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Diffstat (limited to 'src/net_processing.cpp')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/net_processing.cpp | 3986 |
1 files changed, 3986 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/net_processing.cpp b/src/net_processing.cpp new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0247b9cc7e --- /dev/null +++ b/src/net_processing.cpp @@ -0,0 +1,3986 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2009-2010 Satoshi Nakamoto +// Copyright (c) 2009-2018 The Bitcoin Core developers +// Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying +// file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php. + +#include <net_processing.h> + +#include <addrman.h> +#include <banman.h> +#include <arith_uint256.h> +#include <blockencodings.h> +#include <chainparams.h> +#include <consensus/validation.h> +#include <hash.h> +#include <validation.h> +#include <merkleblock.h> +#include <netmessagemaker.h> +#include <netbase.h> +#include <policy/fees.h> +#include <policy/policy.h> +#include <primitives/block.h> +#include <primitives/transaction.h> +#include <random.h> +#include <reverse_iterator.h> +#include <scheduler.h> +#include <tinyformat.h> +#include <txmempool.h> +#include <ui_interface.h> +#include <util/system.h> +#include <util/moneystr.h> +#include <util/strencodings.h> + +#include <memory> + +#if defined(NDEBUG) +# error "Bitcoin cannot be compiled without assertions." +#endif + +/** Expiration time for orphan transactions in seconds */ +static constexpr int64_t ORPHAN_TX_EXPIRE_TIME = 20 * 60; +/** Minimum time between orphan transactions expire time checks in seconds */ +static constexpr int64_t ORPHAN_TX_EXPIRE_INTERVAL = 5 * 60; +/** Headers download timeout expressed in microseconds + * Timeout = base + per_header * (expected number of headers) */ +static constexpr int64_t HEADERS_DOWNLOAD_TIMEOUT_BASE = 15 * 60 * 1000000; // 15 minutes +static constexpr int64_t HEADERS_DOWNLOAD_TIMEOUT_PER_HEADER = 1000; // 1ms/header +/** Protect at least this many outbound peers from disconnection due to slow/ + * behind headers chain. + */ +static constexpr int32_t MAX_OUTBOUND_PEERS_TO_PROTECT_FROM_DISCONNECT = 4; +/** Timeout for (unprotected) outbound peers to sync to our chainwork, in seconds */ +static constexpr int64_t CHAIN_SYNC_TIMEOUT = 20 * 60; // 20 minutes +/** How frequently to check for stale tips, in seconds */ +static constexpr int64_t STALE_CHECK_INTERVAL = 10 * 60; // 10 minutes +/** How frequently to check for extra outbound peers and disconnect, in seconds */ +static constexpr int64_t EXTRA_PEER_CHECK_INTERVAL = 45; +/** Minimum time an outbound-peer-eviction candidate must be connected for, in order to evict, in seconds */ +static constexpr int64_t MINIMUM_CONNECT_TIME = 30; +/** SHA256("main address relay")[0:8] */ +static constexpr uint64_t RANDOMIZER_ID_ADDRESS_RELAY = 0x3cac0035b5866b90ULL; +/// Age after which a stale block will no longer be served if requested as +/// protection against fingerprinting. Set to one month, denominated in seconds. +static constexpr int STALE_RELAY_AGE_LIMIT = 30 * 24 * 60 * 60; +/// Age after which a block is considered historical for purposes of rate +/// limiting block relay. Set to one week, denominated in seconds. +static constexpr int HISTORICAL_BLOCK_AGE = 7 * 24 * 60 * 60; +/** Maximum number of in-flight transactions from a peer */ +static constexpr int32_t MAX_PEER_TX_IN_FLIGHT = 100; +/** Maximum number of announced transactions from a peer */ +static constexpr int32_t MAX_PEER_TX_ANNOUNCEMENTS = 2 * MAX_INV_SZ; +/** How many microseconds to delay requesting transactions from inbound peers */ +static constexpr int64_t INBOUND_PEER_TX_DELAY = 2 * 1000000; +/** How long to wait (in microseconds) before downloading a transaction from an additional peer */ +static constexpr int64_t GETDATA_TX_INTERVAL = 60 * 1000000; +/** Maximum delay (in microseconds) for transaction requests to avoid biasing some peers over others. */ +static constexpr int64_t MAX_GETDATA_RANDOM_DELAY = 2 * 1000000; +static_assert(INBOUND_PEER_TX_DELAY >= MAX_GETDATA_RANDOM_DELAY, +"To preserve security, MAX_GETDATA_RANDOM_DELAY should not exceed INBOUND_PEER_DELAY"); +/** Limit to avoid sending big packets. Not used in processing incoming GETDATA for compatibility */ +static const unsigned int MAX_GETDATA_SZ = 1000; + + +struct COrphanTx { + // When modifying, adapt the copy of this definition in tests/DoS_tests. + CTransactionRef tx; + NodeId fromPeer; + int64_t nTimeExpire; + size_t list_pos; +}; +CCriticalSection g_cs_orphans; +std::map<uint256, COrphanTx> mapOrphanTransactions GUARDED_BY(g_cs_orphans); + +void EraseOrphansFor(NodeId peer); + +/** Increase a node's misbehavior score. */ +void Misbehaving(NodeId nodeid, int howmuch, const std::string& message="") EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main); + +/** Average delay between local address broadcasts in seconds. */ +static constexpr unsigned int AVG_LOCAL_ADDRESS_BROADCAST_INTERVAL = 24 * 60 * 60; +/** Average delay between peer address broadcasts in seconds. */ +static const unsigned int AVG_ADDRESS_BROADCAST_INTERVAL = 30; +/** Average delay between trickled inventory transmissions in seconds. + * Blocks and whitelisted receivers bypass this, outbound peers get half this delay. */ +static const unsigned int INVENTORY_BROADCAST_INTERVAL = 5; +/** Maximum number of inventory items to send per transmission. + * Limits the impact of low-fee transaction floods. */ +static constexpr unsigned int INVENTORY_BROADCAST_MAX = 7 * INVENTORY_BROADCAST_INTERVAL; +/** Average delay between feefilter broadcasts in seconds. */ +static constexpr unsigned int AVG_FEEFILTER_BROADCAST_INTERVAL = 10 * 60; +/** Maximum feefilter broadcast delay after significant change. */ +static constexpr unsigned int MAX_FEEFILTER_CHANGE_DELAY = 5 * 60; + +// Internal stuff +namespace { + /** Number of nodes with fSyncStarted. */ + int nSyncStarted GUARDED_BY(cs_main) = 0; + + /** + * Sources of received blocks, saved to be able to send them reject + * messages or ban them when processing happens afterwards. + * Set mapBlockSource[hash].second to false if the node should not be + * punished if the block is invalid. + */ + std::map<uint256, std::pair<NodeId, bool>> mapBlockSource GUARDED_BY(cs_main); + + /** + * Filter for transactions that were recently rejected by + * AcceptToMemoryPool. These are not rerequested until the chain tip + * changes, at which point the entire filter is reset. + * + * Without this filter we'd be re-requesting txs from each of our peers, + * increasing bandwidth consumption considerably. For instance, with 100 + * peers, half of which relay a tx we don't accept, that might be a 50x + * bandwidth increase. A flooding attacker attempting to roll-over the + * filter using minimum-sized, 60byte, transactions might manage to send + * 1000/sec if we have fast peers, so we pick 120,000 to give our peers a + * two minute window to send invs to us. + * + * Decreasing the false positive rate is fairly cheap, so we pick one in a + * million to make it highly unlikely for users to have issues with this + * filter. + * + * Memory used: 1.3 MB + */ + std::unique_ptr<CRollingBloomFilter> recentRejects GUARDED_BY(cs_main); + uint256 hashRecentRejectsChainTip GUARDED_BY(cs_main); + + /** Blocks that are in flight, and that are in the queue to be downloaded. */ + struct QueuedBlock { + uint256 hash; + const CBlockIndex* pindex; //!< Optional. + bool fValidatedHeaders; //!< Whether this block has validated headers at the time of request. + std::unique_ptr<PartiallyDownloadedBlock> partialBlock; //!< Optional, used for CMPCTBLOCK downloads + }; + std::map<uint256, std::pair<NodeId, std::list<QueuedBlock>::iterator> > mapBlocksInFlight GUARDED_BY(cs_main); + + /** Stack of nodes which we have set to announce using compact blocks */ + std::list<NodeId> lNodesAnnouncingHeaderAndIDs GUARDED_BY(cs_main); + + /** Number of preferable block download peers. */ + int nPreferredDownload GUARDED_BY(cs_main) = 0; + + /** Number of peers from which we're downloading blocks. */ + int nPeersWithValidatedDownloads GUARDED_BY(cs_main) = 0; + + /** Number of outbound peers with m_chain_sync.m_protect. */ + int g_outbound_peers_with_protect_from_disconnect GUARDED_BY(cs_main) = 0; + + /** When our tip was last updated. */ + std::atomic<int64_t> g_last_tip_update(0); + + /** Relay map */ + typedef std::map<uint256, CTransactionRef> MapRelay; + MapRelay mapRelay GUARDED_BY(cs_main); + /** Expiration-time ordered list of (expire time, relay map entry) pairs. */ + std::deque<std::pair<int64_t, MapRelay::iterator>> vRelayExpiration GUARDED_BY(cs_main); + + std::atomic<int64_t> nTimeBestReceived(0); // Used only to inform the wallet of when we last received a block + + struct IteratorComparator + { + template<typename I> + bool operator()(const I& a, const I& b) const + { + return &(*a) < &(*b); + } + }; + std::map<COutPoint, std::set<std::map<uint256, COrphanTx>::iterator, IteratorComparator>> mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev GUARDED_BY(g_cs_orphans); + + std::vector<std::map<uint256, COrphanTx>::iterator> g_orphan_list GUARDED_BY(g_cs_orphans); //! For random eviction + + static size_t vExtraTxnForCompactIt GUARDED_BY(g_cs_orphans) = 0; + static std::vector<std::pair<uint256, CTransactionRef>> vExtraTxnForCompact GUARDED_BY(g_cs_orphans); +} // namespace + +namespace { +struct CBlockReject { + unsigned char chRejectCode; + std::string strRejectReason; + uint256 hashBlock; +}; + +/** + * Maintain validation-specific state about nodes, protected by cs_main, instead + * by CNode's own locks. This simplifies asynchronous operation, where + * processing of incoming data is done after the ProcessMessage call returns, + * and we're no longer holding the node's locks. + */ +struct CNodeState { + //! The peer's address + const CService address; + //! Whether we have a fully established connection. + bool fCurrentlyConnected; + //! Accumulated misbehaviour score for this peer. + int nMisbehavior; + //! Whether this peer should be disconnected and banned (unless whitelisted). + bool fShouldBan; + //! String name of this peer (debugging/logging purposes). + const std::string name; + //! List of asynchronously-determined block rejections to notify this peer about. + std::vector<CBlockReject> rejects; + //! The best known block we know this peer has announced. + const CBlockIndex *pindexBestKnownBlock; + //! The hash of the last unknown block this peer has announced. + uint256 hashLastUnknownBlock; + //! The last full block we both have. + const CBlockIndex *pindexLastCommonBlock; + //! The best header we have sent our peer. + const CBlockIndex *pindexBestHeaderSent; + //! Length of current-streak of unconnecting headers announcements + int nUnconnectingHeaders; + //! Whether we've started headers synchronization with this peer. + bool fSyncStarted; + //! When to potentially disconnect peer for stalling headers download + int64_t nHeadersSyncTimeout; + //! Since when we're stalling block download progress (in microseconds), or 0. + int64_t nStallingSince; + std::list<QueuedBlock> vBlocksInFlight; + //! When the first entry in vBlocksInFlight started downloading. Don't care when vBlocksInFlight is empty. + int64_t nDownloadingSince; + int nBlocksInFlight; + int nBlocksInFlightValidHeaders; + //! Whether we consider this a preferred download peer. + bool fPreferredDownload; + //! Whether this peer wants invs or headers (when possible) for block announcements. + bool fPreferHeaders; + //! Whether this peer wants invs or cmpctblocks (when possible) for block announcements. + bool fPreferHeaderAndIDs; + /** + * Whether this peer will send us cmpctblocks if we request them. + * This is not used to gate request logic, as we really only care about fSupportsDesiredCmpctVersion, + * but is used as a flag to "lock in" the version of compact blocks (fWantsCmpctWitness) we send. + */ + bool fProvidesHeaderAndIDs; + //! Whether this peer can give us witnesses + bool fHaveWitness; + //! Whether this peer wants witnesses in cmpctblocks/blocktxns + bool fWantsCmpctWitness; + /** + * If we've announced NODE_WITNESS to this peer: whether the peer sends witnesses in cmpctblocks/blocktxns, + * otherwise: whether this peer sends non-witnesses in cmpctblocks/blocktxns. + */ + bool fSupportsDesiredCmpctVersion; + + /** State used to enforce CHAIN_SYNC_TIMEOUT + * Only in effect for outbound, non-manual connections, with + * m_protect == false + * Algorithm: if a peer's best known block has less work than our tip, + * set a timeout CHAIN_SYNC_TIMEOUT seconds in the future: + * - If at timeout their best known block now has more work than our tip + * when the timeout was set, then either reset the timeout or clear it + * (after comparing against our current tip's work) + * - If at timeout their best known block still has less work than our + * tip did when the timeout was set, then send a getheaders message, + * and set a shorter timeout, HEADERS_RESPONSE_TIME seconds in future. + * If their best known block is still behind when that new timeout is + * reached, disconnect. + */ + struct ChainSyncTimeoutState { + //! A timeout used for checking whether our peer has sufficiently synced + int64_t m_timeout; + //! A header with the work we require on our peer's chain + const CBlockIndex * m_work_header; + //! After timeout is reached, set to true after sending getheaders + bool m_sent_getheaders; + //! Whether this peer is protected from disconnection due to a bad/slow chain + bool m_protect; + }; + + ChainSyncTimeoutState m_chain_sync; + + //! Time of last new block announcement + int64_t m_last_block_announcement; + + /* + * State associated with transaction download. + * + * Tx download algorithm: + * + * When inv comes in, queue up (process_time, txid) inside the peer's + * CNodeState (m_tx_process_time) as long as m_tx_announced for the peer + * isn't too big (MAX_PEER_TX_ANNOUNCEMENTS). + * + * The process_time for a transaction is set to nNow for outbound peers, + * nNow + 2 seconds for inbound peers. This is the time at which we'll + * consider trying to request the transaction from the peer in + * SendMessages(). The delay for inbound peers is to allow outbound peers + * a chance to announce before we request from inbound peers, to prevent + * an adversary from using inbound connections to blind us to a + * transaction (InvBlock). + * + * When we call SendMessages() for a given peer, + * we will loop over the transactions in m_tx_process_time, looking + * at the transactions whose process_time <= nNow. We'll request each + * such transaction that we don't have already and that hasn't been + * requested from another peer recently, up until we hit the + * MAX_PEER_TX_IN_FLIGHT limit for the peer. Then we'll update + * g_already_asked_for for each requested txid, storing the time of the + * GETDATA request. We use g_already_asked_for to coordinate transaction + * requests amongst our peers. + * + * For transactions that we still need but we have already recently + * requested from some other peer, we'll reinsert (process_time, txid) + * back into the peer's m_tx_process_time at the point in the future at + * which the most recent GETDATA request would time out (ie + * GETDATA_TX_INTERVAL + the request time stored in g_already_asked_for). + * We add an additional delay for inbound peers, again to prefer + * attempting download from outbound peers first. + * We also add an extra small random delay up to 2 seconds + * to avoid biasing some peers over others. (e.g., due to fixed ordering + * of peer processing in ThreadMessageHandler). + * + * When we receive a transaction from a peer, we remove the txid from the + * peer's m_tx_in_flight set and from their recently announced set + * (m_tx_announced). We also clear g_already_asked_for for that entry, so + * that if somehow the transaction is not accepted but also not added to + * the reject filter, then we will eventually redownload from other + * peers. + */ + struct TxDownloadState { + /* Track when to attempt download of announced transactions (process + * time in micros -> txid) + */ + std::multimap<int64_t, uint256> m_tx_process_time; + + //! Store all the transactions a peer has recently announced + std::set<uint256> m_tx_announced; + + //! Store transactions which were requested by us + std::set<uint256> m_tx_in_flight; + }; + + TxDownloadState m_tx_download; + + CNodeState(CAddress addrIn, std::string addrNameIn) : address(addrIn), name(addrNameIn) { + fCurrentlyConnected = false; + nMisbehavior = 0; + fShouldBan = false; + pindexBestKnownBlock = nullptr; + hashLastUnknownBlock.SetNull(); + pindexLastCommonBlock = nullptr; + pindexBestHeaderSent = nullptr; + nUnconnectingHeaders = 0; + fSyncStarted = false; + nHeadersSyncTimeout = 0; + nStallingSince = 0; + nDownloadingSince = 0; + nBlocksInFlight = 0; + nBlocksInFlightValidHeaders = 0; + fPreferredDownload = false; + fPreferHeaders = false; + fPreferHeaderAndIDs = false; + fProvidesHeaderAndIDs = false; + fHaveWitness = false; + fWantsCmpctWitness = false; + fSupportsDesiredCmpctVersion = false; + m_chain_sync = { 0, nullptr, false, false }; + m_last_block_announcement = 0; + } +}; + +// Keeps track of the time (in microseconds) when transactions were requested last time +limitedmap<uint256, int64_t> g_already_asked_for GUARDED_BY(cs_main)(MAX_INV_SZ); + +/** Map maintaining per-node state. */ +static std::map<NodeId, CNodeState> mapNodeState GUARDED_BY(cs_main); + +static CNodeState *State(NodeId pnode) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main) { + std::map<NodeId, CNodeState>::iterator it = mapNodeState.find(pnode); + if (it == mapNodeState.end()) + return nullptr; + return &it->second; +} + +static void UpdatePreferredDownload(CNode* node, CNodeState* state) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main) +{ + nPreferredDownload -= state->fPreferredDownload; + + // Whether this node should be marked as a preferred download node. + state->fPreferredDownload = (!node->fInbound || node->fWhitelisted) && !node->fOneShot && !node->fClient; + + nPreferredDownload += state->fPreferredDownload; +} + +static void PushNodeVersion(CNode *pnode, CConnman* connman, int64_t nTime) +{ + ServiceFlags nLocalNodeServices = pnode->GetLocalServices(); + uint64_t nonce = pnode->GetLocalNonce(); + int nNodeStartingHeight = pnode->GetMyStartingHeight(); + NodeId nodeid = pnode->GetId(); + CAddress addr = pnode->addr; + + CAddress addrYou = (addr.IsRoutable() && !IsProxy(addr) ? addr : CAddress(CService(), addr.nServices)); + CAddress addrMe = CAddress(CService(), nLocalNodeServices); + + connman->PushMessage(pnode, CNetMsgMaker(INIT_PROTO_VERSION).Make(NetMsgType::VERSION, PROTOCOL_VERSION, (uint64_t)nLocalNodeServices, nTime, addrYou, addrMe, + nonce, strSubVersion, nNodeStartingHeight, ::fRelayTxes)); + + if (fLogIPs) { + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "send version message: version %d, blocks=%d, us=%s, them=%s, peer=%d\n", PROTOCOL_VERSION, nNodeStartingHeight, addrMe.ToString(), addrYou.ToString(), nodeid); + } else { + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "send version message: version %d, blocks=%d, us=%s, peer=%d\n", PROTOCOL_VERSION, nNodeStartingHeight, addrMe.ToString(), nodeid); + } +} + +// Returns a bool indicating whether we requested this block. +// Also used if a block was /not/ received and timed out or started with another peer +static bool MarkBlockAsReceived(const uint256& hash) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main) { + std::map<uint256, std::pair<NodeId, std::list<QueuedBlock>::iterator> >::iterator itInFlight = mapBlocksInFlight.find(hash); + if (itInFlight != mapBlocksInFlight.end()) { + CNodeState *state = State(itInFlight->second.first); + assert(state != nullptr); + state->nBlocksInFlightValidHeaders -= itInFlight->second.second->fValidatedHeaders; + if (state->nBlocksInFlightValidHeaders == 0 && itInFlight->second.second->fValidatedHeaders) { + // Last validated block on the queue was received. + nPeersWithValidatedDownloads--; + } + if (state->vBlocksInFlight.begin() == itInFlight->second.second) { + // First block on the queue was received, update the start download time for the next one + state->nDownloadingSince = std::max(state->nDownloadingSince, GetTimeMicros()); + } + state->vBlocksInFlight.erase(itInFlight->second.second); + state->nBlocksInFlight--; + state->nStallingSince = 0; + mapBlocksInFlight.erase(itInFlight); + return true; + } + return false; +} + +// returns false, still setting pit, if the block was already in flight from the same peer +// pit will only be valid as long as the same cs_main lock is being held +static bool MarkBlockAsInFlight(NodeId nodeid, const uint256& hash, const CBlockIndex* pindex = nullptr, std::list<QueuedBlock>::iterator** pit = nullptr) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main) { + CNodeState *state = State(nodeid); + assert(state != nullptr); + + // Short-circuit most stuff in case it is from the same node + std::map<uint256, std::pair<NodeId, std::list<QueuedBlock>::iterator> >::iterator itInFlight = mapBlocksInFlight.find(hash); + if (itInFlight != mapBlocksInFlight.end() && itInFlight->second.first == nodeid) { + if (pit) { + *pit = &itInFlight->second.second; + } + return false; + } + + // Make sure it's not listed somewhere already. + MarkBlockAsReceived(hash); + + std::list<QueuedBlock>::iterator it = state->vBlocksInFlight.insert(state->vBlocksInFlight.end(), + {hash, pindex, pindex != nullptr, std::unique_ptr<PartiallyDownloadedBlock>(pit ? new PartiallyDownloadedBlock(&mempool) : nullptr)}); + state->nBlocksInFlight++; + state->nBlocksInFlightValidHeaders += it->fValidatedHeaders; + if (state->nBlocksInFlight == 1) { + // We're starting a block download (batch) from this peer. + state->nDownloadingSince = GetTimeMicros(); + } + if (state->nBlocksInFlightValidHeaders == 1 && pindex != nullptr) { + nPeersWithValidatedDownloads++; + } + itInFlight = mapBlocksInFlight.insert(std::make_pair(hash, std::make_pair(nodeid, it))).first; + if (pit) + *pit = &itInFlight->second.second; + return true; +} + +/** Check whether the last unknown block a peer advertised is not yet known. */ +static void ProcessBlockAvailability(NodeId nodeid) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main) { + CNodeState *state = State(nodeid); + assert(state != nullptr); + + if (!state->hashLastUnknownBlock.IsNull()) { + const CBlockIndex* pindex = LookupBlockIndex(state->hashLastUnknownBlock); + if (pindex && pindex->nChainWork > 0) { + if (state->pindexBestKnownBlock == nullptr || pindex->nChainWork >= state->pindexBestKnownBlock->nChainWork) { + state->pindexBestKnownBlock = pindex; + } + state->hashLastUnknownBlock.SetNull(); + } + } +} + +/** Update tracking information about which blocks a peer is assumed to have. */ +static void UpdateBlockAvailability(NodeId nodeid, const uint256 &hash) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main) { + CNodeState *state = State(nodeid); + assert(state != nullptr); + + ProcessBlockAvailability(nodeid); + + const CBlockIndex* pindex = LookupBlockIndex(hash); + if (pindex && pindex->nChainWork > 0) { + // An actually better block was announced. + if (state->pindexBestKnownBlock == nullptr || pindex->nChainWork >= state->pindexBestKnownBlock->nChainWork) { + state->pindexBestKnownBlock = pindex; + } + } else { + // An unknown block was announced; just assume that the latest one is the best one. + state->hashLastUnknownBlock = hash; + } +} + +/** + * When a peer sends us a valid block, instruct it to announce blocks to us + * using CMPCTBLOCK if possible by adding its nodeid to the end of + * lNodesAnnouncingHeaderAndIDs, and keeping that list under a certain size by + * removing the first element if necessary. + */ +static void MaybeSetPeerAsAnnouncingHeaderAndIDs(NodeId nodeid, CConnman* connman) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main) +{ + AssertLockHeld(cs_main); + CNodeState* nodestate = State(nodeid); + if (!nodestate || !nodestate->fSupportsDesiredCmpctVersion) { + // Never ask from peers who can't provide witnesses. + return; + } + if (nodestate->fProvidesHeaderAndIDs) { + for (std::list<NodeId>::iterator it = lNodesAnnouncingHeaderAndIDs.begin(); it != lNodesAnnouncingHeaderAndIDs.end(); it++) { + if (*it == nodeid) { + lNodesAnnouncingHeaderAndIDs.erase(it); + lNodesAnnouncingHeaderAndIDs.push_back(nodeid); + return; + } + } + connman->ForNode(nodeid, [connman](CNode* pfrom){ + AssertLockHeld(cs_main); + uint64_t nCMPCTBLOCKVersion = (pfrom->GetLocalServices() & NODE_WITNESS) ? 2 : 1; + if (lNodesAnnouncingHeaderAndIDs.size() >= 3) { + // As per BIP152, we only get 3 of our peers to announce + // blocks using compact encodings. + connman->ForNode(lNodesAnnouncingHeaderAndIDs.front(), [connman, nCMPCTBLOCKVersion](CNode* pnodeStop){ + AssertLockHeld(cs_main); + connman->PushMessage(pnodeStop, CNetMsgMaker(pnodeStop->GetSendVersion()).Make(NetMsgType::SENDCMPCT, /*fAnnounceUsingCMPCTBLOCK=*/false, nCMPCTBLOCKVersion)); + return true; + }); + lNodesAnnouncingHeaderAndIDs.pop_front(); + } + connman->PushMessage(pfrom, CNetMsgMaker(pfrom->GetSendVersion()).Make(NetMsgType::SENDCMPCT, /*fAnnounceUsingCMPCTBLOCK=*/true, nCMPCTBLOCKVersion)); + lNodesAnnouncingHeaderAndIDs.push_back(pfrom->GetId()); + return true; + }); + } +} + +static bool TipMayBeStale(const Consensus::Params &consensusParams) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main) +{ + AssertLockHeld(cs_main); + if (g_last_tip_update == 0) { + g_last_tip_update = GetTime(); + } + return g_last_tip_update < GetTime() - consensusParams.nPowTargetSpacing * 3 && mapBlocksInFlight.empty(); +} + +static bool CanDirectFetch(const Consensus::Params &consensusParams) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main) +{ + return chainActive.Tip()->GetBlockTime() > GetAdjustedTime() - consensusParams.nPowTargetSpacing * 20; +} + +static bool PeerHasHeader(CNodeState *state, const CBlockIndex *pindex) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main) +{ + if (state->pindexBestKnownBlock && pindex == state->pindexBestKnownBlock->GetAncestor(pindex->nHeight)) + return true; + if (state->pindexBestHeaderSent && pindex == state->pindexBestHeaderSent->GetAncestor(pindex->nHeight)) + return true; + return false; +} + +/** Update pindexLastCommonBlock and add not-in-flight missing successors to vBlocks, until it has + * at most count entries. */ +static void FindNextBlocksToDownload(NodeId nodeid, unsigned int count, std::vector<const CBlockIndex*>& vBlocks, NodeId& nodeStaller, const Consensus::Params& consensusParams) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main) +{ + if (count == 0) + return; + + vBlocks.reserve(vBlocks.size() + count); + CNodeState *state = State(nodeid); + assert(state != nullptr); + + // Make sure pindexBestKnownBlock is up to date, we'll need it. + ProcessBlockAvailability(nodeid); + + if (state->pindexBestKnownBlock == nullptr || state->pindexBestKnownBlock->nChainWork < chainActive.Tip()->nChainWork || state->pindexBestKnownBlock->nChainWork < nMinimumChainWork) { + // This peer has nothing interesting. + return; + } + + if (state->pindexLastCommonBlock == nullptr) { + // Bootstrap quickly by guessing a parent of our best tip is the forking point. + // Guessing wrong in either direction is not a problem. + state->pindexLastCommonBlock = chainActive[std::min(state->pindexBestKnownBlock->nHeight, chainActive.Height())]; + } + + // If the peer reorganized, our previous pindexLastCommonBlock may not be an ancestor + // of its current tip anymore. Go back enough to fix that. + state->pindexLastCommonBlock = LastCommonAncestor(state->pindexLastCommonBlock, state->pindexBestKnownBlock); + if (state->pindexLastCommonBlock == state->pindexBestKnownBlock) + return; + + std::vector<const CBlockIndex*> vToFetch; + const CBlockIndex *pindexWalk = state->pindexLastCommonBlock; + // Never fetch further than the best block we know the peer has, or more than BLOCK_DOWNLOAD_WINDOW + 1 beyond the last + // linked block we have in common with this peer. The +1 is so we can detect stalling, namely if we would be able to + // download that next block if the window were 1 larger. + int nWindowEnd = state->pindexLastCommonBlock->nHeight + BLOCK_DOWNLOAD_WINDOW; + int nMaxHeight = std::min<int>(state->pindexBestKnownBlock->nHeight, nWindowEnd + 1); + NodeId waitingfor = -1; + while (pindexWalk->nHeight < nMaxHeight) { + // Read up to 128 (or more, if more blocks than that are needed) successors of pindexWalk (towards + // pindexBestKnownBlock) into vToFetch. We fetch 128, because CBlockIndex::GetAncestor may be as expensive + // as iterating over ~100 CBlockIndex* entries anyway. + int nToFetch = std::min(nMaxHeight - pindexWalk->nHeight, std::max<int>(count - vBlocks.size(), 128)); + vToFetch.resize(nToFetch); + pindexWalk = state->pindexBestKnownBlock->GetAncestor(pindexWalk->nHeight + nToFetch); + vToFetch[nToFetch - 1] = pindexWalk; + for (unsigned int i = nToFetch - 1; i > 0; i--) { + vToFetch[i - 1] = vToFetch[i]->pprev; + } + + // Iterate over those blocks in vToFetch (in forward direction), adding the ones that + // are not yet downloaded and not in flight to vBlocks. In the meantime, update + // pindexLastCommonBlock as long as all ancestors are already downloaded, or if it's + // already part of our chain (and therefore don't need it even if pruned). + for (const CBlockIndex* pindex : vToFetch) { + if (!pindex->IsValid(BLOCK_VALID_TREE)) { + // We consider the chain that this peer is on invalid. + return; + } + if (!State(nodeid)->fHaveWitness && IsWitnessEnabled(pindex->pprev, consensusParams)) { + // We wouldn't download this block or its descendants from this peer. + return; + } + if (pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_HAVE_DATA || chainActive.Contains(pindex)) { + if (pindex->HaveTxsDownloaded()) + state->pindexLastCommonBlock = pindex; + } else if (mapBlocksInFlight.count(pindex->GetBlockHash()) == 0) { + // The block is not already downloaded, and not yet in flight. + if (pindex->nHeight > nWindowEnd) { + // We reached the end of the window. + if (vBlocks.size() == 0 && waitingfor != nodeid) { + // We aren't able to fetch anything, but we would be if the download window was one larger. + nodeStaller = waitingfor; + } + return; + } + vBlocks.push_back(pindex); + if (vBlocks.size() == count) { + return; + } + } else if (waitingfor == -1) { + // This is the first already-in-flight block. + waitingfor = mapBlocksInFlight[pindex->GetBlockHash()].first; + } + } + } +} + +void EraseTxRequest(const uint256& txid) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main) +{ + g_already_asked_for.erase(txid); +} + +int64_t GetTxRequestTime(const uint256& txid) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main) +{ + auto it = g_already_asked_for.find(txid); + if (it != g_already_asked_for.end()) { + return it->second; + } + return 0; +} + +void UpdateTxRequestTime(const uint256& txid, int64_t request_time) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main) +{ + auto it = g_already_asked_for.find(txid); + if (it == g_already_asked_for.end()) { + g_already_asked_for.insert(std::make_pair(txid, request_time)); + } else { + g_already_asked_for.update(it, request_time); + } +} + + +void RequestTx(CNodeState* state, const uint256& txid, int64_t nNow) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main) +{ + CNodeState::TxDownloadState& peer_download_state = state->m_tx_download; + if (peer_download_state.m_tx_announced.size() >= MAX_PEER_TX_ANNOUNCEMENTS || peer_download_state.m_tx_announced.count(txid)) { + // Too many queued announcements from this peer, or we already have + // this announcement + return; + } + peer_download_state.m_tx_announced.insert(txid); + + int64_t process_time; + int64_t last_request_time = GetTxRequestTime(txid); + // First time requesting this tx + if (last_request_time == 0) { + process_time = nNow; + } else { + // Randomize the delay to avoid biasing some peers over others (such as due to + // fixed ordering of peer processing in ThreadMessageHandler) + process_time = last_request_time + GETDATA_TX_INTERVAL + GetRand(MAX_GETDATA_RANDOM_DELAY); + } + + // We delay processing announcements from non-preferred (eg inbound) peers + if (!state->fPreferredDownload) process_time += INBOUND_PEER_TX_DELAY; + + peer_download_state.m_tx_process_time.emplace(process_time, txid); +} + +} // namespace + +// This function is used for testing the stale tip eviction logic, see +// denialofservice_tests.cpp +void UpdateLastBlockAnnounceTime(NodeId node, int64_t time_in_seconds) +{ + LOCK(cs_main); + CNodeState *state = State(node); + if (state) state->m_last_block_announcement = time_in_seconds; +} + +// Returns true for outbound peers, excluding manual connections, feelers, and +// one-shots +static bool IsOutboundDisconnectionCandidate(const CNode *node) +{ + return !(node->fInbound || node->m_manual_connection || node->fFeeler || node->fOneShot); +} + +void PeerLogicValidation::InitializeNode(CNode *pnode) { + CAddress addr = pnode->addr; + std::string addrName = pnode->GetAddrName(); + NodeId nodeid = pnode->GetId(); + { + LOCK(cs_main); + mapNodeState.emplace_hint(mapNodeState.end(), std::piecewise_construct, std::forward_as_tuple(nodeid), std::forward_as_tuple(addr, std::move(addrName))); + } + if(!pnode->fInbound) + PushNodeVersion(pnode, connman, GetTime()); +} + +void PeerLogicValidation::FinalizeNode(NodeId nodeid, bool& fUpdateConnectionTime) { + fUpdateConnectionTime = false; + LOCK(cs_main); + CNodeState *state = State(nodeid); + assert(state != nullptr); + + if (state->fSyncStarted) + nSyncStarted--; + + if (state->nMisbehavior == 0 && state->fCurrentlyConnected) { + fUpdateConnectionTime = true; + } + + for (const QueuedBlock& entry : state->vBlocksInFlight) { + mapBlocksInFlight.erase(entry.hash); + } + EraseOrphansFor(nodeid); + nPreferredDownload -= state->fPreferredDownload; + nPeersWithValidatedDownloads -= (state->nBlocksInFlightValidHeaders != 0); + assert(nPeersWithValidatedDownloads >= 0); + g_outbound_peers_with_protect_from_disconnect -= state->m_chain_sync.m_protect; + assert(g_outbound_peers_with_protect_from_disconnect >= 0); + + mapNodeState.erase(nodeid); + + if (mapNodeState.empty()) { + // Do a consistency check after the last peer is removed. + assert(mapBlocksInFlight.empty()); + assert(nPreferredDownload == 0); + assert(nPeersWithValidatedDownloads == 0); + assert(g_outbound_peers_with_protect_from_disconnect == 0); + } + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Cleared nodestate for peer=%d\n", nodeid); +} + +bool GetNodeStateStats(NodeId nodeid, CNodeStateStats &stats) { + LOCK(cs_main); + CNodeState *state = State(nodeid); + if (state == nullptr) + return false; + stats.nMisbehavior = state->nMisbehavior; + stats.nSyncHeight = state->pindexBestKnownBlock ? state->pindexBestKnownBlock->nHeight : -1; + stats.nCommonHeight = state->pindexLastCommonBlock ? state->pindexLastCommonBlock->nHeight : -1; + for (const QueuedBlock& queue : state->vBlocksInFlight) { + if (queue.pindex) + stats.vHeightInFlight.push_back(queue.pindex->nHeight); + } + return true; +} + +////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// +// +// mapOrphanTransactions +// + +static void AddToCompactExtraTransactions(const CTransactionRef& tx) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(g_cs_orphans) +{ + size_t max_extra_txn = gArgs.GetArg("-blockreconstructionextratxn", DEFAULT_BLOCK_RECONSTRUCTION_EXTRA_TXN); + if (max_extra_txn <= 0) + return; + if (!vExtraTxnForCompact.size()) + vExtraTxnForCompact.resize(max_extra_txn); + vExtraTxnForCompact[vExtraTxnForCompactIt] = std::make_pair(tx->GetWitnessHash(), tx); + vExtraTxnForCompactIt = (vExtraTxnForCompactIt + 1) % max_extra_txn; +} + +bool AddOrphanTx(const CTransactionRef& tx, NodeId peer) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(g_cs_orphans) +{ + const uint256& hash = tx->GetHash(); + if (mapOrphanTransactions.count(hash)) + return false; + + // Ignore big transactions, to avoid a + // send-big-orphans memory exhaustion attack. If a peer has a legitimate + // large transaction with a missing parent then we assume + // it will rebroadcast it later, after the parent transaction(s) + // have been mined or received. + // 100 orphans, each of which is at most 100,000 bytes big is + // at most 10 megabytes of orphans and somewhat more byprev index (in the worst case): + unsigned int sz = GetTransactionWeight(*tx); + if (sz > MAX_STANDARD_TX_WEIGHT) + { + LogPrint(BCLog::MEMPOOL, "ignoring large orphan tx (size: %u, hash: %s)\n", sz, hash.ToString()); + return false; + } + + auto ret = mapOrphanTransactions.emplace(hash, COrphanTx{tx, peer, GetTime() + ORPHAN_TX_EXPIRE_TIME, g_orphan_list.size()}); + assert(ret.second); + g_orphan_list.push_back(ret.first); + for (const CTxIn& txin : tx->vin) { + mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev[txin.prevout].insert(ret.first); + } + + AddToCompactExtraTransactions(tx); + + LogPrint(BCLog::MEMPOOL, "stored orphan tx %s (mapsz %u outsz %u)\n", hash.ToString(), + mapOrphanTransactions.size(), mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev.size()); + return true; +} + +int static EraseOrphanTx(uint256 hash) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(g_cs_orphans) +{ + std::map<uint256, COrphanTx>::iterator it = mapOrphanTransactions.find(hash); + if (it == mapOrphanTransactions.end()) + return 0; + for (const CTxIn& txin : it->second.tx->vin) + { + auto itPrev = mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev.find(txin.prevout); + if (itPrev == mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev.end()) + continue; + itPrev->second.erase(it); + if (itPrev->second.empty()) + mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev.erase(itPrev); + } + + size_t old_pos = it->second.list_pos; + assert(g_orphan_list[old_pos] == it); + if (old_pos + 1 != g_orphan_list.size()) { + // Unless we're deleting the last entry in g_orphan_list, move the last + // entry to the position we're deleting. + auto it_last = g_orphan_list.back(); + g_orphan_list[old_pos] = it_last; + it_last->second.list_pos = old_pos; + } + g_orphan_list.pop_back(); + + mapOrphanTransactions.erase(it); + return 1; +} + +void EraseOrphansFor(NodeId peer) +{ + LOCK(g_cs_orphans); + int nErased = 0; + std::map<uint256, COrphanTx>::iterator iter = mapOrphanTransactions.begin(); + while (iter != mapOrphanTransactions.end()) + { + std::map<uint256, COrphanTx>::iterator maybeErase = iter++; // increment to avoid iterator becoming invalid + if (maybeErase->second.fromPeer == peer) + { + nErased += EraseOrphanTx(maybeErase->second.tx->GetHash()); + } + } + if (nErased > 0) LogPrint(BCLog::MEMPOOL, "Erased %d orphan tx from peer=%d\n", nErased, peer); +} + + +unsigned int LimitOrphanTxSize(unsigned int nMaxOrphans) +{ + LOCK(g_cs_orphans); + + unsigned int nEvicted = 0; + static int64_t nNextSweep; + int64_t nNow = GetTime(); + if (nNextSweep <= nNow) { + // Sweep out expired orphan pool entries: + int nErased = 0; + int64_t nMinExpTime = nNow + ORPHAN_TX_EXPIRE_TIME - ORPHAN_TX_EXPIRE_INTERVAL; + std::map<uint256, COrphanTx>::iterator iter = mapOrphanTransactions.begin(); + while (iter != mapOrphanTransactions.end()) + { + std::map<uint256, COrphanTx>::iterator maybeErase = iter++; + if (maybeErase->second.nTimeExpire <= nNow) { + nErased += EraseOrphanTx(maybeErase->second.tx->GetHash()); + } else { + nMinExpTime = std::min(maybeErase->second.nTimeExpire, nMinExpTime); + } + } + // Sweep again 5 minutes after the next entry that expires in order to batch the linear scan. + nNextSweep = nMinExpTime + ORPHAN_TX_EXPIRE_INTERVAL; + if (nErased > 0) LogPrint(BCLog::MEMPOOL, "Erased %d orphan tx due to expiration\n", nErased); + } + FastRandomContext rng; + while (mapOrphanTransactions.size() > nMaxOrphans) + { + // Evict a random orphan: + size_t randompos = rng.randrange(g_orphan_list.size()); + EraseOrphanTx(g_orphan_list[randompos]->first); + ++nEvicted; + } + return nEvicted; +} + +/** + * Mark a misbehaving peer to be banned depending upon the value of `-banscore`. + */ +void Misbehaving(NodeId pnode, int howmuch, const std::string& message) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main) +{ + if (howmuch == 0) + return; + + CNodeState *state = State(pnode); + if (state == nullptr) + return; + + state->nMisbehavior += howmuch; + int banscore = gArgs.GetArg("-banscore", DEFAULT_BANSCORE_THRESHOLD); + std::string message_prefixed = message.empty() ? "" : (": " + message); + if (state->nMisbehavior >= banscore && state->nMisbehavior - howmuch < banscore) + { + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "%s: %s peer=%d (%d -> %d) BAN THRESHOLD EXCEEDED%s\n", __func__, state->name, pnode, state->nMisbehavior-howmuch, state->nMisbehavior, message_prefixed); + state->fShouldBan = true; + } else + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "%s: %s peer=%d (%d -> %d)%s\n", __func__, state->name, pnode, state->nMisbehavior-howmuch, state->nMisbehavior, message_prefixed); +} + + + + + + + + +////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// +// +// blockchain -> download logic notification +// + +// To prevent fingerprinting attacks, only send blocks/headers outside of the +// active chain if they are no more than a month older (both in time, and in +// best equivalent proof of work) than the best header chain we know about and +// we fully-validated them at some point. +static bool BlockRequestAllowed(const CBlockIndex* pindex, const Consensus::Params& consensusParams) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main) +{ + AssertLockHeld(cs_main); + if (chainActive.Contains(pindex)) return true; + return pindex->IsValid(BLOCK_VALID_SCRIPTS) && (pindexBestHeader != nullptr) && + (pindexBestHeader->GetBlockTime() - pindex->GetBlockTime() < STALE_RELAY_AGE_LIMIT) && + (GetBlockProofEquivalentTime(*pindexBestHeader, *pindex, *pindexBestHeader, consensusParams) < STALE_RELAY_AGE_LIMIT); +} + +PeerLogicValidation::PeerLogicValidation(CConnman* connmanIn, BanMan* banman, CScheduler &scheduler, bool enable_bip61) + : connman(connmanIn), m_banman(banman), m_stale_tip_check_time(0), m_enable_bip61(enable_bip61) { + // Initialize global variables that cannot be constructed at startup. + recentRejects.reset(new CRollingBloomFilter(120000, 0.000001)); + + const Consensus::Params& consensusParams = Params().GetConsensus(); + // Stale tip checking and peer eviction are on two different timers, but we + // don't want them to get out of sync due to drift in the scheduler, so we + // combine them in one function and schedule at the quicker (peer-eviction) + // timer. + static_assert(EXTRA_PEER_CHECK_INTERVAL < STALE_CHECK_INTERVAL, "peer eviction timer should be less than stale tip check timer"); + scheduler.scheduleEvery(std::bind(&PeerLogicValidation::CheckForStaleTipAndEvictPeers, this, consensusParams), EXTRA_PEER_CHECK_INTERVAL * 1000); +} + +/** + * Evict orphan txn pool entries (EraseOrphanTx) based on a newly connected + * block. Also save the time of the last tip update. + */ +void PeerLogicValidation::BlockConnected(const std::shared_ptr<const CBlock>& pblock, const CBlockIndex* pindex, const std::vector<CTransactionRef>& vtxConflicted) { + LOCK(g_cs_orphans); + + std::vector<uint256> vOrphanErase; + + for (const CTransactionRef& ptx : pblock->vtx) { + const CTransaction& tx = *ptx; + + // Which orphan pool entries must we evict? + for (const auto& txin : tx.vin) { + auto itByPrev = mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev.find(txin.prevout); + if (itByPrev == mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev.end()) continue; + for (auto mi = itByPrev->second.begin(); mi != itByPrev->second.end(); ++mi) { + const CTransaction& orphanTx = *(*mi)->second.tx; + const uint256& orphanHash = orphanTx.GetHash(); + vOrphanErase.push_back(orphanHash); + } + } + } + + // Erase orphan transactions included or precluded by this block + if (vOrphanErase.size()) { + int nErased = 0; + for (const uint256& orphanHash : vOrphanErase) { + nErased += EraseOrphanTx(orphanHash); + } + LogPrint(BCLog::MEMPOOL, "Erased %d orphan tx included or conflicted by block\n", nErased); + } + + g_last_tip_update = GetTime(); +} + +// All of the following cache a recent block, and are protected by cs_most_recent_block +static CCriticalSection cs_most_recent_block; +static std::shared_ptr<const CBlock> most_recent_block GUARDED_BY(cs_most_recent_block); +static std::shared_ptr<const CBlockHeaderAndShortTxIDs> most_recent_compact_block GUARDED_BY(cs_most_recent_block); +static uint256 most_recent_block_hash GUARDED_BY(cs_most_recent_block); +static bool fWitnessesPresentInMostRecentCompactBlock GUARDED_BY(cs_most_recent_block); + +/** + * Maintain state about the best-seen block and fast-announce a compact block + * to compatible peers. + */ +void PeerLogicValidation::NewPoWValidBlock(const CBlockIndex *pindex, const std::shared_ptr<const CBlock>& pblock) { + std::shared_ptr<const CBlockHeaderAndShortTxIDs> pcmpctblock = std::make_shared<const CBlockHeaderAndShortTxIDs> (*pblock, true); + const CNetMsgMaker msgMaker(PROTOCOL_VERSION); + + LOCK(cs_main); + + static int nHighestFastAnnounce = 0; + if (pindex->nHeight <= nHighestFastAnnounce) + return; + nHighestFastAnnounce = pindex->nHeight; + + bool fWitnessEnabled = IsWitnessEnabled(pindex->pprev, Params().GetConsensus()); + uint256 hashBlock(pblock->GetHash()); + + { + LOCK(cs_most_recent_block); + most_recent_block_hash = hashBlock; + most_recent_block = pblock; + most_recent_compact_block = pcmpctblock; + fWitnessesPresentInMostRecentCompactBlock = fWitnessEnabled; + } + + connman->ForEachNode([this, &pcmpctblock, pindex, &msgMaker, fWitnessEnabled, &hashBlock](CNode* pnode) { + AssertLockHeld(cs_main); + + // TODO: Avoid the repeated-serialization here + if (pnode->nVersion < INVALID_CB_NO_BAN_VERSION || pnode->fDisconnect) + return; + ProcessBlockAvailability(pnode->GetId()); + CNodeState &state = *State(pnode->GetId()); + // If the peer has, or we announced to them the previous block already, + // but we don't think they have this one, go ahead and announce it + if (state.fPreferHeaderAndIDs && (!fWitnessEnabled || state.fWantsCmpctWitness) && + !PeerHasHeader(&state, pindex) && PeerHasHeader(&state, pindex->pprev)) { + + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "%s sending header-and-ids %s to peer=%d\n", "PeerLogicValidation::NewPoWValidBlock", + hashBlock.ToString(), pnode->GetId()); + connman->PushMessage(pnode, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::CMPCTBLOCK, *pcmpctblock)); + state.pindexBestHeaderSent = pindex; + } + }); +} + +/** + * Update our best height and announce any block hashes which weren't previously + * in chainActive to our peers. + */ +void PeerLogicValidation::UpdatedBlockTip(const CBlockIndex *pindexNew, const CBlockIndex *pindexFork, bool fInitialDownload) { + const int nNewHeight = pindexNew->nHeight; + connman->SetBestHeight(nNewHeight); + + SetServiceFlagsIBDCache(!fInitialDownload); + if (!fInitialDownload) { + // Find the hashes of all blocks that weren't previously in the best chain. + std::vector<uint256> vHashes; + const CBlockIndex *pindexToAnnounce = pindexNew; + while (pindexToAnnounce != pindexFork) { + vHashes.push_back(pindexToAnnounce->GetBlockHash()); + pindexToAnnounce = pindexToAnnounce->pprev; + if (vHashes.size() == MAX_BLOCKS_TO_ANNOUNCE) { + // Limit announcements in case of a huge reorganization. + // Rely on the peer's synchronization mechanism in that case. + break; + } + } + // Relay inventory, but don't relay old inventory during initial block download. + connman->ForEachNode([nNewHeight, &vHashes](CNode* pnode) { + if (nNewHeight > (pnode->nStartingHeight != -1 ? pnode->nStartingHeight - 2000 : 0)) { + for (const uint256& hash : reverse_iterate(vHashes)) { + pnode->PushBlockHash(hash); + } + } + }); + connman->WakeMessageHandler(); + } + + nTimeBestReceived = GetTime(); +} + +/** + * Handle invalid block rejection and consequent peer banning, maintain which + * peers announce compact blocks. + */ +void PeerLogicValidation::BlockChecked(const CBlock& block, const CValidationState& state) { + LOCK(cs_main); + + const uint256 hash(block.GetHash()); + std::map<uint256, std::pair<NodeId, bool>>::iterator it = mapBlockSource.find(hash); + + int nDoS = 0; + if (state.IsInvalid(nDoS)) { + // Don't send reject message with code 0 or an internal reject code. + if (it != mapBlockSource.end() && State(it->second.first) && state.GetRejectCode() > 0 && state.GetRejectCode() < REJECT_INTERNAL) { + CBlockReject reject = {(unsigned char)state.GetRejectCode(), state.GetRejectReason().substr(0, MAX_REJECT_MESSAGE_LENGTH), hash}; + State(it->second.first)->rejects.push_back(reject); + if (nDoS > 0 && it->second.second) + Misbehaving(it->second.first, nDoS); + } + } + // Check that: + // 1. The block is valid + // 2. We're not in initial block download + // 3. This is currently the best block we're aware of. We haven't updated + // the tip yet so we have no way to check this directly here. Instead we + // just check that there are currently no other blocks in flight. + else if (state.IsValid() && + !IsInitialBlockDownload() && + mapBlocksInFlight.count(hash) == mapBlocksInFlight.size()) { + if (it != mapBlockSource.end()) { + MaybeSetPeerAsAnnouncingHeaderAndIDs(it->second.first, connman); + } + } + if (it != mapBlockSource.end()) + mapBlockSource.erase(it); +} + +////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// +// +// Messages +// + + +bool static AlreadyHave(const CInv& inv) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main) +{ + switch (inv.type) + { + case MSG_TX: + case MSG_WITNESS_TX: + { + assert(recentRejects); + if (chainActive.Tip()->GetBlockHash() != hashRecentRejectsChainTip) + { + // If the chain tip has changed previously rejected transactions + // might be now valid, e.g. due to a nLockTime'd tx becoming valid, + // or a double-spend. Reset the rejects filter and give those + // txs a second chance. + hashRecentRejectsChainTip = chainActive.Tip()->GetBlockHash(); + recentRejects->reset(); + } + + { + LOCK(g_cs_orphans); + if (mapOrphanTransactions.count(inv.hash)) return true; + } + + return recentRejects->contains(inv.hash) || + mempool.exists(inv.hash) || + pcoinsTip->HaveCoinInCache(COutPoint(inv.hash, 0)) || // Best effort: only try output 0 and 1 + pcoinsTip->HaveCoinInCache(COutPoint(inv.hash, 1)); + } + case MSG_BLOCK: + case MSG_WITNESS_BLOCK: + return LookupBlockIndex(inv.hash) != nullptr; + } + // Don't know what it is, just say we already got one + return true; +} + +static void RelayTransaction(const CTransaction& tx, CConnman* connman) +{ + CInv inv(MSG_TX, tx.GetHash()); + connman->ForEachNode([&inv](CNode* pnode) + { + pnode->PushInventory(inv); + }); +} + +static void RelayAddress(const CAddress& addr, bool fReachable, CConnman* connman) +{ + unsigned int nRelayNodes = fReachable ? 2 : 1; // limited relaying of addresses outside our network(s) + + // Relay to a limited number of other nodes + // Use deterministic randomness to send to the same nodes for 24 hours + // at a time so the addrKnowns of the chosen nodes prevent repeats + uint64_t hashAddr = addr.GetHash(); + const CSipHasher hasher = connman->GetDeterministicRandomizer(RANDOMIZER_ID_ADDRESS_RELAY).Write(hashAddr << 32).Write((GetTime() + hashAddr) / (24*60*60)); + FastRandomContext insecure_rand; + + std::array<std::pair<uint64_t, CNode*>,2> best{{{0, nullptr}, {0, nullptr}}}; + assert(nRelayNodes <= best.size()); + + auto sortfunc = [&best, &hasher, nRelayNodes](CNode* pnode) { + if (pnode->nVersion >= CADDR_TIME_VERSION) { + uint64_t hashKey = CSipHasher(hasher).Write(pnode->GetId()).Finalize(); + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < nRelayNodes; i++) { + if (hashKey > best[i].first) { + std::copy(best.begin() + i, best.begin() + nRelayNodes - 1, best.begin() + i + 1); + best[i] = std::make_pair(hashKey, pnode); + break; + } + } + } + }; + + auto pushfunc = [&addr, &best, nRelayNodes, &insecure_rand] { + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < nRelayNodes && best[i].first != 0; i++) { + best[i].second->PushAddress(addr, insecure_rand); + } + }; + + connman->ForEachNodeThen(std::move(sortfunc), std::move(pushfunc)); +} + +void static ProcessGetBlockData(CNode* pfrom, const CChainParams& chainparams, const CInv& inv, CConnman* connman) +{ + bool send = false; + std::shared_ptr<const CBlock> a_recent_block; + std::shared_ptr<const CBlockHeaderAndShortTxIDs> a_recent_compact_block; + bool fWitnessesPresentInARecentCompactBlock; + const Consensus::Params& consensusParams = chainparams.GetConsensus(); + { + LOCK(cs_most_recent_block); + a_recent_block = most_recent_block; + a_recent_compact_block = most_recent_compact_block; + fWitnessesPresentInARecentCompactBlock = fWitnessesPresentInMostRecentCompactBlock; + } + + bool need_activate_chain = false; + { + LOCK(cs_main); + const CBlockIndex* pindex = LookupBlockIndex(inv.hash); + if (pindex) { + if (pindex->HaveTxsDownloaded() && !pindex->IsValid(BLOCK_VALID_SCRIPTS) && + pindex->IsValid(BLOCK_VALID_TREE)) { + // If we have the block and all of its parents, but have not yet validated it, + // we might be in the middle of connecting it (ie in the unlock of cs_main + // before ActivateBestChain but after AcceptBlock). + // In this case, we need to run ActivateBestChain prior to checking the relay + // conditions below. + need_activate_chain = true; + } + } + } // release cs_main before calling ActivateBestChain + if (need_activate_chain) { + CValidationState state; + if (!ActivateBestChain(state, Params(), a_recent_block)) { + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "failed to activate chain (%s)\n", FormatStateMessage(state)); + } + } + + LOCK(cs_main); + const CBlockIndex* pindex = LookupBlockIndex(inv.hash); + if (pindex) { + send = BlockRequestAllowed(pindex, consensusParams); + if (!send) { + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "%s: ignoring request from peer=%i for old block that isn't in the main chain\n", __func__, pfrom->GetId()); + } + } + const CNetMsgMaker msgMaker(pfrom->GetSendVersion()); + // disconnect node in case we have reached the outbound limit for serving historical blocks + // never disconnect whitelisted nodes + if (send && connman->OutboundTargetReached(true) && ( ((pindexBestHeader != nullptr) && (pindexBestHeader->GetBlockTime() - pindex->GetBlockTime() > HISTORICAL_BLOCK_AGE)) || inv.type == MSG_FILTERED_BLOCK) && !pfrom->fWhitelisted) + { + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "historical block serving limit reached, disconnect peer=%d\n", pfrom->GetId()); + + //disconnect node + pfrom->fDisconnect = true; + send = false; + } + // Avoid leaking prune-height by never sending blocks below the NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED threshold + if (send && !pfrom->fWhitelisted && ( + (((pfrom->GetLocalServices() & NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED) == NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED) && ((pfrom->GetLocalServices() & NODE_NETWORK) != NODE_NETWORK) && (chainActive.Tip()->nHeight - pindex->nHeight > (int)NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED_MIN_BLOCKS + 2 /* add two blocks buffer extension for possible races */) ) + )) { + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Ignore block request below NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED threshold from peer=%d\n", pfrom->GetId()); + + //disconnect node and prevent it from stalling (would otherwise wait for the missing block) + pfrom->fDisconnect = true; + send = false; + } + // Pruned nodes may have deleted the block, so check whether + // it's available before trying to send. + if (send && (pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_HAVE_DATA)) + { + std::shared_ptr<const CBlock> pblock; + if (a_recent_block && a_recent_block->GetHash() == pindex->GetBlockHash()) { + pblock = a_recent_block; + } else if (inv.type == MSG_WITNESS_BLOCK) { + // Fast-path: in this case it is possible to serve the block directly from disk, + // as the network format matches the format on disk + std::vector<uint8_t> block_data; + if (!ReadRawBlockFromDisk(block_data, pindex, chainparams.MessageStart())) { + assert(!"cannot load block from disk"); + } + connman->PushMessage(pfrom, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::BLOCK, MakeSpan(block_data))); + // Don't set pblock as we've sent the block + } else { + // Send block from disk + std::shared_ptr<CBlock> pblockRead = std::make_shared<CBlock>(); + if (!ReadBlockFromDisk(*pblockRead, pindex, consensusParams)) + assert(!"cannot load block from disk"); + pblock = pblockRead; + } + if (pblock) { + if (inv.type == MSG_BLOCK) + connman->PushMessage(pfrom, msgMaker.Make(SERIALIZE_TRANSACTION_NO_WITNESS, NetMsgType::BLOCK, *pblock)); + else if (inv.type == MSG_WITNESS_BLOCK) + connman->PushMessage(pfrom, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::BLOCK, *pblock)); + else if (inv.type == MSG_FILTERED_BLOCK) + { + bool sendMerkleBlock = false; + CMerkleBlock merkleBlock; + { + LOCK(pfrom->cs_filter); + if (pfrom->pfilter) { + sendMerkleBlock = true; + merkleBlock = CMerkleBlock(*pblock, *pfrom->pfilter); + } + } + if (sendMerkleBlock) { + connman->PushMessage(pfrom, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::MERKLEBLOCK, merkleBlock)); + // CMerkleBlock just contains hashes, so also push any transactions in the block the client did not see + // This avoids hurting performance by pointlessly requiring a round-trip + // Note that there is currently no way for a node to request any single transactions we didn't send here - + // they must either disconnect and retry or request the full block. + // Thus, the protocol spec specified allows for us to provide duplicate txn here, + // however we MUST always provide at least what the remote peer needs + typedef std::pair<unsigned int, uint256> PairType; + for (PairType& pair : merkleBlock.vMatchedTxn) + connman->PushMessage(pfrom, msgMaker.Make(SERIALIZE_TRANSACTION_NO_WITNESS, NetMsgType::TX, *pblock->vtx[pair.first])); + } + // else + // no response + } + else if (inv.type == MSG_CMPCT_BLOCK) + { + // If a peer is asking for old blocks, we're almost guaranteed + // they won't have a useful mempool to match against a compact block, + // and we don't feel like constructing the object for them, so + // instead we respond with the full, non-compact block. + bool fPeerWantsWitness = State(pfrom->GetId())->fWantsCmpctWitness; + int nSendFlags = fPeerWantsWitness ? 0 : SERIALIZE_TRANSACTION_NO_WITNESS; + if (CanDirectFetch(consensusParams) && pindex->nHeight >= chainActive.Height() - MAX_CMPCTBLOCK_DEPTH) { + if ((fPeerWantsWitness || !fWitnessesPresentInARecentCompactBlock) && a_recent_compact_block && a_recent_compact_block->header.GetHash() == pindex->GetBlockHash()) { + connman->PushMessage(pfrom, msgMaker.Make(nSendFlags, NetMsgType::CMPCTBLOCK, *a_recent_compact_block)); + } else { + CBlockHeaderAndShortTxIDs cmpctblock(*pblock, fPeerWantsWitness); + connman->PushMessage(pfrom, msgMaker.Make(nSendFlags, NetMsgType::CMPCTBLOCK, cmpctblock)); + } + } else { + connman->PushMessage(pfrom, msgMaker.Make(nSendFlags, NetMsgType::BLOCK, *pblock)); + } + } + } + + // Trigger the peer node to send a getblocks request for the next batch of inventory + if (inv.hash == pfrom->hashContinue) + { + // Bypass PushInventory, this must send even if redundant, + // and we want it right after the last block so they don't + // wait for other stuff first. + std::vector<CInv> vInv; + vInv.push_back(CInv(MSG_BLOCK, chainActive.Tip()->GetBlockHash())); + connman->PushMessage(pfrom, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::INV, vInv)); + pfrom->hashContinue.SetNull(); + } + } +} + +void static ProcessGetData(CNode* pfrom, const CChainParams& chainparams, CConnman* connman, const std::atomic<bool>& interruptMsgProc) LOCKS_EXCLUDED(cs_main) +{ + AssertLockNotHeld(cs_main); + + std::deque<CInv>::iterator it = pfrom->vRecvGetData.begin(); + std::vector<CInv> vNotFound; + const CNetMsgMaker msgMaker(pfrom->GetSendVersion()); + { + LOCK(cs_main); + + while (it != pfrom->vRecvGetData.end() && (it->type == MSG_TX || it->type == MSG_WITNESS_TX)) { + if (interruptMsgProc) + return; + // Don't bother if send buffer is too full to respond anyway + if (pfrom->fPauseSend) + break; + + const CInv &inv = *it; + it++; + + // Send stream from relay memory + bool push = false; + auto mi = mapRelay.find(inv.hash); + int nSendFlags = (inv.type == MSG_TX ? SERIALIZE_TRANSACTION_NO_WITNESS : 0); + if (mi != mapRelay.end()) { + connman->PushMessage(pfrom, msgMaker.Make(nSendFlags, NetMsgType::TX, *mi->second)); + push = true; + } else if (pfrom->timeLastMempoolReq) { + auto txinfo = mempool.info(inv.hash); + // To protect privacy, do not answer getdata using the mempool when + // that TX couldn't have been INVed in reply to a MEMPOOL request. + if (txinfo.tx && txinfo.nTime <= pfrom->timeLastMempoolReq) { + connman->PushMessage(pfrom, msgMaker.Make(nSendFlags, NetMsgType::TX, *txinfo.tx)); + push = true; + } + } + if (!push) { + vNotFound.push_back(inv); + } + } + } // release cs_main + + if (it != pfrom->vRecvGetData.end() && !pfrom->fPauseSend) { + const CInv &inv = *it; + if (inv.type == MSG_BLOCK || inv.type == MSG_FILTERED_BLOCK || inv.type == MSG_CMPCT_BLOCK || inv.type == MSG_WITNESS_BLOCK) { + it++; + ProcessGetBlockData(pfrom, chainparams, inv, connman); + } + } + + pfrom->vRecvGetData.erase(pfrom->vRecvGetData.begin(), it); + + if (!vNotFound.empty()) { + // Let the peer know that we didn't find what it asked for, so it doesn't + // have to wait around forever. Currently only SPV clients actually care + // about this message: it's needed when they are recursively walking the + // dependencies of relevant unconfirmed transactions. SPV clients want to + // do that because they want to know about (and store and rebroadcast and + // risk analyze) the dependencies of transactions relevant to them, without + // having to download the entire memory pool. + connman->PushMessage(pfrom, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::NOTFOUND, vNotFound)); + } +} + +static uint32_t GetFetchFlags(CNode* pfrom) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main) { + uint32_t nFetchFlags = 0; + if ((pfrom->GetLocalServices() & NODE_WITNESS) && State(pfrom->GetId())->fHaveWitness) { + nFetchFlags |= MSG_WITNESS_FLAG; + } + return nFetchFlags; +} + +inline void static SendBlockTransactions(const CBlock& block, const BlockTransactionsRequest& req, CNode* pfrom, CConnman* connman) { + BlockTransactions resp(req); + for (size_t i = 0; i < req.indexes.size(); i++) { + if (req.indexes[i] >= block.vtx.size()) { + LOCK(cs_main); + Misbehaving(pfrom->GetId(), 100, strprintf("Peer %d sent us a getblocktxn with out-of-bounds tx indices", pfrom->GetId())); + return; + } + resp.txn[i] = block.vtx[req.indexes[i]]; + } + LOCK(cs_main); + const CNetMsgMaker msgMaker(pfrom->GetSendVersion()); + int nSendFlags = State(pfrom->GetId())->fWantsCmpctWitness ? 