diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/net.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/net.h | 34 |
1 files changed, 17 insertions, 17 deletions
@@ -768,6 +768,9 @@ public: std::vector<NetWhitebindPermissions> vWhiteBinds; std::vector<CService> vBinds; std::vector<CService> onion_binds; + /// True if the user did not specify -bind= or -whitebind= and thus + /// we should bind on `0.0.0.0` (IPv4) and `::` (IPv6). + bool bind_on_any; bool m_use_addrman_outgoing = true; std::vector<std::string> m_specified_outgoing; std::vector<std::string> m_added_nodes; @@ -962,10 +965,7 @@ private: bool BindListenPort(const CService& bindAddr, bilingual_str& strError, NetPermissionFlags permissions); bool Bind(const CService& addr, unsigned int flags, NetPermissionFlags permissions); - bool InitBinds( - const std::vector<CService>& binds, - const std::vector<NetWhitebindPermissions>& whiteBinds, - const std::vector<CService>& onion_binds); + bool InitBinds(const Options& options); void ThreadOpenAddedConnections(); void AddAddrFetch(const std::string& strDest); @@ -1209,7 +1209,7 @@ struct NodeEvictionCandidate uint64_t nKeyedNetGroup; bool prefer_evict; bool m_is_local; - bool m_is_onion; + Network m_network; }; /** @@ -1227,20 +1227,20 @@ struct NodeEvictionCandidate * longest, to replicate the non-eviction implicit behavior and preclude attacks * that start later. * - * Half of these protected spots (1/4 of the total) are reserved for onion peers - * connected via our tor control service, if any, sorted by longest uptime, even - * if they're not longest uptime overall. Any remaining slots of the 1/4 are - * then allocated to protect localhost peers, if any (or up to 2 localhost peers - * if no slots remain and 2 or more onion peers were protected), sorted by - * longest uptime, as manually configured hidden services not using - * `-bind=addr[:port]=onion` will not be detected as inbound onion connections. + * Half of these protected spots (1/4 of the total) are reserved for the + * following categories of peers, sorted by longest uptime, even if they're not + * longest uptime overall: + * + * - onion peers connected via our tor control service + * + * - localhost peers, as manually configured hidden services not using + * `-bind=addr[:port]=onion` will not be detected as inbound onion connections * - * This helps protect onion peers, which tend to be otherwise disadvantaged - * under our eviction criteria for their higher min ping times relative to IPv4 - * and IPv6 peers, and favorise the diversity of peer connections. + * - I2P peers * - * This function was extracted from SelectNodeToEvict() to be able to test the - * ratio-based protection logic deterministically. + * This helps protect these privacy network peers, which tend to be otherwise + * disadvantaged under our eviction criteria for their higher min ping times + * relative to IPv4/IPv6 peers, and favorise the diversity of peer connections. */ void ProtectEvictionCandidatesByRatio(std::vector<NodeEvictionCandidate>& vEvictionCandidates); |