diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/net_processing.cpp')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/net_processing.cpp | 70 |
1 files changed, 32 insertions, 38 deletions
diff --git a/src/net_processing.cpp b/src/net_processing.cpp index dc36b69802..2538904ade 100644 --- a/src/net_processing.cpp +++ b/src/net_processing.cpp @@ -397,7 +397,8 @@ private: /** The height of the best chain */ std::atomic<int> m_best_height{-1}; - int64_t m_stale_tip_check_time; //!< Next time to check for stale tip + /** Next time to check for stale tip */ + int64_t m_stale_tip_check_time{0}; /** Whether this node is running in blocks only mode */ const bool m_ignore_incoming_txs; @@ -470,16 +471,26 @@ private: * * Memory used: 1.3 MB */ - std::unique_ptr<CRollingBloomFilter> recentRejects GUARDED_BY(cs_main); + CRollingBloomFilter m_recent_rejects GUARDED_BY(::cs_main){120'000, 0.000'001}; uint256 hashRecentRejectsChainTip GUARDED_BY(cs_main); /* * Filter for transactions that have been recently confirmed. * We use this to avoid requesting transactions that have already been * confirnmed. + * + * Blocks don't typically have more than 4000 transactions, so this should + * be at least six blocks (~1 hr) worth of transactions that we can store, + * inserting both a txid and wtxid for every observed transaction. + * If the number of transactions appearing in a block goes up, or if we are + * seeing getdata requests more than an hour after initial announcement, we + * can increase this number. + * The false positive rate of 1/1M should come out to less than 1 + * transaction per day that would be inadvertently ignored (which is the + * same probability that we have in the reject filter). */ Mutex m_recent_confirmed_transactions_mutex; - std::unique_ptr<CRollingBloomFilter> m_recent_confirmed_transactions GUARDED_BY(m_recent_confirmed_transactions_mutex); + CRollingBloomFilter m_recent_confirmed_transactions GUARDED_BY(m_recent_confirmed_transactions_mutex){48'000, 0.000'001}; /** Have we requested this block from a peer */ bool IsBlockRequested(const uint256& hash) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main); @@ -1195,6 +1206,7 @@ void PeerManagerImpl::FinalizeNode(const CNode& node) assert(m_outbound_peers_with_protect_from_disconnect == 0); assert(m_wtxid_relay_peers == 0); assert(m_txrequest.Size() == 0); + assert(m_orphanage.Size() == 0); } } // cs_main if (node.fSuccessfullyConnected && misbehavior == 0 && @@ -1399,23 +1411,8 @@ PeerManagerImpl::PeerManagerImpl(const CChainParams& chainparams, CConnman& conn m_banman(banman), m_chainman(chainman), m_mempool(pool), - m_stale_tip_check_time(0), m_ignore_incoming_txs(ignore_incoming_txs) { - // Initialize global variables that cannot be constructed at startup. - recentRejects.reset(new CRollingBloomFilter(120000, 0.000001)); - - // Blocks don't typically have more than 4000 transactions, so this should - // be at least six blocks (~1 hr) worth of transactions that we can store, - // inserting both a txid and wtxid for every observed transaction. - // If the number of transactions appearing in a block goes up, or if we are - // seeing getdata requests more than an hour after initial announcement, we - // can increase this number. - // The false positive rate of 1/1M should come out to less than 1 - // transaction per day that would be inadvertently ignored (which is the - // same probability that we have in the reject filter). - m_recent_confirmed_transactions.reset(new CRollingBloomFilter(48000, 0.000001)); - // Stale tip checking and peer eviction are on two different timers, but we // don't want them to get out of sync due to drift in the scheduler, so we // combine them in one function and schedule at the quicker (peer-eviction) @@ -1441,9 +1438,9 @@ void PeerManagerImpl::BlockConnected(const std::shared_ptr<const CBlock>& pblock { LOCK(m_recent_confirmed_transactions_mutex); for (const auto& ptx : pblock->vtx) { - m_recent_confirmed_transactions->insert(ptx->GetHash()); + m_recent_confirmed_transactions.insert(ptx->GetHash()); if (ptx->GetHash() != ptx->GetWitnessHash()) { - m_recent_confirmed_transactions->insert(ptx->GetWitnessHash()); + m_recent_confirmed_transactions.insert(ptx->GetWitnessHash()); } } } @@ -1467,7 +1464,7 @@ void PeerManagerImpl::BlockDisconnected(const std::shared_ptr<const CBlock> &blo // presumably the most common case of relaying a confirmed transaction // should be just after a new block containing it is found. LOCK(m_recent_confirmed_transactions_mutex); - m_recent_confirmed_transactions->reset(); + m_recent_confirmed_transactions.reset(); } // All of the following cache a recent block, and are protected by cs_most_recent_block @@ -1607,14 +1604,13 @@ void PeerManagerImpl::BlockChecked(const CBlock& block, const BlockValidationSta bool PeerManagerImpl::AlreadyHaveTx(const GenTxid& gtxid) { - assert(recentRejects); if (m_chainman.ActiveChain().Tip()->GetBlockHash() != hashRecentRejectsChainTip) { // If the chain tip has changed previously rejected transactions // might be now valid, e.g. due to a nLockTime'd tx becoming valid, // or a double-spend. Reset