1 files changed, 133 insertions, 125 deletions

diff --git a/src/net_processing.cpp b/src/net_processing.cpp
index b6839dcf21..1e065da07d 100644
--- a/src/net_processing.cpp
+++ b/src/net_processing.cpp
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 // Copyright (c) 2009-2010 Satoshi Nakamoto
-// Copyright (c) 2009-2018 The Bitcoin Core developers
+// Copyright (c) 2009-2020 The Bitcoin Core developers
 // Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying
 // file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
 
@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@
 
 #include <addrman.h>
 #include <banman.h>
-#include <arith_uint256.h>
 #include <blockencodings.h>
 #include <chainparams.h>
 #include <consensus/validation.h>
@@ -30,6 +29,7 @@
 #include <util/validation.h>
 
 #include <memory>
+#include <typeinfo>
 
 #if defined(NDEBUG)
 # error "Bitcoin cannot be compiled without assertions."
@@ -39,6 +39,8 @@
 static constexpr int64_t ORPHAN_TX_EXPIRE_TIME = 20 * 60;
 /** Minimum time between orphan transactions expire time checks in seconds */
 static constexpr int64_t ORPHAN_TX_EXPIRE_INTERVAL = 5 * 60;
+/** How long to cache transactions in mapRelay for normal relay */
+static constexpr std::chrono::seconds RELAY_TX_CACHE_TIME{15 * 60};
 /** Headers download timeout expressed in microseconds
  *  Timeout = base + per_header * (expected number of headers) */
 static constexpr int64_t HEADERS_DOWNLOAD_TIMEOUT_BASE = 15 * 60 * 1000000; // 15 minutes
@@ -88,7 +90,7 @@ struct COrphanTx {
     int64_t nTimeExpire;
     size_t list_pos;
 };
-CCriticalSection g_cs_orphans;
+RecursiveMutex g_cs_orphans;
 std::map<uint256, COrphanTx> mapOrphanTransactions GUARDED_BY(g_cs_orphans);
 
 void EraseOrphansFor(NodeId peer);
@@ -117,8 +119,8 @@ namespace {
     int nSyncStarted GUARDED_BY(cs_main) = 0;
 
     /**
-     * Sources of received blocks, saved to be able to send them reject
-     * messages or ban them when processing happens afterwards.
+     * Sources of received blocks, saved to be able punish them when processing
+     * happens afterwards.
      * Set mapBlockSource[hash].second to false if the node should not be
      * punished if the block is invalid.
      */
@@ -981,38 +983,34 @@ void Misbehaving(NodeId pnode, int howmuch, const std::string& message) EXCLUSIV
  * banning/disconnecting us. We use this to determine which unaccepted
  * transactions from a whitelisted peer that we can safely relay.
  */
-static bool TxRelayMayResultInDisconnect(const CValidationState& state)
-{
-    assert(IsTransactionReason(state.GetReason()));
-    return state.GetReason() == ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS;
+static bool TxRelayMayResultInDisconnect(const TxValidationState& state) {
+    return state.GetResult() == TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS;
 }
 
