aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
-rw-r--r--src/consensus/validation.h3
-rw-r--r--src/net_processing.cpp35
-rw-r--r--src/policy/policy.cpp8
-rw-r--r--src/validation.cpp5
-rwxr-xr-xtest/functional/p2p_segwit.py12
5 files changed, 55 insertions, 8 deletions
diff --git a/src/consensus/validation.h b/src/consensus/validation.h
index 8de7a8f2d8..2a93a090d6 100644
--- a/src/consensus/validation.h
+++ b/src/consensus/validation.h
@@ -26,7 +26,8 @@ enum class TxValidationResult {
* is uninteresting.
*/
TX_RECENT_CONSENSUS_CHANGE,
- TX_NOT_STANDARD, //!< didn't meet our local policy rules
+ TX_INPUTS_NOT_STANDARD, //!< inputs (covered by txid) failed policy rules
+ TX_NOT_STANDARD, //!< otherwise didn't meet our local policy rules
TX_MISSING_INPUTS, //!< transaction was missing some of its inputs
TX_PREMATURE_SPEND, //!< transaction spends a coinbase too early, or violates locktime/sequence locks
/**
diff --git a/src/net_processing.cpp b/src/net_processing.cpp
index c503a97be5..72c8e65c6b 100644
--- a/src/net_processing.cpp
+++ b/src/net_processing.cpp
@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ namespace {
* million to make it highly unlikely for users to have issues with this
* filter.
*
- * We only need to add wtxids to this filter. For non-segwit
+ * We typically only add wtxids to this filter. For non-segwit
* transactions, the txid == wtxid, so this only prevents us from
* re-downloading non-segwit transactions when communicating with
* non-wtxidrelay peers -- which is important for avoiding malleation
@@ -196,6 +196,12 @@ namespace {
* the reject filter store wtxids is exactly what we want to avoid
* redownload of a rejected transaction.
*
+ * In cases where we can tell that a segwit transaction will fail
+ * validation no matter the witness, we may add the txid of such
+ * transaction to the filter as well. This can be helpful when
+ * communicating with txid-relay peers or if we were to otherwise fetch a
+ * transaction via txid (eg in our orphan handling).
+ *
* Memory used: 1.3 MB
*/
std::unique_ptr<CRollingBloomFilter> recentRejects GUARDED_BY(cs_main);
@@ -1161,6 +1167,7 @@ static bool MaybePunishNodeForTx(NodeId nodeid, const TxValidationState& state,
}
// Conflicting (but not necessarily invalid) data or different policy:
case TxValidationResult::TX_RECENT_CONSENSUS_CHANGE:
+ case TxValidationResult::TX_INPUTS_NOT_STANDARD:
case TxValidationResult::TX_NOT_STANDARD:
case TxValidationResult::TX_MISSING_INPUTS:
case TxValidationResult::TX_PREMATURE_SPEND:
@@ -2052,6 +2059,19 @@ void static ProcessOrphanTx(CConnman& connman, CTxMemPool& mempool, std::set<uin
// if we start doing this too early.
assert(recentRejects);
recentRejects->insert(orphanTx.GetWitnessHash());
+ // If the transaction failed for TX_INPUTS_NOT_STANDARD,
+ // then we know that the witness was irrelevant to the policy
+ // failure, since this check depends only on the txid
+ // (the scriptPubKey being spent is covered by the txid).
+ // Add the txid to the reject filter to prevent repeated
+ // processing of this transaction in the event that child
+ // transactions are later received (resulting in
+ // parent-fetching by txid via the orphan-handling logic).
+ if (orphan_state.GetResult() == TxValidationResult::TX_INPUTS_NOT_STANDARD && orphanTx.GetWitnessHash() != orphanTx.GetHash()) {
+ // We only add the txid if it differs from the wtxid, to
+ // avoid wasting entries in the rolling bloom filter.
+ recentRejects->insert(orphanTx.GetHash());
+ }
}
EraseOrphanTx(orphanHash);
done = true;
@@ -2943,7 +2963,7 @@ void ProcessMessage(
// We do the AlreadyHave() check using wtxid, rather than txid - in the
// absence of witness malleation, this is strictly better, because the
- // recent rejects filter may contain the wtxid but will never contain
+ // recent rejects filter may contain the wtxid but rarely contains
// the txid of a segwit transaction that has been rejected.
