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-rw-r--r--src/net_processing.cpp305
1 files changed, 169 insertions, 136 deletions
diff --git a/src/net_processing.cpp b/src/net_processing.cpp
index c8da927763..6996af38cb 100644
--- a/src/net_processing.cpp
+++ b/src/net_processing.cpp
@@ -582,6 +582,20 @@ private:
*/
bool MaybeDiscourageAndDisconnect(CNode& pnode, Peer& peer);
+ /** Handle a transaction whose result was not MempoolAcceptResult::ResultType::VALID.
+ * @param[in] maybe_add_extra_compact_tx Whether this tx should be added to vExtraTxnForCompact.
+ * Set to false if the tx has already been rejected before,
+ * e.g. is an orphan, to avoid adding duplicate entries.
+ * Updates m_txrequest, m_recent_rejects, m_orphanage, and vExtraTxnForCompact. */
+ void ProcessInvalidTx(NodeId nodeid, const CTransactionRef& tx, const TxValidationState& result,
+ bool maybe_add_extra_compact_tx)
+ EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!m_peer_mutex, g_msgproc_mutex, cs_main);
+
+ /** Handle a transaction whose result was MempoolAcceptResult::ResultType::VALID.
+ * Updates m_txrequest, m_orphanage, and vExtraTxnForCompact. Also queues the tx for relay. */
+ void ProcessValidTx(NodeId nodeid, const CTransactionRef& tx, const std::list<CTransactionRef>& replaced_transactions)
+ EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!m_peer_mutex, g_msgproc_mutex, cs_main);
+
/**
* Reconsider orphan transactions after a parent has been accepted to the mempool.
*
@@ -1451,6 +1465,7 @@ void PeerManagerImpl::FindNextBlocks(std::vector<const CBlockIndex*>& vBlocks, c
{
std::vector<const CBlockIndex*> vToFetch;
int nMaxHeight = std::min<int>(state->pindexBestKnownBlock->nHeight, nWindowEnd + 1);
+ bool is_limited_peer = IsLimitedPeer(peer);
NodeId waitingfor = -1;
while (pindexWalk->nHeight < nMaxHeight) {
// Read up to 128 (or more, if more blocks than that are needed) successors of pindexWalk (towards
@@ -1473,30 +1488,46 @@ void PeerManagerImpl::FindNextBlocks(std::vector<const CBlockIndex*>& vBlocks, c
// We consider the chain that this peer is on invalid.
return;
}
+
if (!CanServeWitnesses(peer) && DeploymentActiveAt(*pindex, m_chainman, Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_SEGWIT)) {
// We wouldn't download this block or its descendants from this peer.
return;
}
+
if (pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_HAVE_DATA || (activeChain && activeChain->Contains(pindex))) {
- if (activeChain && pindex->HaveNumChainTxs())
+ if (activeChain && pindex->HaveNumChainTxs()) {
state->pindexLastCommonBlock = pindex;
- } else if (!IsBlockRequested(pindex->GetBlockHash())) {
- // The block is not already downloaded, and not yet in flight.
- if (pindex->nHeight > nWindowEnd) {
- // We reached the end of the window.
- if (vBlocks.size() == 0 && waitingfor != peer.m_id) {
- // We aren't able to fetch anything, but we would be if the download window was one larger.
- if (nodeStaller) *nodeStaller = waitingfor;
- }
- return;
}
- vBlocks.push_back(pindex);
- if (vBlocks.size() == count) {
- return;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ // Is block in-flight?
+ if (IsBlockRequested(pindex->GetBlockHash())) {
+ if (waitingfor == -1) {
+ // This is the first already-in-flight block.
+ waitingfor = mapBlocksInFlight.lower_bound(pindex->GetBlockHash())->second.first;
+ }
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ // The block is not already downloaded, and not yet in flight.
+ if (pindex->nHeight > nWindowEnd) {
+ // We reached the end of the window.
+ if (vBlocks.size() == 0 && waitingfor != peer.m_id) {
+ // We aren't able to fetch anything, but we would be if the download window was one larger.
+ if (nodeStaller) *nodeStaller = waitingfor;
}
- } else if (waitingfor == -1) {
- // This is the first already-in-flight block.
