diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/net_processing.cpp')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/net_processing.cpp | 91 |
1 files changed, 57 insertions, 34 deletions
diff --git a/src/net_processing.cpp b/src/net_processing.cpp index 7f3af68042..a416093db1 100644 --- a/src/net_processing.cpp +++ b/src/net_processing.cpp @@ -959,6 +959,34 @@ void Misbehaving(NodeId pnode, int howmuch, const std::string& message) EXCLUSIV LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "%s: %s peer=%d (%d -> %d)%s\n", __func__, state->name, pnode, state->nMisbehavior-howmuch, state->nMisbehavior, message_prefixed); } +static bool TxRelayMayResultInDisconnect(const CValidationState& state) +{ + return (state.GetDoS() > 0); +} + +/** + * Potentially ban a node based on the contents of a CValidationState object + * TODO: net_processing should make the punish decision based on the reason + * a tx/block was invalid, rather than just the nDoS score handed back by validation. + * + * @parameter via_compact_block: this bool is passed in because net_processing should + * punish peers differently depending on whether the data was provided in a compact + * block message or not. If the compact block had a valid header, but contained invalid + * txs, the peer should not be punished. See BIP 152. + */ +static bool MaybePunishNode(NodeId nodeid, const CValidationState& state, bool via_compact_block, const std::string& message = "") { + int nDoS = state.GetDoS(); + if (nDoS > 0 && !via_compact_block) { + LOCK(cs_main); + Misbehaving(nodeid, nDoS, message); + return true; + } + if (message != "") { + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "peer=%d: %s\n", nodeid, message); + } + return false; +} + @@ -1132,14 +1160,12 @@ void PeerLogicValidation::BlockChecked(const CBlock& block, const CValidationSta const uint256 hash(block.GetHash()); std::map<uint256, std::pair<NodeId, bool>>::iterator it = mapBlockSource.find(hash); - int nDoS = 0; - if (state.IsInvalid(nDoS)) { + if (state.IsInvalid()) { // Don't send reject message with code 0 or an internal reject code. if (it != mapBlockSource.end() && State(it->second.first) && state.GetRejectCode() > 0 && state.GetRejectCode() < REJECT_INTERNAL) { CBlockReject reject = {(unsigned char)state.GetRejectCode(), state.GetRejectReason().substr(0, MAX_REJECT_MESSAGE_LENGTH), hash}; State(it->second.first)->rejects.push_back(reject); - if (nDoS > 0 && it->second.second) - Misbehaving(it->second.first, nDoS); + MaybePunishNode(/*nodeid=*/ it->second.first, state, /*via_compact_block=*/ !it->second.second); } } // Check that: @@ -1551,14 +1577,7 @@ bool static ProcessHeadersMessage(CNode *pfrom, CConnman *connman, const std::ve CValidationState state; CBlockHeader first_invalid_header; if (!ProcessNewBlockHeaders(headers, state, chainparams, &pindexLast, &first_invalid_header)) { - int nDoS; - if (state.IsInvalid(nDoS)) { - LOCK(cs_main); - if (nDoS > 0) { - Misbehaving(pfrom->GetId(), nDoS, "invalid header received"); - } else { - LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "peer=%d: invalid header received\n", pfrom->GetId()); - } + if (state.IsInvalid()) { if (punish_duplicate_invalid && LookupBlockIndex(first_invalid_header.GetHash())) { // Goal: don't allow outbound peers to use up our outbound // connection slots if they are on incompatible chains. @@ -1593,6 +1612,7 @@ bool static ProcessHeadersMessage(CNode *pfrom, CConnman *connman, const std::ve // etc), and not just the duplicate-invalid case. pfrom->fDisconnect = true; } + MaybePunishNode(pfrom->GetId(), state, /*via_compact_block*/ false, "invalid header received"); return false; } } @@ -1727,9 +1747,9 @@ void static ProcessOrphanTx(CConnman* connman, std::set<uint256>& orphan_work_se const CTransaction& orphanTx = *porphanTx; NodeId fromPeer = orphan_it->second.fromPeer; bool