0 : SERIALIZE_TRANSACTION_NO_WITNESS; + connman->PushMessage(pfrom, msgMaker.Make(nSendFlags, NetMsgType::BLOCKTXN, resp)); +} + +bool static ProcessHeadersMessage(CNode *pfrom, CConnman *connman, const std::vector<CBlockHeader>& headers, const CChainParams& chainparams, bool punish_duplicate_invalid) +{ + const CNetMsgMaker msgMaker(pfrom->GetSendVersion()); + size_t nCount = headers.size(); + + if (nCount == 0) { + // Nothing interesting. Stop asking this peers for more headers. + return true; + } + + bool received_new_header = false; + const CBlockIndex *pindexLast = nullptr; + { + LOCK(cs_main); + CNodeState *nodestate = State(pfrom->GetId()); + + // If this looks like it could be a block announcement (nCount < + // MAX_BLOCKS_TO_ANNOUNCE), use special logic for handling headers that + // don't connect: + // - Send a getheaders message in response to try to connect the chain. + // - The peer can send up to MAX_UNCONNECTING_HEADERS in a row that + // don't connect before giving DoS points + // - Once a headers message is received that is valid and does connect, + // nUnconnectingHeaders gets reset back to 0. + if (!LookupBlockIndex(headers[0].hashPrevBlock) && nCount < MAX_BLOCKS_TO_ANNOUNCE) { + nodestate->nUnconnectingHeaders++; + connman->PushMessage(pfrom, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::GETHEADERS, chainActive.GetLocator(pindexBestHeader), uint256())); + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "received header %s: missing prev block %s, sending getheaders (%d) to end (peer=%d, nUnconnectingHeaders=%d)\n", + headers[0].GetHash().ToString(), + headers[0].hashPrevBlock.ToString(), + pindexBestHeader->nHeight, + pfrom->GetId(), nodestate->nUnconnectingHeaders); + // Set hashLastUnknownBlock for this peer, so that if we + // eventually get the headers - even from a different peer - + // we can use this peer to download. + UpdateBlockAvailability(pfrom->GetId(), headers.back().GetHash()); + + if (nodestate->nUnconnectingHeaders % MAX_UNCONNECTING_HEADERS == 0) { + Misbehaving(pfrom->GetId(), 20); + } + return true; + } + + uint256 hashLastBlock; + for (const CBlockHeader& header : headers) { + if (!hashLastBlock.IsNull() && header.hashPrevBlock != hashLastBlock) { + Misbehaving(pfrom->GetId(), 20, "non-continuous headers sequence"); + return false; + } + hashLastBlock = header.GetHash(); + } + + // If we don't have the last header, then they'll have given us + // something new (if these headers are valid). + if (!LookupBlockIndex(hashLastBlock)) { + received_new_header = true; + } + } + + CValidationState state; + CBlockHeader first_invalid_header; + if (!ProcessNewBlockHeaders(headers, state, chainparams, &pindexLast, &first_invalid_header)) { + int nDoS; + if (state.IsInvalid(nDoS)) { + LOCK(cs_main); + if (nDoS > 0) { + Misbehaving(pfrom->GetId(), nDoS, "invalid header received"); + } else { + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "peer=%d: invalid header received\n", pfrom->GetId()); + } + if (punish_duplicate_invalid && LookupBlockIndex(first_invalid_header.GetHash())) { + // Goal: don't allow outbound peers to use up our outbound + // connection slots if they are on incompatible chains. + // + // We ask the caller to set punish_invalid appropriately based + // on the peer and the method of header delivery (compact + // blocks are allowed to be invalid in some circumstances, + // under BIP 152). + // Here, we try to detect the narrow situation that we have a + // valid block header (ie it was valid at the time the header + // was received, and hence stored in mapBlockIndex) but know the + // block is invalid, and that a peer has announced that same + // block as being on its active chain. + // Disconnect the peer in such a situation. + // + // Note: if the header that is invalid was not accepted to our + // mapBlockIndex at all, that may also be grounds for + // disconnecting the peer, as the chain they are on is likely + // to be incompatible. However, there is a circumstance where + // that does not hold: if the header's timestamp is more than + // 2 hours ahead of our current time. In that case, the header + // may become valid in the future, and we don't want to + // disconnect a peer merely for serving us one too-far-ahead + // block header, to prevent an attacker from splitting the + // network by mining a block right at the 2 hour boundary. + // + // TODO: update the DoS logic (or, rather, rewrite the + // DoS-interface between validation and net_processing) so that + // the interface is cleaner, and so that we disconnect on all the + // reasons that a peer's headers chain is incompatible + // with ours (eg block->nVersion softforks, MTP violations, + // etc), and not just the duplicate-invalid case. + pfrom->fDisconnect = true; + } + return false; + } + } + + { + LOCK(cs_main); + CNodeState *nodestate = State(pfrom->GetId()); + if (nodestate->nUnconnectingHeaders > 0) { + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "peer=%d: resetting nUnconnectingHeaders (%d -> 0)\n", pfrom->GetId(), nodestate->nUnconnectingHeaders); + } + nodestate->nUnconnectingHeaders = 0; + + assert(pindexLast); + UpdateBlockAvailability(pfrom->GetId(), pindexLast->GetBlockHash()); + + // From here, pindexBestKnownBlock should be guaranteed to be non-null, + // because it is set in UpdateBlockAvailability. Some nullptr checks + // are still present, however, as belt-and-suspenders. + + if (received_new_header && pindexLast->nChainWork > chainActive.Tip()->nChainWork) { + nodestate->m_last_block_announcement = GetTime(); + } + + if (nCount == MAX_HEADERS_RESULTS) { + // Headers message had its maximum size; the peer may have more headers. + // TODO: optimize: if pindexLast is an ancestor of chainActive.Tip or pindexBestHeader, continue + // from there instead. + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "more getheaders (%d) to end to peer=%d (startheight:%d)\n", pindexLast->nHeight, pfrom->GetId(), pfrom->nStartingHeight); + connman->PushMessage(pfrom, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::GETHEADERS, chainActive.GetLocator(pindexLast), uint256())); + } + + bool fCanDirectFetch = CanDirectFetch(chainparams.GetConsensus()); + // If this set of headers is valid and ends in a block with at least as + // much work as our tip, download as much as possible. + if (fCanDirectFetch && pindexLast->IsValid(BLOCK_VALID_TREE) && chainActive.Tip()->nChainWork <= pindexLast->nChainWork) { + std::vector<const CBlockIndex*> vToFetch; + const CBlockIndex *pindexWalk = pindexLast; + // Calculate all the blocks we'd need to switch to pindexLast, up to a limit. + while (pindexWalk && !chainActive.Contains(pindexWalk) && vToFetch.size() <= MAX_BLOCKS_IN_TRANSIT_PER_PEER) { + if (!(pindexWalk->nStatus & BLOCK_HAVE_DATA) && + !mapBlocksInFlight.count(pindexWalk->GetBlockHash()) && + (!IsWitnessEnabled(pindexWalk->pprev, chainparams.GetConsensus()) || State(pfrom->GetId())->fHaveWitness)) { + // We don't have this block, and it's not yet in flight. + vToFetch.push_back(pindexWalk); + } + pindexWalk = pindexWalk->pprev; + } + // If pindexWalk still isn't on our main chain, we're looking at a + // very large reorg at a time we think we're close to caught up to + // the main chain -- this shouldn't really happen. Bail out on the + // direct fetch and rely on parallel download instead. + if (!chainActive.Contains(pindexWalk)) { + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Large reorg, won't direct fetch to %s (%d)\n", + pindexLast->GetBlockHash().ToString(), + pindexLast->nHeight); + } else { + std::vector<CInv> vGetData; + // Download as much as possible, from earliest to latest. + for (const CBlockIndex *pindex : reverse_iterate(vToFetch)) { + if (nodestate->nBlocksInFlight >= MAX_BLOCKS_IN_TRANSIT_PER_PEER) { + // Can't download any more from this peer + break; + } + uint32_t nFetchFlags = GetFetchFlags(pfrom); + vGetData.push_back(CInv(MSG_BLOCK | nFetchFlags, pindex->GetBlockHash())); + MarkBlockAsInFlight(pfrom->GetId(), pindex->GetBlockHash(), pindex); + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Requesting block %s from peer=%d\n", + pindex->GetBlockHash().ToString(), pfrom->GetId()); + } + if (vGetData.size() > 1) { + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Downloading blocks toward %s (%d) via headers direct fetch\n", + pindexLast->GetBlockHash().ToString(), pindexLast->nHeight); + } + if (vGetData.size() > 0) { + if (nodestate->fSupportsDesiredCmpctVersion && vGetData.size() == 1 && mapBlocksInFlight.size() == 1 && pindexLast->pprev->IsValid(BLOCK_VALID_CHAIN)) { + // In any case, we want to download using a compact block, not a regular one + vGetData[0] = CInv(MSG_CMPCT_BLOCK, vGetData[0].hash); + } + connman->PushMessage(pfrom, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::GETDATA, vGetData)); + } + } + } + // If we're in IBD, we want outbound peers that will serve us a useful + // chain. Disconnect peers that are on chains with insufficient work. + if (IsInitialBlockDownload() && nCount != MAX_HEADERS_RESULTS) { + // When nCount < MAX_HEADERS_RESULTS, we know we have no more + // headers to fetch from this peer. + if (nodestate->pindexBestKnownBlock && nodestate->pindexBestKnownBlock->nChainWork < nMinimumChainWork) { + // This peer has too little work on their headers chain to help + // us sync -- disconnect if using an outbound slot (unless + // whitelisted or addnode). + // Note: We compare their tip to nMinimumChainWork (rather than + // chainActive.Tip()) because we won't start block download + // until we have a headers chain that has at least + // nMinimumChainWork, even if a peer has a chain past our tip, + // as an anti-DoS measure. + if (IsOutboundDisconnectionCandidate(pfrom)) { + LogPrintf("Disconnecting outbound peer %d -- headers chain has insufficient work\n", pfrom->GetId()); + pfrom->fDisconnect = true; + } + } + } + + if (!pfrom->fDisconnect && IsOutboundDisconnectionCandidate(pfrom) && nodestate->pindexBestKnownBlock != nullptr) { + // If this is an outbound peer, check to see if we should protect + // it from the bad/lagging chain logic. + if (g_outbound_peers_with_protect_from_disconnect < MAX_OUTBOUND_PEERS_TO_PROTECT_FROM_DISCONNECT && nodestate->pindexBestKnownBlock->nChainWork >= chainActive.Tip()->nChainWork && !nodestate->m_chain_sync.m_protect) { + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Protecting outbound peer=%d from eviction\n", pfrom->GetId()); + nodestate->m_chain_sync.m_protect = true; + ++g_outbound_peers_with_protect_from_disconnect; + } + } + } + + return true; +} + +bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv, int64_t nTimeReceived, const CChainParams& chainparams, CConnman* connman, const std::atomic<bool>& interruptMsgProc, bool enable_bip61) +{ + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "received: %s (%u bytes) peer=%d\n", SanitizeString(strCommand), vRecv.size(), pfrom->GetId()); + if (gArgs.IsArgSet("-dropmessagestest") && GetRand(gArgs.GetArg("-dropmessagestest", 0)) == 0) + { + LogPrintf("dropmessagestest DROPPING RECV MESSAGE\n"); + return true; + } + + + if (!(pfrom->GetLocalServices() & NODE_BLOOM) && + (strCommand == NetMsgType::FILTERLOAD || + strCommand == NetMsgType::FILTERADD)) + { + if (pfrom->nVersion >= NO_BLOOM_VERSION) { + LOCK(cs_main); + Misbehaving(pfrom->GetId(), 100); + return false; + } else { + pfrom->fDisconnect = true; + return false; + } + } + + if (strCommand == NetMsgType::REJECT) + { + if (LogAcceptCategory(BCLog::NET)) { + try { + std::string strMsg; unsigned char ccode; std::string strReason; + vRecv >> LIMITED_STRING(strMsg, CMessageHeader::COMMAND_SIZE) >> ccode >> LIMITED_STRING(strReason, MAX_REJECT_MESSAGE_LENGTH); + + std::ostringstream ss; + ss << strMsg << " code " << itostr(ccode) << ": " << strReason; + + if (strMsg == NetMsgType::BLOCK || strMsg == NetMsgType::TX) + { + uint256 hash; + vRecv >> hash; + ss << ": hash " << hash.ToString(); + } + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Reject %s\n", SanitizeString(ss.str())); + } catch (const std::ios_base::failure&) { + // Avoid feedback loops by preventing reject messages from triggering a new reject message. + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Unparseable reject message received\n"); + } + } + return true; + } + + if (strCommand == NetMsgType::VERSION) { + // Each connection can only send one version message + if (pfrom->nVersion != 0) + { + if (enable_bip61) { + connman->PushMessage(pfrom, CNetMsgMaker(INIT_PROTO_VERSION).Make(NetMsgType::REJECT, strCommand, REJECT_DUPLICATE, std::string("Duplicate version message"))); + } + LOCK(cs_main); + Misbehaving(pfrom->GetId(), 1); + return false; + } + + int64_t nTime; + CAddress addrMe; + CAddress addrFrom; + uint64_t nNonce = 1; + uint64_t nServiceInt; + ServiceFlags nServices; + int nVersion; + int nSendVersion; + std::string strSubVer; + std::string cleanSubVer; + int nStartingHeight = -1; + bool fRelay = true; + + vRecv >> nVersion >> nServiceInt >> nTime >> addrMe; + nSendVersion = std::min(nVersion, PROTOCOL_VERSION); + nServices = ServiceFlags(nServiceInt); + if (!pfrom->fInbound) + { + connman->SetServices(pfrom->addr, nServices); + } + if (!pfrom->fInbound && !pfrom->fFeeler && !pfrom->m_manual_connection && !HasAllDesirableServiceFlags(nServices)) + { + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "peer=%d does not offer the expected services (%08x offered, %08x expected); disconnecting\n", pfrom->GetId(), nServices, GetDesirableServiceFlags(nServices)); + if (enable_bip61) { + connman->PushMessage(pfrom, CNetMsgMaker(INIT_PROTO_VERSION).Make(NetMsgType::REJECT, strCommand, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, + strprintf("Expected to offer services %08x", GetDesirableServiceFlags(nServices)))); + } + pfrom->fDisconnect = true; + return false; + } + + if (nVersion < MIN_PEER_PROTO_VERSION) { + // disconnect from peers older than this proto version + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "peer=%d using obsolete version %i; disconnecting\n", pfrom->GetId(), nVersion); + if (enable_bip61) { + connman->PushMessage(pfrom, CNetMsgMaker(INIT_PROTO_VERSION).Make(NetMsgType::REJECT, strCommand, REJECT_OBSOLETE, + strprintf("Version must be %d or greater", MIN_PEER_PROTO_VERSION))); + } + pfrom->fDisconnect = true; + return false; + } + + if (!vRecv.empty()) + vRecv >> addrFrom >> nNonce; + if (!vRecv.empty()) { + vRecv >> LIMITED_STRING(strSubVer, MAX_SUBVERSION_LENGTH); + cleanSubVer = SanitizeString(strSubVer); + } + if (!vRecv.empty()) { + vRecv >> nStartingHeight; + } + if (!vRecv.empty()) + vRecv >> fRelay; + // Disconnect if we connected to ourself + if (pfrom->fInbound && !connman->CheckIncomingNonce(nNonce)) + { + LogPrintf("connected to self at %s, disconnecting\n", pfrom->addr.ToString()); + pfrom->fDisconnect = true; + return true; + } + + if (pfrom->fInbound && addrMe.IsRoutable()) + { + SeenLocal(addrMe); + } + + // Be shy and don't send version until we hear + if (pfrom->fInbound) + PushNodeVersion(pfrom, connman, GetAdjustedTime()); + + connman->PushMessage(pfrom, CNetMsgMaker(INIT_PROTO_VERSION).Make(NetMsgType::VERACK)); + + pfrom->nServices = nServices; + pfrom->SetAddrLocal(addrMe); + { + LOCK(pfrom->cs_SubVer); + pfrom->strSubVer = strSubVer; + pfrom->cleanSubVer = cleanSubVer; + } + pfrom->nStartingHeight = nStartingHeight; + + // set nodes not relaying blocks and tx and not serving (parts) of the historical blockchain as "clients" + pfrom->fClient = (!(nServices & NODE_NETWORK) && !(nServices & NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED)); + + // set nodes not capable of serving the complete blockchain history as "limited nodes" + pfrom->m_limited_node = (!