ local node
- LogPrintf("Warning: disconnecting but not banning local peer %s!\n", pnode.addr.ToString());
+ } else if (pnode.addr.IsLocal()) {
+ // Disconnect but don't discourage this local node
+ LogPrintf("Warning: disconnecting but not discouraging local peer %s!\n", pnode.addr.ToString());
pnode.fDisconnect = true;
} else {
- // Disconnect and ban all nodes sharing the address
+ // Disconnect and discourage all nodes sharing the address
+ LogPrintf("Disconnecting and discouraging peer %s!\n", pnode.addr.ToString());
if (m_banman) {
- m_banman->Ban(pnode.addr, BanReasonNodeMisbehaving);
+ m_banman->Discourage(pnode.addr);
}
connman->DisconnectNode(pnode.addr);
}
@@ -3683,7 +3682,7 @@ bool PeerLogicValidation::ProcessMessages(CNode* pfrom, std::atomic<bool>& inter
}
LOCK(cs_main);
- CheckIfBanned(*pfrom);
+ MaybeDiscourageAndDisconnect(*pfrom);
return fMoreWork;
}
@@ -3886,7 +3885,7 @@ bool PeerLogicValidation::SendMessages(CNode* pto)
if (!lockMain)
return true;
- if (CheckIfBanned(*pto)) return true;
+ if (MaybeDiscourageAndDisconnect(*pto)) return true;
CNodeState &state = *State(pto->GetId());
@@ -4388,15 +4387,26 @@ bool PeerLogicValidation::SendMessages(CNode* pto)
//
// Message: feefilter
//
- // We don't want white listed peers to filter txs to us if we have -whitelistforcerelay
if (pto->m_tx_relay != nullptr && pto->nVersion >= FEEFILTER_VERSION && gArgs.GetBoolArg("-feefilter", DEFAULT_FEEFILTER) &&
- !pto->HasPermission(PF_FORCERELAY)) {
+ !pto->HasPermission(PF_FORCERELAY) // peers with the forcerelay permission should not filter txs to us
+ ) {
CAmount currentFilter = m_mempool.GetMinFee(gArgs.GetArg("-maxmempool", DEFAULT_MAX_MEMPOOL_SIZE) * 1000000).GetFeePerK();
int64_t timeNow = GetTimeMicros();
+ static FeeFilterRounder g_filter_rounder{CFeeRate{DEFAULT_MIN_RELAY_TX_FEE}};
+ if (m_chainman.ActiveChainstate().IsInitialBlockDownload()) {
+ // Received tx-inv messages are discarded when the active
+ // chainstate is in IBD, so tell the peer to not send them.
+ currentFilter = MAX_MONEY;
+ } else {
+ static const CAmount MAX_FILTER{g_filter_rounder.round(MAX_MONEY)};
+ if (pto->m_tx_relay->lastSentFeeFilter == MAX_FILTER) {
+ // Send the current filter if we sent MAX_FILTER previously
+ // and made it out of IBD.
+ pto->m_tx_relay->nextSendTimeFeeFilter = timeNow - 1;
+ }
+ }
if (timeNow > pto->m_tx_relay->nextSendTimeFeeFilter) {
- static CFeeRate default_feerate(DEFAULT_MIN_RELAY_TX_FEE);
- static FeeFilterRounder filterRounder(default_feerate);
- CAmount filterToSend = filterRounder.round(currentFilter);
+ CAmount filterToSend = g_filter_rounder.round(currentFilter);
// We always have a fee filter of at least minRelayTxFee
filterToSend = std::max(filterToSend, ::minRelayTxFee.GetFeePerK());
if (filterToSend != pto->m_tx_relay->lastSentFeeFilter) {
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.26.2) at 2024-10-30 18:31:50 +0000