- waitingfor = mapBlocksInFlight.lower_bound(pindex->GetBlockHash())->second.first;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ // Don't request blocks that go further than what limited peers can provide
+ if (is_limited_peer && (state->pindexBestKnownBlock->nHeight - pindex->nHeight >= static_cast<int>(NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED_MIN_BLOCKS) - 2 /* two blocks buffer for possible races */)) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ vBlocks.push_back(pindex);
+ if (vBlocks.size() == count) {
+ return;
}
}
}
@@ -1571,6 +1602,11 @@ void PeerManagerImpl::InitializeNode(CNode& node, ServiceFlags our_services)
m_node_states.emplace_hint(m_node_states.end(), std::piecewise_construct, std::forward_as_tuple(nodeid), std::forward_as_tuple(node.IsInboundConn()));
assert(m_txrequest.Count(nodeid) == 0);
}
+
+ if (NetPermissions::HasFlag(node.m_permission_flags, NetPermissionFlags::BloomFilter)) {
+ our_services = static_cast<ServiceFlags>(our_services | NODE_BLOOM);
+ }
+
PeerRef peer = std::make_shared<Peer>(nodeid, our_services);
{
LOCK(m_peer_mutex);
@@ -2690,8 +2726,8 @@ bool PeerManagerImpl::IsContinuationOfLowWorkHeadersSync(Peer& peer, CNode& pfro
bool PeerManagerImpl::TryLowWorkHeadersSync(Peer& peer, CNode& pfrom, const CBlockIndex* chain_start_header, std::vector<CBlockHeader>& headers)
{
- // Calculate the total work on this chain.
- arith_uint256 total_work = chain_start_header->nChainWork + CalculateHeadersWork(headers);
+ // Calculate the claimed total work on this chain.
+ arith_uint256 total_work = chain_start_header->nChainWork + CalculateClaimedHeadersWork(headers);
// Our dynamic anti-DoS threshold (minimum work required on a headers chain
// before we'll store it)
@@ -3032,6 +3068,91 @@ void PeerManagerImpl::ProcessHeadersMessage(CNode& pfrom, Peer& peer,
return;
}
+void PeerManagerImpl::ProcessInvalidTx(NodeId nodeid, const CTransactionRef& ptx, const TxValidationState& state,
+ bool maybe_add_extra_compact_tx)
+{
+ AssertLockNotHeld(m_peer_mutex);
+ AssertLockHeld(g_msgproc_mutex);
+ AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
+
+ LogDebug(BCLog::MEMPOOLREJ, "%s (wtxid=%s) from peer=%d was not accepted: %s\n",
+ ptx->GetHash().ToString(),
+ ptx->GetWitnessHash().ToString(),
+ nodeid,
+ state.ToString());
+
+ if (state.GetResult() == TxValidationResult::TX_MISSING_INPUTS) {
+ return;
+ } else if (state.GetResult() != TxValidationResult::TX_WITNESS_STRIPPED) {
+ // We can add the wtxid of this transaction to our reject filter.
+ // Do not add txids of witness transactions or witness-stripped
+ // transactions to the filter, as they can have been malleated;
+ // adding such txids to the reject filter would potentially
+ // interfere with relay of valid transactions from peers that
+ // do not support wtxid-based relay. See
+ // https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/8279 for details.
+ // We can remove this restriction (and always add wtxids to
+ // the filter even for witness stripped transactions) once
+ // wtxid-based relay is broadly deployed.
+ // See also comments in https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/18044#discussion_r443419034
+ // for concerns around weakening security of unupgraded nodes
+ // if we start doing this too early.
+ m_recent_rejects.insert(ptx->GetWitnessHash().ToUint256());
+ m_txrequest.ForgetTxHash(ptx->GetWitnessHash());
+ // If the transaction failed for TX_INPUTS_NOT_STANDARD,
+ // then we know that the witness was irrelevant to the policy
+ // failure, since this check depends only on the txid
+ // (the scriptPubKey being spent is covered by the txid).
+ // Add the txid to the reject filter to prevent repeated
+ // processing of this transaction in the event that child
+ // transactions are later received (resulting in
+ // parent-fetching by txid via the orphan-handling logic).
+ if (state.GetResult() == TxValidationResult::TX_INPUTS_NOT_STANDARD && ptx->HasWitness()) {
+ m_recent_rejects.insert(ptx->GetHash().ToUint256());
+ m_txrequest.ForgetTxHash(ptx->GetHash());
+ }
+ if (maybe_add_extra_compact_tx && RecursiveDynamicUsage(*ptx) < 100000) {
+ AddToCompactExtraTransactions(ptx);
+ }
+ }
+
+ MaybePunishNodeForTx(nodeid, state);
+
+ // If the tx failed in ProcessOrphanTx, it should be removed from the orphanage unless the
+ // tx was still missing inputs. If the tx was not in the orphanage, EraseTx does nothing and returns 0.