(nServices & NODE_NETWORK) && (nServices & NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED)); + + { + LOCK(pfrom->cs_filter); + pfrom->fRelayTxes = fRelay; // set to true after we get the first filter* message + } + + // Change version + pfrom->SetSendVersion(nSendVersion); + pfrom->nVersion = nVersion; + + if((nServices & NODE_WITNESS)) + { + LOCK(cs_main); + State(pfrom->GetId())->fHaveWitness = true; + } + + // Potentially mark this peer as a preferred download peer. + { + LOCK(cs_main); + UpdatePreferredDownload(pfrom, State(pfrom->GetId())); + } + + if (!pfrom->fInbound) + { + // Advertise our address + if (fListen && !IsInitialBlockDownload()) + { + CAddress addr = GetLocalAddress(&pfrom->addr, pfrom->GetLocalServices()); + FastRandomContext insecure_rand; + if (addr.IsRoutable()) + { + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "ProcessMessages: advertising address %s\n", addr.ToString()); + pfrom->PushAddress(addr, insecure_rand); + } else if (IsPeerAddrLocalGood(pfrom)) { + addr.SetIP(addrMe); + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "ProcessMessages: advertising address %s\n", addr.ToString()); + pfrom->PushAddress(addr, insecure_rand); + } + } + + // Get recent addresses + if (pfrom->fOneShot || pfrom->nVersion >= CADDR_TIME_VERSION || connman->GetAddressCount() < 1000) + { + connman->PushMessage(pfrom, CNetMsgMaker(nSendVersion).Make(NetMsgType::GETADDR)); + pfrom->fGetAddr = true; + } + connman->MarkAddressGood(pfrom->addr); + } + + std::string remoteAddr; + if (fLogIPs) + remoteAddr = ", peeraddr=" + pfrom->addr.ToString(); + + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "receive version message: %s: version %d, blocks=%d, us=%s, peer=%d%s\n", + cleanSubVer, pfrom->nVersion, + pfrom->nStartingHeight, addrMe.ToString(), pfrom->GetId(), + remoteAddr); + + int64_t nTimeOffset = nTime - GetTime(); + pfrom->nTimeOffset = nTimeOffset; + AddTimeData(pfrom->addr, nTimeOffset); + + // If the peer is old enough to have the old alert system, send it the final alert. + if (pfrom->nVersion <= 70012) { + CDataStream finalAlert(ParseHex("60010000000000000000000000ffffff7f00000000ffffff7ffeffff7f01ffffff7f00000000ffffff7f00ffffff7f002f555247454e543a20416c657274206b657920636f6d70726f6d697365642c2075706772616465207265717569726564004630440220653febd6410f470f6bae11cad19c48413becb1ac2c17f908fd0fd53bdc3abd5202206d0e9c96fe88d4a0f01ed9dedae2b6f9e00da94cad0fecaae66ecf689bf71b50"), SER_NETWORK, PROTOCOL_VERSION); + connman->PushMessage(pfrom, CNetMsgMaker(nSendVersion).Make("alert", finalAlert)); + } + + // Feeler connections exist only to verify if address is online. + if (pfrom->fFeeler) { + assert(pfrom->fInbound == false); + pfrom->fDisconnect = true; + } + return true; + } + + if (pfrom->nVersion == 0) { + // Must have a version message before anything else + LOCK(cs_main); + Misbehaving(pfrom->GetId(), 1); + return false; + } + + // At this point, the outgoing message serialization version can't change. + const CNetMsgMaker msgMaker(pfrom->GetSendVersion()); + + if (strCommand == NetMsgType::VERACK) + { + pfrom->SetRecvVersion(std::min(pfrom->nVersion.load(), PROTOCOL_VERSION)); + + if (!pfrom->fInbound) { + // Mark this node as currently connected, so we update its timestamp later. + LOCK(cs_main); + State(pfrom->GetId())->fCurrentlyConnected = true; + LogPrintf("New outbound peer connected: version: %d, blocks=%d, peer=%d%s\n", + pfrom->nVersion.load(), pfrom->nStartingHeight, pfrom->GetId(), + (fLogIPs ? strprintf(", peeraddr=%s", pfrom->addr.ToString()) : "")); + } + + if (pfrom->nVersion >= SENDHEADERS_VERSION) { + // Tell our peer we prefer to receive headers rather than inv's + // We send this to non-NODE NETWORK peers as well, because even + // non-NODE NETWORK peers can announce blocks (such as pruning + // nodes) + connman->PushMessage(pfrom, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::SENDHEADERS)); + } + if (pfrom->nVersion >= SHORT_IDS_BLOCKS_VERSION) { + // Tell our peer we are willing to provide version 1 or 2 cmpctblocks + // However, we do not request new block announcements using + // cmpctblock messages. + // We send this to non-NODE NETWORK peers as well, because + // they may wish to request compact blocks from us + bool fAnnounceUsingCMPCTBLOCK = false; + uint64_t nCMPCTBLOCKVersion = 2; + if (pfrom->GetLocalServices() & NODE_WITNESS) + connman->PushMessage(pfrom, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::SENDCMPCT, fAnnounceUsingCMPCTBLOCK, nCMPCTBLOCKVersion)); + nCMPCTBLOCKVersion = 1; + connman->PushMessage(pfrom, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::SENDCMPCT, fAnnounceUsingCMPCTBLOCK, nCMPCTBLOCKVersion)); + } + pfrom->fSuccessfullyConnected = true; + return true; + } + + if (!pfrom->fSuccessfullyConnected) { + // Must have a verack message before anything else + LOCK(cs_main); + Misbehaving(pfrom->GetId(), 1); + return false; + } + + if (strCommand == NetMsgType::ADDR) { + std::vector<CAddress> vAddr; + vRecv >> vAddr; + + // Don't want addr from older versions unless seeding + if (pfrom->nVersion < CADDR_TIME_VERSION && connman->GetAddressCount() > 1000) + return true; + if (vAddr.size() > 1000) + { + LOCK(cs_main); + Misbehaving(pfrom->GetId(), 20, strprintf("message addr size() = %u", vAddr.size())); + return false; + } + + // Store the new addresses + std::vector<CAddress> vAddrOk; + int64_t nNow = GetAdjustedTime(); + int64_t nSince = nNow - 10 * 60; + for (CAddress& addr : vAddr) + { + if (interruptMsgProc) + return true; + + // We only bother storing full nodes, though this may include + // things which we would not make an outbound connection to, in + // part because we may make feeler connections to them. + if (!MayHaveUsefulAddressDB(addr.nServices) && !HasAllDesirableServiceFlags(addr.nServices)) + continue; + + if (addr.nTime <= 100000000 || addr.nTime > nNow + 10 * 60) + addr.nTime = nNow - 5 * 24 * 60 * 60; + pfrom->AddAddressKnown(addr); + if (g_banman->IsBanned(addr)) continue; // Do not process banned addresses beyond remembering we received them + bool fReachable = IsReachable(addr); + if (addr.nTime > nSince && !pfrom->fGetAddr && vAddr.size() <= 10 && addr.IsRoutable()) + { + // Relay to a limited number of other nodes + RelayAddress(addr, fReachable, connman); + } + // Do not store addresses outside our network + if (fReachable) + vAddrOk.push_back(addr); + } + connman->AddNewAddresses(vAddrOk, pfrom->addr, 2 * 60 * 60); + if (vAddr.size() < 1000) + pfrom->fGetAddr = false; + if (pfrom->fOneShot) + pfrom->fDisconnect = true; + return true; + } + + if (strCommand == NetMsgType::SENDHEADERS) { + LOCK(cs_main); + State(pfrom->GetId())->fPreferHeaders = true; + return true; + } + + if (strCommand == NetMsgType::SENDCMPCT) { + bool fAnnounceUsingCMPCTBLOCK = false; + uint64_t nCMPCTBLOCKVersion = 0; + vRecv >> fAnnounceUsingCMPCTBLOCK >> nCMPCTBLOCKVersion; + if (nCMPCTBLOCKVersion == 1 || ((pfrom->GetLocalServices() & NODE_WITNESS) && nCMPCTBLOCKVersion == 2)) { + LOCK(cs_main); + // fProvidesHeaderAndIDs is used to "lock in" version of compact blocks we send (fWantsCmpctWitness) + if (!State(pfrom->GetId())->fProvidesHeaderAndIDs) { + State(pfrom->GetId())->fProvidesHeaderAndIDs = true; + State(pfrom->GetId())->fWantsCmpctWitness = nCMPCTBLOCKVersion == 2; + } + if (State(pfrom->GetId())->fWantsCmpctWitness == (nCMPCTBLOCKVersion == 2)) // ignore later version announces + State(pfrom->GetId())->fPreferHeaderAndIDs = fAnnounceUsingCMPCTBLOCK; + if (!State(pfrom->GetId())->fSupportsDesiredCmpctVersion) { + if (pfrom->GetLocalServices() & NODE_WITNESS) + State(pfrom->GetId())->fSupportsDesiredCmpctVersion = (nCMPCTBLOCKVersion == 2); + else + State(pfrom->GetId())->fSupportsDesiredCmpctVersion = (nCMPCTBLOCKVersion == 1); + } + } + return true; + } + + if (strCommand == NetMsgType::INV) { + std::vector<CInv> vInv; + vRecv >> vInv; + if (vInv.size() > MAX_INV_SZ) + { + LOCK(cs_main); + Misbehaving(pfrom->GetId(), 20, strprintf("message inv size() = %u", vInv.size())); + return false; + } + + bool fBlocksOnly = !fRelayTxes; + + // Allow whitelisted peers to send data other than blocks in blocks only mode if whitelistrelay is true + if (pfrom->fWhitelisted && gArgs.GetBoolArg("-whitelistrelay", DEFAULT_WHITELISTRELAY)) + fBlocksOnly = false; + + LOCK(cs_main); + + uint32_t nFetchFlags = GetFetchFlags(pfrom); + int64_t nNow = GetTimeMicros(); + + for (CInv &inv : vInv) + { + if (interruptMsgProc) + return true; + + bool fAlreadyHave = AlreadyHave(inv); + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "got inv: %s %s peer=%d\n", inv.ToString(), fAlreadyHave ? "have" : "new", pfrom->GetId()); + + if (inv.type == MSG_TX) { + inv.type |= nFetchFlags; + } + + if (inv.type == MSG_BLOCK) { + UpdateBlockAvailability(pfrom->GetId(), inv.hash); + if (!fAlreadyHave && !fImporting && !fReindex && !mapBlocksInFlight.count(inv.hash)) { + // We used to request the full block here, but since headers-announcements are now the + // primary method of announcement on the network, and since, in the case that a node + // fell back to inv we probably have a reorg which we should get the headers for first, + // we now only provide a getheaders response here. When we receive the headers, we will + // then ask for the blocks we need. + connman->PushMessage(pfrom, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::GETHEADERS, chainActive.GetLocator(pindexBestHeader), inv.hash)); + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "getheaders (%d) %s to peer=%d\n", pindexBestHeader->nHeight, inv.hash.ToString(), pfrom->GetId()); + } + } + else + { + pfrom->AddInventoryKnown(inv); + if (fBlocksOnly) { + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "transaction (%s) inv sent in violation of protocol peer=%d\n", inv.hash.ToString(), pfrom->GetId()); + } else if (!fAlreadyHave && !fImporting && !fReindex && !IsInitialBlockDownload()) { + RequestTx(State(pfrom->GetId()), inv.hash, nNow); + } + } + } + return true; + } + + if (strCommand == NetMsgType::GETDATA) { + std::vector<CInv> vInv; + vRecv >> vInv; + if (vInv.size() > MAX_INV_SZ) + { + LOCK(cs_main); + Misbehaving(pfrom->GetId(), 20, strprintf("message getdata size() = %u", vInv.size())); + return false; + } + + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "received getdata (%u invsz) peer=%d\n", vInv.size(), pfrom->GetId()); + + if (vInv.size() > 0) { + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "received getdata for: %s peer=%d\n", vInv[0].ToString(), pfrom->GetId()); + } + + pfrom->vRecvGetData.insert(pfrom->vRecvGetData.end(), vInv.begin(), vInv.end()); + ProcessGetData(pfrom, chainparams, connman, interruptMsgProc); + return true; + } + + if (strCommand == NetMsgType::GETBLOCKS) { + CBlockLocator locator; + uint256 hashStop; + vRecv >> locator >> hashStop; + + if (locator.vHave.size() > MAX_LOCATOR_SZ) { + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "getblocks locator size %lld > %d, disconnect peer=%d\n", locator.vHave.size(), MAX_LOCATOR_SZ, pfrom->GetId()); + pfrom->fDisconnect = true; + return true; + } + + // We might have announced the currently-being-connected tip using a + // compact block, which resulted in the peer sending a getblocks + // request, which we would otherwise respond to without the new block. + // To avoid this situation we simply verify that we are on our best + // known chain now. This is super overkill, but we handle it better + // for getheaders requests, and there are no known nodes which support + // compact blocks but still use getblocks to request blocks. + { + std::shared_ptr<const CBlock> a_recent_block; + { + LOCK(cs_most_recent_block); + a_recent_block = most_recent_block; + } + CValidationState state; + if (!ActivateBestChain(state, Params(), a_recent_block)) { + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "failed to activate chain (%s)\n", FormatStateMessage(state)); + } + } + + LOCK(cs_main); + + // Find the last block the caller has in the main chain + const CBlockIndex* pindex = FindForkInGlobalIndex(chainActive, locator); + + // Send the rest of the chain + if (pindex) + pindex = chainActive.Next(pindex); + int nLimit = 500; + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "getblocks %d to %s limit %d from peer=%d\n", (pindex ? pindex->nHeight : -1), hashStop.IsNull() ? "end" : hashStop.ToString(), nLimit, pfrom->GetId()); + for (; pindex; pindex = chainActive.Next(pindex)) + { + if (pindex->GetBlockHash() == hashStop) + { + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, " getblocks stopping at %d %s\n", pindex->nHeight, pindex->GetBlockHash().ToString()); + break; + } + // If pruning, don't inv blocks unless we have on disk and are likely to still have + // for some reasonable time window (1 hour) that block relay might require. + const int nPrunedBlocksLikelyToHave = MIN_BLOCKS_TO_KEEP - 3600 / chainparams.GetConsensus().nPowTargetSpacing; + if (fPruneMode && (!(pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_HAVE_DATA) || pindex->nHeight <= chainActive.Tip()->nHeight - nPrunedBlocksLikelyToHave)) + { + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, " getblocks stopping, pruned or too old block at %d %s\n", pindex->nHeight, pindex->GetBlockHash().ToString()); + break; + } + pfrom->PushInventory(CInv(MSG_BLOCK, pindex->GetBlockHash())); + if (--nLimit <= 0) + { + // When this block is requested, we'll send an inv that'll + // trigger the peer to getblocks the next batch of inventory. + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, " getblocks stopping at limit %d %s\n", pindex->nHeight, pindex->GetBlockHash().ToString()); + pfrom->hashContinue = pindex->GetBlockHash(); + break; + } + } + return true; + } + + if (strCommand == NetMsgType::GETBLOCKTXN) { + BlockTransactionsRequest req; + vRecv >> req; + + std::shared_ptr<const CBlock> recent_block; + { + LOCK(cs_most_recent_block); + if (most_recent_block_hash == req.blockhash) + recent_block = most_recent_block; + // Unlock cs_most_recent_block to avoid cs_main lock inversion + } + if (recent_block) { + SendBlockTransactions(*recent_block, req, pfrom, connman); + return true; + } + + LOCK(cs_main); + + const CBlockIndex* pindex = LookupBlockIndex(req.blockhash); + if (!pindex || !(pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_HAVE_DATA)) { + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Peer %d sent us a getblocktxn for a block we don't have\n", pfrom->GetId()); + return true; + } + + if (pindex->nHeight < chainActive.Height() - MAX_BLOCKTXN_DEPTH) { + // If an older block is requested (should never happen in practice, + // but can happen in tests) send a block response instead of a + // blocktxn response. Sending a full block response instead of a + // small blocktxn response is preferable in the case where a peer + // might maliciously send lots of getblocktxn requests to trigger + // expensive disk reads, because it will require the peer to + // actually receive all the data read from disk over the network. + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Peer %d sent us a getblocktxn for a block > %i deep\n", pfrom->GetId(), MAX_BLOCKTXN_DEPTH); + CInv inv; + inv.type = State(pfrom->GetId())->fWantsCmpctWitness ? MSG_WITNESS_BLOCK : MSG_BLOCK; + inv.hash = req.blockhash; + pfrom->vRecvGetData.push_back(inv); + // The message processing loop will go around again (without pausing) and we'll respond then (without cs_main) + return true; + } + + CBlock block; + bool ret = ReadBlockFromDisk(block, pindex, chainparams.GetConsensus()); + assert(ret); + + SendBlockTransactions(block, req, pfrom, connman); + return true; + } + + if (strCommand == NetMsgType::GETHEADERS) { + CBlockLocator locator; + uint256 hashStop; + vRecv >> locator >> hashStop; + + if (locator.vHave.size() > MAX_LOCATOR_SZ) { + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "getheaders locator size %lld > %d, disconnect peer=%d\n", locator.vHave.size(), MAX_LOCATOR_SZ, pfrom->GetId()); + pfrom->fDisconnect = true; + return true; + } + + LOCK(cs_main); + if (IsInitialBlockDownload() && !pfrom->fWhitelisted) { + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Ignoring getheaders from peer=%d because node is in initial block download\n", pfrom->GetId()); + return true; + } + + CNodeState *nodestate = State(pfrom->GetId()); + const CBlockIndex* pindex = nullptr; + if (locator.IsNull()) + { + // If locator is null, return the hashStop block + pindex = LookupBlockIndex(hashStop); + if (!pindex) { + return true; + } + + if (!BlockRequestAllowed(pindex, chainparams.GetConsensus())) { + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "%s: ignoring request from peer=%i for old block header that isn't in the main chain\n", __func__, pfrom->GetId()); + return true; + } + } + else + { + // Find the last block the caller has in the main chain + pindex = FindForkInGlobalIndex(chainActive, locator); + if (pindex) + pindex = chainActive.Next(pindex); + } + + // we must use CBlocks, as CBlockHeaders won't include the 0x00 nTx count at the end + std::vector<CBlock> vHeaders; + int nLimit = MAX_HEADERS_RESULTS; + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "getheaders %d to %s from peer=%d\n", (pindex ? pindex->nHeight : -1), hashStop.IsNull() ? "end" : hashStop.ToString(), pfrom->GetId()); + for (; pindex; pindex = chainActive.Next(pindex)) + { + vHeaders.push_back(pindex->GetBlockHeader()); + if (--nLimit <= 0 || pindex->GetBlockHash() == hashStop) + break; + } + // pindex can be nullptr either if we sent chainActive.Tip() OR + // if our peer has chainActive.Tip() (and thus we are sending an empty + // headers message). In both cases it's safe to update + // pindexBestHeaderSent to be our tip. + // + // It is important that we simply reset the BestHeaderSent value here, + // and not max(BestHeaderSent, newHeaderSent). We might have announced + // the currently-being-connected tip using a compact block, which + // resulted in the peer sending a headers request, which we respond to + // without the new block. By resetting the BestHeaderSent, we ensure we + // will re-announce the new block via headers (or compact blocks again) + // in the SendMessages logic. + nodestate->pindexBestHeaderSent = pindex ? pindex : chainActive.Tip(); + connman->PushMessage(pfrom, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::HEADERS, vHeaders)); + return true; + } + + if (strCommand == NetMsgType::TX) { + // Stop processing the transaction early if + // We are in blocks only mode and peer is either not whitelisted or whitelistrelay is off + if (!fRelayTxes && (!pfrom->fWhitelisted || !gArgs.GetBoolArg("-whitelistrelay", DEFAULT_WHITELISTRELAY))) + { + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "transaction sent in violation of protocol peer=%d\n", pfrom->GetId()); + return true; + } + + std::deque<COutPoint> vWorkQueue; + std::vector<uint256> vEraseQueue; + CTransactionRef ptx; + vRecv >> ptx; + const CTransaction& tx = *ptx; + + CInv inv(MSG_TX, tx.GetHash()); + pfrom->AddInventoryKnown(inv); + + LOCK2(cs_main, g_cs_orphans); + + bool fMissingInputs = false; + CValidationState state; + + CNodeState* nodestate = State(pfrom->GetId()); + nodestate->m_tx_download.m_tx_announced.erase(inv.hash); + nodestate->m_tx_download.m_tx_in_flight.erase(inv.hash); + EraseTxRequest(inv.hash); + + std::list<CTransactionRef> lRemovedTxn; + + if (!AlreadyHave(inv) && + AcceptToMemoryPool(mempool, state, ptx, &fMissingInputs, &lRemovedTxn, false /* bypass_limits */, 0 /* nAbsurdFee */)) { + mempool.check(pcoinsTip.get()); + RelayTransaction(tx, connman); + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < tx.vout.size(); i++) { + vWorkQueue.emplace_back(inv.hash, i); + } + + pfrom->nLastTXTime = GetTime(); + + LogPrint(BCLog::MEMPOOL, "AcceptToMemoryPool: peer=%d: accepted %s (poolsz %u txn, %u kB)\n", + pfrom->GetId(), + tx.GetHash().ToString(), + mempool.size(), mempool.DynamicMemoryUsage() / 1000); + + // Recursively process any orphan transactions that depended on this one + std::set<NodeId> setMisbehaving; + while (!vWorkQueue.empty()) { + auto itByPrev = mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev.find(vWorkQueue.front()); + vWorkQueue.pop_front(); + if (itByPrev == mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev.end()) + continue; + for (auto mi = itByPrev->second.begin(); + mi != itByPrev->second.end(); + ++mi) + { + const CTransactionRef& porphanTx = (*mi)->second.tx; + const CTransaction& orphanTx = *porphanTx; + const uint256& orphanHash = orphanTx.GetHash(); + NodeId fromPeer = (*mi)->second.fromPeer; + bool fMissingInputs2 = false; + // Use a dummy CValidationState so someone can't setup nodes to counter-DoS based on orphan + // resolution (that is, feeding people an invalid transaction based on LegitTxX in order to get + // anyone relaying LegitTxX banned) + CValidationState stateDummy; + + + if (setMisbehaving.count(fromPeer)) + continue; + if (AcceptToMemoryPool(mempool, stateDummy, porphanTx, &fMissingInputs2, &lRemovedTxn, false /* bypass_limits */, 0 /* nAbsurdFee */)) { + LogPrint(BCLog::MEMPOOL, " accepted orphan tx %s\n", orphanHash.ToString()); + RelayTransaction(orphanTx, connman); + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < orphanTx.vout.size(); i++) { + vWorkQueue.emplace_back(orphanHash, i); + } + vEraseQueue.push_back(orphanHash); + } + else if (!fMissingInputs2) + { + int nDos = 0; + if (stateDummy.IsInvalid(nDos) && nDos > 0) + { + // Punish peer that gave us an invalid orphan tx + Misbehaving(fromPeer, nDos); + setMisbehaving.insert(fromPeer); + LogPrint(BCLog::MEMPOOL, " invalid orphan tx %s\n", orphanHash.ToString()); + } + // Has inputs but not accepted to mempool + // Probably non-standard or insufficient fee + LogPrint(BCLog::MEMPOOL, " removed orphan tx %s\n", orphanHash.ToString()); + vEraseQueue.push_back(orphanHash); + if (!orphanTx.HasWitness() && !stateDummy.CorruptionPossible()) { + // Do not use rejection cache for witness transactions or + // witness-stripped transactions, as they can have been malleated. + // See https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/8279 for details. + assert(recentRejects); + recentRejects->insert(orphanHash); + } + } + mempool.check(pcoinsTip.get()); + } + } + + for (const uint256& hash : vEraseQueue) + EraseOrphanTx(hash); + } + else if (fMissingInputs) + { + bool fRejectedParents = false; // It may be the case that the orphans parents have all been rejected + for (const CTxIn& txin : tx.vin) { + if (recentRejects->contains(txin.prevout.hash)) { + fRejectedParents = true; + break; + } + } + if (!fRejectedParents) { + uint32_t nFetchFlags = GetFetchFlags(pfrom); + int64_t nNow = GetTimeMicros(); + + for (const CTxIn& txin : tx.vin) { + CInv _inv(MSG_TX | nFetchFlags, txin.prevout.hash); + pfrom->AddInventoryKnown(_inv); + if (!AlreadyHave(_inv)) RequestTx(State(pfrom->GetId()), _inv.hash, nNow); + } + AddOrphanTx(ptx, pfrom->GetId()); + + // DoS prevention: do not allow mapOrphanTransactions to grow unbounded + unsigned int nMaxOrphanTx = (unsigned int)std::max((int64_t)0, gArgs.GetArg("-maxorphantx", DEFAULT_MAX_ORPHAN_TRANSACTIONS)); + unsigned int nEvicted = LimitOrphanTxSize(nMaxOrphanTx); + if (nEvicted > 0) { + LogPrint(BCLog::MEMPOOL, "mapOrphan overflow, removed %u tx\n", nEvicted); + } + } else { + LogPrint(BCLog::MEMPOOL, "not keeping orphan with rejected parents %s\n",tx.GetHash().ToString()); + // We will continue to reject this tx since it has rejected + // parents so avoid re-requesting it from other peers. + recentRejects->insert(tx.GetHash()); + } + } else { + if (!tx.HasWitness() && !state.CorruptionPossible()) { + // Do not use rejection cache for witness transactions or + // witness-stripped transactions, as they can have been malleated. + // See https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/8279 for details. + assert(recentRejects); + recentRejects->insert(tx.GetHash()); + if (RecursiveDynamicUsage(*ptx) < 100000) { + AddToCompactExtraTransactions(ptx); + } + } else if (tx.HasWitness() && RecursiveDynamicUsage(*ptx) < 100000) { + AddToCompactExtraTransactions(ptx); + } + + if (pfrom->fWhitelisted && gArgs.GetBoolArg("-whitelistforcerelay", DEFAULT_WHITELISTFORCERELAY)) { + // Always relay transactions received from whitelisted peers, even + // if they were already in the mempool or rejected from it due + // to policy, allowing the node to function as a gateway for + // nodes hidden behind it. + // + // Never relay transactions that we would assign a non-zero DoS + // score for, as we expect peers to do the same with us in that + // case. + int nDoS = 0; + if (!state.IsInvalid(nDoS) || nDoS == 0) { + LogPrintf("Force relaying tx %s from whitelisted peer=%d\n", tx.GetHash().ToString(), pfrom->GetId()); + RelayTransaction(tx, connman); + } else { + LogPrintf("Not relaying invalid transaction %s from whitelisted peer=%d (%s)\n", tx.GetHash().ToString(), pfrom->GetId(), FormatStateMessage(state)); + } + } + } + + for (const CTransactionRef& removedTx : lRemovedTxn) + AddToCompactExtraTransactions(removedTx); + + // If a tx has been detected by recentRejects, we will have reached + // this point and the tx will have been ignored. Because we haven't run + // the tx through AcceptToMemoryPool, we won't have computed a DoS + // score for it or determined exactly why we consider it invalid. + // + // This means we won't penalize any peer subsequently relaying a DoSy + // tx (even if we penalized the first peer who gave it to us) because + // we have to account for recentRejects showing false positives. In + // other words, we shouldn't penalize a peer if we aren't *sure* they + // submitted a DoSy tx. + // + // Note that recentRejects doesn't just record DoSy or invalid + // transactions, but any tx not accepted by the mempool, which may be + // due to node policy (vs. consensus). So we can't blanket penalize a + // peer simply for relaying a tx that our recentRejects has caught, + // regardless of false positives. + + int nDoS = 0; + if (state.IsInvalid(nDoS)) + { + LogPrint(BCLog::MEMPOOLREJ, "%s from peer=%d was not accepted: %s\n", tx.GetHash().ToString(), + pfrom->GetId(), + FormatStateMessage(state)); + if (enable_bip61 && state.GetRejectCode() > 0 && state.GetRejectCode() < REJECT_INTERNAL) { // Never send AcceptToMemoryPool's internal codes over P2P + connman->PushMessage(pfrom, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::REJECT, strCommand, (unsigned char)state.GetRejectCode(), + state.GetRejectReason().substr(0, MAX_REJECT_MESSAGE_LENGTH), inv.hash)); + } + if (nDoS > 0) { + Misbehaving(pfrom->GetId(), nDoS); + } + } + return true; + } + + if (strCommand == NetMsgType::CMPCTBLOCK) + { + // Ignore cmpctblock received while importing + if (fImporting || fReindex) { + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Unexpected cmpctblock message received from peer %d\n", pfrom->GetId()); + return true; + } + + CBlockHeaderAndShortTxIDs cmpctblock; + vRecv >> cmpctblock; + + bool received_new_header = false; + + { + LOCK(cs_main); + + if (!LookupBlockIndex(cmpctblock.header.hashPrevBlock)) { + // Doesn't connect (or is genesis), instead of DoSing in AcceptBlockHeader, request deeper headers + if (!IsInitialBlockDownload()) + connman->PushMessage(pfrom, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::GETHEADERS, chainActive.GetLocator(pindexBestHeader), uint256())); + return true; + } + + if (!LookupBlockIndex(cmpctblock.header.GetHash())) { + received_new_header = true; + } + } + + const CBlockIndex *pindex = nullptr; + CValidationState state; + if (!ProcessNewBlockHeaders({cmpctblock.header}, state, chainparams, &pindex)) { + int nDoS; + if (state.IsInvalid(nDoS)) { + if (nDoS > 0) { + LOCK(cs_main); + Misbehaving(pfrom->GetId(), nDoS, strprintf("Peer %d sent us invalid header via cmpctblock\n", pfrom->GetId())); + } else { + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Peer %d sent us invalid header via cmpctblock\n", pfrom->GetId()); + } + return true; + } + } + + // When we succeed in decoding a block's txids from a cmpctblock + // message we typically jump to the BLOCKTXN handling code, with a + // dummy (empty) BLOCKTXN message, to re-use the logic there in + // completing processing of the putative block (without cs_main). + bool fProcessBLOCKTXN = false; + CDataStream blockTxnMsg(SER_NETWORK, PROTOCOL_VERSION); + + // If we end up treating this as a plain headers message, call that as well + // without cs_main. + bool fRevertToHeaderProcessing = false; + + // Keep a CBlock for "optimistic" compactblock reconstructions (see + // below) + std::shared_ptr<CBlock> pblock = std::make_shared<CBlock>(); + bool fBlockReconstructed = false; + + { + LOCK2(cs_main, g_cs_orphans); + // If AcceptBlockHeader returned true, it set pindex + assert(pindex); + UpdateBlockAvailability(pfrom->GetId(), pindex->GetBlockHash()); + + CNodeState *nodestate = State(pfrom->GetId()); + + // If this was a new header with more work than our tip, update the + // peer's last block announcement time + if (received_new_header && pindex->nChainWork > chainActive.Tip()->nChainWork) { + nodestate->m_last_block_announcement = GetTime(); + } + + std::map<uint256, std::pair<NodeId, std::list<QueuedBlock>::iterator> >::iterator blockInFlightIt = mapBlocksInFlight.find(pindex->GetBlockHash()); + bool fAlreadyInFlight = blockInFlightIt != mapBlocksInFlight.end(); + + if (pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_HAVE_DATA) // Nothing to do here + return true; + + if (pindex->nChainWork <= chainActive.Tip()->nChainWork || // We know something better + pindex->nTx != 0) { // We had this block at some point, but pruned it + if (fAlreadyInFlight) { + // We requested this block for some reason, but our mempool will probably be useless + // so we just grab the block via normal getdata + std::vector<CInv> vInv(1); + vInv[0] = CInv(MSG_BLOCK | GetFetchFlags(pfrom), cmpctblock.header.GetHash()); + connman->PushMessage(pfrom, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::GETDATA, vInv)); + } + return true; + } + + // If we're not close to tip yet, give up and let parallel block fetch work its magic + if (!fAlreadyInFlight && !CanDirectFetch(chainparams.GetConsensus())) + return true; + + if (IsWitnessEnabled(pindex->pprev, chainparams.GetConsensus()) && !nodestate->fSupportsDesiredCmpctVersion) { + // Don't bother trying to process compact blocks from v1 peers + // after segwit activates. + return true; + } + + // We want to be a bit conservative just to be extra careful about DoS + // possibilities in compact block processing... + if (pindex->nHeight <= chainActive.Height() + 2) { + if ((!fAlreadyInFlight && nodestate->nBlocksInFlight < MAX_BLOCKS_IN_TRANSIT_PER_PEER) || + (fAlreadyInFlight && blockInFlightIt->second.first == pfrom->GetId())) { + std::list<QueuedBlock>::iterator* queuedBlockIt = nullptr; + if (!MarkBlockAsInFlight(pfrom->GetId(), pindex->GetBlockHash(), pindex, &queuedBlockIt)) { + if (!(*queuedBlockIt)->partialBlock) + (*queuedBlockIt)->partialBlock.reset(new PartiallyDownloadedBlock(&mempool)); + else { + // The block was already in flight using compact blocks from the same peer + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Peer sent us compact block we were already syncing!\n"); + return true; + } + } + + PartiallyDownloadedBlock& partialBlock = *(*queuedBlockIt)->partialBlock; + ReadStatus status = partialBlock.InitData(cmpctblock, vExtraTxnForCompact); + if (status == READ_STATUS_INVALID) { + MarkBlockAsReceived(pindex->GetBlockHash()); // Reset in-flight state in case of whitelist + Misbehaving(pfrom->GetId(), 100, strprintf("Peer %d sent us invalid compact block\n", pfrom->GetId())); + return true; + } else if (status == READ_STATUS_FAILED) { + // Duplicate txindexes, the block is now in-flight, so just request it + std::vector<CInv> vInv(1); + vInv[0] = CInv(MSG_BLOCK | GetFetchFlags(pfrom), cmpctblock.header.GetHash()); + connman->PushMessage(pfrom, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::GETDATA, vInv)); + return true; + } + + BlockTransactionsRequest req; + for (size_t i = 0; i < cmpctblock.BlockTxCount(); i++) { + if (!partialBlock.IsTxAvailable(i)) + req.indexes.push_back(i); + } + if (req.indexes.empty()) { + // Dirty hack to jump to BLOCKTXN code (TODO: move message handling into their own functions) + BlockTransactions txn; + txn.blockhash = cmpctblock.header.GetHash(); + blockTxnMsg << txn; + fProcessBLOCKTXN = true; + } else { + req.blockhash = pindex->GetBlockHash(); + connman->PushMessage(pfrom, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::GETBLOCKTXN, req)); + } + } else { + // This block is either already in flight from a different + // peer, or this peer has too many blocks outstanding to + // download from. + // Optimistically try to reconstruct anyway since we might be + // able to without any round trips. + PartiallyDownloadedBlock tempBlock(&mempool); + ReadStatus status = tempBlock.InitData(cmpctblock, vExtraTxnForCompact); + if (status != READ_STATUS_OK) { + // TODO: don't ignore failures + return true; + } + std::vector<CTransactionRef> dummy; + status = tempBlock.FillBlock(*pblock, dummy); + if (status == READ_STATUS_OK) { + fBlockReconstructed = true; + } + } + } else { + if (fAlreadyInFlight) { + // We requested this block, but its far into the future, so our + // mempool will probably be useless - request the block normally + std::vector<CInv> vInv(1); + vInv[0] = CInv(MSG_BLOCK | GetFetchFlags(pfrom), cmpctblock.header.GetHash()); + connman->PushMessage(pfrom, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::GETDATA, vInv)); + return true; + } else { + // If this was an announce-cmpctblock, we want the same treatment as a header message + fRevertToHeaderProcessing = true; + } + } + } // cs_main + + if (fProcessBLOCKTXN) + return ProcessMessage(pfrom, NetMsgType::BLOCKTXN, blockTxnMsg, nTimeReceived, chainparams, connman, interruptMsgProc, enable_bip61); + + if (fRevertToHeaderProcessing) { + // Headers received from HB compact block peers are permitted to be + // relayed before full validation (see BIP 152), so we don't want to disconnect + // the peer if the header turns out to be for an invalid block. + // Note that if a peer tries to build on an invalid chain, that + // will be detected and the peer will be banned. + return ProcessHeadersMessage(pfrom, connman, {cmpctblock.header}, chainparams, /*punish_duplicate_invalid=*/false); + } + + if (fBlockReconstructed) { + // If we got here, we were able to optimistically reconstruct a + // block that is in flight from some other peer. + { + LOCK(cs_main); + mapBlockSource.emplace(pblock->GetHash(), std::make_pair(pfrom->GetId(), false)); + } + bool fNewBlock = false; + // Setting fForceProcessing to true means that we bypass some of + // our anti-DoS protections in AcceptBlock, which filters + // unrequested blocks that might be trying to waste our resources + // (eg disk space). Because we only try to reconstruct blocks when + // we're close to caught up (via the CanDirectFetch() requirement + // above, combined with the behavior of not requesting blocks until + // we have a chain with at least nMinimumChainWork), and we ignore + // compact blocks with less work than our tip, it is safe to treat + // reconstructed compact blocks as having been requested. + ProcessNewBlock(chainparams, pblock, /*fForceProcessing=*/true, &fNewBlock); + if (fNewBlock) { + pfrom->nLastBlockTime = GetTime(); + } else { + LOCK(cs_main); + mapBlockSource.erase(pblock->GetHash()); + } + LOCK(cs_main); // hold cs_main for CBlockIndex::IsValid() + if (pindex->IsValid(BLOCK_VALID_TRANSACTIONS)) { + // Clear download state for this block, which is in + // process from some other peer. We do this after calling + // ProcessNewBlock so that a malleated cmpctblock announcement + // can't be used to interfere with block relay. + MarkBlockAsReceived(pblock->GetHash()); + } + } + return true; + } + + if (strCommand == NetMsgType::BLOCKTXN) + { + // Ignore blocktxn received while importing + if (fImporting || fReindex) { + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Unexpected blocktxn message received from peer %d\n", pfrom->GetId()); + return true; + } + + BlockTransactions resp; + vRecv >> resp; + + std::shared_ptr<CBlock> pblock = std::make_shared<CBlock>(); + bool fBlockRead = false; + { + LOCK(cs_main); + + std::map<uint256, std::pair<NodeId, std::list<QueuedBlock>::iterator> >::iterator it = mapBlocksInFlight.find(resp.blockhash); + if (it == mapBlocksInFlight.end() || !it->second.second->partialBlock || + it->second.first != pfrom->GetId()) { + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Peer %d sent us block transactions for block we weren't expecting\n", pfrom->GetId()); + return true; + } + + PartiallyDownloadedBlock& partialBlock = *it->second.second->partialBlock; + ReadStatus status = partialBlock.FillBlock(*pblock, resp.txn); + if (status == READ_STATUS_INVALID) { + MarkBlockAsReceived(resp.blockhash); // Reset in-flight state in case of whitelist + Misbehaving(pfrom->GetId(), 100, strprintf("Peer %d sent us invalid compact block/non-matching block transactions\n", pfrom->GetId())); + return true; + } else if (status == READ_STATUS_FAILED) { + // Might have collided, fall back to getdata now :( + std::vector<CInv> invs; + invs.push_back(CInv(MSG_BLOCK | GetFetchFlags(pfrom), resp.blockhash)); + connman->PushMessage(pfrom, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::GETDATA, invs)); + } else { + // Block is either okay, or possibly we received + // READ_STATUS_CHECKBLOCK_FAILED. + // Note that CheckBlock can only fail for one of a few reasons: + // 1. bad-proof-of-work (impossible here, because we've already + // accepted the header) + // 2. merkleroot doesn't match the transactions given (already + // caught in FillBlock with READ_STATUS_FAILED, so + // impossible here) + // 3. the block is otherwise invalid (eg invalid coinbase, + // block is too big, too many legacy sigops, etc). + // So if CheckBlock failed, #3 is the only possibility. + // Under BIP 152, we don't DoS-ban unless proof of work is + // invalid (we don't require all the stateless checks to have + // been run). This is handled below, so just treat this as + // though the block was successfully read, and rely on the + // handling in ProcessNewBlock to ensure the block index is + // updated, reject messages go out, etc. + MarkBlockAsReceived(resp.blockhash); // it is now an empty pointer + fBlockRead = true; + // mapBlockSource is only used for sending reject messages and DoS scores, + // so the race between here and cs_main in ProcessNewBlock is fine. + // BIP 152 permits peers to relay compact blocks after validating + // the header only; we should not punish peers if the block turns + // out to be invalid. + mapBlockSource.emplace(resp.blockhash, std::make_pair(pfrom->GetId(), false)); + } + } // Don't hold cs_main when we call into ProcessNewBlock + if (fBlockRead) { + bool fNewBlock = false; + // Since we requested this block (it was in mapBlocksInFlight), force it to be processed, + // even if it would not be a candidate for new tip (missing previous block, chain not long enough, etc) + // This bypasses some anti-DoS logic in AcceptBlock (eg to prevent + // disk-space attacks), but this should be safe due to the + // protections in the compact block handler -- see related comment + // in compact block optimistic reconstruction handling. + ProcessNewBlock(chainparams, pblock, /*fForceProcessing=*/true, &fNewBlock); + if (fNewBlock) { + pfrom->nLastBlockTime = GetTime(); + } else { + LOCK(cs_main); + mapBlockSource.erase(pblock->GetHash()); + } + } + return true; + } + + if (strCommand == NetMsgType::HEADERS) + { + // Ignore headers received while importing + if (fImporting || fReindex) { + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Unexpected headers message received from peer %d\n", pfrom->GetId()); + return true; + } + + std::vector<CBlockHeader> headers; + + // Bypass the normal CBlock deserialization, as we don't want to risk deserializing 2000 full blocks. + unsigned int nCount = ReadCompactSize(vRecv); + if (nCount > MAX_HEADERS_RESULTS) { + LOCK(cs_main); + Misbehaving(pfrom->GetId(), 20, strprintf("headers message size = %u", nCount)); + return false; + } + headers.resize(nCount); + for (unsigned int n = 0; n < nCount; n++) { + vRecv >> headers[n]; + ReadCompactSize(vRecv); // ignore tx count; assume it is 0. + } + + // Headers received via a HEADERS message should be valid, and reflect + // the chain the peer is on. If we receive a known-invalid header, + // disconnect the peer if it is using one of our outbound connection + // slots. + bool should_punish = !pfrom->fInbound && !pfrom->m_manual_connection; + return ProcessHeadersMessage(pfrom, connman, headers, chainparams, should_punish); + } + + if (strCommand == NetMsgType::BLOCK) + { + // Ignore block received while importing + if (fImporting || fReindex) { + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Unexpected block message received from peer %d\n", pfrom->GetId()); + return true; + } + + std::shared_ptr<CBlock> pblock = std::make_shared<CBlock>(); + vRecv >> *pblock; + + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "received block %s peer=%d\n", pblock->GetHash().ToString(), pfrom->GetId()); + + bool forceProcessing = false; + const uint256 hash(pblock->GetHash()); + { + LOCK(cs_main); + // Also always process if we requested the block explicitly, as we may + // need it even though it is not a candidate for a new best tip. + forceProcessing |= MarkBlockAsReceived(hash); + // mapBlockSource is only used for sending reject messages and DoS scores, + // so the race between here and cs_main in ProcessNewBlock is fine. + mapBlockSource.emplace(hash, std::make_pair(pfrom->GetId(), true)); + } + bool fNewBlock = false; + ProcessNewBlock(chainparams, pblock, forceProcessing, &fNewBlock); + if (fNewBlock) { + pfrom->nLastBlockTime = GetTime(); + } else { + LOCK(cs_main); + mapBlockSource.erase(pblock->GetHash()); + } + return true; + } + + if (strCommand == NetMsgType::GETADDR) { + // This asymmetric behavior for inbound and outbound connections was introduced + // to prevent a fingerprinting attack: an attacker can send specific fake addresses + // to users' AddrMan and later request them by sending getaddr messages. + // Making nodes which are behind NAT and can only make outgoing connections ignore + // the getaddr message mitigates the attack. + if (!pfrom->fInbound) { + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Ignoring \"getaddr\" from outbound connection. peer=%d\n", pfrom->GetId()); + return true; + } + + // Only send one GetAddr response per connection to reduce resource waste + // and discourage addr stamping of INV announcements. + if (pfrom->fSentAddr) { + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Ignoring repeated \"getaddr\". peer=%d\n", pfrom->GetId()); + return true; + } + pfrom->fSentAddr = true; + + pfrom->vAddrToSend.clear(); + std::vector<CAddress> vAddr = connman->GetAddresses(); + FastRandomContext insecure_rand; + for (const CAddress &addr : vAddr) { + if (!g_banman->IsBanned(addr)) { + pfrom->PushAddress(addr, insecure_rand); + } + } + return true; + } + + if (strCommand == NetMsgType::MEMPOOL) { + if (!