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-rw-r--r--src/main.cpp38
1 files changed, 27 insertions, 11 deletions
diff --git a/src/main.cpp b/src/main.cpp
index 83a640d7f3..a0f4f40cb1 100644
--- a/src/main.cpp
+++ b/src/main.cpp
@@ -515,10 +515,14 @@ bool IsStandardTx(const CTransaction& tx, string& reason)
BOOST_FOREACH(const CTxIn& txin, tx.vin)
{
- // Biggest 'standard' txin is a 3-signature 3-of-3 CHECKMULTISIG
- // pay-to-script-hash, which is 3 ~80-byte signatures, 3
- // ~65-byte public keys, plus a few script ops.
- if (txin.scriptSig.size() > 500) {
+ // Biggest 'standard' txin is a 15-of-15 P2SH multisig with compressed
+ // keys. (remember the 520 byte limit on redeemScript size) That works
+ // out to a (15*(33+1))+3=513 byte redeemScript, 513+1+15*(73+1)=1624
+ // bytes of scriptSig, which we round off to 1650 bytes for some minor
+ // future-proofing. That's also enough to spend a 20-of-20
+ // CHECKMULTISIG scriptPubKey, though such a scriptPubKey is not
+ // considered standard)
+ if (txin.scriptSig.size() > 1650) {
reason = "scriptsig-size";
return false;
}
@@ -945,7 +949,7 @@ bool AcceptToMemoryPool(CTxMemPool& pool, CValidationState &state, const CTransa
// Check against previous transactions
// This is done last to help prevent CPU exhaustion denial-of-service attacks.
- if (!CheckInputs(tx, state, view, true, SCRIPT_VERIFY_P2SH | SCRIPT_VERIFY_STRICTENC))
+ if (!CheckInputs(tx, state, view, true, STANDARD_SCRIPT_VERIFY_FLAGS))
{
return error("AcceptToMemoryPool: : ConnectInputs failed %s", hash.ToString());
}
@@ -1588,14 +1592,26 @@ bool CheckInputs(const CTransaction& tx, CValidationState &state, CCoinsViewCach
pvChecks->push_back(CScriptCheck());
check.swap(pvChecks->back());
} else if (!check()) {
- if (flags & SCRIPT_VERIFY_STRICTENC) {
- // For now, check whether the failure was caused by non-canonical
- // encodings or not; if so, don't trigger DoS protection.
- CScriptCheck check(coins, tx, i, flags & (~SCRIPT_VERIFY_STRICTENC), 0);
+ if (flags & STANDARD_NOT_MANDATORY_VERIFY_FLAGS) {
+ // Check whether the failure was caused by a
+ // non-mandatory script verification check, such as
+ // non-standard DER encodings or non-null dummy
+ // arguments; if so, don't trigger DoS protection to
+ // avoid splitting the network between upgraded and
+ // non-upgraded nodes.
+ CScriptCheck check(coins, tx, i,
+ flags & ~STANDARD_NOT_MANDATORY_VERIFY_FLAGS, 0);
if (check())
- return state.Invalid(false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "non-canonical");
+ return state.Invalid(false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "non-mandatory-script-verify-flag");
}
- return state.DoS(100,false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "non-canonical");
+ // Failures of other flags indicate a transaction that is
+ // invalid in new blocks, e.g. a invalid P2SH. We DoS ban
+ // such nodes as they are not following the protocol. That
+ // said during an upgrade careful thought should be taken
+ // as to the correct behavior - we may want to continue
+ // peering with non-upgraded nodes even after a soft-fork
+ // super-majority vote has passed.
+ return state.DoS(100,false, REJECT_INVALID, "mandatory-script-verify-flag-failed");
}
}
}