+ if (Assume(state.GetResult() != TxValidationResult::TX_MISSING_INPUTS) && m_orphanage.EraseTx(ptx->GetHash()) > 0) {
+ LogDebug(BCLog::TXPACKAGES, " removed orphan tx %s (wtxid=%s)\n", ptx->GetHash().ToString(), ptx->GetWitnessHash().ToString());
+ }
+}
+
+void PeerManagerImpl::ProcessValidTx(NodeId nodeid, const CTransactionRef& tx, const std::list<CTransactionRef>& replaced_transactions)
+{
+ AssertLockNotHeld(m_peer_mutex);
+ AssertLockHeld(g_msgproc_mutex);
+ AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
+
+ // As this version of the transaction was acceptable, we can forget about any requests for it.
+ // No-op if the tx is not in txrequest.
+ m_txrequest.ForgetTxHash(tx->GetHash());
+ m_txrequest.ForgetTxHash(tx->GetWitnessHash());
+
+ m_orphanage.AddChildrenToWorkSet(*tx);
+ // If it came from the orphanage, remove it. No-op if the tx is not in txorphanage.
+ m_orphanage.EraseTx(tx->GetHash());
+
+ LogDebug(BCLog::MEMPOOL, "AcceptToMemoryPool: peer=%d: accepted %s (wtxid=%s) (poolsz %u txn, %u kB)\n",
+ nodeid,
+ tx->GetHash().ToString(),
+ tx->GetWitnessHash().ToString(),
+ m_mempool.size(), m_mempool.DynamicMemoryUsage() / 1000);
+
+ RelayTransaction(tx->GetHash(), tx->GetWitnessHash());
+
+ for (const CTransactionRef& removedTx : replaced_transactions) {
+ AddToCompactExtraTransactions(removedTx);
+ }
+}
+
bool PeerManagerImpl::ProcessOrphanTx(Peer& peer)
{
AssertLockHeld(g_msgproc_mutex);
@@ -3047,66 +3168,23 @@ bool PeerManagerImpl::ProcessOrphanTx(Peer& peer)
if (result.m_result_type == MempoolAcceptResult::ResultType::VALID) {
LogPrint(BCLog::TXPACKAGES, " accepted orphan tx %s (wtxid=%s)\n", orphanHash.ToString(), orphan_wtxid.ToString());
- LogPrint(BCLog::MEMPOOL, "AcceptToMemoryPool: peer=%d: accepted %s (wtxid=%s) (poolsz %u txn, %u kB)\n",
- peer.m_id,
- orphanHash.ToString(),
- orphan_wtxid.ToString(),
- m_mempool.size(), m_mempool.DynamicMemoryUsage() / 1000);
- RelayTransaction(orphanHash, porphanTx->GetWitnessHash());
- m_orphanage.AddChildrenToWorkSet(*porphanTx);
- m_orphanage.EraseTx(orphanHash);
- for (const CTransactionRef& removedTx : result.m_replaced_transactions.value()) {
- AddToCompactExtraTransactions(removedTx);
- }
+ Assume(result.m_replaced_transactions.has_value());
+ std::list<CTransactionRef> empty_replacement_list;
+ ProcessValidTx(peer.m_id, porphanTx, result.m_replaced_transactions.value_or(empty_replacement_list));
return true;
} else if (state.GetResult() != TxValidationResult::TX_MISSING_INPUTS) {
- if (state.IsInvalid()) {
- LogPrint(BCLog::TXPACKAGES, " invalid orphan tx %s (wtxid=%s) from peer=%d. %s\n",
- orphanHash.ToString(),
- orphan_wtxid.ToString(),
- peer.m_id,
- state.ToString());
- LogPrint(BCLog::MEMPOOLREJ, "%s (wtxid=%s) from peer=%d was not accepted: %s\n",
- orphanHash.ToString(),
- orphan_wtxid.ToString(),
- peer.m_id,
- state.ToString());
- // Maybe punish peer that gave us an invalid orphan tx
- MaybePunishNodeForTx(peer.m_id, state);
- }
- // Has inputs but not accepted to mempool
- // Probably non-standard or insufficient fee
- LogPrint(BCLog::TXPACKAGES, " removed orphan tx %s (wtxid=%s)\n", orphanHash.ToString(), orphan_wtxid.ToString());
- if (state.GetResult() != TxValidationResult::TX_WITNESS_STRIPPED) {
- // We can add the wtxid of this transaction to our reject filter.
