diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/net_processing.cpp')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/net_processing.cpp | 205 |
1 files changed, 114 insertions, 91 deletions
diff --git a/src/net_processing.cpp b/src/net_processing.cpp index e3053869ae..ad349cf1a7 100644 --- a/src/net_processing.cpp +++ b/src/net_processing.cpp @@ -38,7 +38,9 @@ static constexpr int64_t ORPHAN_TX_EXPIRE_TIME = 20 * 60; /** Minimum time between orphan transactions expire time checks in seconds */ static constexpr int64_t ORPHAN_TX_EXPIRE_INTERVAL = 5 * 60; /** How long to cache transactions in mapRelay for normal relay */ -static constexpr std::chrono::seconds RELAY_TX_CACHE_TIME{15 * 60}; +static constexpr std::chrono::seconds RELAY_TX_CACHE_TIME = std::chrono::minutes{15}; +/** How long a transaction has to be in the mempool before it can unconditionally be relayed (even when not in mapRelay). */ +static constexpr std::chrono::seconds UNCONDITIONAL_RELAY_DELAY = std::chrono::minutes{2}; /** Headers download timeout expressed in microseconds * Timeout = base + per_header * (expected number of headers) */ static constexpr int64_t HEADERS_DOWNLOAD_TIMEOUT_BASE = 15 * 60 * 1000000; // 15 minutes @@ -63,8 +65,8 @@ static constexpr int STALE_RELAY_AGE_LIMIT = 30 * 24 * 60 * 60; /// Age after which a block is considered historical for purposes of rate /// limiting block relay. Set to one week, denominated in seconds. static constexpr int HISTORICAL_BLOCK_AGE = 7 * 24 * 60 * 60; -/** Time between pings automatically sent out for latency probing and keepalive (in seconds). */ -static const int PING_INTERVAL = 2 * 60; +/** Time between pings automatically sent out for latency probing and keepalive */ +static constexpr std::chrono::minutes PING_INTERVAL{2}; /** The maximum number of entries in a locator */ static const unsigned int MAX_LOCATOR_SZ = 101; /** The maximum number of entries in an 'inv' protocol message */ @@ -117,11 +119,20 @@ static constexpr std::chrono::hours AVG_LOCAL_ADDRESS_BROADCAST_INTERVAL{24}; /** Average delay between peer address broadcasts */ static constexpr std::chrono::seconds AVG_ADDRESS_BROADCAST_INTERVAL{30}; /** Average delay between trickled inventory transmissions in seconds. - * Blocks and whitelisted receivers bypass this, outbound peers get half this delay. */ + * Blocks and peers with noban permission bypass this, outbound peers get half this delay. */ static const unsigned int INVENTORY_BROADCAST_INTERVAL = 5; -/** Maximum number of inventory items to send per transmission. +/** Maximum rate of inventory items to send per second. * Limits the impact of low-fee transaction floods. */ -static constexpr unsigned int INVENTORY_BROADCAST_MAX = 7 * INVENTORY_BROADCAST_INTERVAL; +static constexpr unsigned int INVENTORY_BROADCAST_PER_SECOND = 7; +/** Maximum number of inventory items to send per transmission. */ +static constexpr unsigned int INVENTORY_BROADCAST_MAX = INVENTORY_BROADCAST_PER_SECOND * INVENTORY_BROADCAST_INTERVAL; +/** The number of most recently announced transactions a peer can request. */ +static constexpr unsigned int INVENTORY_MAX_RECENT_RELAY = 3500; +/** Verify that INVENTORY_MAX_RECENT_RELAY is enough to cache everything typically + * relayed before unconditional relay from the mempool kicks in. This is only a + * lower bound, and it should be larger to account for higher inv rate to outbound + * peers, and random variations in the broadcast mechanism. */ +static_assert(INVENTORY_MAX_RECENT_RELAY >= INVENTORY_BROADCAST_PER_SECOND * UNCONDITIONAL_RELAY_DELAY / std::chrono::seconds{1}, "INVENTORY_RELAY_MAX too low"); /** Average delay between feefilter broadcasts in seconds. */ static constexpr unsigned int AVG_FEEFILTER_BROADCAST_INTERVAL = 10 * 60; /** Maximum feefilter broadcast delay after significant change. */ @@ -249,8 +260,8 @@ struct CNodeState { bool fCurrentlyConnected; //! Accumulated misbehaviour score for this peer. int nMisbehavior; - //! Whether this peer should be disconnected and banned (unless whitelisted). - bool fShouldBan; + //! Whether this peer should be disconnected and marked as discouraged (unless it has the noban permission). + bool m_should_discourage; //! String name of this peer (debugging/logging purposes). const std::string name; //! The best known block we know this peer has announced. @@ -395,13 +406,16 @@ struct CNodeState { //! Whether this peer is a manual connection bool m_is_manual_connection; + //! A rolling bloom filter of all announced tx CInvs to this peer. + CRollingBloomFilter m_recently_announced_invs = CRollingBloomFilter{INVENTORY_MAX_RECENT_RELAY, 0.000001}; + CNodeState(CAddress addrIn, std::string addrNameIn, bool is_inbound, bool is_manual) : address(addrIn), name(std::move(addrNameIn)), m_is_inbound(is_inbound), m_is_manual_connection (is_manual) { fCurrentlyConnected = false; nMisbehavior = 0; - fShouldBan = false; + m_should_discourage = false; pindexBestKnownBlock = nullptr; hashLastUnknownBlock.SetNull(); pindexLastCommonBlock = nullptr; @@ -422,6 +436,7 @@ struct CNodeState { fSupportsDesiredCmpctVersion = false; m_chain_sync = { 0, nullptr, false, false }; m_last_block_announcement = 0; + m_recently_announced_invs.reset(); } }; @@ -1016,7 +1031,8 @@ unsigned int LimitOrphanTxSize(unsigned int nMaxOrphans) } /** - * Mark a misbehaving peer to be banned depending upon the value of `-banscore`. + * Increment peer's misbehavior score. If the new value >= DISCOURAGEMENT_THRESHOLD, mark the node + * to be discouraged, meaning the peer might be disconnected and added to the discouragement filter. */ void Misbehaving(NodeId pnode, int howmuch, const std::string& message) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main) { @@ -1028,18 +1044,17 @@ void Misbehaving(NodeId pnode, int howmuch, const std::string& message) EXCLUSIV return; state->nMisbehavior += howmuch; - int banscore = gArgs.GetArg("-banscore", DEFAULT_BANSCORE_THRESHOLD); std::string message_prefixed = message.empty() ? "" : (": " + message); - if (state->nMisbehavior >= banscore && state->nMisbehavior - howmuch < banscore) + if (state->nMisbehavior >= DISCOURAGEMENT_THRESHOLD && state->nMisbehavior - howmuch < DISCOURAGEMENT_THRESHOLD) { - LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "%s: %s peer=%d (%d -> %d) BAN THRESHOLD EXCEEDED%s\n", __func__, state->name, pnode, state->nMisbehavior-howmuch, state->nMisbehavior, message_prefixed); - state->fShouldBan = true; + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "%s: %s peer=%d (%d -> %d) DISCOURAGE THRESHOLD EXCEEDED%s\n", __func__, state->name, pnode, state->nMisbehavior-howmuch, state->nMisbehavior, message_prefixed); + state->m_should_discourage = true; } else LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "%s: %s peer=%d (%d -> %d)%s\n", __func__, state->name, pnode, state->nMisbehavior-howmuch, state->nMisbehavior, message_prefixed); } /** - * Potentially ban a node based on the