(pfrom->GetLocalServices() & NODE_BLOOM) && !pfrom->fWhitelisted) + { + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "mempool request with bloom filters disabled, disconnect peer=%d\n", pfrom->GetId()); + pfrom->fDisconnect = true; + return true; + } + + if (connman->OutboundTargetReached(false) && !pfrom->fWhitelisted) + { + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "mempool request with bandwidth limit reached, disconnect peer=%d\n", pfrom->GetId()); + pfrom->fDisconnect = true; + return true; + } + + LOCK(pfrom->cs_inventory); + pfrom->fSendMempool = true; + return true; + } + + if (strCommand == NetMsgType::PING) { + if (pfrom->nVersion > BIP0031_VERSION) + { + uint64_t nonce = 0; + vRecv >> nonce; + // Echo the message back with the nonce. This allows for two useful features: + // + // 1) A remote node can quickly check if the connection is operational + // 2) Remote nodes can measure the latency of the network thread. If this node + // is overloaded it won't respond to pings quickly and the remote node can + // avoid sending us more work, like chain download requests. + // + // The nonce stops the remote getting confused between different pings: without + // it, if the remote node sends a ping once per second and this node takes 5 + // seconds to respond to each, the 5th ping the remote sends would appear to + // return very quickly. + connman->PushMessage(pfrom, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::PONG, nonce)); + } + return true; + } + + if (strCommand == NetMsgType::PONG) { + int64_t pingUsecEnd = nTimeReceived; + uint64_t nonce = 0; + size_t nAvail = vRecv.in_avail(); + bool bPingFinished = false; + std::string sProblem; + + if (nAvail >= sizeof(nonce)) { + vRecv >> nonce; + + // Only process pong message if there is an outstanding ping (old ping without nonce should never pong) + if (pfrom->nPingNonceSent != 0) { + if (nonce == pfrom->nPingNonceSent) { + // Matching pong received, this ping is no longer outstanding + bPingFinished = true; + int64_t pingUsecTime = pingUsecEnd - pfrom->nPingUsecStart; + if (pingUsecTime > 0) { + // Successful ping time measurement, replace previous + pfrom->nPingUsecTime = pingUsecTime; + pfrom->nMinPingUsecTime = std::min(pfrom->nMinPingUsecTime.load(), pingUsecTime); + } else { + // This should never happen + sProblem = "Timing mishap"; + } + } else { + // Nonce mismatches are normal when pings are overlapping + sProblem = "Nonce mismatch"; + if (nonce == 0) { + // This is most likely a bug in another implementation somewhere; cancel this ping + bPingFinished = true; + sProblem = "Nonce zero"; + } + } + } else { + sProblem = "Unsolicited pong without ping"; + } + } else { + // This is most likely a bug in another implementation somewhere; cancel this ping + bPingFinished = true; + sProblem = "Short payload"; + } + + if (!(sProblem.empty())) { + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "pong peer=%d: %s, %x expected, %x received, %u bytes\n", + pfrom->GetId(), + sProblem, + pfrom->nPingNonceSent, + nonce, + nAvail); + } + if (bPingFinished) { + pfrom->nPingNonceSent = 0; + } + return true; + } + + if (strCommand == NetMsgType::FILTERLOAD) { + CBloomFilter filter; + vRecv >> filter; + + if (!filter.IsWithinSizeConstraints()) + { + // There is no excuse for sending a too-large filter + LOCK(cs_main); + Misbehaving(pfrom->GetId(), 100); + } + else + { + LOCK(pfrom->cs_filter); + pfrom->pfilter.reset(new CBloomFilter(filter)); + pfrom->pfilter->UpdateEmptyFull(); + pfrom->fRelayTxes = true; + } + return true; + } + + if (strCommand == NetMsgType::FILTERADD) { + std::vector<unsigned char> vData; + vRecv >> vData; + + // Nodes must NEVER send a data item > 520 bytes (the max size for a script data object, + // and thus, the maximum size any matched object can have) in a filteradd message + bool bad = false; + if (vData.size() > MAX_SCRIPT_ELEMENT_SIZE) { + bad = true; + } else { + LOCK(pfrom->cs_filter); + if (pfrom->pfilter) { + pfrom->pfilter->insert(vData); + } else { + bad = true; + } + } + if (bad) { + LOCK(cs_main); + Misbehaving(pfrom->GetId(), 100); + } + return true; + } + + if (strCommand == NetMsgType::FILTERCLEAR) { + LOCK(pfrom->cs_filter); + if (pfrom->GetLocalServices() & NODE_BLOOM) { + pfrom->pfilter.reset(new CBloomFilter()); + } + pfrom->fRelayTxes = true; + return true; + } + + if (strCommand == NetMsgType::FEEFILTER) { + CAmount newFeeFilter = 0; + vRecv >> newFeeFilter; + if (MoneyRange(newFeeFilter)) { + { + LOCK(pfrom->cs_feeFilter); + pfrom->minFeeFilter = newFeeFilter; + } + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "received: feefilter of %s from peer=%d\n", CFeeRate(newFeeFilter).ToString(), pfrom->GetId()); + } + return true; + } + + if (strCommand == NetMsgType::NOTFOUND) { + // We do not care about the NOTFOUND message, but logging an Unknown Command + // message would be undesirable as we transmit it ourselves. + return true; + } + + // Ignore unknown commands for extensibility + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Unknown command \"%s\" from peer=%d\n", SanitizeString(strCommand), pfrom->GetId()); + return true; +} + +bool PeerLogicValidation::SendRejectsAndCheckIfBanned(CNode* pnode, bool enable_bip61) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main) +{ + AssertLockHeld(cs_main); + CNodeState &state = *State(pnode->GetId()); + + if (enable_bip61) { + for (const CBlockReject& reject : state.rejects) { + connman->PushMessage(pnode, CNetMsgMaker(INIT_PROTO_VERSION).Make(NetMsgType::REJECT, std::string(NetMsgType::BLOCK), reject.chRejectCode, reject.strRejectReason, reject.hashBlock)); + } + } + state.rejects.clear(); + + if (state.fShouldBan) { + state.fShouldBan = false; + if (pnode->fWhitelisted) + LogPrintf("Warning: not punishing whitelisted peer %s!\n", pnode->addr.ToString()); + else if (pnode->m_manual_connection) + LogPrintf("Warning: not punishing manually-connected peer %s!\n", pnode->addr.ToString()); + else if (pnode->addr.IsLocal()) { + // Disconnect but don't ban _this_ local node + LogPrintf("Warning: disconnecting but not banning local peer %s!\n", pnode->addr.ToString()); + pnode->fDisconnect = true; + } else { + // Disconnect and ban all nodes sharing the address + if (m_banman) { + m_banman->Ban(pnode->addr, BanReasonNodeMisbehaving); + } + connman->DisconnectNode(pnode->addr); + } + return true; + } + return false; +} + +bool PeerLogicValidation::ProcessMessages(CNode* pfrom, std::atomic<bool>& interruptMsgProc) +{ + const CChainParams& chainparams = Params(); + // + // Message format + // (4) message start + // (12) command + // (4) size + // (4) checksum + // (x) data + // + bool fMoreWork = false; + + if (!pfrom->vRecvGetData.empty()) + ProcessGetData(pfrom, chainparams, connman, interruptMsgProc); + + if (pfrom->fDisconnect) + return false; + + // this maintains the order of responses + if (!pfrom->vRecvGetData.empty()) return true; + + // Don't bother if send buffer is too full to respond anyway + if (pfrom->fPauseSend) + return false; + + std::list<CNetMessage> msgs; + { + LOCK(pfrom->cs_vProcessMsg); + if (pfrom->vProcessMsg.empty()) + return false; + // Just take one message + msgs.splice(msgs.begin(), pfrom->vProcessMsg, pfrom->vProcessMsg.begin()); + pfrom->nProcessQueueSize -= msgs.front().vRecv.size() + CMessageHeader::HEADER_SIZE; + pfrom->fPauseRecv = pfrom->nProcessQueueSize > connman->GetReceiveFloodSize(); + fMoreWork = !pfrom->vProcessMsg.empty(); + } + CNetMessage& msg(msgs.front()); + + msg.SetVersion(pfrom->GetRecvVersion()); + // Scan for message start + if (memcmp(msg.hdr.pchMessageStart, chainparams.MessageStart(), CMessageHeader::MESSAGE_START_SIZE) != 0) { + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "PROCESSMESSAGE: INVALID MESSAGESTART %s peer=%d\n", SanitizeString(msg.hdr.GetCommand()), pfrom->GetId()); + pfrom->fDisconnect = true; + return false; + } + + // Read header + CMessageHeader& hdr = msg.hdr; + if (!hdr.IsValid(chainparams.MessageStart())) + { + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "PROCESSMESSAGE: ERRORS IN HEADER %s peer=%d\n", SanitizeString(hdr.GetCommand()), pfrom->GetId()); + return fMoreWork; + } + std::string strCommand = hdr.GetCommand(); + + // Message size + unsigned int nMessageSize = hdr.nMessageSize; + + // Checksum + CDataStream& vRecv = msg.vRecv; + const uint256& hash = msg.GetMessageHash(); + if (memcmp(hash.begin(), hdr.pchChecksum, CMessageHeader::CHECKSUM_SIZE) != 0) + { + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "%s(%s, %u bytes): CHECKSUM ERROR expected %s was %s\n", __func__, + SanitizeString(strCommand), nMessageSize, + HexStr(hash.begin(), hash.begin()+CMessageHeader::CHECKSUM_SIZE), + HexStr(hdr.pchChecksum, hdr.pchChecksum+CMessageHeader::CHECKSUM_SIZE)); + return fMoreWork; + } + + // Process message + bool fRet = false; + try + { + fRet = ProcessMessage(pfrom, strCommand, vRecv, msg.nTime, chainparams, connman, interruptMsgProc, m_enable_bip61); + if (interruptMsgProc) + return false; + if (!pfrom->vRecvGetData.empty()) + fMoreWork = true; + } + catch (const std::ios_base::failure& e) + { + if (m_enable_bip61) { + connman->PushMessage(pfrom, CNetMsgMaker(INIT_PROTO_VERSION).Make(NetMsgType::REJECT, strCommand, REJECT_MALFORMED, std::string("error parsing message"))); + } + if (strstr(e.what(), "end of data")) + { + // Allow exceptions from under-length message on vRecv + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "%s(%s, %u bytes): Exception '%s' caught, normally caused by a message being shorter than its stated length\n", __func__, SanitizeString(strCommand), nMessageSize, e.what()); + } + else if (strstr(e.what(), "size too large")) + { + // Allow exceptions from over-long size + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "%s(%s, %u bytes): Exception '%s' caught\n", __func__, SanitizeString(strCommand), nMessageSize, e.what()); + } + else if (strstr(e.what(), "non-canonical ReadCompactSize()")) + { + // Allow exceptions from non-canonical encoding + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "%s(%s, %u bytes): Exception '%s' caught\n", __func__, SanitizeString(strCommand), nMessageSize, e.what()); + } + else + { + PrintExceptionContinue(&e, "ProcessMessages()"); + } + } + catch (const std::exception& e) { + PrintExceptionContinue(&e, "ProcessMessages()"); + } catch (...) { + PrintExceptionContinue(nullptr, "ProcessMessages()"); + } + + if (!fRet) { + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "%s(%s, %u bytes) FAILED peer=%d\n", __func__, SanitizeString(strCommand), nMessageSize, pfrom->GetId()); + } + + LOCK(cs_main); + SendRejectsAndCheckIfBanned(pfrom, m_enable_bip61); + + return fMoreWork; +} + +void PeerLogicValidation::ConsiderEviction(CNode *pto, int64_t time_in_seconds) +{ + AssertLockHeld(cs_main); + + CNodeState &state = *State(pto->GetId()); + const CNetMsgMaker msgMaker(pto->GetSendVersion()); + + if (!state.m_chain_sync.m_protect && IsOutboundDisconnectionCandidate(pto) && state.fSyncStarted) { + // This is an outbound peer subject to disconnection if they don't + // announce a block with as much work as the current tip within + // CHAIN_SYNC_TIMEOUT + HEADERS_RESPONSE_TIME seconds (note: if + // their chain has more work than ours, we should sync to it, + // unless it's invalid, in which case we should find that out and + // disconnect from them elsewhere). + if (state.pindexBestKnownBlock != nullptr && state.pindexBestKnownBlock->nChainWork >= chainActive.Tip()->nChainWork) { + if (state.m_chain_sync.m_timeout != 0) { + state.m_chain_sync.m_timeout = 0; + state.m_chain_sync.m_work_header = nullptr; + state.m_chain_sync.m_sent_getheaders = false; + } + } else if (state.m_chain_sync.m_timeout == 0 || (state.m_chain_sync.m_work_header != nullptr && state.pindexBestKnownBlock != nullptr && state.pindexBestKnownBlock->nChainWork >= state.m_chain_sync.m_work_header->nChainWork)) { + // Our best block known by this peer is behind our tip, and we're either noticing + // that for the first time, OR this peer was able to catch up to some earlier point + // where we checked against our tip. + // Either way, set a new timeout based on current tip. + state.m_chain_sync.m_timeout = time_in_seconds + CHAIN_SYNC_TIMEOUT; + state.m_chain_sync.m_work_header = chainActive.Tip(); + state.m_chain_sync.m_sent_getheaders = false; + } else if (state.m_chain_sync.m_timeout > 0 && time_in_seconds > state.m_chain_sync.m_timeout) { + // No evidence yet that our peer has synced to a chain with work equal to that + // of our tip, when we first detected it was behind. Send a single getheaders + // message to give the peer a chance to update us. + if (state.m_chain_sync.m_sent_getheaders) { + // They've run out of time to catch up! + LogPrintf("Disconnecting outbound peer %d for old chain, best known block = %s\n", pto->GetId(), state.pindexBestKnownBlock != nullptr ? state.pindexBestKnownBlock->GetBlockHash().ToString() : "<none>"); + pto->fDisconnect = true; + } else { + assert(state.m_chain_sync.m_work_header); + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "sending getheaders to outbound peer=%d to verify chain work (current best known block:%s, benchmark blockhash: %s)\n", pto->GetId(), state.pindexBestKnownBlock != nullptr ? state.pindexBestKnownBlock->GetBlockHash().ToString() : "<none>", state.m_chain_sync.m_work_header->GetBlockHash().ToString()); + connman->PushMessage(pto, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::GETHEADERS, chainActive.GetLocator(state.m_chain_sync.m_work_header->pprev), uint256())); + state.m_chain_sync.m_sent_getheaders = true; + constexpr int64_t HEADERS_RESPONSE_TIME = 120; // 2 minutes + // Bump the timeout to allow a response, which could clear the timeout + // (if the response shows the peer has synced), reset the timeout (if + // the peer syncs to the required work but not to our tip), or result + // in disconnect (if we advance to the timeout and pindexBestKnownBlock + // has not sufficiently progressed) + state.m_chain_sync.m_timeout = time_in_seconds + HEADERS_RESPONSE_TIME; + } + } + } +} + +void PeerLogicValidation::EvictExtraOutboundPeers(int64_t time_in_seconds) +{ + // Check whether we have too many outbound peers + int extra_peers = connman->GetExtraOutboundCount(); + if (extra_peers > 0) { + // If we have more outbound peers than we target, disconnect one. + // Pick the outbound peer that least recently announced + // us a new block, with ties broken by choosing the more recent + // connection (higher node id) + NodeId worst_peer = -1; + int64_t oldest_block_announcement = std::numeric_limits<int64_t>::max(); + + connman->ForEachNode([&](CNode* pnode) { + AssertLockHeld(cs_main); + + // Ignore non-outbound peers, or nodes marked for disconnect already + if (!IsOutboundDisconnectionCandidate(pnode) || pnode->fDisconnect) return; + CNodeState *state = State(pnode->GetId()); + if (state == nullptr) return; // shouldn't be possible, but just in case + // Don't evict our protected peers + if (state->m_chain_sync.m_protect) return; + if (state->m_last_block_announcement < oldest_block_announcement || (state->m_last_block_announcement == oldest_block_announcement && pnode->GetId() > worst_peer)) { + worst_peer = pnode->GetId(); + oldest_block_announcement = state->m_last_block_announcement; + } + }); + if (worst_peer != -1) { + bool disconnected = connman->ForNode(worst_peer, [&](CNode *pnode) { + AssertLockHeld(cs_main); + + // Only disconnect a peer that has been connected to us for + // some reasonable fraction of our check-frequency, to give + // it time for new information to have arrived. + // Also don't disconnect any peer we're trying to download a + // block from. + CNodeState &state = *State(pnode->GetId()); + if (time_in_seconds - pnode->nTimeConnected > MINIMUM_CONNECT_TIME && state.nBlocksInFlight == 0) { + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "disconnecting extra outbound peer=%d (last block announcement received at time %d)\n", pnode->GetId(), oldest_block_announcement); + pnode->fDisconnect = true; + return true; + } else { + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "keeping outbound peer=%d chosen for eviction (connect time: %d, blocks_in_flight: %d)\n", pnode->GetId(), pnode->nTimeConnected, state.nBlocksInFlight); + return false; + } + }); + if (disconnected) { + // If we disconnected an extra peer, that means we successfully + // connected to at least one peer after the last time we + // detected a stale tip. Don't try any more extra peers until + // we next detect a stale tip, to limit the load we put on the + // network from these extra connections. + connman->SetTryNewOutboundPeer(false); + } + } + } +} + +void PeerLogicValidation::CheckForStaleTipAndEvictPeers(const Consensus::Params &consensusParams) +{ + LOCK(cs_main); + + if (connman == nullptr) return; + + int64_t time_in_seconds = GetTime(); + + EvictExtraOutboundPeers(time_in_seconds); + + if (time_in_seconds > m_stale_tip_check_time) { + // Check whether our tip is stale, and if so, allow using an extra + // outbound peer + if (!fImporting && !fReindex && connman->GetNetworkActive() && connman->GetUseAddrmanOutgoing() && TipMayBeStale(consensusParams)) { + LogPrintf("Potential stale tip detected, will try using extra outbound peer (last tip update: %d seconds ago)\n", time_in_seconds - g_last_tip_update); + connman->SetTryNewOutboundPeer(true); + } else if (connman->GetTryNewOutboundPeer()) { + connman->SetTryNewOutboundPeer(false); + } + m_stale_tip_check_time = time_in_seconds + STALE_CHECK_INTERVAL; + } +} + +namespace { +class CompareInvMempoolOrder +{ + CTxMemPool *mp; +public: + explicit CompareInvMempoolOrder(CTxMemPool *_mempool) + { + mp = _mempool; + } + + bool operator()(std::set<uint256>::iterator a, std::set<uint256>::iterator b) + { + /* As std::make_heap produces a max-heap, we want the entries with the + * fewest ancestors/highest fee to sort later. */ + return mp->CompareDepthAndScore(*b, *a); + } +}; +} + +bool PeerLogicValidation::SendMessages(CNode* pto) +{ + const Consensus::Params& consensusParams = Params().GetConsensus(); + { + // Don't send anything until the version handshake is complete + if (!pto->fSuccessfullyConnected || pto->fDisconnect) + return true; + + // If we get here, the outgoing message serialization version is set and can't change. + const CNetMsgMaker msgMaker(pto->GetSendVersion()); + + // + // Message: ping + // + bool pingSend = false; + if (pto->fPingQueued) { + // RPC ping request by user + pingSend = true; + } + if (pto->nPingNonceSent == 0 && pto->nPingUsecStart + PING_INTERVAL * 1000000 < GetTimeMicros()) { + // Ping automatically sent as a latency probe & keepalive. + pingSend = true; + } + if (pingSend) { + uint64_t nonce = 0; + while (nonce == 0) { + GetRandBytes((unsigned char*)&nonce, sizeof(nonce)); + } + pto->fPingQueued = false; + pto->nPingUsecStart = GetTimeMicros(); + if (pto->nVersion > BIP0031_VERSION) { + pto->nPingNonceSent = nonce; + connman->PushMessage(pto, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::PING, nonce)); + } else { + // Peer is too old to support ping command with nonce, pong will never arrive. + pto->nPingNonceSent = 0; + connman->PushMessage(pto, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::PING)); + } + } + + TRY_LOCK(cs_main, lockMain); // Acquire cs_main for IsInitialBlockDownload() and CNodeState() + if (!lockMain) + return true; + + if (SendRejectsAndCheckIfBanned(pto, m_enable_bip61)) return true; + CNodeState &state = *State(pto->GetId()); + + // Address refresh broadcast + int64_t nNow = GetTimeMicros(); + if (!IsInitialBlockDownload() && pto->nNextLocalAddrSend < nNow) { + AdvertiseLocal(pto); + pto->nNextLocalAddrSend = PoissonNextSend(nNow, AVG_LOCAL_ADDRESS_BROADCAST_INTERVAL); + } + + // + // Message: addr + // + if (pto->nNextAddrSend < nNow) { + pto->nNextAddrSend = PoissonNextSend(nNow, AVG_ADDRESS_BROADCAST_INTERVAL); + std::vector<CAddress> vAddr; + vAddr.reserve(pto->vAddrToSend.size()); + for (const CAddress& addr : pto->vAddrToSend) + { + if (!pto->addrKnown.contains(addr.GetKey())) + { + pto->addrKnown.insert(addr.GetKey()); + vAddr.push_back(addr); + // receiver rejects addr messages larger than 1000 + if (vAddr.size() >= 