diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/net_processing.cpp')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/net_processing.cpp | 301 |
1 files changed, 169 insertions, 132 deletions
diff --git a/src/net_processing.cpp b/src/net_processing.cpp index 74e33189dc..b3facdcd3a 100644 --- a/src/net_processing.cpp +++ b/src/net_processing.cpp @@ -351,7 +351,16 @@ struct CNodeState { TxDownloadState m_tx_download; - CNodeState(CAddress addrIn, std::string addrNameIn) : address(addrIn), name(addrNameIn) { + //! Whether this peer is an inbound connection + bool m_is_inbound; + + //! Whether this peer is a manual connection + bool m_is_manual_connection; + + CNodeState(CAddress addrIn, std::string addrNameIn, bool is_inbound, bool is_manual) : + address(addrIn), name(std::move(addrNameIn)), m_is_inbound(is_inbound), + m_is_manual_connection (is_manual) + { fCurrentlyConnected = false; nMisbehavior = 0; fShouldBan = false; @@ -570,7 +579,7 @@ static bool TipMayBeStale(const Consensus::Params &consensusParams) EXCLUSIVE_LO static bool CanDirectFetch(const Consensus::Params &consensusParams) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main) { - return chainActive.Tip()->GetBlockTime() > GetAdjustedTime() - consensusParams.nPowTargetSpacing * 20; + return ::ChainActive().Tip()->GetBlockTime() > GetAdjustedTime() - consensusParams.nPowTargetSpacing * 20; } static bool PeerHasHeader(CNodeState *state, const CBlockIndex *pindex) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main) @@ -596,7 +605,7 @@ static void FindNextBlocksToDownload(NodeId nodeid, unsigned int count, std::vec // Make sure pindexBestKnownBlock is up to date, we'll need it. ProcessBlockAvailability(nodeid); - if (state->pindexBestKnownBlock == nullptr || state->pindexBestKnownBlock->nChainWork < chainActive.Tip()->nChainWork || state->pindexBestKnownBlock->nChainWork < nMinimumChainWork) { + if (state->pindexBestKnownBlock == nullptr || state->pindexBestKnownBlock->nChainWork < ::ChainActive().Tip()->nChainWork || state->pindexBestKnownBlock->nChainWork < nMinimumChainWork) { // This peer has nothing interesting. return; } @@ -604,7 +613,7 @@ static void FindNextBlocksToDownload(NodeId nodeid, unsigned int count, std::vec if (state->pindexLastCommonBlock == nullptr) { // Bootstrap quickly by guessing a parent of our best tip is the forking point. // Guessing wrong in either direction is not a problem. - state->pindexLastCommonBlock = chainActive[std::min(state->pindexBestKnownBlock->nHeight, chainActive.Height())]; + state->pindexLastCommonBlock = ::ChainActive()[std::min(state->pindexBestKnownBlock->nHeight, ::ChainActive().Height())]; } // If the peer reorganized, our previous pindexLastCommonBlock may not be an ancestor @@ -646,7 +655,7 @@ static void FindNextBlocksToDownload(NodeId nodeid, unsigned int count, std::vec // We wouldn't download this block or its descendants from this peer. return; } - if (pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_HAVE_DATA || chainActive.Contains(pindex)) { + if (pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_HAVE_DATA || ::ChainActive().Contains(pindex)) { if (pindex->HaveTxsDownloaded()) state->pindexLastCommonBlock = pindex; } else if (mapBlocksInFlight.count(pindex->GetBlockHash()) == 0) { @@ -747,7 +756,7 @@ void PeerLogicValidation::InitializeNode(CNode *pnode) { NodeId nodeid = pnode->GetId(); { LOCK(cs_main); - mapNodeState.emplace_hint(mapNodeState.end(), std::piecewise_construct, std::forward_as_tuple(nodeid), std::forward_as_tuple(addr, std::move(addrName))); + mapNodeState.emplace_hint(mapNodeState.end(), std::piecewise_construct, std::forward_as_tuple(nodeid), std::forward_as_tuple(addr, std::move(addrName), pnode->fInbound, pnode->m_manual_connection)); } if(!pnode->fInbound) PushNodeVersion(pnode, connman, GetTime()); @@ -959,6 +968,90 @@ void Misbehaving(NodeId pnode, int howmuch, const std::string& message) EXCLUSIV LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "%s: %s peer=%d (%d -> %d)%s\n", __func__, state->name, pnode, state->nMisbehavior-howmuch, state->nMisbehavior, message_prefixed); } +/** + * Returns true if the given validation state result may result in a peer + * banning/disconnecting us. We use this to determine which unaccepted + * transactions from a whitelisted peer that we can safely relay. + */ +static bool TxRelayMayResultInDisconnect(const CValidationState& state) +{ + assert(IsTransactionReason(state.GetReason())); + return state.GetReason() == ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS; +} + +/** + * Potentially ban a node based on the contents of a CValidationState object + * + * @param[in] via_compact_block: this bool is passed in because net_processing should + * punish peers differently depending on whether the data was provided in a compact + * block