 /**
- * Potentially ban a node based on the contents of a CValidationState object
+ * Potentially ban a node based on the contents of a BlockValidationState object
  *
- * @param[in] via_compact_block: this bool is passed in because net_processing should
+ * @param[in] via_compact_block this bool is passed in because net_processing should
  * punish peers differently depending on whether the data was provided in a compact
  * block message or not. If the compact block had a valid header, but contained invalid
  * txs, the peer should not be punished. See BIP 152.
  *
  * @return Returns true if the peer was punished (probably disconnected)
- *
- * Changes here may need to be reflected in TxRelayMayResultInDisconnect().
  */
-static bool MaybePunishNode(NodeId nodeid, const CValidationState& state, bool via_compact_block, const std::string& message = "") {
-    switch (state.GetReason()) {
-    case ValidationInvalidReason::NONE:
+static bool MaybePunishNodeForBlock(NodeId nodeid, const BlockValidationState& state, bool via_compact_block, const std::string& message = "") {
+    switch (state.GetResult()) {
+    case BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_RESULT_UNSET:
         break;
     // The node is providing invalid data:
-    case ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS:
-    case ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MUTATED:
+    case BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS:
+    case BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED:
         if (!via_compact_block) {
             LOCK(cs_main);
             Misbehaving(nodeid, 100, message);
             return true;
         }
         break;
-    case ValidationInvalidReason::CACHED_INVALID:
+    case BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CACHED_INVALID:
         {
             LOCK(cs_main);
             CNodeState *node_state = State(nodeid);
@@ -1028,30 +1026,24 @@ static bool MaybePunishNode(NodeId nodeid, const CValidationState& state, bool v
             }
             break;
         }
-    case ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER:
-    case ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_CHECKPOINT:
-    case ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_INVALID_PREV:
+    case BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER:
+    case BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CHECKPOINT:
+    case BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_INVALID_PREV:
         {
             LOCK(cs_main);
             Misbehaving(nodeid, 100, message);
         }
         return true;
     // Conflicting (but not necessarily invalid) data or different policy:
-    case ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MISSING_PREV:
+    case BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MISSING_PREV:
         {
             // TODO: Handle this much more gracefully (10 DoS points is super arbitrary)
             LOCK(cs_main);
             Misbehaving(nodeid, 10, message);
         }
         return true;
-    case ValidationInvalidReason::RECENT_CONSENSUS_CHANGE:
-    case ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_TIME_FUTURE:
-    case ValidationInvalidReason::TX_NOT_STANDARD:
-    case ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MISSING_INPUTS:
-    case ValidationInvalidReason::TX_PREMATURE_SPEND:
-    case ValidationInvalidReason::TX_WITNESS_MUTATED:
-    case ValidationInvalidReason::TX_CONFLICT:
-    case ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY:
+    case BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_RECENT_CONSENSUS_CHANGE:
+    case BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_TIME_FUTURE:
         break;
     }
     if (message != "") {
@@ -1060,6 +1052,39 @@ static bool MaybePunishNode(NodeId nodeid, const CValidationState& state, bool v
     return false;
 }
 
+/**
+ * Potentially ban a node based on the contents of a TxValidationState object
+ *
+ * @return Returns true if the peer was punished (probably disconnected)
+ *
+ * Changes here may need to be reflected in TxRelayMayResultInDisconnect().
+ */
+static bool MaybePunishNodeForTx(NodeId nodeid, const TxValidationState& state, const std::string& message = "") {
+    switch (state.GetResult()) {
+    case TxValidationResult::TX_RESULT_UNSET:
+        break;
+    // The node is providing invalid data:
+    case TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS:
+        {
+            LOCK(cs_main);
+            Misbehaving(nodeid, 100, message);
+            return true;
+        }
+    // Conflicting (but not necessarily invalid) data or different policy:
+    case TxValidationResult::TX_RECENT_CONSENSUS_CHANGE:
+    case TxValidationResult::TX_NOT_STANDARD:
+    case TxValidationResult::TX_MISSING_INPUTS:
+    case TxValidationResult::TX_PREMATURE_SPEND:
+    case TxValidationResult::TX_WITNESS_MUTATED:
+    case TxValidationResult::TX_CONFLICT:
+    case TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY:
+        break;
+    }
+    if (message != "") {
+        LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "peer=%d: %s\n", nodeid, message);
+    }
+    return false;
+}
 
 
 
@@ -1137,7 +1162,7 @@ void PeerLogicValidation::BlockConnected(const std::shared_ptr<const CBlock>& pb
 }
 
 // All of the following cache a recent block, and are protected by cs_most_recent_block
-static CCriticalSection cs_most_recent_block;
+static RecursiveMutex cs_most_recent_block;
 static std::shared_ptr<const CBlock> most_recent_block GUARDED_BY(cs_most_recent_block);
 static std::shared_ptr<const CBlockHeaderAndShortTxIDs> most_recent_compact_block GUARDED_BY(cs_most_recent_block);
 static uint256 most_recent_block_hash GUARDED_BY(cs_most_recent_block);
@@ -1228,17 +1253,18 @@ void PeerLogicValidation::UpdatedBlockTip(const CBlockIndex *pindexNew, const CB
  * Handle invalid block rejection and consequent peer banning, maintain which
  * peers announce compact blocks.
  */
-void PeerLogicValidation::BlockChecked(const CBlock& block, const CValidationState& state) {
+void PeerLogicValidation::BlockChecked(const CBlock& block, const BlockValidationState& state) {
     LOCK(cs_main);
 
     const uint256 hash(block.GetHash());
     std::map<uint256, std::pair<NodeId, bool>>::iterator it = mapBlockSource.find(hash);
 
