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-rw-r--r--src/net_processing.cpp91
1 files changed, 57 insertions, 34 deletions
diff --git a/src/net_processing.cpp b/src/net_processing.cpp
index 7f3af68042..a416093db1 100644
--- a/src/net_processing.cpp
+++ b/src/net_processing.cpp
@@ -959,6 +959,34 @@ void Misbehaving(NodeId pnode, int howmuch, const std::string& message) EXCLUSIV
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "%s: %s peer=%d (%d -> %d)%s\n", __func__, state->name, pnode, state->nMisbehavior-howmuch, state->nMisbehavior, message_prefixed);
}
+static bool TxRelayMayResultInDisconnect(const CValidationState& state)
+{
+ return (state.GetDoS() > 0);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Potentially ban a node based on the contents of a CValidationState object
+ * TODO: net_processing should make the punish decision based on the reason
+ * a tx/block was invalid, rather than just the nDoS score handed back by validation.
+ *
+ * @parameter via_compact_block: this bool is passed in because net_processing should
+ * punish peers differently depending on whether the data was provided in a compact
+ * block message or not. If the compact block had a valid header, but contained invalid
+ * txs, the peer should not be punished. See BIP 152.
+ */
+static bool MaybePunishNode(NodeId nodeid, const CValidationState& state, bool via_compact_block, const std::string& message = "") {
+ int nDoS = state.GetDoS();
+ if (nDoS > 0 && !via_compact_block) {
+ LOCK(cs_main);
+ Misbehaving(nodeid, nDoS, message);
+ return true;
+ }
+ if (message != "") {
+ LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "peer=%d: %s\n", nodeid, message);
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
@@ -1132,14 +1160,12 @@ void PeerLogicValidation::BlockChecked(const CBlock& block, const CValidationSta
const uint256 hash(block.GetHash());
std::map<uint256, std::pair<NodeId, bool>>::iterator it = mapBlockSource.find(hash);
- int nDoS = 0;
- if (state.IsInvalid(nDoS)) {
+ if (state.IsInvalid()) {
// Don't send reject message with code 0 or an internal reject code.
if (it != mapBlockSource.end() && State(it->second.first) && state.GetRejectCode() > 0 && state.GetRejectCode() < REJECT_INTERNAL) {
CBlockReject reject = {(unsigned char)state.GetRejectCode(), state.GetRejectReason().substr(0, MAX_REJECT_MESSAGE_LENGTH), hash};
State(it->second.first)->rejects.push_back(reject);
- if (nDoS > 0 && it->second.second)
- Misbehaving(it->second.first, nDoS);
+ MaybePunishNode(/*nodeid=*/ it->second.first, state, /*via_compact_block=*/ !it->second.second);
}
}
// Check that:
@@ -1551,14 +1577,7 @@ bool static ProcessHeadersMessage(CNode *pfrom, CConnman *connman, const std::ve
CValidationState state;
CBlockHeader first_invalid_header;
if (!ProcessNewBlockHeaders(headers, state, chainparams, &pindexLast, &first_invalid_header)) {
- int nDoS;
- if (state.IsInvalid(nDoS)) {
- LOCK(cs_main);
- if (nDoS > 0) {
- Misbehaving(pfrom->GetId(), nDoS, "invalid header received");
- } else {
- LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "peer=%d: invalid header received\n", pfrom->GetId());
- }
+ if (state.IsInvalid()) {
if (punish_duplicate_invalid && LookupBlockIndex(first_invalid_header.GetHash())) {
// Goal: don't allow outbound peers to use up our outbound
// connection slots if they are on incompatible chains.
@@ -1593,6 +1612,7 @@ bool static ProcessHeadersMessage(CNode *pfrom, CConnman *connman, const std::ve
// etc), and not just the duplicate-invalid case.
pfrom->fDisconnect = true;
}
+ MaybePunishNode(pfrom->GetId(), state, /*via_compact_block*/ false, "invalid header received");
return false;
}
}
@@ -1727,9 +1747,9 @@ void static ProcessOrphanTx(CConnman* connman, std::set<uint256>& orphan_work_se
const CTransaction& orphanTx = *porphanTx;
NodeId fromPeer = orphan_it->second.fromPeer;
bool fMissingInputs2 = false;
- // Use a dummy CValidationState so someone can't setup nodes to counter-DoS based on orphan
- // resolution (that is, feeding people an invalid transaction based on LegitTxX in order to get
- // anyone relaying LegitTxX banned)
+ // Use a new CValidationState because orphans come from different peers (and we call
+ // MaybePunishNode based on the source peer from the orphan map, not based on the peer
+ // that relayed the previous transaction).
