diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | src/net.cpp | 7 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/net.h | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/test/net_peer_eviction_tests.cpp | 10 |
3 files changed, 11 insertions, 8 deletions
diff --git a/src/net.cpp b/src/net.cpp index a69d13436d..4d7c181330 100644 --- a/src/net.cpp +++ b/src/net.cpp @@ -908,16 +908,17 @@ void ProtectEvictionCandidatesByRatio(std::vector<NodeEvictionCandidate>& evicti // Protect the half of the remaining nodes which have been connected the longest. // This replicates the non-eviction implicit behavior, and precludes attacks that start later. // To favorise the diversity of our peer connections, reserve up to half of these protected - // spots for Tor/onion and localhost peers, even if they're not longest uptime overall. + // spots for Tor/onion, localhost and I2P peers, even if they're not longest uptime overall. // This helps protect these higher-latency peers that tend to be otherwise // disadvantaged under our eviction criteria. const size_t initial_size = eviction_candidates.size(); const size_t total_protect_size{initial_size / 2}; - // Disadvantaged networks to protect: localhost and Tor/onion. In case of equal counts, earlier + // Disadvantaged networks to protect: I2P, localhost, Tor/onion. In case of equal counts, earlier // array members have first opportunity to recover unused slots from the previous iteration. struct Net { bool is_local; Network id; size_t count; }; - std::array<Net, 3> networks{{{/* localhost */ true, NET_MAX, 0}, {false, NET_ONION, 0}}}; + std::array<Net, 3> networks{ + {{false, NET_I2P, 0}, {/* localhost */ true, NET_MAX, 0}, {false, NET_ONION, 0}}}; // Count and store the number of eviction candidates per network. for (Net& n : networks) { @@ -1236,6 +1236,8 @@ struct NodeEvictionCandidate * - localhost peers, as manually configured hidden services not using * `-bind=addr[:port]=onion` will not be detected as inbound onion connections * + * - I2P peers + * * This helps protect these privacy network peers, which tend to be otherwise * disadvantaged under our eviction criteria for their higher min ping times * relative to IPv4/IPv6 peers, and favorise the diversity of peer connections. diff --git a/src/test/net_peer_eviction_tests.cpp b/src/test/net_peer_eviction_tests.cpp index ec4aa50173..bf56e1bea7 100644 --- a/src/test/net_peer_eviction_tests.cpp +++ b/src/test/net_peer_eviction_tests.cpp @@ -109,10 +109,10 @@ BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(peer_protection_test) /* unprotected_peer_ids */ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, random_context)); - // Test protection of onion and localhost peers... + // Test protection of onion, localhost, and I2P peers... // Expect 1/4 onion peers to be protected from eviction, - // if no localhost peers. + // if no localhost or I2P peers. BOOST_CHECK(IsProtected( num_peers, [](NodeEvictionCandidate& c) { c.m_is_local = false; @@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(peer_protection_test) random_context)); // Expect 1/4 onion peers and 1/4 of the other peers to be protected, - // sorted by longest uptime (lowest nTimeConnected), if no localhost peers. + // sorted by longest uptime (lowest nTimeConnected), if no localhost or I2P peers. BOOST_CHECK(IsProtected( num_peers, [](NodeEvictionCandidate& c) { c.nTimeConnected = c.id; @@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(peer_protection_test) random_context)); // Expect 1/4 localhost peers to be protected from eviction, - // if no onion peers. + // if no onion or I2P peers. BOOST_CHECK(IsProtected( num_peers, [](NodeEvictionCandidate& c) { c.m_is_local = (c.id == 1 || c.id == 9 || c.id == 11); @@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(peer_protection_test) random_context)); // Expect 1/4 localhost peers and 1/4 of the other peers to be protected, - // sorted by longest uptime (lowest nTimeConnected), if no onion peers. + // sorted by longest uptime (lowest nTimeConnected), if no onion or I2P peers. BOOST_CHECK(IsProtected( num_peers, [](NodeEvictionCandidate& c) { c.nTimeConnected = c.id; |