-    if (state.IsInvalid()) {
-        // Don't send reject message with code 0 or an internal reject code.
-        if (it != mapBlockSource.end() && State(it->second.first) && state.GetRejectCode() > 0 && state.GetRejectCode() < REJECT_INTERNAL) {
-            MaybePunishNode(/*nodeid=*/ it->second.first, state, /*via_compact_block=*/ !it->second.second);
-        }
+    // If the block failed validation, we know where it came from and we're still connected
+    // to that peer, maybe punish.
+    if (state.IsInvalid() &&
+        it != mapBlockSource.end() &&
+        State(it->second.first)) {
+            MaybePunishNodeForBlock(/*nodeid=*/ it->second.first, state, /*via_compact_block=*/ !it->second.second);
     }
     // Check that:
     // 1. The block is valid
@@ -1315,7 +1341,7 @@ static void RelayAddress(const CAddress& addr, bool fReachable, CConnman* connma
 
     // Relay to a limited number of other nodes
     // Use deterministic randomness to send to the same nodes for 24 hours
-    // at a time so the addrKnowns of the chosen nodes prevent repeats
+    // at a time so the m_addr_knowns of the chosen nodes prevent repeats
     uint64_t hashAddr = addr.GetHash();
     const CSipHasher hasher = connman->GetDeterministicRandomizer(RANDOMIZER_ID_ADDRESS_RELAY).Write(hashAddr << 32).Write((GetTime() + hashAddr) / (24*60*60));
     FastRandomContext insecure_rand;
@@ -1376,7 +1402,7 @@ void static ProcessGetBlockData(CNode* pfrom, const CChainParams& chainparams, c
         }
     } // release cs_main before calling ActivateBestChain
     if (need_activate_chain) {
-        CValidationState state;
+        BlockValidationState state;
         if (!ActivateBestChain(state, Params(), a_recent_block)) {
             LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "failed to activate chain (%s)\n", FormatStateMessage(state));
         }
@@ -1513,6 +1539,10 @@ void static ProcessGetData(CNode* pfrom, const CChainParams& chainparams, CConnm
     // messages from this peer (likely resulting in our peer eventually
     // disconnecting us).
     if (pfrom->m_tx_relay != nullptr) {
+        // mempool entries added before this time have likely expired from mapRelay
+        const std::chrono::seconds longlived_mempool_time = GetTime<std::chrono::seconds>() - RELAY_TX_CACHE_TIME;
+        const std::chrono::seconds mempool_req = pfrom->m_tx_relay->m_last_mempool_req.load();
+
         LOCK(cs_main);
 
         while (it != pfrom->vRecvGetData.end() && (it->type == MSG_TX || it->type == MSG_WITNESS_TX)) {
@@ -1532,11 +1562,15 @@ void static ProcessGetData(CNode* pfrom, const CChainParams& chainparams, CConnm
             if (mi != mapRelay.end()) {
                 connman->PushMessage(pfrom, msgMaker.Make(nSendFlags, NetMsgType::TX, *mi->second));
                 push = true;
-            } else if (pfrom->m_tx_relay->m_last_mempool_req.load().count()) {
+            } else {
                 auto txinfo = mempool.info(inv.hash);
                 // To protect privacy, do not answer getdata using the mempool when
-                // that TX couldn't have been INVed in reply to a MEMPOOL request.
-                if (txinfo.tx && txinfo.m_time <= pfrom->m_tx_relay->m_last_mempool_req.load()) {
+                // that TX couldn't have been INVed in reply to a MEMPOOL request,
+                // or when it's too recent to have expired from mapRelay.
+                if (txinfo.tx && (
+                     (mempool_req.count() && txinfo.m_time <= mempool_req)
+                      || (txinfo.m_time <= longlived_mempool_time)))
+                {
                     connman->PushMessage(pfrom, msgMaker.Make(nSendFlags, NetMsgType::TX, *txinfo.tx));
                     push = true;
                 }
@@ -1664,11 +1698,10 @@ bool static ProcessHeadersMessage(CNode *pfrom, CConnman *connman, const std::ve
         }
     }
 