message or not. If the compact block had a valid header, but contained invalid + * txs, the peer should not be punished. See BIP 152. + * + * @return Returns true if the peer was punished (probably disconnected) + * + * Changes here may need to be reflected in TxRelayMayResultInDisconnect(). + */ +static bool MaybePunishNode(NodeId nodeid, const CValidationState& state, bool via_compact_block, const std::string& message = "") { + switch (state.GetReason()) { + case ValidationInvalidReason::NONE: + break; + // The node is providing invalid data: + case ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS: + case ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MUTATED: + if (!via_compact_block) { + LOCK(cs_main); + Misbehaving(nodeid, 100, message); + return true; + } + break; + case ValidationInvalidReason::CACHED_INVALID: + { + LOCK(cs_main); + CNodeState *node_state = State(nodeid); + if (node_state == nullptr) { + break; + } + + // Ban outbound (but not inbound) peers if on an invalid chain. + // Exempt HB compact block peers and manual connections. + if (!via_compact_block && !node_state->m_is_inbound && !node_state->m_is_manual_connection) { + Misbehaving(nodeid, 100, message); + return true; + } + break; + } + case ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER: + case ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_CHECKPOINT: + case ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_INVALID_PREV: + { + LOCK(cs_main); + Misbehaving(nodeid, 100, message); + } + return true; + // Conflicting (but not necessarily invalid) data or different policy: + case ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MISSING_PREV: + { + // TODO: Handle this much more gracefully (10 DoS points is super arbitrary) + LOCK(cs_main); + Misbehaving(nodeid, 10, message); + } + return true; + case ValidationInvalidReason::RECENT_CONSENSUS_CHANGE: + case ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_TIME_FUTURE: + case ValidationInvalidReason::TX_NOT_STANDARD: + case ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MISSING_INPUTS: + case ValidationInvalidReason::TX_PREMATURE_SPEND: + case ValidationInvalidReason::TX_WITNESS_MUTATED: + case ValidationInvalidReason::TX_CONFLICT: + case ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY: + break; + } + if (message != "") { + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "peer=%d: %s\n", nodeid, message); + } + return false; +} + @@ -978,7 +1071,7 @@ void Misbehaving(NodeId pnode, int howmuch, const std::string& message) EXCLUSIV static bool BlockRequestAllowed(const CBlockIndex* pindex, const Consensus::Params& consensusParams) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main) { AssertLockHeld(cs_main); - if (chainActive.Contains(pindex)) return true; + if (::ChainActive().Contains(pindex)) return true; return pindex->IsValid(BLOCK_VALID_SCRIPTS) && (pindexBestHeader != nullptr) && (pindexBestHeader->GetBlockTime() - pindex->GetBlockTime() < STALE_RELAY_AGE_LIMIT) && (GetBlockProofEquivalentTime(*pindexBestHeader, *pindex, *pindexBestHeader, consensusParams) < STALE_RELAY_AGE_LIMIT); @@ -1090,7 +1183,7 @@ void PeerLogicValidation::NewPoWValidBlock(const CBlockIndex *pindex, const std: /** * Update our best height and announce any block hashes which weren't previously - * in chainActive to our peers. + * in ::ChainActive() to our peers. */ void PeerLogicValidation::UpdatedBlockTip(const CBlockIndex *pindexNew, const CBlockIndex *pindexFork, bool fInitialDownload) { const int nNewHeight = pindexNew->nHeight; @@ -1132,14 +1225,12 @@ void PeerLogicValidation::BlockChecked(const CBlock& block, const CValidationSta const uint256 hash(block.GetHash()); std::map<uint256, std::pair<NodeId, bool>>::iterator it = mapBlockSource.find(hash); - int nDoS = 0; - if (state.IsInvalid(nDoS)) { + if (state.IsInvalid()) { // Don't send reject message with code 0 or an internal reject code. if (it != mapBlockSource.end() && State(it->second.first) && state.GetRejectCode() > 0 && state.GetRejectCode() < REJECT_INTERNAL) { CBlockReject reject = {(unsigned char)state.GetRejectCode(), state.GetRejectReason().substr(0, MAX_REJECT_MESSAGE_LENGTH), hash}; State(it->second.first)->rejects.push_back(reject); - if (nDoS > 0 && it->second.second) - Misbehaving(it->second.first, nDoS); + MaybePunishNode(/*nodeid=*/ it->second.first, state, /*via_compact_block=*/ !it->second.second); } } // Check that: @@ -1173,13 +1264,13 @@ bool static AlreadyHave(const CInv& inv) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main) case MSG_WITNESS_TX: { assert(recentRejects); - if (chainActive.Tip()->GetBlockHash() != hashRecentRejectsChainTip) + if (::ChainActive().Tip()->GetBlockHash() != hashRecentRejectsChainTip) { // If the chain tip has changed previously rejected transactions // might be now