CValidationState orphan_state;
if (setMisbehaving.count(fromPeer)) continue;
@@ -1747,11 +1767,11 @@ void static ProcessOrphanTx(CConnman* connman, std::set<uint256>& orphan_work_se
EraseOrphanTx(orphanHash);
done = true;
} else if (!fMissingInputs2) {
- int nDos = 0;
- if (orphan_state.IsInvalid(nDos) && nDos > 0) {
+ if (orphan_state.IsInvalid()) {
// Punish peer that gave us an invalid orphan tx
- Misbehaving(fromPeer, nDos);
- setMisbehaving.insert(fromPeer);
+ if (MaybePunishNode(fromPeer, orphan_state, /*via_compact_block*/ false)) {
+ setMisbehaving.insert(fromPeer);
+ }
LogPrint(BCLog::MEMPOOL, " invalid orphan tx %s\n", orphanHash.ToString());
}
// Has inputs but not accepted to mempool
@@ -2496,8 +2516,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr
// Never relay transactions that we would assign a non-zero DoS
// score for, as we expect peers to do the same with us in that
// case.
- int nDoS = 0;
- if (!state.IsInvalid(nDoS) || nDoS == 0) {
+ if (!state.IsInvalid() || !TxRelayMayResultInDisconnect(state)) {
LogPrintf("Force relaying tx %s from whitelisted peer=%d\n", tx.GetHash().ToString(), pfrom->GetId());
RelayTransaction(tx, connman);
} else {
@@ -2526,8 +2545,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr
// peer simply for relaying a tx that our recentRejects has caught,
// regardless of false positives.
- int nDoS = 0;
- if (state.IsInvalid(nDoS))
+ if (state.IsInvalid())
{
LogPrint(BCLog::MEMPOOLREJ, "%s from peer=%d was not accepted: %s\n", tx.GetHash().ToString(),
pfrom->GetId(),
@@ -2536,9 +2554,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr
connman->PushMessage(pfrom, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::REJECT, strCommand, (unsigned char)state.GetRejectCode(),
state.GetRejectReason().substr(0, MAX_REJECT_MESSAGE_LENGTH), inv.hash));
}
- if (nDoS > 0) {
- Misbehaving(pfrom->GetId(), nDoS);
- }
+ MaybePunishNode(pfrom->GetId(), state, /*via_compact_block*/ false);
}
return true;
}
@@ -2574,14 +2590,21 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr
const CBlockIndex *pindex = nullptr;
CValidationState state;
if (!ProcessNewBlockHeaders({cmpctblock.header}, state, chainparams, &pindex)) {
- int nDoS;
- if (state.IsInvalid(nDoS)) {
- if (nDoS > 0) {
- LOCK(cs_main);
- Misbehaving(pfrom->GetId(), nDoS, strprintf("Peer %d sent us invalid header via cmpctblock\n", pfrom->GetId()));
- } else {
- LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Peer %d sent us invalid header via cmpctblock\n", pfrom->GetId());
- }
+ if (state.IsInvalid() && received_new_header) {
+ // In this situation, the block header is known to be invalid.
+ // If we never created a CBlockIndex entry for it, then the
+ // header must be bad just by inspection (and is not one that
+ // looked okay but the block later turned out to be invalid for
+ // some other reason).
+ // We should punish compact block peers that give us an invalid
+ // header (other than a "duplicate-invalid" one, see
+ // ProcessHeadersMessage), so set via_compact_block to false
+ // here.
+ // TODO: when we switch from DoS scores to reasons that
+ // tx/blocks are invalid, this call should set
+ // via_compact_block to true, since MaybePunishNode will have
+ // sufficient information to act correctly.
+ MaybePunishNode(pfrom->GetId(), state, /*via_compact_block*/ false, "invalid header via cmpctblock");
return true;
}
}