aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat
-rw-r--r--src/net.h2
-rw-r--r--src/net_processing.cpp140
2 files changed, 80 insertions, 62 deletions
diff --git a/src/net.h b/src/net.h
index f4a90e01f1..f1d09f5934 100644
--- a/src/net.h
+++ b/src/net.h
@@ -739,6 +739,8 @@ public:
CAmount lastSentFeeFilter{0};
int64_t nextSendTimeFeeFilter{0};
+ std::set<uint256> orphan_work_set;
+
CNode(NodeId id, ServiceFlags nLocalServicesIn, int nMyStartingHeightIn, SOCKET hSocketIn, const CAddress &addrIn, uint64_t nKeyedNetGroupIn, uint64_t nLocalHostNonceIn, const CAddress &addrBindIn, const std::string &addrNameIn = "", bool fInboundIn = false);
~CNode();
CNode(const CNode&) = delete;
diff --git a/src/net_processing.cpp b/src/net_processing.cpp
index 0247b9cc7e..0654a96e26 100644
--- a/src/net_processing.cpp
+++ b/src/net_processing.cpp
@@ -1713,6 +1713,67 @@ bool static ProcessHeadersMessage(CNode *pfrom, CConnman *connman, const std::ve
return true;
}
+void static ProcessOrphanTx(CConnman* connman, std::set<uint256>& orphan_work_set, std::list<CTransactionRef>& removed_txn) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main, g_cs_orphans)
+{
+ AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
+ AssertLockHeld(g_cs_orphans);
+ std::set<NodeId> setMisbehaving;
+ bool done = false;
+ while (!done && !orphan_work_set.empty()) {
+ const uint256 orphanHash = *orphan_work_set.begin();
+ orphan_work_set.erase(orphan_work_set.begin());
+
+ auto orphan_it = mapOrphanTransactions.find(orphanHash);
+ if (orphan_it == mapOrphanTransactions.end()) continue;
+
+ const CTransactionRef porphanTx = orphan_it->second.tx;
+ const CTransaction& orphanTx = *porphanTx;
+ NodeId fromPeer = orphan_it->second.fromPeer;
+ bool fMissingInputs2 = false;
+ // Use a dummy CValidationState so someone can't setup nodes to counter-DoS based on orphan
+ // resolution (that is, feeding people an invalid transaction based on LegitTxX in order to get
+ // anyone relaying LegitTxX banned)
+ CValidationState stateDummy;
+
+ if (setMisbehaving.count(fromPeer)) continue;
+ if (AcceptToMemoryPool(mempool, stateDummy, porphanTx, &fMissingInputs2, &removed_txn, false /* bypass_limits */, 0 /* nAbsurdFee */)) {
+ LogPrint(BCLog::MEMPOOL, " accepted orphan tx %s\n", orphanHash.ToString());
+ RelayTransaction(orphanTx, connman);
+ for (unsigned int i = 0; i < orphanTx.vout.size(); i++) {
+ auto it_by_prev = mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev.find(COutPoint(orphanHash, i));
+ if (it_by_prev != mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev.end()) {
+ for (const auto& elem : it_by_prev->second) {
+ orphan_work_set.insert(elem->first);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ EraseOrphanTx(orphanHash);
+ done = true;
+ } else if (!fMissingInputs2) {
+ int nDos = 0;
+ if (stateDummy.IsInvalid(nDos) && nDos > 0) {
+ // Punish peer that gave us an invalid orphan tx
+ Misbehaving(fromPeer, nDos);
+ setMisbehaving.insert(fromPeer);
+ LogPrint(BCLog::MEMPOOL, " invalid orphan tx %s\n", orphanHash.ToString());
+ }
+ // Has inputs but not accepted to mempool
+ // Probably non-standard or insufficient fee
+ LogPrint(BCLog::MEMPOOL, " removed orphan tx %s\n", orphanHash.ToString());
+ if (!orphanTx.HasWitness() && !stateDummy.CorruptionPossible()) {
+ // Do not use rejection cache for witness transactions or
+ // witness-stripped transactions, as they can have been malleated.
+ // See https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/8279 for details.