fMissingInputs2 = false; - // Use a dummy CValidationState so someone can't setup nodes to counter-DoS based on orphan - // resolution (that is, feeding people an invalid transaction based on LegitTxX in order to get - // anyone relaying LegitTxX banned) + // Use a new CValidationState because orphans come from different peers (and we call + // MaybePunishNode based on the source peer from the orphan map, not based on the peer + // that relayed the previous transaction). CValidationState orphan_state; if (setMisbehaving.count(fromPeer)) continue; @@ -1747,11 +1767,11 @@ void static ProcessOrphanTx(CConnman* connman, std::set<uint256>& orphan_work_se EraseOrphanTx(orphanHash); done = true; } else if (!fMissingInputs2) { - int nDos = 0; - if (orphan_state.IsInvalid(nDos) && nDos > 0) { + if (orphan_state.IsInvalid()) { // Punish peer that gave us an invalid orphan tx - Misbehaving(fromPeer, nDos); - setMisbehaving.insert(fromPeer); + if (MaybePunishNode(fromPeer, orphan_state, /*via_compact_block*/ false)) { + setMisbehaving.insert(fromPeer); + } LogPrint(BCLog::MEMPOOL, " invalid orphan tx %s\n", orphanHash.ToString()); } // Has inputs but not accepted to mempool @@ -2496,8 +2516,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr // Never relay transactions that we would assign a non-zero DoS // score for, as we expect peers to do the same with us in that // case. - int nDoS = 0; - if (!state.IsInvalid(nDoS) || nDoS == 0) { + if (!state.IsInvalid() || !TxRelayMayResultInDisconnect(state)) { LogPrintf("Force relaying tx %s from whitelisted peer=%d\n", tx.GetHash().ToString(), pfrom->GetId()); RelayTransaction(tx, connman); } else { @@ -2526,8 +2545,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr // peer simply for relaying a tx that our recentRejects has caught, // regardless of false positives. - int nDoS = 0; - if (state.IsInvalid(nDoS)) + if (state.IsInvalid()) { LogPrint(BCLog::MEMPOOLREJ, "%s from peer=%d was not accepted: %s\n", tx.GetHash().ToString(), pfrom->GetId(), @@ -2536,9 +2554,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr connman->PushMessage(pfrom, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::REJECT, strCommand, (unsigned char)state.GetRejectCode(), state.GetRejectReason().substr(0, MAX_REJECT_MESSAGE_LENGTH), inv.hash)); } - if (nDoS > 0) { - Misbehaving(pfrom->GetId(), nDoS); - } + MaybePunishNode(pfrom->GetId(), state, /*via_compact_block*/ false); } return true; } @@ -2574,14 +2590,21 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr const CBlockIndex *pindex = nullptr; CValidationState state; if (!ProcessNewBlockHeaders({cmpctblock.header}, state, chainparams, &pindex)) { - int nDoS; - if (state.IsInvalid(nDoS)) { - if (nDoS > 0) { - LOCK(cs_main); - Misbehaving(pfrom->GetId(), nDoS, strprintf("Peer %d sent us invalid header via cmpctblock\n", pfrom->GetId())); - } else { - LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Peer %d sent us invalid header via cmpctblock\n", pfrom->GetId()); - } + if (state.IsInvalid() && received_new_header) { + // In this situation, the block header is known to be invalid. + // If we never created a CBlockIndex entry for it, then the + // header must be bad just by inspection (and is not one that + // looked okay but the block later turned out to be invalid for + // some other reason). + // We should punish compact block peers that give us an invalid + // header (other than a "duplicate-invalid" one, see + // ProcessHeadersMessage), so set via_compact_block to false + // here. + // TODO: when we switch from DoS scores to reasons that + // tx/blocks are invalid, this call should set + // via_compact_block to true, since MaybePunishNode will have + // sufficient information to act correctly. + MaybePunishNode(pfrom->GetId(), state, /*via_compact_block*/ false, "invalid header via cmpctblock"); return true; } } |