diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'contrib/verify-commits/gpg.sh')
| -rwxr-xr-x | contrib/verify-commits/gpg.sh | 26 |
1 files changed, 18 insertions, 8 deletions
diff --git a/contrib/verify-commits/gpg.sh b/contrib/verify-commits/gpg.sh index 09ff237544..4342d7bd0f 100755 --- a/contrib/verify-commits/gpg.sh +++ b/contrib/verify-commits/gpg.sh @@ -8,21 +8,31 @@ VALID=false REVSIG=false IFS=' ' -for LINE in $(echo "$INPUT" | gpg --trust-model always "$@" 2>/dev/null); do +if [ "$BITCOIN_VERIFY_COMMITS_ALLOW_SHA1" = 1 ]; then + GPG_RES="$(echo "$INPUT" | gpg --trust-model always "$@" 2>/dev/null)" +else + # Note how we've disabled SHA1 with the --weak-digest option, disabling + # signatures - including selfsigs - that use SHA1. While you might think that + # collision attacks shouldn't be an issue as they'd be an attack on yourself, + # in fact because what's being signed is a commit object that's + # semi-deterministically generated by untrusted input (the pull-req) in theory + # an attacker could construct a pull-req that results in a commit object that + # they've created a collision for. Not the most likely attack, but preventing + # it is pretty easy so we do so as a "belt-and-suspenders" measure. + + GPG_RES="$(echo "$INPUT" | gpg --trust-model always --weak-digest sha1 "$@" 2>/dev/null)" +fi +for LINE in $(echo "$GPG_RES"); do case "$LINE" in "[GNUPG:] VALIDSIG "*) while read KEY; do - case "$LINE" in "[GNUPG:] VALIDSIG $KEY "*) VALID=true;; esac + [ "${LINE#?GNUPG:? VALIDSIG * * * * * * * * * }" = "$KEY" ] && VALID=true done < ./contrib/verify-commits/trusted-keys ;; "[GNUPG:] REVKEYSIG "*) [ "$BITCOIN_VERIFY_COMMITS_ALLOW_REVSIG" != 1 ] && exit 1 - while read KEY; do - case "$LINE" in "[GNUPG:] REVKEYSIG ${KEY#????????????????????????} "*) - REVSIG=true - GOODREVSIG="[GNUPG:] GOODSIG ${KEY#????????????????????????} " - esac - done < ./contrib/verify-commits/trusted-keys + REVSIG=true + GOODREVSIG="[GNUPG:] GOODSIG ${LINE#* * *}" ;; esac done |