-    CValidationState state;
-    CBlockHeader first_invalid_header;
-    if (!ProcessNewBlockHeaders(headers, state, chainparams, &pindexLast, &first_invalid_header)) {
+    BlockValidationState state;
+    if (!ProcessNewBlockHeaders(headers, state, chainparams, &pindexLast)) {
         if (state.IsInvalid()) {
-            MaybePunishNode(pfrom->GetId(), state, via_compact_block, "invalid header received");
+            MaybePunishNodeForBlock(pfrom->GetId(), state, via_compact_block, "invalid header received");
             return false;
         }
     }
@@ -1804,14 +1837,13 @@ void static ProcessOrphanTx(CConnman* connman, std::set<uint256>& orphan_work_se
         const CTransactionRef porphanTx = orphan_it->second.tx;
         const CTransaction& orphanTx = *porphanTx;
         NodeId fromPeer = orphan_it->second.fromPeer;
-        bool fMissingInputs2 = false;
-        // Use a new CValidationState because orphans come from different peers (and we call
-        // MaybePunishNode based on the source peer from the orphan map, not based on the peer
+        // Use a new TxValidationState because orphans come from different peers (and we call
+        // MaybePunishNodeForTx based on the source peer from the orphan map, not based on the peer
         // that relayed the previous transaction).
-        CValidationState orphan_state;
+        TxValidationState orphan_state;
 
         if (setMisbehaving.count(fromPeer)) continue;
-        if (AcceptToMemoryPool(mempool, orphan_state, porphanTx, &fMissingInputs2, &removed_txn, false /* bypass_limits */, 0 /* nAbsurdFee */)) {
+        if (AcceptToMemoryPool(mempool, orphan_state, porphanTx, &removed_txn, false /* bypass_limits */, 0 /* nAbsurdFee */)) {
             LogPrint(BCLog::MEMPOOL, "   accepted orphan tx %s\n", orphanHash.ToString());
             RelayTransaction(orphanHash, *connman);
             for (unsigned int i = 0; i < orphanTx.vout.size(); i++) {
@@ -1824,10 +1856,10 @@ void static ProcessOrphanTx(CConnman* connman, std::set<uint256>& orphan_work_se
             }
             EraseOrphanTx(orphanHash);
             done = true;
-        } else if (!fMissingInputs2) {
+        } else if (orphan_state.GetResult() != TxValidationResult::TX_MISSING_INPUTS) {
             if (orphan_state.IsInvalid()) {
                 // Punish peer that gave us an invalid orphan tx
-                if (MaybePunishNode(fromPeer, orphan_state, /*via_compact_block*/ false)) {
+                if (MaybePunishNodeForTx(fromPeer, orphan_state)) {
                     setMisbehaving.insert(fromPeer);
                 }
                 LogPrint(BCLog::MEMPOOL, "   invalid orphan tx %s\n", orphanHash.ToString());
@@ -1835,8 +1867,7 @@ void static ProcessOrphanTx(CConnman* connman, std::set<uint256>& orphan_work_se
             // Has inputs but not accepted to mempool
             // Probably non-standard or insufficient fee
             LogPrint(BCLog::MEMPOOL, "   removed orphan tx %s\n", orphanHash.ToString());
-            assert(IsTransactionReason(orphan_state.GetReason()));
-            if (!orphanTx.HasWitness() && orphan_state.GetReason() != ValidationInvalidReason::TX_WITNESS_MUTATED) {
+            if (!orphanTx.HasWitness() && orphan_state.GetResult() != TxValidationResult::TX_WITNESS_MUTATED) {
                 // Do not use rejection cache for witness transactions or
                 // witness-stripped transactions, as they can have been malleated.
                 // See https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/8279 for details.
@@ -1850,7 +1881,7 @@ void static ProcessOrphanTx(CConnman* connman, std::set<uint256>& orphan_work_se
     }
 }
 
-bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv, int64_t nTimeReceived, const CChainParams& chainparams, CConnman* connman, const std::atomic<bool>& interruptMsgProc)
+bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv, int64_t nTimeReceived, const CChainParams& chainparams, CConnman* connman, BanMan* banman, const std::atomic<bool>& interruptMsgProc)
 {
     LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "received: %s (%u bytes) peer=%d\n", SanitizeString(strCommand), vRecv.size(), pfrom->GetId());
     if (gArgs.IsArgSet("-dropmessagestest") && GetRand(gArgs.GetArg("-dropmessagestest", 0)) == 0)
@@ -2126,7 +2157,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr
             if (addr.nTime <= 100000000 || addr.nTime > nNow + 10 * 60)
                 addr.nTime = nNow - 5 * 24 * 60 * 60;
             pfrom->AddAddressKnown(addr);
-            if (g_banman->IsBanned(addr)) continue; // Do not process banned addresses beyond remembering we received them
+            if (banman->IsBanned(addr)) continue; // Do not process banned addresses beyond remembering we received them
             bool fReachable = IsReachable(addr);
             if (addr.nTime > nSince && !pfrom->fGetAddr && vAddr.size() <= 10 && addr.IsRoutable())
             {
@@ -2281,7 +2312,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr
                 LOCK(cs_most_recent_block);
                 a_recent_block = most_recent_block;
             }
-            CValidationState state;
+            BlockValidationState state;
             if (!ActivateBestChain(state, Params(), a_recent_block)) {
                 LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "failed to activate chain (%s)\n", FormatStateMessage(state));
             }
@@ -2461,8 +2492,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr
 
         LOCK2(cs_main, g_cs_orphans);
 
-        bool fMissingInputs = false;
-        CValidationState state;
+        TxValidationState state;
 
         CNodeState* nodestate = State(pfrom->GetId());
         nodestate->m_tx_download.m_tx_announced.erase(inv.hash);
@@ -2472,7 +2502,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr
         std::list<CTransactionRef> lRemovedTxn;
 
         if (!AlreadyHave(inv) &&
-            AcceptToMemoryPool(mempool, state, ptx, &fMissingInputs, &lRemovedTxn, false /* bypass_limits */, 0 /* nAbsurdFee */)) {
+            AcceptToMemoryPool(mempool, state, ptx, &lRemovedTxn, false /* bypass_limits */, 0 /* nAbsurdFee */)) {
             mempool.check(&::ChainstateActive().CoinsTip());
             RelayTransaction(tx.GetHash(), *connman);
             for (unsigned int i = 0; i < tx.vout.size(); i++) {
@@ -2494,7 +2524,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr
             // Recursively process any orphan transactions that depended on this one
             ProcessOrphanTx(connman, pfrom->orphan_work_set, lRemovedTxn);
         }
-        else if (fMissingInputs)
+        else if (state.GetResult() == TxValidationResult::TX_MISSING_INPUTS)
         {
             bool fRejectedParents = false; // It may be the case that the orphans parents have all been rejected
             for (const CTxIn& txin : tx.vin) {
@@ -2527,8 +2557,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr
                 recentRejects->insert(tx.GetHash());
             }
         } else {
-            assert(IsTransactionReason(state.GetReason()));
-            if (!tx.HasWitness() && state.GetReason() != ValidationInvalidReason::TX_WITNESS_MUTATED) {
+            if (!tx.HasWitness() && state.GetResult() != TxValidationResult::TX_WITNESS_MUTATED) {
                 // Do not use rejection cache for witness transactions or
                 // witness-stripped transactions, as they can have been malleated.
                 // See https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/8279 for details.
@@ -2583,7 +2612,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr
             LogPrint(BCLog::MEMPOOLREJ, "%s from peer=%d was not accepted: %s\n", tx.GetHash().ToString(),
                 pfrom->GetId(),
                 FormatStateMessage(state));
-            MaybePunishNode(pfrom->GetId(), state, /*via_compact_block*/ false);
+            MaybePunishNodeForTx(pfrom->GetId(), state);
         }
         return true;
     }
@@ -2617,10 +2646,10 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr
         }
 