- // Do not add txids of witness transactions or witness-stripped
- // transactions to the filter, as they can have been malleated;
- // adding such txids to the reject filter would potentially
- // interfere with relay of valid transactions from peers that
- // do not support wtxid-based relay. See
- // https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/8279 for details.
- // We can remove this restriction (and always add wtxids to
- // the filter even for witness stripped transactions) once
- // wtxid-based relay is broadly deployed.
- // See also comments in https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/18044#discussion_r443419034
- // for concerns around weakening security of unupgraded nodes
- // if we start doing this too early.
- m_recent_rejects.insert(porphanTx->GetWitnessHash().ToUint256());
- // If the transaction failed for TX_INPUTS_NOT_STANDARD,
- // then we know that the witness was irrelevant to the policy
- // failure, since this check depends only on the txid
- // (the scriptPubKey being spent is covered by the txid).
- // Add the txid to the reject filter to prevent repeated
- // processing of this transaction in the event that child
- // transactions are later received (resulting in
- // parent-fetching by txid via the orphan-handling logic).
- if (state.GetResult() == TxValidationResult::TX_INPUTS_NOT_STANDARD && porphanTx->HasWitness()) {
- // We only add the txid if it differs from the wtxid, to
- // avoid wasting entries in the rolling bloom filter.
- m_recent_rejects.insert(porphanTx->GetHash().ToUint256());
- }
+ LogPrint(BCLog::TXPACKAGES, " invalid orphan tx %s (wtxid=%s) from peer=%d. %s\n",
+ orphanHash.ToString(),
+ orphan_wtxid.ToString(),
+ peer.m_id,
+ state.ToString());
+
+ if (Assume(state.IsInvalid() &&
+ state.GetResult() != TxValidationResult::TX_UNKNOWN &&
+ state.GetResult() != TxValidationResult::TX_NO_MEMPOOL &&
+ state.GetResult() != TxValidationResult::TX_RESULT_UNSET)) {
+ ProcessInvalidTx(peer.m_id, porphanTx, state, /*maybe_add_extra_compact_tx=*/false);
}
- m_orphanage.EraseTx(orphanHash);
return true;
}
}
@@ -4276,24 +4354,8 @@ void PeerManagerImpl::ProcessMessage(CNode& pfrom, const std::string& msg_type,
const TxValidationState& state = result.m_state;
if (result.m_result_type == MempoolAcceptResult::ResultType::VALID) {
- // As this version of the transaction was acceptable, we can forget about any
- // requests for it.
- m_txrequest.ForgetTxHash(tx.GetHash());
- m_txrequest.ForgetTxHash(tx.GetWitnessHash());
- RelayTransaction(tx.GetHash(), tx.GetWitnessHash());
- m_orphanage.AddChildrenToWorkSet(tx);
-
+ ProcessValidTx(pfrom.GetId(), ptx, result.m_replaced_transactions.value());
pfrom.m_last_tx_time = GetTime<std::chrono::seconds>();
-
- LogPrint(BCLog::MEMPOOL, "AcceptToMemoryPool: peer=%d: accepted %s (wtxid=%s) (poolsz %u txn, %u kB)\n",
- pfrom.GetId(),
- tx.GetHash().ToString(),
- tx.GetWitnessHash().ToString(),
- m_mempool.size(), m_mempool.DynamicMemoryUsage() / 1000);
-
- for (const CTransactionRef& removedTx : result.m_replaced_transactions.value()) {
- AddToCompactExtraTransactions(removedTx);
- }
}
else if (state.GetResult() == TxValidationResult::TX_MISSING_INPUTS)
{
@@ -4354,48 +4416,9 @@ void PeerManagerImpl::ProcessMessage(CNode& pfrom, const std::string& msg_type,
m_txrequest.ForgetTxHash(tx.GetHash());
m_txrequest.ForgetTxHash(tx.GetWitnessHash());
}
- } else {
- if (state.GetResult() != TxValidationResult::TX_WITNESS_STRIPPED) {
- // We can add the wtxid of this transaction to our reject filter.
- // Do not add txids of witness transactions or witness-stripped
- // transactions to the filter, as they can have been malleated;
- // adding such txids to the reject filter would potentially
- // interfere with relay of valid transactions from peers that
- // do not support wtxid-based relay. See
- // https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/8279 for details.
- // We can remove this restriction (and always add wtxids to
- // the filter even for witness stripped transactions) once
- // wtxid-based relay is broadly deployed.