contents of a BlockValidationState object + * Potentially mark a node discouraged based on the contents of a BlockValidationState object * * @param[in] via_compact_block this bool is passed in because net_processing should * punish peers differently depending on whether the data was provided in a compact @@ -1069,7 +1084,7 @@ static bool MaybePunishNodeForBlock(NodeId nodeid, const BlockValidationState& s break; } - // Ban outbound (but not inbound) peers if on an invalid chain. + // Discourage outbound (but not inbound) peers if on an invalid chain. // Exempt HB compact block peers and manual connections. if (!via_compact_block && !node_state->m_is_inbound && !node_state->m_is_manual_connection) { Misbehaving(nodeid, 100, message); @@ -1104,7 +1119,7 @@ static bool MaybePunishNodeForBlock(NodeId nodeid, const BlockValidationState& s } /** - * Potentially ban a node based on the contents of a TxValidationState object + * Potentially disconnect and discourage a node based on the contents of a TxValidationState object * * @return Returns true if the peer was punished (probably disconnected) */ @@ -1325,9 +1340,10 @@ void PeerLogicValidation::UpdatedBlockTip(const CBlockIndex *pindexNew, const CB } // Relay inventory, but don't relay old inventory during initial block download. connman->ForEachNode([nNewHeight, &vHashes](CNode* pnode) { + LOCK(pnode->cs_inventory); if (nNewHeight > (pnode->nStartingHeight != -1 ? pnode->nStartingHeight - 2000 : 0)) { for (const uint256& hash : reverse_iterate(vHashes)) { - pnode->PushBlockHash(hash); + pnode->vBlockHashesToAnnounce.push_back(hash); } } }); @@ -1336,7 +1352,7 @@ void PeerLogicValidation::UpdatedBlockTip(const CBlockIndex *pindexNew, const CB } /** - * Handle invalid block rejection and consequent peer banning, maintain which + * Handle invalid block rejection and consequent peer discouragement, maintain which * peers announce compact blocks. */ void PeerLogicValidation::BlockChecked(const CBlock& block, const BlockValidationState& state) { @@ -1437,7 +1453,7 @@ static void RelayAddress(const CAddress& addr, bool fReachable, const CConnman& assert(nRelayNodes <= best.size()); auto sortfunc = [&best, &hasher, nRelayNodes](CNode* pnode) { - if (pnode->nVersion >= CADDR_TIME_VERSION && pnode->IsAddrRelayPeer()) { + if (pnode->IsAddrRelayPeer()) { uint64_t hashKey = CSipHasher(hasher).Write(pnode->GetId()).Finalize(); for (unsigned int i = 0; i < nRelayNodes; i++) { if (hashKey > best[i].first) { @@ -1508,7 +1524,7 @@ void static ProcessGetBlockData(CNode& pfrom, const CChainParams& chainparams, c if (send && connman->OutboundTargetReached(true) && (((pindexBestHeader != nullptr) && (pindexBestHeader->GetBlockTime() - pindex->GetBlockTime() > HISTORICAL_BLOCK_AGE)) || inv.type == MSG_FILTERED_BLOCK) && - !pfrom.HasPermission(PF_NOBAN) // never disconnect nodes with the noban permission + !pfrom.HasPermission(PF_DOWNLOAD) // nodes with the download permission may exceed target ) { LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "historical block serving limit reached, disconnect peer=%d\n", pfrom.GetId()); @@ -1604,7 +1620,7 @@ void static ProcessGetBlockData(CNode& pfrom, const CChainParams& chainparams, c // Trigger the peer node to send a getblocks request for the next batch of inventory if (inv.hash == pfrom.hashContinue) { - // Bypass PushBlockInventory, this must send even if redundant, + // Send immediately. This must send even if redundant, // and we want it right after