diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/main.cpp')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/main.cpp | 20 |
1 files changed, 10 insertions, 10 deletions
diff --git a/src/main.cpp b/src/main.cpp index 2c12e08492..263c2abf6f 100644 --- a/src/main.cpp +++ b/src/main.cpp @@ -941,7 +941,7 @@ bool AcceptToMemoryPool(CTxMemPool& pool, CValidationState &state, const CTransa // do all inputs exist? // Note that this does not check for the presence of actual outputs (see the next check for that), - // only helps filling in pfMissingInputs (to determine missing vs spent). + // and only helps with filling in pfMissingInputs (to determine missing vs spent). BOOST_FOREACH(const CTxIn txin, tx.vin) { if (!view.HaveCoins(txin.prevout.hash)) { if (pfMissingInputs) @@ -1277,8 +1277,8 @@ void CheckForkWarningConditionsOnNewFork(CBlockIndex* pindexNewForkTip) pfork = pfork->pprev; } - // We define a condition which we should warn the user about as a fork of at least 7 blocks - // who's tip is within 72 blocks (+/- 12 hours if no one mines it) of ours + // We define a condition where we should warn the user about as a fork of at least 7 blocks + // with a tip within 72 blocks (+/- 12 hours if no one mines it) of ours // We use 7 blocks rather arbitrarily as it represents just under 10% of sustained network // hash rate operating on the fork. // or a chain that is entirely longer than ours and invalid (note that this should be detected by both) @@ -1719,7 +1719,7 @@ bool ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, CBlockIndex* pin // See BIP30 and http://r6.ca/blog/20120206T005236Z.html for more information. // This logic is not necessary for memory pool transactions, as AcceptToMemoryPool // already refuses previously-known transaction ids entirely. - // This rule was originally applied all blocks whose timestamp was after March 15, 2012, 0:00 UTC. + // This rule was originally applied to all blocks with a timestamp after March 15, 2012, 0:00 UTC. // Now that the whole chain is irreversibly beyond that time it is applied to all blocks except the // two in the chain that violate it. This prevents exploiting the issue against nodes in their // initial block download. @@ -1984,7 +1984,7 @@ void static UpdateTip(CBlockIndex *pindexNew) { if (nUpgraded > 100/2) { // strMiscWarning is read by GetWarnings(), called by Qt and the JSON-RPC code to warn the user: - strMiscWarning = _("Warning: This version is obsolete, upgrade required!"); + strMiscWarning = _("Warning: This version is obsolete; upgrade required!"); CAlert::Notify(strMiscWarning, true); fWarned = true; } @@ -3732,7 +3732,7 @@ void static ProcessGetData(CNode* pfrom) pfrom->PushMessage("merkleblock", merkleBlock); // CMerkleBlock just contains hashes, so also push any transactions in the block the client did not see // This avoids hurting performance by pointlessly requiring a round-trip - // Note that there is currently no way for a node to request any single transactions we didnt send here - + // Note that there is currently no way for a node to request any single transactions we didn't send here - // they must either disconnect and retry or request the full block. // Thus, the protocol spec specified allows for us to provide duplicate txn here, // however we MUST always provide at least what the remote peer needs @@ -4059,7 +4059,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv, if (inv.type == MSG_BLOCK) { UpdateBlockAvailability(pfrom->GetId(), inv.hash); if (!fAlreadyHave && !fImporting && !fReindex && !mapBlocksInFlight.count(inv.hash)) { - // First request the headers preceeding the announced block. In the normal fully-synced + // First request the headers preceding the announced block. In the normal fully-synced // case where a new block is announced that succeeds the current tip (no reorganization), // there are no such headers. // Secondly, and only when we are close to being synced, we request the announced block directly, @@ -4466,7 +4466,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv, // Nonce mismatches are normal when pings are overlapping sProblem = "Nonce mismatch"; if (nonce == 0) { - // This is most likely a bug in another implementation somewhere, cancel this ping + // This is most likely a bug in another implementation somewhere; cancel this ping bPingFinished = true; sProblem = "Nonce zero"; } @@ -4475,7 +4475,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv, sProblem = "Unsolicited pong without ping"; } } else { - // This is most likely a bug in another implementation somewhere, cancel this ping + // This is most likely a bug in another implementation somewhere; cancel this ping bPingFinished = true; sProblem = "Short payload"; } @@ -4918,7 +4918,7 @@ bool SendMessages(CNode* pto, bool fSendTrickle) // In case there is a block that has been in flight from this peer for (2 + 0.5 * N) times the block interval // (with N the number of validated blocks that were in flight at the time it was requested), disconnect due to // timeout. We compensate for in-flight blocks to prevent killing off peers due to our own downstream link - // being saturated. We only count validated in-flight blocks so peers can't advertize nonexisting block hashes + // being saturated. We only count validated in-flight blocks so peers can't advertise non-existing block hashes // to unreasonably increase our timeout. if (!pto->fDisconnect && state.vBlocksInFlight.size() > 0 && state.vBlocksInFlight.front().nTime < nNow - 500000 * consensusParams.nPowTargetSpacing * (4 + state.vBlocksInFlight.front().nValidatedQueuedBefore)) { LogPrintf("Timeout downloading block %s from peer=%d, disconnecting\n", state.vBlocksInFlight.front().hash.ToString(), pto->id); |