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Diffstat (limited to 'share/certs/PrivateKeyNotes.md')
| -rw-r--r-- | share/certs/PrivateKeyNotes.md | 46 |
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diff --git a/share/certs/PrivateKeyNotes.md b/share/certs/PrivateKeyNotes.md deleted file mode 100644 index 8d50144c21..0000000000 --- a/share/certs/PrivateKeyNotes.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,46 +0,0 @@ -Code-signing private key notes -== - -The private keys for these certificates were generated on Gavin's main work machine, -following the certificate authority's recommendations for generating certificate -signing requests. - -For OSX, the private key was generated by Keychain.app on Gavin's main work machine. -The key and certificate is in a separate, passphrase-protected keychain file that is -unlocked to sign the Bitcoin-Qt.app bundle. - -For Windows, the private key was generated by Firefox running on Gavin's main work machine. -The key and certificate were exported into a separate, passphrase-protected PKCS#12 file, and -then deleted from Firefox's keystore. The exported file is used to sign the Windows setup.exe. - -Threat analysis --- - -Gavin is a single point of failure. He could be coerced to divulge the secret signing keys, -allowing somebody to distribute a Bitcoin-Qt.app or bitcoin-qt-setup.exe with a valid -signature but containing a malicious binary. - -Or the machine Gavin uses to sign the binaries could be compromised, either remotely or -by breaking in to his office, allowing the attacker to get the private key files and then -install a keylogger to get the passphrase that protects them. - -Threat Mitigation --- - -"Air gapping" the machine used to do the signing will not work, because the signing -process needs to access a timestamp server over the network. And it would not -prevent the "rubber hose cryptography" threat (coercing Gavin to sign a bad binary -or divulge the private keys). - -Windows binaries are reproducibly 'gitian-built', and the setup.exe file created -by the NSIS installer system is a 7zip archive, so you could check to make sure -that the bitcoin-qt.exe file inside the installer had not been tampered with. -However, an attacker could modify the installer's code, so when the setup.exe -was run it compromised users' systems. A volunteer to write an auditing tool -that checks the setup.exe for tampering, and checks the files in it against -the list of gitian signatures, is needed. - -The long-term solution is something like the 'gitian downloader' system, which -uses signatures from multiple developers to determine whether or not a binary -should be trusted. However, that just pushes the problem to "how will -non-technical users securely get the gitian downloader code to start?" |