valid, e.g. due to a nLockTime'd tx becoming valid, // or a double-spend. Reset the rejects filter and give those // txs a second chance. - hashRecentRejectsChainTip = chainActive.Tip()->GetBlockHash(); + hashRecentRejectsChainTip = ::ChainActive().Tip()->GetBlockHash(); recentRejects->reset(); } @@ -1304,7 +1395,7 @@ void static ProcessGetBlockData(CNode* pfrom, const CChainParams& chainparams, c } // Avoid leaking prune-height by never sending blocks below the NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED threshold if (send && !pfrom->fWhitelisted && ( - (((pfrom->GetLocalServices() & NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED) == NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED) && ((pfrom->GetLocalServices() & NODE_NETWORK) != NODE_NETWORK) && (chainActive.Tip()->nHeight - pindex->nHeight > (int)NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED_MIN_BLOCKS + 2 /* add two blocks buffer extension for possible races */) ) + (((pfrom->GetLocalServices() & NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED) == NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED) && ((pfrom->GetLocalServices() & NODE_NETWORK) != NODE_NETWORK) && (::ChainActive().Tip()->nHeight - pindex->nHeight > (int)NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED_MIN_BLOCKS + 2 /* add two blocks buffer extension for possible races */) ) )) { LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Ignore block request below NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED threshold from peer=%d\n", pfrom->GetId()); @@ -1374,7 +1465,7 @@ void static ProcessGetBlockData(CNode* pfrom, const CChainParams& chainparams, c // instead we respond with the full, non-compact block. bool fPeerWantsWitness = State(pfrom->GetId())->fWantsCmpctWitness; int nSendFlags = fPeerWantsWitness ? 0 : SERIALIZE_TRANSACTION_NO_WITNESS; - if (CanDirectFetch(consensusParams) && pindex->nHeight >= chainActive.Height() - MAX_CMPCTBLOCK_DEPTH) { + if (CanDirectFetch(consensusParams) && pindex->nHeight >= ::ChainActive().Height() - MAX_CMPCTBLOCK_DEPTH) { if ((fPeerWantsWitness || !fWitnessesPresentInARecentCompactBlock) && a_recent_compact_block && a_recent_compact_block->header.GetHash() == pindex->GetBlockHash()) { connman->PushMessage(pfrom, msgMaker.Make(nSendFlags, NetMsgType::CMPCTBLOCK, *a_recent_compact_block)); } else { @@ -1394,7 +1485,7 @@ void static ProcessGetBlockData(CNode* pfrom, const CChainParams& chainparams, c // and we want it right after the last block so they don't // wait for other stuff first. std::vector<CInv> vInv; - vInv.push_back(CInv(MSG_BLOCK, chainActive.Tip()->GetBlockHash())); + vInv.push_back(CInv(MSG_BLOCK, ::ChainActive().Tip()->GetBlockHash())); connman->PushMessage(pfrom, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::INV, vInv)); pfrom->hashContinue.SetNull(); } @@ -1489,7 +1580,7 @@ inline void static SendBlockTransactions(const CBlock& block, const BlockTransac connman->PushMessage(pfrom, msgMaker.Make(nSendFlags, NetMsgType::BLOCKTXN, resp)); } -bool static ProcessHeadersMessage(CNode *pfrom, CConnman *connman, const std::vector<CBlockHeader>& headers, const CChainParams& chainparams, bool punish_duplicate_invalid) +bool static ProcessHeadersMessage(CNode *pfrom, CConnman *connman, const std::vector<CBlockHeader>& headers, const CChainParams& chainparams, bool via_compact_block) { const CNetMsgMaker msgMaker(pfrom->GetSendVersion()); size_t nCount = headers.size(); @@ -1515,7 +1606,7 @@ bool static ProcessHeadersMessage(CNode *pfrom, CConnman *connman, const std::ve // nUnconnectingHeaders gets reset back to 0. if (!LookupBlockIndex(headers[0].hashPrevBlock) && nCount < MAX_BLOCKS_TO_ANNOUNCE) { nodestate->nUnconnectingHeaders++; - connman->PushMessage(pfrom, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::GETHEADERS, chainActive.GetLocator(pindexBestHeader), uint256())); + connman->PushMessage(pfrom, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::GETHEADERS, ::ChainActive().GetLocator(pindexBestHeader), uint256())); LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "received header %s: missing prev block %s, sending getheaders (%d) to end (peer=%d, nUnconnectingHeaders=%d)\n", headers[0].GetHash().ToString(), headers[0].hashPrevBlock.ToString(), @@ -1551,48 +1642,8 @@ bool static ProcessHeadersMessage(CNode *pfrom, CConnman *connman, const std::ve CValidationState state; CBlockHeader first_invalid_header; if (!ProcessNewBlockHeaders(headers, state, chainparams, &pindexLast, &first_invalid_header)) { - int nDoS; - if (state.IsInvalid(nDoS)) { - LOCK(cs_main); - if (nDoS > 0) { - Misbehaving(pfrom->GetId(), nDoS, "invalid header received"); - } else { - LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "peer=%d: invalid header received\n", pfrom->GetId()); - } - if (punish_duplicate_invalid && LookupBlockIndex(first_invalid_header.GetHash())) { - // Goal: don't allow outbound peers to use up our outbound - // connection slots if they are on incompatible chains. - // - // We ask the caller to set punish_invalid appropriately based - // on the peer and the method of header delivery (compact - // blocks are allowed to be invalid in some circumstances, - // under BIP 152). - // Here, we try to detect the narrow situation that we have a - // valid block header (ie it was valid at the time the header - // was received, and hence stored in mapBlockIndex) but know the - // block is invalid, and that a peer has announced that same - // block as being on its active chain. - // Disconnect the peer in such a situation. - // - // Note: if the header that is invalid was not accepted to our - // mapBlockIndex at all, that may also be grounds for - // disconnecting the peer, as the chain they are on is likely - // to be incompatible. However, there is a circumstance where - // that does not hold: if the header's timestamp is more than - // 2 hours ahead of our current time. In that case, the header - // may become valid in the future, and we don't want to - // disconnect a peer merely for serving us one too-far-ahead - // block header, to prevent an attacker from splitting the - // network by mining a block right at the 2 hour boundary. - // - // TODO: update the DoS logic (or, rather, rewrite the - // DoS-interface between validation and net_processing) so that - // the interface is cleaner, and so that we disconnect on all the - // reasons that a peer's headers chain is incompatible - // with ours (eg block->nVersion softforks, MTP violations, - // etc), and not just the duplicate-invalid case. - pfrom->fDisconnect = true; - } + if (state.IsInvalid()) { + MaybePunishNode(pfrom->GetId(), state, via_compact_block, "invalid header received"); return false; } } @@ -1612,26 +1663,26 @@ bool static ProcessHeadersMessage(CNode *pfrom, CConnman *connman, const std::ve // because it is set in UpdateBlockAvailability. Some nullptr checks // are still present, however, as belt-and-suspenders. - if (received_new_header && pindexLast->nChainWork > chainActive.Tip()->nChainWork) { + if (received_new_header && pindexLast->nChainWork > ::ChainActive().Tip()->nChainWork) { nodestate->m_last_block_announcement = GetTime(); } if (nCount == MAX_HEADERS_RESULTS) { // Headers message had its maximum size; the peer may have more headers. - // TODO: optimize: if pindexLast is an ancestor of chainActive.Tip or pindexBestHeader, continue + // TODO: optimize: if pindexLast is an ancestor of ::ChainActive().Tip or pindexBestHeader, continue // from there instead. LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "more getheaders (%d) to end to peer=%d (startheight:%d)\n", pindexLast->nHeight, pfrom->GetId(), pfrom->nStartingHeight); - connman->PushMessage(pfrom, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::GETHEADERS, chainActive.GetLocator(pindexLast), uint256())); + connman->PushMessage(pfrom, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::GETHEADERS, ::ChainActive().GetLocator(pindexLast), uint256())); } bool fCanDirectFetch = CanDirectFetch(chainparams.GetConsensus()); // If this set of headers is valid and ends in a block with at least as // much work as our tip, download as much as possible. - if (fCanDirectFetch && pindexLast->IsValid(BLOCK_VALID_TREE) && chainActive.Tip()->nChainWork <= pindexLast->nChainWork) { + if (fCanDirectFetch && pindexLast->IsValid(BLOCK_VALID_TREE) && ::ChainActive().Tip()->nChainWork <= pindexLast->nChainWork) { std::vector<const CBlockIndex*> vToFetch; const CBlockIndex *pindexWalk = pindexLast; // Calculate all the blocks we'd need to switch to pindexLast, up to a limit. - while (pindexWalk && !chainActive.Contains(pindexWalk) && vToFetch.size() <= MAX_BLOCKS_IN_TRANSIT_PER_PEER) { + while (pindexWalk && !::ChainActive().Contains(pindexWalk) && vToFetch.size() <= MAX_BLOCKS_IN_TRANSIT_PER_PEER) { if (!(pindexWalk->nStatus & BLOCK_HAVE_DATA) && !mapBlocksInFlight.count(pindexWalk->GetBlockHash()) && (!IsWitnessEnabled(pindexWalk->pprev, chainparams.GetConsensus()) || State(pfrom->GetId())->fHaveWitness)) { @@ -1644,7 +1695,7 @@ bool static ProcessHeadersMessage(CNode *pfrom, CConnman *connman, const std::ve // very large reorg at a time we think we're close to caught up to // the main chain -- this shouldn't really happen. Bail out on the // direct fetch and rely on parallel download instead. - if (!chainActive.Contains(pindexWalk)) { + if (!::ChainActive().Contains(pindexWalk)) { LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Large reorg, won't direct fetch to %s (%d)\n", pindexLast->GetBlockHash().ToString(), pindexLast->nHeight); @@ -1685,7 +1736,7 @@ bool static ProcessHeadersMessage(CNode *pfrom, CConnman *connman, const std::ve // us sync -- disconnect if using an outbound slot (unless // whitelisted or addnode). // Note: We compare their tip to nMinimumChainWork (rather than - // chainActive.Tip()) because we won't start block download + // ::ChainActive().Tip()) because we won't start block download // until we have a headers chain that has at least // nMinimumChainWork, even if a peer has a chain past our tip, // as an anti-DoS measure. @@ -1699,7 +1750,7 @@ bool static ProcessHeadersMessage(CNode *pfrom, CConnman *connman, const std::ve if (!pfrom->fDisconnect && IsOutboundDisconnectionCandidate(pfrom) && nodestate->pindexBestKnownBlock != nullptr) { // If this is an outbound peer, check to see if we should protect // it from the bad/lagging chain logic. - if (g_outbound_peers_with_protect_from_disconnect < MAX_OUTBOUND_PEERS_TO_PROTECT_FROM_DISCONNECT && nodestate->pindexBestKnownBlock->nChainWork >= chainActive.Tip()->nChainWork && !nodestate->m_chain_sync.m_protect) { + if (g_outbound_peers_with_protect_from_disconnect < MAX_OUTBOUND_PEERS_TO_PROTECT_FROM_DISCONNECT && nodestate->pindexBestKnownBlock->nChainWork >= ::ChainActive().Tip()->nChainWork && !nodestate->m_chain_sync.m_protect) { LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Protecting outbound peer=%d from eviction\n", pfrom->GetId()); nodestate->m_chain_sync.m_protect = true; ++g_outbound_peers_with_protect_from_disconnect; @@ -1727,13 +1778,13 @@ void static ProcessOrphanTx(CConnman* connman, std::set<uint256>& orphan_work_se const CTransaction& orphanTx = *porphanTx; NodeId fromPeer = orphan_it->second.fromPeer; bool fMissingInputs2 = false; - // Use a dummy CValidationState so someone can't setup nodes to counter-DoS based on orphan - // resolution (that is, feeding people an invalid transaction based on LegitTxX in order to get - // anyone relaying LegitTxX banned) - CValidationState stateDummy; + // Use a new CValidationState because orphans come from different peers (and we call + // MaybePunishNode based on the source peer from the orphan map, not based on the peer + // that relayed the previous transaction). + CValidationState orphan_state; if (setMisbehaving.count(fromPeer)) continue; - if (AcceptToMemoryPool(mempool, stateDummy, porphanTx, &fMissingInputs2, &removed_txn, false /* bypass_limits */, 0 /* nAbsurdFee */)) { + if (AcceptToMemoryPool(mempool, orphan_state, porphanTx, &fMissingInputs2, &removed_txn, false /* bypass_limits */, 0 /* nAbsurdFee */)) { LogPrint(BCLog::MEMPOOL, " accepted orphan tx %s\n", orphanHash.ToString()); RelayTransaction(orphanTx, connman); for (unsigned int i = 0; i < orphanTx.vout.size(); i++) { @@ -1747,17 +1798,18 @@ void static ProcessOrphanTx(CConnman* connman, std::set<uint256>& orphan_work_se EraseOrphanTx(orphanHash); done = true; } else if (!fMissingInputs2) { - int nDos = 0; - if (stateDummy.IsInvalid(nDos) && nDos > 0) { + if (orphan_state.IsInvalid()) { // Punish peer that gave us an invalid orphan tx - Misbehaving(fromPeer, nDos); - setMisbehaving.insert(fromPeer); + if (MaybePunishNode(fromPeer, orphan_state, /*via_compact_block*/ false)) { + setMisbehaving.insert(fromPeer); + } LogPrint(BCLog::MEMPOOL, " invalid orphan tx %s\n", orphanHash.ToString()); } // Has inputs but not accepted to mempool // Probably non-standard or insufficient fee LogPrint(BCLog::MEMPOOL, " removed orphan tx %s\n", orphanHash.ToString()); - if (!orphanTx.HasWitness() && !stateDummy.CorruptionPossible()) { + assert(IsTransactionReason(orphan_state.GetReason())); + if (!orphanTx.HasWitness() && orphan_state.GetReason() != ValidationInvalidReason::TX_WITNESS_MUTATED) { // Do not use rejection cache for witness transactions or // witness-stripped transactions, as they can have been malleated. // See https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/8279 for details. @@ -2168,7 +2220,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr // fell back to inv we probably have a reorg which we should get the headers for first, // we now only provide a getheaders response here. When we receive the headers, we will // then ask for the blocks we need. - connman->PushMessage(pfrom, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::GETHEADERS, chainActive.GetLocator(pindexBestHeader), inv.hash)); + connman->PushMessage(pfrom, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::GETHEADERS, ::ChainActive().GetLocator(pindexBestHeader), inv.hash)); LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "getheaders (%d) %s to peer=%d\n", pindexBestHeader->nHeight, inv.hash.ToString(), pfrom->GetId()); } } @@ -2239,14 +2291,14 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr LOCK(cs_main); // Find the last block the caller has in the main chain - const CBlockIndex* pindex = FindForkInGlobalIndex(chainActive, locator); + const CBlockIndex* pindex = FindForkInGlobalIndex(::ChainActive(), locator); // Send the rest of the chain if (pindex) - pindex = chainActive.Next(pindex); + pindex = ::ChainActive().Next(pindex); int nLimit = 500; LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "getblocks %d to %s limit %d from peer=%d\n", (pindex ? pindex->nHeight : -1), hashStop.IsNull() ? "end" : hashStop.ToString(), nLimit, pfrom->GetId()); - for (; pindex; pindex = chainActive.Next(pindex)) + for (; pindex; pindex = ::ChainActive().Next(pindex)) { if (pindex->GetBlockHash() == hashStop) { @@ -2256,7 +2308,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr // If pruning, don't inv blocks unless we have on disk and are likely to still have // for some reasonable time window (1 hour) that block relay might require. const int nPrunedBlocksLikelyToHave = MIN_BLOCKS_TO_KEEP - 3600 / chainparams.GetConsensus().nPowTargetSpacing; - if (fPruneMode && (!(pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_HAVE_DATA) || pindex->nHeight <= chainActive.Tip()->nHeight - nPrunedBlocksLikelyToHave)) + if (fPruneMode && (!(pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_HAVE_DATA) || pindex->nHeight <= ::ChainActive().Tip()->nHeight - nPrunedBlocksLikelyToHave)) { LogPrint(BCLog::NET, " getblocks stopping, pruned or too old block at %d %s\n", pindex->nHeight, pindex->GetBlockHash().ToString()); break; @@ -2298,7 +2350,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr return true; } - if (pindex->nHeight < chainActive.Height() - MAX_BLOCKTXN_DEPTH) { + if (pindex->nHeight < ::ChainActive().Height() - MAX_BLOCKTXN_DEPTH) { // If an older block is requested (should never happen in practice, // but can happen in tests) send a block response instead of a // blocktxn response. Sending a full block response instead of a @@ -2358,23 +2410,23 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr else { // Find the last block the caller has in the main chain - pindex = FindForkInGlobalIndex(chainActive, locator); + pindex = FindForkInGlobalIndex(::ChainActive(), locator); if (pindex) - pindex = chainActive.Next(pindex); + pindex = ::ChainActive().Next(pindex); } // we must use CBlocks, as CBlockHeaders won't include the 0x00 nTx count at the end std::vector<CBlock> vHeaders; int nLimit = MAX_HEADERS_RESULTS; LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "getheaders %d to %s from peer=%d\n", (pindex ? pindex->nHeight : -1), hashStop.IsNull() ? "end" : hashStop.ToString(), pfrom->GetId()); - for (; pindex; pindex = chainActive.Next(pindex)) + for (; pindex; pindex = ::ChainActive().Next(pindex)) { vHeaders.push_back(pindex->GetBlockHeader()); if (--nLimit <= 0 || pindex->GetBlockHash() == hashStop) break; } - // pindex can be nullptr either if we sent chainActive.Tip() OR - // if our peer has chainActive.Tip() (and thus we are sending an empty + // pindex can be nullptr either if we sent ::ChainActive().Tip() OR + // if our peer has ::ChainActive().Tip() (and thus we are sending an empty // headers message). In both cases it's safe to update // pindexBestHeaderSent to be our tip. // @@ -2385,7 +2437,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr // without the new block. By resetting the BestHeaderSent, we ensure we // will re-announce the new block via headers (or compact blocks again) // in the SendMessages logic. - nodestate->pindexBestHeaderSent = pindex ? pindex : chainActive.Tip(); + nodestate->pindexBestHeaderSent = pindex ? pindex : ::ChainActive().Tip(); connman->PushMessage(pfrom, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::HEADERS, vHeaders)); return true; } @@ -2474,7 +2526,8 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr recentRejects->insert(tx.GetHash()); } } else { - if (!tx.HasWitness() && !state.CorruptionPossible()) { + assert(IsTransactionReason(state.GetReason())); + if (!tx.HasWitness() && state.GetReason() != ValidationInvalidReason::TX_WITNESS_MUTATED) { // Do not use rejection cache for witness transactions or // witness-stripped transactions, as they can have been malleated. // See https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/8279 for details. @@ -2493,15 +2546,13 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr // to policy, allowing the node to function as a gateway for // nodes hidden behind it. // - // Never relay transactions that we would assign a non-zero DoS - // score for, as we expect peers to do the same with us in that - // case. - int nDoS = 0; - if (!state.IsInvalid(nDoS) || nDoS == 0) { + // Never relay transactions that might result in being + // disconnected (or banned). + if (state.IsInvalid() && TxRelayMayResultInDisconnect(state)) { + LogPrintf("Not relaying invalid transaction %s from whitelisted peer=%d (%s)\n", tx.GetHash().ToString(), pfrom->GetId(), FormatStateMessage(state)); + } else { LogPrintf("Force relaying tx %s from whitelisted peer=%d\n", tx.GetHash().ToString(), pfrom->GetId()); RelayTransaction(tx, connman); - } else { - LogPrintf("Not relaying invalid transaction %s from whitelisted peer=%d (%s)\n", tx.GetHash().ToString(), pfrom->GetId(), FormatStateMessage(state)); } } } @@ -2526,8 +2577,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr // peer simply for relaying a tx that our recentRejects has caught, // regardless of false positives. - int nDoS = 0; - if (state.IsInvalid(nDoS)) + if (state.IsInvalid()) { LogPrint(BCLog::MEMPOOLREJ, "%s from peer=%d was not accepted: %s\n", tx.GetHash().ToString(), pfrom->GetId(), @@ -2536,9 +2586,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr connman->PushMessage(pfrom, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::REJECT, strCommand, (unsigned char)state.GetRejectCode(), state.GetRejectReason().substr(0, MAX_REJECT_MESSAGE_LENGTH), inv.hash)); } - if (nDoS > 0) { - Misbehaving(pfrom->GetId(), nDoS); - } + MaybePunishNode(pfrom->GetId(), state, /*via_compact_block*/ false); } return true; } @@ -2562,7 +2610,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr if (!LookupBlockIndex(cmpctblock.header.hashPrevBlock)) { // Doesn't connect (or is genesis), instead of DoSing in AcceptBlockHeader, request deeper headers if (!IsInitialBlockDownload()) - connman->PushMessage(pfrom, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::GETHEADERS, chainActive.GetLocator(pindexBestHeader), uint256())); + connman->PushMessage(pfrom, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::GETHEADERS, ::ChainActive().GetLocator(pindexBestHeader), uint256())); return true; } @@ -2574,14 +2622,8 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr const CBlockIndex *pindex = nullptr; CValidationState state; if (!ProcessNewBlockHeaders({cmpctblock.header}, state, chainparams, &pindex)) { - int nDoS; - if (state.IsInvalid(nDoS)) { - if (nDoS > 0) { - LOCK(cs_main); - Misbehaving(pfrom->GetId(), nDoS, strprintf("Peer %d sent us invalid header via cmpctblock\n", pfrom->GetId())); - } else { - LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Peer %d sent us invalid header via cmpctblock\n", pfrom->GetId()); - } + if (state.IsInvalid()) { + MaybePunishNode(pfrom->GetId(), state, /*via_compact_block*/ true, "invalid header via cmpctblock"); return true; } } @@ -2612,7 +2654,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr // If this was a new header with more work than our tip, update the // peer's last block announcement time - if (received_new_header && pindex->nChainWork > chainActive.Tip()->nChainWork) { + if (received_new_header && pindex->nChainWork > ::ChainActive().Tip()->nChainWork) { nodestate->m_last_block_announcement = GetTime(); } @@ -2622,7 +2664,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr if (pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_HAVE_DATA) // Nothing to do here return true; - if (pindex->nChainWork <= chainActive.Tip()->nChainWork || // We know something better + if (pindex->nChainWork <= ::ChainActive().Tip()->nChainWork || // We know something better pindex->nTx != 0) { // We had this block at some point, but pruned it if (fAlreadyInFlight) { // We requested this block for some reason, but our mempool will probably be useless @@ -2646,7 +2688,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr // We want to be a bit conservative just to be extra careful about DoS // possibilities in compact block processing... - if (pindex->nHeight <= chainActive.Height() + 2) { + if (pindex->nHeight <= ::ChainActive().Height() + 2) { if ((!fAlreadyInFlight && nodestate->nBlocksInFlight < MAX_BLOCKS_IN_TRANSIT_PER_PEER) || (fAlreadyInFlight && blockInFlightIt->second.first == pfrom->GetId())) { std::list<QueuedBlock>::iterator* queuedBlockIt = nullptr; @@ -2731,7 +2773,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr // the peer if the header turns out to be for an invalid block. // Note that if a peer tries to build on an invalid chain, that // will be detected and the peer will be banned. - return ProcessHeadersMessage(pfrom, connman, {cmpctblock.header}, chainparams, /*punish_duplicate_invalid=*/false); + return ProcessHeadersMessage(pfrom, connman, {cmpctblock.header}, chainparams, /*via_compact_block=*/true); } if (fBlockReconstructed) { @@ -2874,12 +2916,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr ReadCompactSize(vRecv); // ignore tx count; assume it is 0. } - // Headers received via a HEADERS message should be valid, and reflect - // the chain the peer is on. If we receive a known-invalid header, - // disconnect the peer if it is using one of our outbound connection - // slots. - bool should_punish = !pfrom->fInbound && !pfrom->m_manual_connection; - return ProcessHeadersMessage(pfrom, connman, headers, chainparams, should_punish); + return