+ assert(recentRejects);
+ recentRejects->insert(orphanHash);
+ }
+ EraseOrphanTx(orphanHash);
+ done = true;
+ }
+ mempool.check(pcoinsTip.get());
+ }
+}
+
bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv, int64_t nTimeReceived, const CChainParams& chainparams, CConnman* connman, const std::atomic<bool>& interruptMsgProc, bool enable_bip61)
{
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "received: %s (%u bytes) peer=%d\n", SanitizeString(strCommand), vRecv.size(), pfrom->GetId());
@@ -2342,8 +2403,6 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr
return true;
}
- std::deque<COutPoint> vWorkQueue;
- std::vector<uint256> vEraseQueue;
CTransactionRef ptx;
vRecv >> ptx;
const CTransaction& tx = *ptx;
@@ -2368,7 +2427,12 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr
mempool.check(pcoinsTip.get());
RelayTransaction(tx, connman);
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < tx.vout.size(); i++) {
- vWorkQueue.emplace_back(inv.hash, i);
+ auto it_by_prev = mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev.find(COutPoint(inv.hash, i));
+ if (it_by_prev != mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev.end()) {
+ for (const auto& elem : it_by_prev->second) {
+ pfrom->orphan_work_set.insert(elem->first);
+ }
+ }
}
pfrom->nLastTXTime = GetTime();
@@ -2379,65 +2443,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr
mempool.size(), mempool.DynamicMemoryUsage() / 1000);
// Recursively process any orphan transactions that depended on this one
- std::set<NodeId> setMisbehaving;
- while (!vWorkQueue.empty()) {
- auto itByPrev = mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev.find(vWorkQueue.front());
- vWorkQueue.pop_front();
- if (itByPrev == mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev.end())
- continue;
- for (auto mi = itByPrev->second.begin();
- mi != itByPrev->second.end();
- ++mi)
- {
- const CTransactionRef& porphanTx = (*mi)->second.tx;
- const CTransaction& orphanTx = *porphanTx;
- const uint256& orphanHash = orphanTx.GetHash();
- NodeId fromPeer = (*mi)->second.fromPeer;
- bool fMissingInputs2 = false;
- // Use a dummy CValidationState so someone can't setup nodes to counter-DoS based on orphan
- // resolution (that is, feeding people an invalid transaction based on LegitTxX in order to get
- // anyone relaying LegitTxX banned)
- CValidationState stateDummy;
-
-
- if (setMisbehaving.count(fromPeer))
- continue;
- if (AcceptToMemoryPool(mempool, stateDummy, porphanTx, &fMissingInputs2, &lRemovedTxn, false /* bypass_limits */, 0 /* nAbsurdFee */)) {
- LogPrint(BCLog::MEMPOOL, " accepted orphan tx %s\n", orphanHash.ToString());
- RelayTransaction(orphanTx, connman);
- for (unsigned int i = 0; i < orphanTx.vout.size(); i++) {
- vWorkQueue.emplace_back(orphanHash, i);
- }
- vEraseQueue.push_back(orphanHash);
- }
- else if (!fMissingInputs2)
- {
- int nDos = 0;
- if (stateDummy.IsInvalid(nDos) && nDos > 0)
- {
- // Punish peer that gave us an invalid orphan tx
- Misbehaving(fromPeer, nDos);
- setMisbehaving.insert(fromPeer);
- LogPrint(BCLog::MEMPOOL, " invalid orphan tx %s\n", orphanHash.ToString());
- }
- // Has inputs but not accepted to mempool
- // Probably non-standard or insufficient fee
- LogPrint(BCLog::MEMPOOL, " removed orphan tx %s\n", orphanHash.ToString());
- vEraseQueue.push_back(orphanHash);
- if (!orphanTx.HasWitness() && !stateDummy.CorruptionPossible()) {
- // Do not use rejection cache for witness transactions or
- // witness-stripped transactions, as they can have been malleated.
- // See https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/8279 for details.
- assert(recentRejects);
- recentRejects->insert(orphanHash);
- }
- }
- mempool.check(pcoinsTip.get());
- }
- }
-
- for (const uint256& hash : vEraseQueue)
- EraseOrphanTx(hash);
+ ProcessOrphanTx(connman, pfrom->orphan_work_set, lRemovedTxn);
}
else if (fMissingInputs)
{
@@ -3169,11 +3175,21 @@ bool PeerLogicValidation::ProcessMessages(CNode* pfrom, std::atomic<bool>& inter
if (!pfrom->vRecvGetData.empty())
ProcessGetData(pfrom, chainparams, connman, interruptMsgProc);
+ if (!pfrom->orphan_work_set.empty()) {
+ std::list<CTransactionRef> removed_txn;
+ LOCK2(cs_main, g_cs_orphans);
+ ProcessOrphanTx(connman, pfrom->orphan_work_set, removed_txn);
+ for (const CTransactionRef& removedTx : removed_txn) {
+ AddToCompactExtraTransactions(removedTx);
+ }
+ }
+
if (pfrom->fDisconnect)
return false;
// this maintains the order of responses
if (!pfrom->vRecvGetData.empty()) return true;
+ if (!pfrom->orphan_work_set.empty()) return true;
// Don't bother if send buffer is too full to respond anyway
if (pfrom->fPauseSend)
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.26.2) at 2024-11-14 04:28:12 +0000