- // See also comments in https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/18044#discussion_r443419034
- // for concerns around weakening security of unupgraded nodes
- // if we start doing this too early.
- m_recent_rejects.insert(tx.GetWitnessHash().ToUint256());
- m_txrequest.ForgetTxHash(tx.GetWitnessHash());
- // If the transaction failed for TX_INPUTS_NOT_STANDARD,
- // then we know that the witness was irrelevant to the policy
- // failure, since this check depends only on the txid
- // (the scriptPubKey being spent is covered by the txid).
- // Add the txid to the reject filter to prevent repeated
- // processing of this transaction in the event that child
- // transactions are later received (resulting in
- // parent-fetching by txid via the orphan-handling logic).
- if (state.GetResult() == TxValidationResult::TX_INPUTS_NOT_STANDARD && tx.HasWitness()) {
- m_recent_rejects.insert(tx.GetHash().ToUint256());
- m_txrequest.ForgetTxHash(tx.GetHash());
- }
- if (RecursiveDynamicUsage(*ptx) < 100000) {
- AddToCompactExtraTransactions(ptx);
- }
- }
}
-
if (state.IsInvalid()) {
- LogPrint(BCLog::MEMPOOLREJ, "%s (wtxid=%s) from peer=%d was not accepted: %s\n",
- tx.GetHash().ToString(),
- tx.GetWitnessHash().ToString(),
- pfrom.GetId(),
- state.ToString());
- MaybePunishNodeForTx(pfrom.GetId(), state);
+ ProcessInvalidTx(pfrom.GetId(), ptx, state, /*maybe_add_extra_compact_tx=*/true);
}
return;
}
@@ -4424,7 +4447,7 @@ void PeerManagerImpl::ProcessMessage(CNode& pfrom, const std::string& msg_type,
MaybeSendGetHeaders(pfrom, GetLocator(m_chainman.m_best_header), *peer);
}
return;
- } else if (prev_block->nChainWork + CalculateHeadersWork({cmpctblock.header}) < GetAntiDoSWorkThreshold()) {
+ } else if (prev_block->nChainWork + CalculateClaimedHeadersWork({cmpctblock.header}) < GetAntiDoSWorkThreshold()) {
// If we get a low-work header in a compact block, we can ignore it.
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Ignoring low-work compact block from peer %d\n", pfrom.GetId());
return;
@@ -4719,6 +4742,17 @@ void PeerManagerImpl::ProcessMessage(CNode& pfrom, const std::string& msg_type,
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "received block %s peer=%d\n", pblock->GetHash().ToString(), pfrom.GetId());
+ const CBlockIndex* prev_block{WITH_LOCK(m_chainman.GetMutex(), return m_chainman.m_blockman.LookupBlockIndex(pblock->hashPrevBlock))};
+
+ // Check for possible mutation if it connects to something we know so we can check for DEPLOYMENT_SEGWIT being active
+ if (prev_block && IsBlockMutated(/*block=*/*pblock,
+ /*check_witness_root=*/DeploymentActiveAfter(prev_block, m_chainman, Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_SEGWIT))) {
+ LogDebug(BCLog::NET, "Received mutated block from peer=%d\n", peer->m_id);
+ Misbehaving(*peer, 100, "mutated block");
+ WITH_LOCK(cs_main, RemoveBlockRequest(pblock->GetHash(), peer->m_id));
+ return;
+ }
+
bool forceProcessing = false;
const uint256 hash(pblock->GetHash());
bool min_pow_checked = false;
@@ -4733,9 +4767,8 @@ void PeerManagerImpl::ProcessMessage(CNode& pfrom, const std::string& msg_type,
// cs_main in ProcessNewBlock is fine.
mapBlockSource.emplace(hash, std::make_pair(pfrom.GetId(), true));
- // Check work on this block against our anti-dos thresholds.
- const CBlockIndex* prev_block = m_chainman.m_blockman.LookupBlockIndex(pblock->hashPrevBlock);
- if (prev_block && prev_block->nChainWork + CalculateHeadersWork({pblock->GetBlockHeader()}) >= GetAntiDoSWorkThreshold()) {
+ // Check claimed work on this block against our anti-dos thresholds.
+ if (prev_block && prev_block->nChainWork + CalculateClaimedHeadersWork({pblock->GetBlockHeader()}) >= GetAntiDoSWorkThreshold()) {
min_pow_checked = true;
}
}
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.26.2) at 2024-11-09 10:11:48 +0000