ProcessHeadersMessage(pfrom, connman, headers, chainparams, /*via_compact_block=*/false); } if (strCommand == NetMsgType::BLOCK) @@ -3301,7 +3338,7 @@ void PeerLogicValidation::ConsiderEviction(CNode *pto, int64_t time_in_seconds) // their chain has more work than ours, we should sync to it, // unless it's invalid, in which case we should find that out and // disconnect from them elsewhere). - if (state.pindexBestKnownBlock != nullptr && state.pindexBestKnownBlock->nChainWork >= chainActive.Tip()->nChainWork) { + if (state.pindexBestKnownBlock != nullptr && state.pindexBestKnownBlock->nChainWork >= ::ChainActive().Tip()->nChainWork) { if (state.m_chain_sync.m_timeout != 0) { state.m_chain_sync.m_timeout = 0; state.m_chain_sync.m_work_header = nullptr; @@ -3313,7 +3350,7 @@ void PeerLogicValidation::ConsiderEviction(CNode *pto, int64_t time_in_seconds) // where we checked against our tip. // Either way, set a new timeout based on current tip. state.m_chain_sync.m_timeout = time_in_seconds + CHAIN_SYNC_TIMEOUT; - state.m_chain_sync.m_work_header = chainActive.Tip(); + state.m_chain_sync.m_work_header = ::ChainActive().Tip(); state.m_chain_sync.m_sent_getheaders = false; } else if (state.m_chain_sync.m_timeout > 0 && time_in_seconds > state.m_chain_sync.m_timeout) { // No evidence yet that our peer has synced to a chain with work equal to that @@ -3326,7 +3363,7 @@ void PeerLogicValidation::ConsiderEviction(CNode *pto, int64_t time_in_seconds) } else { assert(state.m_chain_sync.m_work_header); LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "sending getheaders to outbound peer=%d to verify chain work (current best known block:%s, benchmark blockhash: %s)\n", pto->GetId(), state.pindexBestKnownBlock != nullptr ? state.pindexBestKnownBlock->GetBlockHash().ToString() : "<none>", state.m_chain_sync.m_work_header->GetBlockHash().ToString()); - connman->PushMessage(pto, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::GETHEADERS, chainActive.GetLocator(state.m_chain_sync.m_work_header->pprev), uint256())); + connman->PushMessage(pto, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::GETHEADERS, ::ChainActive().GetLocator(state.m_chain_sync.m_work_header->pprev), uint256())); state.m_chain_sync.m_sent_getheaders = true; constexpr int64_t HEADERS_RESPONSE_TIME = 120; // 2 minutes // Bump the timeout to allow a response, which could clear the timeout @@ -3524,7 +3561,7 @@ bool PeerLogicValidation::SendMessages(CNode* pto) // Start block sync if (pindexBestHeader == nullptr) - pindexBestHeader = chainActive.Tip(); + pindexBestHeader = ::ChainActive().Tip(); bool fFetch = state.fPreferredDownload || (nPreferredDownload == 0 && !pto->fClient && !pto->fOneShot); // Download if this is a nice peer, or we have no nice peers and this one might do. if (!state.fSyncStarted && !pto->fClient && !fImporting && !fReindex) { // Only actively request headers from a single peer, unless we're close to today. @@ -3543,7 +3580,7 @@ bool PeerLogicValidation::SendMessages(CNode* pto) if (pindexStart->pprev) pindexStart = pindexStart->pprev; LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "initial getheaders (%d) to peer=%d (startheight:%d)\n", pindexStart->nHeight, pto->GetId(), pto->nStartingHeight); - connman->PushMessage(pto, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::GETHEADERS, chainActive.GetLocator(pindexStart), uint256())); + connman->PushMessage(pto, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::GETHEADERS, ::ChainActive().GetLocator(pindexStart), uint256())); } } @@ -3570,11 +3607,11 @@ bool PeerLogicValidation::SendMessages(CNode* pto) bool fFoundStartingHeader = false; // Try to find first header that our peer doesn't have, and // then send all headers past that one. If we come across any - // headers that aren't on chainActive, give up. + // headers that aren't on ::ChainActive(), give up. for (const uint256 &hash : pto->vBlockHashesToAnnounce) { const CBlockIndex* pindex = LookupBlockIndex(hash); assert(pindex); - if (chainActive[pindex->nHeight] != pindex) { + if (::ChainActive()[pindex->nHeight] != pindex) { // Bail out if we reorged away from this block fRevertToInv = true; break; @@ -3670,9 +3707,9 @@ bool PeerLogicValidation::SendMessages(CNode* pto) // Warn if we're announcing a block that is not on the main chain. // This should be very rare and could be optimized out. // Just log for now. - if (chainActive[pindex->nHeight] != pindex) { + if (::ChainActive()[pindex->nHeight] != pindex) { LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Announcing block %s not on main chain (tip=%s)\n", - hashToAnnounce.ToString(), chainActive.Tip()->GetBlockHash().ToString()); + hashToAnnounce.ToString(), ::ChainActive().Tip()->GetBlockHash().ToString()); } // If the peer's chain has this block, don't inv it back. |