the last block so they don't // wait for other stuff first. std::vector<CInv> vInv; @@ -1616,30 +1632,28 @@ void static ProcessGetBlockData(CNode& pfrom, const CChainParams& chainparams, c } //! Determine whether or not a peer can request a transaction, and return it (or nullptr if not found or not allowed). -CTransactionRef static FindTxForGetData(CNode& peer, const uint256& txid, const std::chrono::seconds mempool_req, const std::chrono::seconds longlived_mempool_time) LOCKS_EXCLUDED(cs_main) +CTransactionRef static FindTxForGetData(const CNode& peer, const uint256& txid, const std::chrono::seconds mempool_req, const std::chrono::seconds now) LOCKS_EXCLUDED(cs_main) { - // Check if the requested transaction is so recent that we're just - // about to announce it to the peer; if so, they certainly shouldn't - // know we already have it. - { - LOCK(peer.m_tx_relay->cs_tx_inventory); - if (peer.m_tx_relay->setInventoryTxToSend.count(txid)) return {}; + auto txinfo = mempool.info(txid); + if (txinfo.tx) { + // If a TX could have been INVed in reply to a MEMPOOL request, + // or is older than UNCONDITIONAL_RELAY_DELAY, permit the request + // unconditionally. + if ((mempool_req.count() && txinfo.m_time <= mempool_req) || txinfo.m_time <= now - UNCONDITIONAL_RELAY_DELAY) { + return std::move(txinfo.tx); + } } { LOCK(cs_main); - // Look up transaction in relay pool - auto mi = mapRelay.find(txid); - if (mi != mapRelay.end()) return mi->second; - } - auto txinfo = mempool.info(txid); - if (txinfo.tx) { - // To protect privacy, do not answer getdata using the mempool when - // that TX couldn't have been INVed in reply to a MEMPOOL request, - // or when it's too recent to have expired from mapRelay. - if ((mempool_req.count() && txinfo.m_time <= mempool_req) || txinfo.m_time <= longlived_mempool_time) { - return txinfo.tx; + // Otherwise, the transaction must have been announced recently. + if (State(peer.GetId())->m_recently_announced_invs.contains(txid)) { + // If it was, it can be relayed from either the mempool... + if (txinfo.tx) return std::move(txinfo.tx); + // ... or the relay pool. + auto mi = mapRelay.find(txid); + if (mi != mapRelay.end()) return mi->second; } } @@ -1654,8 +1668,7 @@ void static ProcessGetData(CNode& pfrom, const CChainParams& chainparams, CConnm std::vector<CInv> vNotFound; const CNetMsgMaker msgMaker(pfrom.GetSendVersion()); - // mempool entries added before this time have likely expired from mapRelay - const std::chrono::seconds longlived_mempool_time = GetTime<std::chrono::seconds>() - RELAY_TX_CACHE_TIME; + const std::chrono::seconds now = GetTime<std::chrono::seconds>(); // Get last mempool request time const std::chrono::seconds mempool_req = pfrom.m_tx_relay != nullptr ? pfrom.m_tx_relay->m_last_mempool_req.load() : std::chrono::seconds::min(); @@ -1676,11 +1689,22 @@ void static ProcessGetData(CNode& pfrom, const CChainParams& chainparams, CConnm continue; } - CTransactionRef tx = FindTxForGetData(pfrom, inv.hash, mempool_req, longlived_mempool_time); + CTransactionRef tx = FindTxForGetData(pfrom, inv.hash, mempool_req, now); if (tx) { int nSendFlags = (inv.type == MSG_TX ? SERIALIZE_TRANSACTION_NO_WITNESS : 0); connman->PushMessage(&pfrom, msgMaker.Make(nSendFlags, NetMsgType::TX, *tx)); mempool.RemoveUnbroadcastTx(inv.hash); + // As we're going to send tx, make sure its unconfirmed parents are made requestable. + for (const auto& txin : tx->vin) { + auto txinfo = mempool.info(txin.prevout.hash); + if (txinfo.tx && txinfo.m_time > now - UNCONDITIONAL_RELAY_DELAY) { + // Relaying a transaction with a recent but unconfirmed parent. + if (WITH_LOCK(pfrom.m_tx_relay->cs_tx_inventory, return !pfrom.m_tx_relay->filterInventoryKnown.contains(txin.prevout.hash))) { + LOCK(cs_main); + State(pfrom.GetId())->m_recently_announced_invs.insert(txin.prevout.hash); + } + } + } } else { vNotFound.push_back(inv); } @@ -1894,8 +1918,8 @@ static void ProcessHeadersMessage(CNode& pfrom, CConnman* connman, ChainstateMan // headers to fetch from this peer. if (nodestate->pindexBestKnownBlock && nodestate->pindexBestKnownBlock->nChainWork < nMinimumChainWork) { // This peer has too little work on their headers chain to help - // us sync -- disconnect if using an outbound slot (unless - // whitelisted or addnode). + // us sync -- disconnect if it is an outbound disconnection + // candidate. // Note: We compare their tip to nMinimumChainWork (rather than // ::ChainActive().Tip()) because we won't start block download // until we have a headers chain that has at least @@ -2205,7 +2229,7 @@ void ProcessMessage( CNode& pfrom, const std::string& msg_type, CDataStream& vRecv, - int64_t nTimeReceived, + const std::chrono::microseconds time_received, const CChainParams& chainparams, ChainstateManager& chainman, CTxMemPool& mempool, @@ -2348,11 +2372,8 @@ void ProcessMessage( } // Get recent addresses - if (pfrom.fOneShot || pfrom.nVersion >= CADDR_TIME_VERSION || connman->GetAddressCount() < 1000) - { - connman->PushMessage(&pfrom, CNetMsgMaker(nSendVersion).Make(NetMsgType::GETADDR)); - pfrom.fGetAddr = true; - } + connman->PushMessage(&pfrom, CNetMsgMaker(nSendVersion).Make(NetMsgType::GETADDR)); + pfrom.fGetAddr = true; connman->MarkAddressGood(pfrom.addr); } @@ -2442,9 +2463,6 @@ void ProcessMessage( std::vector<CAddress> vAddr; vRecv >> vAddr; - // Don't want addr from older versions unless seeding - if (pfrom.nVersion < CADDR_TIME_VERSION && connman->GetAddressCount() > 1000) - return; if (!pfrom.IsAddrRelayPeer()) { return; } @@ -2473,7 +2491,8 @@ void ProcessMessage( if (addr.nTime <= 100000000 || addr.nTime > nNow + 10 * 60) addr.nTime = nNow - 5 * 24 * 60 * 60; pfrom.AddAddressKnown(addr); - if (banman->IsBanned(addr)) continue; // Do not process banned addresses beyond remembering we received them + if (banman->IsDiscouraged(addr)) continue; // Do not process banned/discouraged addresses beyond remembering we received them + if (banman->IsBanned(addr)) continue; bool fReachable = IsReachable(addr); if (addr.nTime > nSince && !pfrom.fGetAddr && vAddr.size() <= 10 && addr.IsRoutable()) { @@ -2535,9 +2554,10 @@ void ProcessMessage( // block-relay-only peer bool fBlocksOnly = !g_relay_txes || (pfrom.m_tx_relay == nullptr); - // Allow whitelisted peers to send data other than blocks in blocks only mode if whitelistrelay is true - if (pfrom.HasPermission(PF_RELAY)) + // Allow peers with relay permission to send data other than blocks in blocks only mode + if (pfrom.HasPermission(PF_RELAY)) { fBlocksOnly = false; + } LOCK(cs_main); @@ -2663,7 +2683,7 @@ void ProcessMessage( LogPrint(BCLog::NET, " getblocks stopping, pruned or too old block at %d %s\n", pindex->nHeight, pindex->GetBlockHash().ToString()); break; } - pfrom.PushBlockInventory(pindex->GetBlockHash()); + WITH_LOCK(pfrom.cs_inventory, pfrom.vInventoryBlockToSend.push_back(pindex->GetBlockHash())); if (--nLimit <= 0) { // When this block is requested, we'll send an inv that'll @@ -2737,7 +2757,7 @@ void ProcessMessage( } LOCK(cs_main); - if (::ChainstateActive().IsInitialBlockDownload() && !pfrom.HasPermission(PF_NOBAN)) { + if (::ChainstateActive().IsInitialBlockDownload() && !pfrom.HasPermission(PF_DOWNLOAD)) { LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Ignoring getheaders from peer=%d because node is in initial block download\n", pfrom.GetId()); return; } @@ -2891,14 +2911,14 @@ void ProcessMessage( } if (pfrom.HasPermission(PF_FORCERELAY)) { - // Always relay transactions received from whitelisted peers, even + // Always relay transactions received from peers with forcerelay permission, even // if they were already in the mempool, // allowing the node to function as a gateway for // nodes hidden behind it. if (!mempool.exists(tx.GetHash())) { - LogPrintf("Not relaying non-mempool transaction %s from whitelisted peer=%d\n", tx.GetHash().ToString(), pfrom.GetId()); + LogPrintf("Not relaying non-mempool transaction %s from forcerelay peer=%d\n", tx.GetHash().ToString(), pfrom.GetId()); } else { - LogPrintf("Force relaying tx %s from whitelisted peer=%d\n", tx.GetHash().ToString(), pfrom.GetId()); + LogPrintf("Force relaying tx %s from peer=%d\n", tx.GetHash().ToString(), pfrom.GetId()); RelayTransaction(tx.GetHash(), *connman); } } @@ -3048,7 +3068,7 @@ void ProcessMessage( PartiallyDownloadedBlock& partialBlock = *(*queuedBlockIt)->partialBlock; ReadStatus status = partialBlock.InitData(cmpctblock, vExtraTxnForCompact); if (status == READ_STATUS_INVALID) { - MarkBlockAsReceived(pindex->GetBlockHash()); // Reset in-flight state in case of whitelist + MarkBlockAsReceived(pindex->GetBlockHash()); // Reset in-flight state in case Misbehaving does not result in a disconnect Misbehaving(pfrom.GetId(), 100, strprintf("Peer %d sent us invalid compact block\n", pfrom.GetId())); return; } else if (status == READ_STATUS_FAILED) { @@ -3108,14 +3128,14 @@ void ProcessMessage( } // cs_main if (fProcessBLOCKTXN) - return ProcessMessage(pfrom, NetMsgType::BLOCKTXN, blockTxnMsg, nTimeReceived, chainparams, chainman, mempool, connman, banman, interruptMsgProc); + return ProcessMessage(pfrom, NetMsgType::BLOCKTXN, blockTxnMsg, time_received, chainparams, chainman, mempool, connman, banman, interruptMsgProc); if (fRevertToHeaderProcessing) { // Headers received from HB compact block peers are permitted to be // relayed before full validation (see BIP 152), so we don't want to disconnect // the peer if the header turns out to be for an invalid block. // Note that if a peer tries to build on an invalid chain, that - // will be detected and the peer will be banned. + // will be detected and the peer will be disconnected/discouraged. return ProcessHeadersMessage(pfrom, connman, chainman, mempool, {cmpctblock.header}, chainparams, /*via_compact_block=*/true); } @@ -3181,7 +3201,7 @@ void ProcessMessage( PartiallyDownloadedBlock& partialBlock = *it->second.second->partialBlock; ReadStatus status = partialBlock.FillBlock(*pblock, resp.txn); if (status == READ_STATUS_INVALID) { - MarkBlockAsReceived(resp.blockhash); // Reset in-flight state in case of whitelist + MarkBlockAsReceived(resp.blockhash); // Reset in-flight state in case Misbehaving does not result in a disconnect Misbehaving(pfrom.GetId(), 100, strprintf("Peer %d sent us invalid compact block/non-matching block transactions\n", pfrom.GetId())); return; } else if (status == READ_STATUS_FAILED) { @@ -3201,7 +3221,7 @@ void ProcessMessage( // 