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-rwxr-xr-xcontrib/verify-commits/gpg.sh18
1 files changed, 15 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/contrib/verify-commits/gpg.sh b/contrib/verify-commits/gpg.sh
index 4342d7bd0f..b01e2a6d39 100755
--- a/contrib/verify-commits/gpg.sh
+++ b/contrib/verify-commits/gpg.sh
@@ -19,8 +19,20 @@ else
# an attacker could construct a pull-req that results in a commit object that
# they've created a collision for. Not the most likely attack, but preventing
# it is pretty easy so we do so as a "belt-and-suspenders" measure.
-
- GPG_RES="$(echo "$INPUT" | gpg --trust-model always --weak-digest sha1 "$@" 2>/dev/null)"
+ GPG_RES=""
+ for LINE in "$(gpg --version)"; do
+ case "$LINE" in
+ "gpg (GnuPG) 1.4.1"*|"gpg (GnuPG) 2.0."*)
+ echo "Please upgrade to at least gpg 2.1.10 to check for weak signatures" > /dev/stderr
+ GPG_RES="$(echo "$INPUT" | gpg --trust-model always "$@" 2>/dev/null)"
+ ;;
+ # We assume if you're running 2.1+, you're probably running 2.1.10+
+ # gpg will fail otherwise
+ # We assume if you're running 1.X, it is either 1.4.1X or 1.4.20+
+ # gpg will fail otherwise
+ esac
+ done
+ [ "$GPG_RES" = "" ] && GPG_RES="$(echo "$INPUT" | gpg --trust-model always --weak-digest sha1 "$@" 2>/dev/null)"
fi
for LINE in $(echo "$GPG_RES"); do
case "$LINE" in
@@ -40,7 +52,7 @@ if ! $VALID; then
exit 1
fi
if $VALID && $REVSIG; then
- echo "$INPUT" | gpg --trust-model always "$@" | grep "\[GNUPG:\] \(NEWSIG\|SIG_ID\|VALIDSIG\)" 2>/dev/null
+ echo "$INPUT" | gpg --trust-model always "$@" 2>/dev/null | grep "\[GNUPG:\] \(NEWSIG\|SIG_ID\|VALIDSIG\)"
echo "$GOODREVSIG"
else
echo "$INPUT" | gpg --trust-model always "$@" 2>/dev/null