the rejects filter and give those // txs a second chance. hashRecentRejectsChainTip = m_chainman.ActiveChain().Tip()->GetBlockHash(); - recentRejects->reset(); + m_recent_rejects.reset(); } const uint256& hash = gtxid.GetHash(); @@ -1623,10 +1619,10 @@ bool PeerManagerImpl::AlreadyHaveTx(const GenTxid& gtxid) { LOCK(m_recent_confirmed_transactions_mutex); - if (m_recent_confirmed_transactions->contains(hash)) return true; + if (m_recent_confirmed_transactions.contains(hash)) return true; } - return recentRejects->contains(hash) || m_mempool.exists(gtxid); + return m_recent_rejects.contains(hash) || m_mempool.exists(gtxid); } bool PeerManagerImpl::AlreadyHaveBlock(const uint256& block_hash) @@ -2245,8 +2241,7 @@ void PeerManagerImpl::ProcessOrphanTx(std::set<uint256>& orphan_work_set) // See also comments in https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/18044#discussion_r443419034 // for concerns around weakening security of unupgraded nodes // if we start doing this too early. - assert(recentRejects); - recentRejects->insert(porphanTx->GetWitnessHash()); + m_recent_rejects.insert(porphanTx->GetWitnessHash()); // If the transaction failed for TX_INPUTS_NOT_STANDARD, // then we know that the witness was irrelevant to the policy // failure, since this check depends only on the txid @@ -2258,7 +2253,7 @@ void PeerManagerImpl::ProcessOrphanTx(std::set<uint256>& orphan_work_set) if (state.GetResult() == TxValidationResult::TX_INPUTS_NOT_STANDARD && porphanTx->GetWitnessHash() != porphanTx->GetHash()) { // We only add the txid if it differs from the wtxid, to // avoid wasting entries in the rolling bloom filter. - recentRejects->insert(porphanTx->GetHash()); + m_recent_rejects.insert(porphanTx->GetHash()); } } m_orphanage.EraseTx(orphanHash); @@ -3259,7 +3254,7 @@ void PeerManagerImpl::ProcessMessage(CNode& pfrom, const std::string& msg_type, std::sort(unique_parents.begin(), unique_parents.end()); unique_parents.erase(std::unique(unique_parents.begin(), unique_parents.end()), unique_parents.end()); for (const uint256& parent_txid : unique_parents) { - if (recentRejects->contains(parent_txid)) { + if (m_recent_rejects.contains(parent_txid)) { fRejectedParents = true; break; } @@ -3300,8 +3295,8 @@ void PeerManagerImpl::ProcessMessage(CNode& pfrom, const std::string& msg_type, // regardless of what witness is provided, we will not accept // this, so we don't need to allow for redownload of this txid // from any of our non-wtxidrelay peers. - recentRejects->insert(tx.GetHash()); - recentRejects->insert(tx.GetWitnessHash()); + m_recent_rejects.insert(tx.GetHash()); + m_recent_rejects.insert(tx.GetWitnessHash()); m_txrequest.ForgetTxHash(tx.GetHash()); m_txrequest.ForgetTxHash(tx.GetWitnessHash()); } @@ -3320,8 +3315,7 @@ void PeerManagerImpl::ProcessMessage(CNode& pfrom, const std::string& msg_type, // See also comments in https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/18044#discussion_r443419034 // for concerns around weakening security of unupgraded nodes // if we start doing this too early. - assert(recentRejects); - recentRejects->insert(tx.GetWitnessHash()); + m_recent_rejects.insert(tx.GetWitnessHash()); m_txrequest.ForgetTxHash(tx.GetWitnessHash()); // If the transaction failed for TX_INPUTS_NOT_STANDARD, // then we know that the witness was irrelevant to the policy @@ -3332,7 +3326,7 @@ void PeerManagerImpl::ProcessMessage(CNode& pfrom, const std::string& msg_type, // transactions are later received (resulting in // parent-fetching by txid via the orphan-handling logic). if (state.GetResult() == TxValidationResult::TX_INPUTS_NOT_STANDARD && tx.GetWitnessHash() != tx.GetHash()) { - recentRejects->insert(tx.GetHash()); + m_recent_rejects.insert(tx.GetHash()); m_txrequest.ForgetTxHash(tx.GetHash()); } if (RecursiveDynamicUsage(*ptx) < 100000) { @@ -3341,21 +3335,21 @@ void PeerManagerImpl::ProcessMessage(CNode& pfrom, const std::string& msg_type, } } - // If a tx has been detected by recentRejects, we will have reached + // If a tx has been detected by m_recent_rejects, we will have reached // this point and the tx will have been ignored. Because we haven't run // the tx through AcceptToMemoryPool, we won't have computed a DoS // score for it or determined exactly why we consider it invalid. // // This means we won't penalize any peer subsequently relaying a DoSy // tx (even if we penalized the first peer who gave it to us) because - // we have to account for recentRejects showing false positives. In + // we have to account for m_recent_rejects showing false positives. In // other words, we shouldn't penalize a peer if we aren't *sure* they // submitted a DoSy tx. // - // Note that recentRejects doesn't just record DoSy or invalid + // Note that m_recent_rejects doesn't just record DoSy or invalid // transactions, but any tx not accepted by the mempool, which may be // due to node policy (vs. consensus). So we can't blanket penalize a - // peer simply for relaying a tx that our recentRejects has caught, + // peer simply for relaying a tx that our m_recent_rejects has caught, // regardless of false positives. if (state.IsInvalid()) { |