         const CBlockIndex *pindex = nullptr;
-        CValidationState state;
+        BlockValidationState state;
         if (!ProcessNewBlockHeaders({cmpctblock.header}, state, chainparams, &pindex)) {
             if (state.IsInvalid()) {
-                MaybePunishNode(pfrom->GetId(), state, /*via_compact_block*/ true, "invalid header via cmpctblock");
+                MaybePunishNodeForBlock(pfrom->GetId(), state, /*via_compact_block*/ true, "invalid header via cmpctblock");
                 return true;
             }
         }
@@ -2762,7 +2791,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr
         } // cs_main
 
         if (fProcessBLOCKTXN)
-            return ProcessMessage(pfrom, NetMsgType::BLOCKTXN, blockTxnMsg, nTimeReceived, chainparams, connman, interruptMsgProc);
+            return ProcessMessage(pfrom, NetMsgType::BLOCKTXN, blockTxnMsg, nTimeReceived, chainparams, connman, banman, interruptMsgProc);
 
         if (fRevertToHeaderProcessing) {
             // Headers received from HB compact block peers are permitted to be
@@ -2860,11 +2889,12 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr
                 // been run).  This is handled below, so just treat this as
                 // though the block was successfully read, and rely on the
                 // handling in ProcessNewBlock to ensure the block index is
-                // updated, reject messages go out, etc.
+                // updated, etc.
                 MarkBlockAsReceived(resp.blockhash); // it is now an empty pointer
                 fBlockRead = true;
-                // mapBlockSource is only used for sending reject messages and DoS scores,
-                // so the race between here and cs_main in ProcessNewBlock is fine.
+                // mapBlockSource is used for potentially punishing peers and
+                // updating which peers send us compact blocks, so the race
+                // between here and cs_main in ProcessNewBlock is fine.
                 // BIP 152 permits peers to relay compact blocks after validating
                 // the header only; we should not punish peers if the block turns
                 // out to be invalid.
@@ -2936,8 +2966,9 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr
             // Also always process if we requested the block explicitly, as we may
             // need it even though it is not a candidate for a new best tip.
             forceProcessing |= MarkBlockAsReceived(hash);
-            // mapBlockSource is only used for sending reject messages and DoS scores,
-            // so the race between here and cs_main in ProcessNewBlock is fine.
+            // mapBlockSource is only used for punishing peers and setting
+            // which peers send us compact blocks, so the race between here and
+            // cs_main in ProcessNewBlock is fine.
             mapBlockSource.emplace(hash, std::make_pair(pfrom->GetId(), true));
         }
         bool fNewBlock = false;
@@ -2978,7 +3009,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr
         std::vector<CAddress> vAddr = connman->GetAddresses();
         FastRandomContext insecure_rand;
         for (const CAddress &addr : vAddr) {
-            if (!g_banman->IsBanned(addr)) {
+            if (!banman->IsBanned(addr)) {
                 pfrom->PushAddress(addr, insecure_rand);
             }
         }
@@ -3260,41 +3291,37 @@ bool PeerLogicValidation::ProcessMessages(CNode* pfrom, std::atomic<bool>& inter
             return false;
         // Just take one message
         msgs.splice(msgs.begin(), pfrom->vProcessMsg, pfrom->vProcessMsg.begin());
-        pfrom->nProcessQueueSize -= msgs.front().vRecv.size() + CMessageHeader::HEADER_SIZE;
+        pfrom->nProcessQueueSize -= msgs.front().m_raw_message_size;
         pfrom->fPauseRecv = pfrom->nProcessQueueSize > connman->GetReceiveFloodSize();
         fMoreWork = !pfrom->vProcessMsg.empty();
     }
     CNetMessage& msg(msgs.front());
 
     msg.SetVersion(pfrom->GetRecvVersion());
-    // Scan for message start
-    if (memcmp(msg.hdr.pchMessageStart, chainparams.MessageStart(), CMessageHeader::MESSAGE_START_SIZE) != 0) {
-        LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "PROCESSMESSAGE: INVALID MESSAGESTART %s peer=%d\n", SanitizeString(msg.hdr.GetCommand()), pfrom->GetId());
+    // Check network magic
+    if (!msg.m_valid_netmagic) {
+        LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "PROCESSMESSAGE: INVALID MESSAGESTART %s peer=%d\n", SanitizeString(msg.m_command), pfrom->GetId());
         pfrom->fDisconnect = true;
         return false;
     }
 