3. the block is otherwise invalid (eg invalid coinbase, // block is too big, too many legacy sigops, etc). // So if CheckBlock failed, #3 is the only possibility. - // Under BIP 152, we don't DoS-ban unless proof of work is + // Under BIP 152, we don't discourage the peer unless proof of work is // invalid (we don't require all the stateless checks to have // been run). This is handled below, so just treat this as // though the block was successfully read, and rely on the @@ -3326,7 +3346,7 @@ void ProcessMessage( std::vector<CAddress> vAddr = connman->GetAddresses(); FastRandomContext insecure_rand; for (const CAddress &addr : vAddr) { - if (!banman->IsBanned(addr)) { + if (!banman->IsDiscouraged(addr) && !banman->IsBanned(addr)) { pfrom.PushAddress(addr, insecure_rand); } } @@ -3383,7 +3403,7 @@ void ProcessMessage( } if (msg_type == NetMsgType::PONG) { - int64_t pingUsecEnd = nTimeReceived; + const auto ping_end = time_received; uint64_t nonce = 0; size_t nAvail = vRecv.in_avail(); bool bPingFinished = false; @@ -3397,11 +3417,11 @@ void ProcessMessage( if (nonce == pfrom.nPingNonceSent) { // Matching pong received, this ping is no longer outstanding bPingFinished = true; - int64_t pingUsecTime = pingUsecEnd - pfrom.nPingUsecStart; - if (pingUsecTime > 0) { + const auto ping_time = ping_end - pfrom.m_ping_start.load(); + if (ping_time.count() > 0) { // Successful ping time measurement, replace previous - pfrom.nPingUsecTime = pingUsecTime; - pfrom.nMinPingUsecTime = std::min(pfrom.nMinPingUsecTime.load(), pingUsecTime); + pfrom.nPingUsecTime = count_microseconds(ping_time); + pfrom.nMinPingUsecTime = std::min(pfrom.nMinPingUsecTime.load(), count_microseconds(ping_time)); } else { // This should never happen sProblem = "Timing mishap"; @@ -3561,25 +3581,26 @@ void ProcessMessage( return; } -bool PeerLogicValidation::CheckIfBanned(CNode& pnode) +bool PeerLogicValidation::MaybeDiscourageAndDisconnect(CNode& pnode) { AssertLockHeld(cs_main); CNodeState &state = *State(pnode.GetId()); - if (state.fShouldBan) { - state.fShouldBan = false; - if (pnode.HasPermission(PF_NOBAN)) + if (state.m_should_discourage) { + state.m_should_discourage = false; + if (pnode.HasPermission(PF_NOBAN)) { LogPrintf("Warning: not punishing whitelisted peer %s!\n", pnode.addr.ToString()); - else if (pnode.m_manual_connection) + } else if (pnode.m_manual_connection) { LogPrintf("Warning: not punishing manually-connected peer %s!\n", pnode.addr.ToString()); - else if (pnode.addr.IsLocal()) { - // Disconnect but don't ban _this_ local node - LogPrintf("Warning: disconnecting but not banning local peer %s!\n", pnode.addr.ToString()); + } else if (pnode.addr.IsLocal()) { + // Disconnect but don't discourage this local node + LogPrintf("Warning: disconnecting but not discouraging local peer %s!\n", pnode.addr.ToString()); pnode.fDisconnect = true; } else { - // Disconnect and ban all nodes sharing the address + // Disconnect and discourage all nodes sharing the address + LogPrintf("Disconnecting and discouraging peer %s!