diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | src/wallet/wallet.cpp | 28 |
1 files changed, 19 insertions, 9 deletions
diff --git a/src/wallet/wallet.cpp b/src/wallet/wallet.cpp index 3f12d88e79..50d20485de 100644 --- a/src/wallet/wallet.cpp +++ b/src/wallet/wallet.cpp @@ -1715,15 +1715,25 @@ bool CWallet::CreateTransaction(const vector<CRecipient>& vecSend, // Discourage fee sniping. // - // However because of a off-by-one-error in previous versions we need to - // neuter it by setting nLockTime to at least one less than nBestHeight. - // Secondly currently propagation of transactions created for block heights - // corresponding to blocks that were just mined may be iffy - transactions - // aren't re-accepted into the mempool - we additionally neuter the code by - // going ten blocks back. Doesn't yet do anything for sniping, but does act - // to shake out wallet bugs like not showing nLockTime'd transactions at - // all. - txNew.nLockTime = std::max(0, chainActive.Height() - 10); + // For a large miner the value of the transactions in the best block and + // the mempool can exceed the cost of delibrately attempting to mine two + // blocks to orphan the current best block. By setting nLockTime such that + // only the next block can include the transaction, we discourage this + // practice as the height restricted and limited blocksize gives miners + // considering fee sniping fewer options for pulling off this attack. + // + // A simple way to think about this is from the wallet's point of view we + // always want the blockchain to move forward. By setting nLockTime this + // way we're basically making the statement that we only want this + // transaction to appear in the next block; we don't want to potentially + // encourage reorgs by allowing transactions to appear at lower heights + // than the next block in forks of the best chain. + // + // Of course, the subsidy is high enough, and transaction volume low + // enough, that fee sniping isn't a problem yet, but by implementing a fix + // now we ensure code won't be written that makes assumptions about + // nLockTime that preclude a fix later. + txNew.nLockTime = chainActive.Height(); // Secondly occasionally randomly pick a nLockTime even further back, so // that transactions that are delayed after signing for whatever reason, |