-    // Read header
-    CMessageHeader& hdr = msg.hdr;
-    if (!hdr.IsValid(chainparams.MessageStart()))
+    // Check header
+    if (!msg.m_valid_header)
     {
-        LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "PROCESSMESSAGE: ERRORS IN HEADER %s peer=%d\n", SanitizeString(hdr.GetCommand()), pfrom->GetId());
+        LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "PROCESSMESSAGE: ERRORS IN HEADER %s peer=%d\n", SanitizeString(msg.m_command), pfrom->GetId());
         return fMoreWork;
     }
-    std::string strCommand = hdr.GetCommand();
+    const std::string& strCommand = msg.m_command;
 
     // Message size
-    unsigned int nMessageSize = hdr.nMessageSize;
+    unsigned int nMessageSize = msg.m_message_size;
 
     // Checksum
-    CDataStream& vRecv = msg.vRecv;
-    const uint256& hash = msg.GetMessageHash();
-    if (memcmp(hash.begin(), hdr.pchChecksum, CMessageHeader::CHECKSUM_SIZE) != 0)
+    CDataStream& vRecv = msg.m_recv;
+    if (!msg.m_valid_checksum)
     {
-        LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "%s(%s, %u bytes): CHECKSUM ERROR expected %s was %s\n", __func__,
-           SanitizeString(strCommand), nMessageSize,
-           HexStr(hash.begin(), hash.begin()+CMessageHeader::CHECKSUM_SIZE),
-           HexStr(hdr.pchChecksum, hdr.pchChecksum+CMessageHeader::CHECKSUM_SIZE));
+        LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "%s(%s, %u bytes): CHECKSUM ERROR peer=%d\n", __func__,
+           SanitizeString(strCommand), nMessageSize, pfrom->GetId());
         return fMoreWork;
     }
 
@@ -3302,37 +3329,15 @@ bool PeerLogicValidation::ProcessMessages(CNode* pfrom, std::atomic<bool>& inter
     bool fRet = false;
     try
     {
-        fRet = ProcessMessage(pfrom, strCommand, vRecv, msg.nTime, chainparams, connman, interruptMsgProc);
+        fRet = ProcessMessage(pfrom, strCommand, vRecv, msg.m_time, chainparams, connman, m_banman, interruptMsgProc);
         if (interruptMsgProc)
             return false;
         if (!pfrom->vRecvGetData.empty())
             fMoreWork = true;
-    }
-    catch (const std::ios_base::failure& e)
-    {
-        if (strstr(e.what(), "end of data")) {
-            // Allow exceptions from under-length message on vRecv
-            LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "%s(%s, %u bytes): Exception '%s' caught, normally caused by a message being shorter than its stated length\n", __func__, SanitizeString(strCommand), nMessageSize, e.what());
-        } else if (strstr(e.what(), "size too large")) {
-            // Allow exceptions from over-long size
-            LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "%s(%s, %u bytes): Exception '%s' caught\n", __func__, SanitizeString(strCommand), nMessageSize, e.what());
-        } else if (strstr(e.what(), "non-canonical ReadCompactSize()")) {
-            // Allow exceptions from non-canonical encoding
-            LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "%s(%s, %u bytes): Exception '%s' caught\n", __func__, SanitizeString(strCommand), nMessageSize, e.what());
-        } else if (strstr(e.what(), "Superfluous witness record")) {
-            // Allow exceptions from illegal witness encoding
-            LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "%s(%s, %u bytes): Exception '%s' caught\n", __func__, SanitizeString(strCommand), nMessageSize, e.what());
-        } else if (strstr(e.what(), "Unknown transaction optional data")) {
-            // Allow exceptions from unknown witness encoding
-            LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "%s(%s, %u bytes): Exception '%s' caught\n", __func__, SanitizeString(strCommand), nMessageSize, e.what());
-        } else {
-            PrintExceptionContinue(&e, "ProcessMessages()");
-        }
-    }
-    catch (const std::exception& e) {
-        PrintExceptionContinue(&e, "ProcessMessages()");
+    } catch (const std::exception& e) {
+        LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "%s(%s, %u bytes): Exception '%s' (%s) caught\n", __func__, SanitizeString(strCommand), nMessageSize, e.what(), typeid(e).name());
     } catch (...) {
-        PrintExceptionContinue(nullptr, "ProcessMessages()");
+        LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "%s(%s, %u bytes): Unknown exception caught\n", __func__, SanitizeString(strCommand), nMessageSize);
     }
 
     if (!fRet) {
@@ -3549,6 +3554,8 @@ bool PeerLogicValidation::SendMessages(CNode* pto)
 