\n", pnode.addr.ToString()); if (m_banman) { - m_banman->Ban(pnode.addr, BanReasonNodeMisbehaving); + m_banman->Discourage(pnode.addr); } connman->DisconnectNode(pnode.addr); } @@ -3679,7 +3700,7 @@ bool PeerLogicValidation::ProcessMessages(CNode* pfrom, std::atomic<bool>& inter } LOCK(cs_main); - CheckIfBanned(*pfrom); + MaybeDiscourageAndDisconnect(*pfrom); return fMoreWork; } @@ -3857,7 +3878,7 @@ bool PeerLogicValidation::SendMessages(CNode* pto) // RPC ping request by user pingSend = true; } - if (pto->nPingNonceSent == 0 && pto->nPingUsecStart + PING_INTERVAL * 1000000 < GetTimeMicros()) { + if (pto->nPingNonceSent == 0 && pto->m_ping_start.load() + PING_INTERVAL < GetTime<std::chrono::microseconds>()) { // Ping automatically sent as a latency probe & keepalive. pingSend = true; } @@ -3867,7 +3888,7 @@ bool PeerLogicValidation::SendMessages(CNode* pto) GetRandBytes((unsigned char*)&nonce, sizeof(nonce)); } pto->fPingQueued = false; - pto->nPingUsecStart = GetTimeMicros(); + pto->m_ping_start = GetTime<std::chrono::microseconds>(); if (pto->nVersion > BIP0031_VERSION) { pto->nPingNonceSent = nonce; connman->PushMessage(pto, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::PING, nonce)); @@ -3882,7 +3903,7 @@ bool PeerLogicValidation::SendMessages(CNode* pto) if (!lockMain) return true; - if (CheckIfBanned(*pto)) return true; + if (MaybeDiscourageAndDisconnect(*pto)) return true; CNodeState &state = *State(pto->GetId()); @@ -4080,7 +4101,7 @@ bool PeerLogicValidation::SendMessages(CNode* pto) // If the peer's chain has this block, don't inv it back. if (!PeerHasHeader(&state, pindex)) { - pto->PushBlockInventory(hashToAnnounce); + pto->vInventoryBlockToSend.push_back(hashToAnnounce); LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "%s: sending inv peer=%d hash=%s\n", __func__, pto->GetId(), hashToAnnounce.ToString()); } @@ -4151,6 +4172,7 @@ bool PeerLogicValidation::SendMessages(CNode* pto) if (!pto->m_tx_relay->pfilter->IsRelevantAndUpdate(*txinfo.tx)) continue; } pto->m_tx_relay->filterInventoryKnown.insert(hash); + // Responses to MEMPOOL requests bypass the m_recently_announced_invs filter. vInv.push_back(inv); if (vInv.size() == MAX_INV_SZ) { connman->PushMessage(pto, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::INV, vInv)); @@ -4204,6 +4226,7 @@ bool PeerLogicValidation::SendMessages(CNode* pto) } if (pto->m_tx_relay->pfilter && !pto->m_tx_relay->pfilter->IsRelevantAndUpdate(*txinfo.tx)) continue; // Send + State(pto->GetId())->m_recently_announced_invs.insert(hash); vInv.push_back(CInv(MSG_TX, hash)); nRelayedTransactions++; { @@ -4261,9 +4284,9 @@ bool PeerLogicValidation::SendMessages(CNode* pto) // Check for headers sync timeouts if (state.fSyncStarted && state.nHeadersSyncTimeout < std::numeric_limits<int64_t>::max()) { // Detect whether this is a stalling initial-headers-sync peer - if (pindexBestHeader->GetBlockTime() <= GetAdjustedTime() - 24*60*60) { + if (pindexBestHeader->GetBlockTime() <= GetAdjustedTime() - 24 * 60 * 60) { if (nNow > state.nHeadersSyncTimeout && nSyncStarted == 1 && (nPreferredDownload - state.fPreferredDownload >= 1)) { - // Disconnect a (non-whitelisted) peer if it is our only sync peer, + // Disconnect a peer (without the noban permission) if it is our only sync peer, // and we have others we could be using instead. // Note: If all our peers are inbound, then we won't // disconnect our sync peer for stalling; we have bigger @@ -4273,7 +4296,7 @@ bool PeerLogicValidation::SendMessages(CNode* pto) pto->fDisconnect = true; return true; } else { - LogPrintf("Timeout downloading headers from whitelisted peer=%d, not disconnecting\n", pto->GetId()); + LogPrintf("Timeout downloading headers from noban peer=%d, not disconnecting\n", pto->GetId()); // Reset the headers sync state so that we have a // chance to try downloading from a different peer. // Note: this will also result in at least one more |