diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/main.cpp')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/main.cpp | 55 |
1 files changed, 28 insertions, 27 deletions
diff --git a/src/main.cpp b/src/main.cpp index df27a7c7af..4f4926eb40 100644 --- a/src/main.cpp +++ b/src/main.cpp @@ -143,8 +143,9 @@ namespace { uint32_t nBlockSequenceId = 1; /** - * Sources of received blocks, to be able to send them reject messages or ban - * them, if processing happens afterwards. Protected by cs_main. + * Sources of received blocks, saved to be able to send them reject + * messages or ban them when processing happens afterwards. Protected by + * cs_main. */ map<uint256, NodeId> mapBlockSource; @@ -390,7 +391,7 @@ void FindNextBlocksToDownload(NodeId nodeid, unsigned int count, std::vector<CBl } // If the peer reorganized, our previous pindexLastCommonBlock may not be an ancestor - // of their current tip anymore. Go back enough to fix that. + // of its current tip anymore. Go back enough to fix that. state->pindexLastCommonBlock = LastCommonAncestor(state->pindexLastCommonBlock, state->pindexBestKnownBlock); if (state->pindexLastCommonBlock == state->pindexBestKnownBlock) return; @@ -942,7 +943,7 @@ bool AcceptToMemoryPool(CTxMemPool& pool, CValidationState &state, const CTransa // do all inputs exist? // Note that this does not check for the presence of actual outputs (see the next check for that), - // only helps filling in pfMissingInputs (to determine missing vs spent). + // and only helps with filling in pfMissingInputs (to determine missing vs spent). BOOST_FOREACH(const CTxIn txin, tx.vin) { if (!view.HaveCoins(txin.prevout.hash)) { if (pfMissingInputs) @@ -1281,8 +1282,8 @@ void CheckForkWarningConditionsOnNewFork(CBlockIndex* pindexNewForkTip) pfork = pfork->pprev; } - // We define a condition which we should warn the user about as a fork of at least 7 blocks - // who's tip is within 72 blocks (+/- 12 hours if no one mines it) of ours + // We define a condition where we should warn the user about as a fork of at least 7 blocks + // with a tip within 72 blocks (+/- 12 hours if no one mines it) of ours // We use 7 blocks rather arbitrarily as it represents just under 10% of sustained network // hash rate operating on the fork. // or a chain that is entirely longer than ours and invalid (note that this should be detected by both) @@ -1723,9 +1724,9 @@ bool ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, CBlockIndex* pin // See BIP30 and http://r6.ca/blog/20120206T005236Z.html for more information. // This logic is not necessary for memory pool transactions, as AcceptToMemoryPool // already refuses previously-known transaction ids entirely. - // This rule was originally applied all blocks whose timestamp was after March 15, 2012, 0:00 UTC. + // This rule was originally applied to all blocks with a timestamp after March 15, 2012, 0:00 UTC. // Now that the whole chain is irreversibly beyond that time it is applied to all blocks except the - // two in the chain that violate it. This prevents exploiting the issue against nodes in their + // two in the chain that violate it. This prevents exploiting the issue against nodes during their // initial block download. bool fEnforceBIP30 = (!pindex->phashBlock) || // Enforce on CreateNewBlock invocations which don't have a hash. !((pindex->nHeight==91842 && pindex->GetBlockHash() == uint256S("0x00000000000a4d0a398161ffc163c503763b1f4360639393e0e4c8e300e0caec")) || @@ -1989,7 +1990,7 @@ void static UpdateTip(CBlockIndex *pindexNew) { if (nUpgraded > 100/2) { // strMiscWarning is read by GetWarnings(), called by Qt and the JSON-RPC code to warn the user: - strMiscWarning = _("Warning: This version is obsolete, upgrade required!"); + strMiscWarning = _("Warning: This version is obsolete; upgrade required!"); CAlert::Notify(strMiscWarning, true); fWarned = true; } @@ -2323,7 +2324,7 @@ bool InvalidateBlock(CValidationState& state, CBlockIndex *pindex) { } // The resulting new best tip may not be in setBlockIndexCandidates anymore, so - // add them again. + // add it again. BlockMap::iterator it = mapBlockIndex.begin(); while (it != mapBlockIndex.end()) { if (it->second->IsValid(BLOCK_VALID_TRANSACTIONS) && it->second->nChainTx && !setBlockIndexCandidates.value_comp()(it->second, chainActive.Tip())) { @@ -3746,7 +3747,7 @@ void static ProcessGetData(CNode* pfrom) pfrom->PushMessage("merkleblock", merkleBlock); // CMerkleBlock just contains hashes, so also push any transactions in the block the client did not see // This avoids hurting performance by pointlessly requiring a round-trip - // Note that there is currently no way for a node to request any single transactions we didnt send here - + // Note that there is currently no way for a node to request any single transactions we didn't send here - // they must either disconnect and retry or request the full block. // Thus, the protocol spec specified allows for us to provide duplicate txn here, // however we MUST always provide at least what the remote peer needs @@ -3759,7 +3760,7 @@ void static ProcessGetData(CNode* pfrom) // no response } - // Trigger them to send a getblocks request for the next batch of inventory + // Trigger the peer node to send a getblocks request for the next batch of inventory if (inv.hash == pfrom->hashContinue) { // Bypass PushInventory, this must send even if redundant, @@ -4008,7 +4009,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv, { LOCK(cs_vNodes); // Use deterministic randomness to send to the same nodes for 24 hours - // at a time so the setAddrKnowns of the chosen nodes prevent repeats + // at a time so the addrKnowns of the chosen nodes prevent repeats static uint256 hashSalt; if (hashSalt.IsNull()) hashSalt = GetRandHash(); @@ -4073,7 +4074,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv, if (inv.type == MSG_BLOCK) { UpdateBlockAvailability(pfrom->GetId(), inv.hash); if (!fAlreadyHave && !fImporting && !fReindex && !mapBlocksInFlight.count(inv.hash)) { - // First request the headers preceeding the announced block. In the normal fully-synced + // First request the headers preceding the announced block. In the normal fully-synced // case where a new block is announced that succeeds the current tip (no reorganization), // there are no such headers. // Secondly, and only when we are close to being synced, we request the announced block directly, @@ -4155,8 +4156,8 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv, pfrom->PushInventory(CInv(MSG_BLOCK, pindex->GetBlockHash())); if (--nLimit <= 0) { - // When this block is requested, we'll send an inv that'll make them - // getblocks the next batch of inventory. + // When this block is requested, we'll send an inv that'll + // trigger the peer to getblocks the next batch of inventory. LogPrint("net", " getblocks stopping at limit %d %s\n", pindex->nHeight, pindex->GetBlockHash().ToString()); pfrom->hashContinue = pindex->GetBlockHash(); break; @@ -4393,9 +4394,9 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv, // This asymmetric behavior for inbound and outbound connections was introduced // to prevent a fingerprinting attack: an attacker can send specific fake addresses - // to users' AddrMan and later request them by sending getaddr messages. - // Making users (which are behind NAT and can only make outgoing connections) ignore - // getaddr message mitigates the attack. + // to users' AddrMan and later request them by sending getaddr messages. + // Making nodes which are behind NAT and can only make outgoing connections ignore + // the getaddr message mitigates the attack. else if ((strCommand == "getaddr") && (pfrom->fInbound)) { pfrom->vAddrToSend.clear(); @@ -4480,7 +4481,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv, // Nonce mismatches are normal when pings are overlapping sProblem = "Nonce mismatch"; if (nonce == 0) { - // This is most likely a bug in another implementation somewhere, cancel this ping + // This is most likely a bug in another implementation somewhere; cancel this ping bPingFinished = true; sProblem = "Nonce zero"; } @@ -4489,7 +4490,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv, sProblem = "Unsolicited pong without ping"; } } else { - // This is most likely a bug in another implementation somewhere, cancel this ping + // This is most likely a bug in another implementation somewhere; cancel this ping bPingFinished = true; sProblem = "Short payload"; } @@ -4748,7 +4749,7 @@ bool SendMessages(CNode* pto, bool fSendTrickle) { const Consensus::Params& consensusParams = Params().GetConsensus(); { - // Don't send anything until we get their version message + // Don't send anything until we get its version message if (pto->nVersion == 0) return true; @@ -4792,9 +4793,9 @@ bool SendMessages(CNode* pto, bool fSendTrickle) LOCK(cs_vNodes); BOOST_FOREACH(CNode* pnode, vNodes) { - // Periodically clear setAddrKnown to allow refresh broadcasts + // Periodically clear addrKnown to allow refresh broadcasts if (nLastRebroadcast) - pnode->setAddrKnown.clear(); + pnode->addrKnown.clear(); // Rebroadcast our address AdvertizeLocal(pnode); @@ -4812,9 +4813,9 @@ bool SendMessages(CNode* pto, bool fSendTrickle) vAddr.reserve(pto->vAddrToSend.size()); BOOST_FOREACH(const CAddress& addr, pto->vAddrToSend) { - // returns true if wasn't already contained in the set - if (pto->setAddrKnown.insert(addr).second) + if (!pto->addrKnown.contains(addr.GetKey())) { + pto->addrKnown.insert(addr.GetKey()); vAddr.push_back(addr); // receiver rejects addr messages larger than 1000 if (vAddr.size() >= 1000) @@ -4932,7 +4933,7 @@ bool SendMessages(CNode* pto, bool fSendTrickle) // In case there is a block that has been in flight from this peer for (2 + 0.5 * N) times the block interval // (with N the number of validated blocks that were in flight at the time it was requested), disconnect due to // timeout. We compensate for in-flight blocks to prevent killing off peers due to our own downstream link - // being saturated. We only count validated in-flight blocks so peers can't advertize nonexisting block hashes + // being saturated. We only count validated in-flight blocks so peers can't advertise non-existing block hashes // to unreasonably increase our timeout. if (!pto->fDisconnect && state.vBlocksInFlight.size() > 0 && state.vBlocksInFlight.front().nTime < nNow - 500000 * consensusParams.nPowTargetSpacing * (4 + state.vBlocksInFlight.front().nValidatedQueuedBefore)) { LogPrintf("Timeout downloading block %s from peer=%d, disconnecting\n", state.vBlocksInFlight.front().hash.ToString(), pto->id); |