         // Address refresh broadcast
         int64_t nNow = GetTimeMicros();
+        auto current_time = GetTime<std::chrono::microseconds>();
+
         if (pto->IsAddrRelayPeer() && !::ChainstateActive().IsInitialBlockDownload() && pto->nNextLocalAddrSend < nNow) {
             AdvertiseLocal(pto);
             pto->nNextLocalAddrSend = PoissonNextSend(nNow, AVG_LOCAL_ADDRESS_BROADCAST_INTERVAL);
@@ -3561,11 +3568,12 @@ bool PeerLogicValidation::SendMessages(CNode* pto)
             pto->nNextAddrSend = PoissonNextSend(nNow, AVG_ADDRESS_BROADCAST_INTERVAL);
             std::vector<CAddress> vAddr;
             vAddr.reserve(pto->vAddrToSend.size());
+            assert(pto->m_addr_known);
             for (const CAddress& addr : pto->vAddrToSend)
             {
-                if (!pto->addrKnown.contains(addr.GetKey()))
+                if (!pto->m_addr_known->contains(addr.GetKey()))
                 {
-                    pto->addrKnown.insert(addr.GetKey());
+                    pto->m_addr_known->insert(addr.GetKey());
                     vAddr.push_back(addr);
                     // receiver rejects addr messages larger than 1000
                     if (vAddr.size() >= 1000)
@@ -3769,13 +3777,13 @@ bool PeerLogicValidation::SendMessages(CNode* pto)
                 LOCK(pto->m_tx_relay->cs_tx_inventory);
                 // Check whether periodic sends should happen
                 bool fSendTrickle = pto->HasPermission(PF_NOBAN);
-                if (pto->m_tx_relay->nNextInvSend < nNow) {
+                if (pto->m_tx_relay->nNextInvSend < current_time) {
                     fSendTrickle = true;
                     if (pto->fInbound) {
-                        pto->m_tx_relay->nNextInvSend = connman->PoissonNextSendInbound(nNow, INVENTORY_BROADCAST_INTERVAL);
+                        pto->m_tx_relay->nNextInvSend = std::chrono::microseconds{connman->PoissonNextSendInbound(nNow, INVENTORY_BROADCAST_INTERVAL)};
                     } else {
                         // Use half the delay for outbound peers, as there is less privacy concern for them.
-                        pto->m_tx_relay->nNextInvSend = PoissonNextSend(nNow, INVENTORY_BROADCAST_INTERVAL >> 1);
+                        pto->m_tx_relay->nNextInvSend = PoissonNextSend(current_time, std::chrono::seconds{INVENTORY_BROADCAST_INTERVAL >> 1});
                     }
                 }
 
@@ -3874,7 +3882,7 @@ bool PeerLogicValidation::SendMessages(CNode* pto)
 
                             auto ret = mapRelay.insert(std::make_pair(hash, std::move(txinfo.tx)));
                             if (ret.second) {
-                                vRelayExpiration.push_back(std::make_pair(nNow + 15 * 60 * 1000000, ret.first));
+                                vRelayExpiration.push_back(std::make_pair(nNow + std::chrono::microseconds{RELAY_TX_CACHE_TIME}.count(), ret.first));
                             }
                         }
                         if (vInv.size() == MAX_INV_SZ) {
@@ -3890,7 +3898,7 @@ bool PeerLogicValidation::SendMessages(CNode* pto)
             connman->PushMessage(pto, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::INV, vInv));
 
         // Detect whether we're stalling
-        const auto current_time = GetTime<std::chrono::microseconds>();
+        current_time = GetTime<std::chrono::microseconds>();
         // nNow is the current system time (GetTimeMicros is not mockable) and
         // should be replaced by the mockable current_time eventually
         nNow = GetTimeMicros();