diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | src/net_processing.cpp | 28 | ||||
| -rwxr-xr-x | test/functional/mempool_reorg.py | 2 | ||||
| -rwxr-xr-x | test/functional/p2p_permissions.py | 2 |
3 files changed, 16 insertions, 16 deletions
diff --git a/src/net_processing.cpp b/src/net_processing.cpp index 0f5f18aada..94ecbdf983 100644 --- a/src/net_processing.cpp +++ b/src/net_processing.cpp @@ -470,7 +470,7 @@ private: * * Memory used: 1.3 MB */ - CRollingBloomFilter recentRejects GUARDED_BY(::cs_main){120'000, 0.000'001}; + CRollingBloomFilter m_recent_rejects GUARDED_BY(::cs_main){120'000, 0.000'001}; uint256 hashRecentRejectsChainTip GUARDED_BY(cs_main); /* @@ -1604,7 +1604,7 @@ bool PeerManagerImpl::AlreadyHaveTx(const GenTxid& gtxid) // or a double-spend. Reset the rejects filter and give those // txs a second chance. hashRecentRejectsChainTip = m_chainman.ActiveChain().Tip()->GetBlockHash(); - recentRejects.reset(); + m_recent_rejects.reset(); } const uint256& hash = gtxid.GetHash(); @@ -1616,7 +1616,7 @@ bool PeerManagerImpl::AlreadyHaveTx(const GenTxid& gtxid) if (m_recent_confirmed_transactions->contains(hash)) return true; } - return recentRejects.contains(hash) || m_mempool.exists(gtxid); + return m_recent_rejects.contains(hash) || m_mempool.exists(gtxid); } bool PeerManagerImpl::AlreadyHaveBlock(const uint256& block_hash) @@ -2235,7 +2235,7 @@ void PeerManagerImpl::ProcessOrphanTx(std::set<uint256>& orphan_work_set) // See also comments in https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/18044#discussion_r443419034 // for concerns around weakening security of unupgraded nodes // if we start doing this too early. - recentRejects.insert(porphanTx->GetWitnessHash()); + m_recent_rejects.insert(porphanTx->GetWitnessHash()); // If the transaction failed for TX_INPUTS_NOT_STANDARD, // then we know that the witness was irrelevant to the policy // failure, since this check depends only on the txid @@ -2247,7 +2247,7 @@ void PeerManagerImpl::ProcessOrphanTx(std::set<uint256>& orphan_work_set) if (state.GetResult() == TxValidationResult::TX_INPUTS_NOT_STANDARD && porphanTx->GetWitnessHash() != porphanTx->GetHash()) { // We only add the txid if it differs from the wtxid, to // avoid wasting entries in the rolling bloom filter. - recentRejects.insert(porphanTx->GetHash()); + m_recent_rejects.insert(porphanTx->GetHash()); } } m_orphanage.EraseTx(orphanHash); @@ -3250,7 +3250,7 @@ void PeerManagerImpl::ProcessMessage(CNode& pfrom, const std::string& msg_type, std::sort(unique_parents.begin(), unique_parents.end()); unique_parents.erase(std::unique(unique_parents.begin(), unique_parents.end()), unique_parents.end()); for (const uint256& parent_txid : unique_parents) { - if (recentRejects.contains(parent_txid)) { + if (m_recent_rejects.contains(parent_txid)) { fRejectedParents = true; break; } @@ -3291,8 +3291,8 @@ void PeerManagerImpl::ProcessMessage(CNode& pfrom, const std::string& msg_type, // regardless of what witness is provided, we will not accept // this, so we don't need to allow for redownload of this txid // from any of our non-wtxidrelay peers. - recentRejects.insert(tx.GetHash()); - recentRejects.insert(tx.GetWitnessHash()); + m_recent_rejects.insert(tx.GetHash()); + m_recent_rejects.insert(tx.GetWitnessHash()); m_txrequest.ForgetTxHash(tx.GetHash()); m_txrequest.ForgetTxHash(tx.GetWitnessHash()); } @@ -3311,7 +3311,7 @@ void PeerManagerImpl::ProcessMessage(CNode& pfrom, const std::string& msg_type, // See also comments in https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/18044#discussion_r443419034 // for concerns around weakening security of unupgraded nodes // if we start doing this too early. - recentRejects.insert(tx.GetWitnessHash()); + m_recent_rejects.insert(tx.GetWitnessHash()); m_txrequest.ForgetTxHash(tx.GetWitnessHash()); // If the transaction failed for TX_INPUTS_NOT_STANDARD, // then we know that the witness was irrelevant to the policy @@ -3322,7 +3322,7 @@ void PeerManagerImpl::ProcessMessage(CNode& pfrom, const std::string& msg_type, // transactions are later received (resulting in // parent-fetching by txid via the orphan-handling logic). if (state.GetResult() == TxValidationResult::TX_INPUTS_NOT_STANDARD && tx.GetWitnessHash() != tx.GetHash()) { - recentRejects.insert(tx.GetHash()); + m_recent_rejects.insert(tx.GetHash()); m_txrequest.ForgetTxHash(tx.GetHash()); } if (RecursiveDynamicUsage(*ptx) < 100000) { @@ -3331,21 +3331,21 @@ void PeerManagerImpl::ProcessMessage(CNode& pfrom, const std::string& msg_type, } } - // If a tx has been detected by recentRejects, we will have reached + // If a tx has been detected by m_recent_rejects, we will have reached // this point and the tx will have been ignored. Because we haven't run // the tx through AcceptToMemoryPool, we won't have computed a DoS // score for it or determined exactly why we consider it invalid. // // This means we won't penalize any peer subsequently relaying a DoSy // tx (even if we penalized the first peer who gave it to us) because - // we have to account for recentRejects showing false positives. In + // we have to account for m_recent_rejects showing false positives. In // other words, we shouldn't penalize a peer if we aren't *sure* they // submitted a DoSy tx. // - // Note that recentRejects doesn't just record DoSy or invalid + // Note that m_recent_rejects doesn't just record DoSy or invalid // transactions, but any tx not accepted by the mempool, which may be // due to node policy (vs. consensus). So we can't blanket penalize a - // peer simply for relaying a tx that our recentRejects has caught, + // peer simply for relaying a tx that our m_recent_rejects has caught, // regardless of false positives. if (state.IsInvalid()) { diff --git a/test/functional/mempool_reorg.py b/test/functional/mempool_reorg.py index bcc6aa7bcc..b5086e1df1 100755 --- a/test/functional/mempool_reorg.py +++ b/test/functional/mempool_reorg.py @@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ class MempoolCoinbaseTest(BitcoinTestFramework): self.log.info("Generate a block") last_block = self.nodes[0].generate(1) # Sync blocks, so that peer 1 gets the block before timelock_tx - # Otherwise, peer 1 would put the timelock_tx in recentRejects + # Otherwise, peer 1 would put the timelock_tx in m_recent_rejects self.sync_all() self.log.info("The time-locked transaction can now be spent") diff --git a/test/functional/p2p_permissions.py b/test/functional/p2p_permissions.py index 594a28d662..8b285907c5 100755 --- a/test/functional/p2p_permissions.py +++ b/test/functional/p2p_permissions.py @@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ class P2PPermissionsTests(BitcoinTestFramework): tx.vout[0].nValue += 1 txid = tx.rehash() # Send the transaction twice. The first time, it'll be rejected by ATMP because it conflicts - # with a mempool transaction. The second time, it'll be in the recentRejects filter. + # with a mempool transaction. The second time, it'll be in the m_recent_rejects filter. p2p_rebroadcast_wallet.send_txs_and_test( [tx], self.nodes[1], |