1000) + { + connman->PushMessage(pto, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::ADDR, vAddr)); + vAddr.clear(); + } + } + } + pto->vAddrToSend.clear(); + if (!vAddr.empty()) + connman->PushMessage(pto, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::ADDR, vAddr)); + // we only send the big addr message once + if (pto->vAddrToSend.capacity() > 40) + pto->vAddrToSend.shrink_to_fit(); + } + + // Start block sync + if (pindexBestHeader == nullptr) + pindexBestHeader = chainActive.Tip(); + bool fFetch = state.fPreferredDownload || (nPreferredDownload == 0 && !pto->fClient && !pto->fOneShot); // Download if this is a nice peer, or we have no nice peers and this one might do. + if (!state.fSyncStarted && !pto->fClient && !fImporting && !fReindex) { + // Only actively request headers from a single peer, unless we're close to today. + if ((nSyncStarted == 0 && fFetch) || pindexBestHeader->GetBlockTime() > GetAdjustedTime() - 24 * 60 * 60) { + state.fSyncStarted = true; + state.nHeadersSyncTimeout = GetTimeMicros() + HEADERS_DOWNLOAD_TIMEOUT_BASE + HEADERS_DOWNLOAD_TIMEOUT_PER_HEADER * (GetAdjustedTime() - pindexBestHeader->GetBlockTime())/(consensusParams.nPowTargetSpacing); + nSyncStarted++; + const CBlockIndex *pindexStart = pindexBestHeader; + /* If possible, start at the block preceding the currently + best known header. This ensures that we always get a + non-empty list of headers back as long as the peer + is up-to-date. With a non-empty response, we can initialise + the peer's known best block. This wouldn't be possible + if we requested starting at pindexBestHeader and + got back an empty response. */ + if (pindexStart->pprev) + pindexStart = pindexStart->pprev; + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "initial getheaders (%d) to peer=%d (startheight:%d)\n", pindexStart->nHeight, pto->GetId(), pto->nStartingHeight); + connman->PushMessage(pto, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::GETHEADERS, chainActive.GetLocator(pindexStart), uint256())); + } + } + + // Resend wallet transactions that haven't gotten in a block yet + // Except during reindex, importing and IBD, when old wallet + // transactions become unconfirmed and spams other nodes. + if (!fReindex && !fImporting && !IsInitialBlockDownload()) + { + GetMainSignals().Broadcast(nTimeBestReceived, connman); + } + + // + // Try sending block announcements via headers + // + { + // If we have less than MAX_BLOCKS_TO_ANNOUNCE in our + // list of block hashes we're relaying, and our peer wants + // headers announcements, then find the first header + // not yet known to our peer but would connect, and send. + // If no header would connect, or if we have too many + // blocks, or if the peer doesn't want headers, just + // add all to the inv queue. + LOCK(pto->cs_inventory); + std::vector<CBlock> vHeaders; + bool fRevertToInv = ((!state.fPreferHeaders && + (!state.fPreferHeaderAndIDs || pto->vBlockHashesToAnnounce.size() > 1)) || + pto->vBlockHashesToAnnounce.size() > MAX_BLOCKS_TO_ANNOUNCE); + const CBlockIndex *pBestIndex = nullptr; // last header queued for delivery + ProcessBlockAvailability(pto->GetId()); // ensure pindexBestKnownBlock is up-to-date + + if (!fRevertToInv) { + bool fFoundStartingHeader = false; + // Try to find first header that our peer doesn't have, and + // then send all headers past that one. If we come across any + // headers that aren't on chainActive, give up. + for (const uint256 &hash : pto->vBlockHashesToAnnounce) { + const CBlockIndex* pindex = LookupBlockIndex(hash); + assert(pindex); + if (chainActive[pindex->nHeight] != pindex) { + // Bail out if we reorged away from this block + fRevertToInv = true; + break; + } + if (pBestIndex != nullptr && pindex->pprev != pBestIndex) { + // This means that the list of blocks to announce don't + // connect to each other. + // This shouldn't really be possible to hit during + // regular operation (because reorgs should take us to + // a chain that has some block not on the prior chain, + // which should be caught by the prior check), but one + // way this could happen is by using invalidateblock / + // reconsiderblock repeatedly on the tip, causing it to + // be added multiple times to vBlockHashesToAnnounce. + // Robustly deal with this rare situation by reverting + // to an inv. + fRevertToInv = true; + break; + } + pBestIndex = pindex; + if (fFoundStartingHeader) { + // add this to the headers message + vHeaders.push_back(pindex->GetBlockHeader()); + } else if (PeerHasHeader(&state, pindex)) { + continue; // keep looking for the first new block + } else if (pindex->pprev == nullptr || PeerHasHeader(&state, pindex->pprev)) { + // Peer doesn't have this header but they do have the prior one. + // Start sending headers. + fFoundStartingHeader = true; + vHeaders.push_back(pindex->GetBlockHeader()); + } else { + // Peer doesn't have this header or the prior one -- nothing will + // connect, so bail out. + fRevertToInv = true; + break; + } + } + } + if (!fRevertToInv && !vHeaders.empty()) { + if (vHeaders.size() == 1 && state.fPreferHeaderAndIDs) { + // We only send up to 1 block as header-and-ids, as otherwise + // probably means we're doing an initial-ish-sync or they're slow + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "%s sending header-and-ids %s to peer=%d\n", __func__, + vHeaders.front().GetHash().ToString(), pto->GetId()); + + int nSendFlags = state.fWantsCmpctWitness ? 0 : SERIALIZE_TRANSACTION_NO_WITNESS; + + bool fGotBlockFromCache = false; + { + LOCK(cs_most_recent_block); + if (most_recent_block_hash == pBestIndex->GetBlockHash()) { + if (state.fWantsCmpctWitness || !fWitnessesPresentInMostRecentCompactBlock) + connman->PushMessage(pto, msgMaker.Make(nSendFlags, NetMsgType::CMPCTBLOCK, *most_recent_compact_block)); + else { + CBlockHeaderAndShortTxIDs cmpctblock(*most_recent_block, state.fWantsCmpctWitness); + connman->PushMessage(pto, msgMaker.Make(nSendFlags, NetMsgType::CMPCTBLOCK, cmpctblock)); + } + fGotBlockFromCache = true; + } + } + if (!fGotBlockFromCache) { + CBlock block; + bool ret = ReadBlockFromDisk(block, pBestIndex, consensusParams); + assert(ret); + CBlockHeaderAndShortTxIDs cmpctblock(block, state.fWantsCmpctWitness); + connman->PushMessage(pto, msgMaker.Make(nSendFlags, NetMsgType::CMPCTBLOCK, cmpctblock)); + } + state.pindexBestHeaderSent = pBestIndex; + } else if (state.fPreferHeaders) { + if (vHeaders.size() > 1) { + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "%s: %u headers, range (%s, %s), to peer=%d\n", __func__, + vHeaders.size(), + vHeaders.front().GetHash().ToString(), + vHeaders.back().GetHash().ToString(), pto->GetId()); + } else { + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "%s: sending header %s to peer=%d\n", __func__, + vHeaders.front().GetHash().ToString(), pto->GetId()); + } + connman->PushMessage(pto, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::HEADERS, vHeaders)); + state.pindexBestHeaderSent = pBestIndex; + } else + fRevertToInv = true; + } + if (fRevertToInv) { + // If falling back to using an inv, just try to inv the tip. + // The last entry in vBlockHashesToAnnounce was our tip at some point + // in the past. + if (!pto->vBlockHashesToAnnounce.empty()) { + const uint256 &hashToAnnounce = pto->vBlockHashesToAnnounce.back(); + const CBlockIndex* pindex = LookupBlockIndex(hashToAnnounce); + assert(pindex); + + // Warn if we're announcing a block that is not on the main chain. + // This should be very rare and could be optimized out. + // Just log for now. + if (chainActive[pindex->nHeight] != pindex) { + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Announcing block %s not on main chain (tip=%s)\n", + hashToAnnounce.ToString(), chainActive.Tip()->GetBlockHash().ToString()); + } + + // If the peer's chain has this block, don't inv it back. + if (!PeerHasHeader(&state, pindex)) { + pto->PushInventory(CInv(MSG_BLOCK, hashToAnnounce)); + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "%s: sending inv peer=%d hash=%s\n", __func__, + pto->GetId(), hashToAnnounce.ToString()); + } + } + } + pto->vBlockHashesToAnnounce.clear(); + } + + // + // Message: inventory + // + std::vector<CInv> vInv; + { + LOCK(pto->cs_inventory); + vInv.reserve(std::max<size_t>(pto->vInventoryBlockToSend.size(), INVENTORY_BROADCAST_MAX)); + + // Add blocks + for (const uint256& hash : pto->vInventoryBlockToSend) { + vInv.push_back(CInv(MSG_BLOCK, hash)); + if (vInv.size() == MAX_INV_SZ) { + connman->PushMessage(pto, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::INV, vInv)); + vInv.clear(); + } + } + pto->vInventoryBlockToSend.clear(); + + // Check whether periodic sends should happen + bool fSendTrickle = pto->fWhitelisted; + if (pto->nNextInvSend < nNow) { + fSendTrickle = true; + if (pto->fInbound) { + pto->nNextInvSend = connman->PoissonNextSendInbound(nNow, INVENTORY_BROADCAST_INTERVAL); + } else { + // Use half the delay for outbound peers, as there is less privacy concern for them. + pto->nNextInvSend = PoissonNextSend(nNow, INVENTORY_BROADCAST_INTERVAL >> 1); + } + } + + // Time to send but the peer has requested we not relay transactions. + if (fSendTrickle) { + LOCK(pto->cs_filter); + if (!pto->fRelayTxes) pto->setInventoryTxToSend.clear(); + } + + // Respond to BIP35 mempool requests + if (fSendTrickle && pto->fSendMempool) { + auto vtxinfo = mempool.infoAll(); + pto->fSendMempool = false; + CAmount filterrate = 0; + { + LOCK(pto->cs_feeFilter); + filterrate = pto->minFeeFilter; + } + + LOCK(pto->cs_filter); + + for (const auto& txinfo : vtxinfo) { + const uint256& hash = txinfo.tx->GetHash(); + CInv inv(MSG_TX, hash); + pto->setInventoryTxToSend.erase(hash); + if (filterrate) { + if (txinfo.feeRate.GetFeePerK() < filterrate) + continue; + } + if (pto->pfilter) { + if (!pto->pfilter->IsRelevantAndUpdate(*txinfo.tx)) continue; + } + pto->filterInventoryKnown.insert(hash); + vInv.push_back(inv); + if (vInv.size() == MAX_INV_SZ) { + connman->PushMessage(pto, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::INV, vInv)); + vInv.clear(); + } + } + pto->timeLastMempoolReq = GetTime(); + } + + // Determine transactions to relay + if (fSendTrickle) { + // Produce a vector with all candidates for sending + std::vector<std::set<uint256>::iterator> vInvTx; + vInvTx.reserve(pto->setInventoryTxToSend.size()); + for (std::set<uint256>::iterator it = pto->setInventoryTxToSend.begin(); it != pto->setInventoryTxToSend.end(); it++) { + vInvTx.push_back(it); + } + CAmount filterrate = 0; + { + LOCK(pto->cs_feeFilter); + filterrate = pto->minFeeFilter; + } + // Topologically and fee-rate sort the inventory we send for privacy and priority reasons. + // A heap is used so that not all items need sorting if only a few are being sent. + CompareInvMempoolOrder compareInvMempoolOrder(&mempool); + std::make_heap(vInvTx.begin(), vInvTx.end(), compareInvMempoolOrder); + // No reason to drain out at many times the network's capacity, + // especially since we have many peers and some will draw much shorter delays. + unsigned int nRelayedTransactions = 0; + LOCK(pto->cs_filter); + while (!vInvTx.empty() && nRelayedTransactions < INVENTORY_BROADCAST_MAX) { + // Fetch the top element from the heap + std::pop_heap(vInvTx.begin(), vInvTx.end(), compareInvMempoolOrder); + std::set<uint256>::iterator it = vInvTx.back(); + vInvTx.pop_back(); + uint256 hash = *it; + // Remove it from the to-be-sent set + pto->setInventoryTxToSend.erase(it); + // Check if not in the filter already + if (pto->filterInventoryKnown.contains(hash)) { + continue; + } + // Not in the mempool anymore? don't bother sending it. + auto txinfo = mempool.info(hash); + if (!txinfo.tx) { + continue; + } + if (filterrate && txinfo.feeRate.GetFeePerK() < filterrate) { + continue; + } + if (pto->pfilter && !pto->pfilter->IsRelevantAndUpdate(*txinfo.tx)) continue; + // Send + vInv.push_back(CInv(MSG_TX, hash)); + nRelayedTransactions++; + { + // Expire old relay messages + while (!vRelayExpiration.empty() && vRelayExpiration.front().first < nNow) + { + mapRelay.erase(vRelayExpiration.front().second); + vRelayExpiration.pop_front(); + } + + auto ret = mapRelay.insert(std::make_pair(hash, std::move(txinfo.tx))); + if (ret.second) { + vRelayExpiration.push_back(std::make_pair(nNow + 15 * 60 * 1000000, ret.first)); + } + } + if (vInv.size() == MAX_INV_SZ) { + connman->PushMessage(pto, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::INV, vInv)); + vInv.clear(); + } + pto->filterInventoryKnown.insert(hash); + } + } + } + if (!vInv.empty()) + connman->PushMessage(pto, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::INV, vInv)); + + // Detect whether we're stalling + nNow = GetTimeMicros(); + if (state.nStallingSince && state.nStallingSince < nNow - 1000000 * BLOCK_STALLING_TIMEOUT) { + // Stalling only triggers when the block download window cannot move. During normal steady state, + // the download window should be much larger than the to-be-downloaded set of blocks, so disconnection + // should only happen during initial block download. + LogPrintf("Peer=%d is stalling block download, disconnecting\n", pto->GetId()); + pto->fDisconnect = true; + return true; + } + // In case there is a block that has been in flight from this peer for 2 + 0.5 * N times the block interval + // (with N the number of peers from which we're downloading validated blocks), disconnect due to timeout. + // We compensate for other peers to prevent killing off peers due to our own downstream link + // being saturated. We only count validated in-flight blocks so peers can't advertise non-existing block hashes + // to unreasonably increase our timeout. + if (state.vBlocksInFlight.size() > 0) { + QueuedBlock &queuedBlock = state.vBlocksInFlight.front(); + int nOtherPeersWithValidatedDownloads = nPeersWithValidatedDownloads - (state.nBlocksInFlightValidHeaders > 0); + if (nNow > state.nDownloadingSince + consensusParams.nPowTargetSpacing * (BLOCK_DOWNLOAD_TIMEOUT_BASE + BLOCK_DOWNLOAD_TIMEOUT_PER_PEER * nOtherPeersWithValidatedDownloads)) { + LogPrintf("Timeout downloading block %s from peer=%d, disconnecting\n", queuedBlock.hash.ToString(), pto->GetId()); + pto->fDisconnect = true; + return true; + } + } + // Check for headers sync timeouts + if (state.fSyncStarted && state.nHeadersSyncTimeout < std::numeric_limits<int64_t>::max()) { + // Detect whether this is a stalling initial-headers-sync peer + if (pindexBestHeader->GetBlockTime() <= GetAdjustedTime() - 24*60*60) { + if (nNow > state.nHeadersSyncTimeout && nSyncStarted == 1 && (nPreferredDownload - state.fPreferredDownload >= 1)) { + // Disconnect a (non-whitelisted) peer if it is our only sync peer, + // and we have others we could be using instead. + // Note: If all our peers are inbound, then we won't + // disconnect our sync peer for stalling; we have bigger + // problems if we can't get any outbound peers. + if (!pto->fWhitelisted) { + LogPrintf("Timeout downloading headers from peer=%d, disconnecting\n", pto->GetId()); + pto->fDisconnect = true; + return true; + } else { + LogPrintf("Timeout downloading headers from whitelisted peer=%d, not disconnecting\n", pto->GetId()); + // Reset the headers sync state so that we have a + // chance to try downloading from a different peer. + // Note: this will also result in at least one more + // getheaders message to be sent to + // this peer (eventually). + state.fSyncStarted = false; + nSyncStarted--; + state.nHeadersSyncTimeout = 0; + } + } + } else { + // After we've caught up once, reset the timeout so we can't trigger + // disconnect later. + state.nHeadersSyncTimeout = std::numeric_limits<int64_t>::max(); + } + } + + // Check that outbound peers have reasonable chains + // GetTime() is used by this anti-DoS logic so we can test this using mocktime + ConsiderEviction(pto, GetTime()); + + // + // Message: getdata (blocks) + // + std::vector<CInv> vGetData; + if (!pto->fClient && ((fFetch && !pto->m_limited_node) || !IsInitialBlockDownload()) && state.nBlocksInFlight < MAX_BLOCKS_IN_TRANSIT_PER_PEER) { + std::vector<const CBlockIndex*> vToDownload; + NodeId staller = -1; + FindNextBlocksToDownload(pto->GetId(), MAX_BLOCKS_IN_TRANSIT_PER_PEER - state.nBlocksInFlight, vToDownload, staller, consensusParams); + for (const CBlockIndex *pindex : vToDownload) { + uint32_t nFetchFlags = GetFetchFlags(pto); + vGetData.push_back(CInv(MSG_BLOCK | nFetchFlags, pindex->GetBlockHash())); + MarkBlockAsInFlight(pto->GetId(), pindex->GetBlockHash(), pindex); + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Requesting block %s (%d) peer=%d\n", pindex->GetBlockHash().ToString(), + pindex->nHeight, pto->GetId()); + } + if (state.nBlocksInFlight == 0 && staller != -1) { + if (State(staller)->nStallingSince == 0) { + State(staller)->nStallingSince = nNow; + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Stall started peer=%d\n", staller); + } + } + } + + // + // Message: getdata (non-blocks) + // + auto& tx_process_time = state.m_tx_download.m_tx_process_time; + while (!tx_process_time.empty() && tx_process_time.begin()->first <= nNow && state.m_tx_download.m_tx_in_flight.size() < MAX_PEER_TX_IN_FLIGHT) { + const uint256& txid = tx_process_time.begin()->second; + CInv inv(MSG_TX | GetFetchFlags(pto), txid); + if (!AlreadyHave(inv)) { + // If this transaction was last requested more than 1 minute ago, + // then request. + int64_t last_request_time = GetTxRequestTime(inv.hash); + if (last_request_time <= nNow - GETDATA_TX_INTERVAL) { + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Requesting %s peer=%d\n", inv.ToString(), pto->GetId()); + vGetData.push_back(inv); + if (vGetData.size() >= MAX_GETDATA_SZ) { + connman->PushMessage(pto, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::GETDATA, vGetData)); + vGetData.clear(); + } + UpdateTxRequestTime(inv.hash, nNow); + state.m_tx_download.m_tx_in_flight.insert(inv.hash); + } else { + // This transaction is in flight from someone else; queue + // up processing to happen after the download times out + // (with a slight delay for inbound peers, to prefer + // requests to outbound peers). + RequestTx(&state, txid, nNow); + } + } else { + // We have already seen this transaction, no need to download. + state.m_tx_download.m_tx_announced.erase(inv.hash); + state.m_tx_download.m_tx_in_flight.erase(inv.hash); + } + tx_process_time.erase(tx_process_time.begin()); + } + + + if (!vGetData.empty()) + connman->PushMessage(pto, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::GETDATA, vGetData)); + + // + // Message: feefilter + // + // We don't want white listed peers to filter txs to us if we have -whitelistforcerelay + if (pto->nVersion >= FEEFILTER_VERSION && gArgs.GetBoolArg("-feefilter", DEFAULT_FEEFILTER) && + !(pto->fWhitelisted && gArgs.GetBoolArg("-whitelistforcerelay", DEFAULT_WHITELISTFORCERELAY))) { + CAmount currentFilter = mempool.GetMinFee(gArgs.GetArg("-maxmempool", DEFAULT_MAX_MEMPOOL_SIZE) * 1000000).GetFeePerK(); + int64_t timeNow = GetTimeMicros(); + if (timeNow > pto->nextSendTimeFeeFilter) { + static CFeeRate default_feerate(DEFAULT_MIN_RELAY_TX_FEE); + static FeeFilterRounder filterRounder(default_feerate); + CAmount filterToSend = filterRounder.round(currentFilter); + // We always have a fee filter of at least minRelayTxFee + filterToSend = std::max(filterToSend, ::minRelayTxFee.GetFeePerK()); + if (filterToSend != pto->lastSentFeeFilter) { + connman->PushMessage(pto, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::FEEFILTER, filterToSend)); + pto->lastSentFeeFilter = filterToSend; + } + pto->nextSendTimeFeeFilter = PoissonNextSend(timeNow, AVG_FEEFILTER_BROADCAST_INTERVAL); + } + // If the fee filter has changed substantially and it's still more than MAX_FEEFILTER_CHANGE_DELAY + // until scheduled broadcast, then move the broadcast to within MAX_FEEFILTER_CHANGE_DELAY. + else if (timeNow + MAX_FEEFILTER_CHANGE_DELAY * 1000000 < pto->nextSendTimeFeeFilter && + (currentFilter < 3 * pto->lastSentFeeFilter / 4 || currentFilter > 4 * pto->lastSentFeeFilter / 3)) { + pto->nextSendTimeFeeFilter = timeNow + GetRandInt(MAX_FEEFILTER_CHANGE_DELAY) * 1000000; + } + } + } + return true; +} + +class CNetProcessingCleanup +{ +public: + CNetProcessingCleanup() {} + ~CNetProcessingCleanup() { + // orphan transactions + mapOrphanTransactions.clear(); + mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev.clear(); + } +} instance_of_cnetprocessingcleanup; |