// In the presence of witness malleation, it's possible that by only
// doing the check with wtxid, we could overlook a transaction which
@@ -3035,6 +3055,17 @@ void ProcessMessage(
// if we start doing this too early.
assert(recentRejects);
recentRejects->insert(tx.GetWitnessHash());
+ // If the transaction failed for TX_INPUTS_NOT_STANDARD,
+ // then we know that the witness was irrelevant to the policy
+ // failure, since this check depends only on the txid
+ // (the scriptPubKey being spent is covered by the txid).
+ // Add the txid to the reject filter to prevent repeated
+ // processing of this transaction in the event that child
+ // transactions are later received (resulting in
+ // parent-fetching by txid via the orphan-handling logic).
+ if (state.GetResult() == TxValidationResult::TX_INPUTS_NOT_STANDARD && tx.GetWitnessHash() != tx.GetHash()) {
+ recentRejects->insert(tx.GetHash());
+ }
if (RecursiveDynamicUsage(*ptx) < 100000) {
AddToCompactExtraTransactions(ptx);
}
diff --git a/src/policy/policy.cpp b/src/policy/policy.cpp
index c56abaf6c9..0e9820da1e 100644
--- a/src/policy/policy.cpp
+++ b/src/policy/policy.cpp
@@ -152,6 +152,8 @@ bool IsStandardTx(const CTransaction& tx, bool permit_bare_multisig, const CFeeR
* script can be anything; an attacker could use a very
* expensive-to-check-upon-redemption script like:
* DUP CHECKSIG DROP ... repeated 100 times... OP_1
+ *
+ * Note that only the non-witness portion of the transaction is checked here.
*/
bool AreInputsStandard(const CTransaction& tx, const CCoinsViewCache& mapInputs)
{
@@ -164,7 +166,11 @@ bool AreInputsStandard(const CTransaction& tx, const CCoinsViewCache& mapInputs)
std::vector<std::vector<unsigned char> > vSolutions;
TxoutType whichType = Solver(prev.scriptPubKey, vSolutions);
- if (whichType == TxoutType::NONSTANDARD) {
+ if (whichType == TxoutType::NONSTANDARD || whichType == TxoutType::WITNESS_UNKNOWN) {
+ // WITNESS_UNKNOWN failures are typically also caught with a policy
+ // flag in the script interpreter, but it can be helpful to catch
+ // this type of NONSTANDARD transaction earlier in transaction
+ // validation.
return false;
} else if (whichType == TxoutType::SCRIPTHASH) {
std::vector<std::vector<unsigned char> > stack;
diff --git a/src/validation.cpp b/src/validation.cpp
index 81af972777..84c106f064 100644
--- a/src/validation.cpp
+++ b/src/validation.cpp
@@ -688,8 +688,9 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws)
}
// Check for non-standard pay-to-script-hash in inputs
- if (fRequireStandard && !AreInputsStandard(tx, m_view))
- return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_NOT_STANDARD, "bad-txns-nonstandard-inputs");
+ if (fRequireStandard && !AreInputsStandard(tx, m_view)) {
+ return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_INPUTS_NOT_STANDARD, "bad-txns-nonstandard-inputs");
+ }
// Check for non-standard witness in P2WSH
if (tx.HasWitness() && fRequireStandard && !IsWitnessStandard(tx, m_view))
diff --git a/test/functional/p2p_segwit.py b/test/functional/p2p_segwit.py
index 728212ca23..2233fa5998 100755
--- a/test/functional/p2p_segwit.py
+++ b/test/functional/p2p_segwit.py
@@ -1418,7 +1418,7 @@ class SegWitTest(BitcoinTestFramework):
temp_utxo.pop() # last entry in temp_utxo was the output we just spent
temp_utxo.append(UTXO(tx2.sha256, 0, tx2.vout[0].nValue))
- # Spend everything in temp_utxo back to an OP_TRUE output.
+ # Spend everything in temp_utxo into an segwit v1 output.
tx3 = CTransaction()
total_value = 0
for i in temp_utxo:
@@ -1426,8 +1426,16 @@ class SegWitTest(BitcoinTestFramework):
tx3.wit.vtxinwit.append(CTxInWitness())
total_value += i.nValue
tx3.wit.vtxinwit[-1].scriptWitness.stack = [witness_program]
- tx3.vout.append(CTxOut(total_value - 1000, CScript([OP_TRUE])))
+ tx3.vout.append(CTxOut(total_value - 1000, script_pubkey))
tx3.rehash()
+
+ # First we test this transaction against fRequireStandard=true node
+ # making sure the txid is added to the reject filter
+ self.std_node.announce_tx_and_wait_for_getdata(tx3)
+ test_transaction_acceptance(self.nodes[1], self.std_node, tx3, with_witness=True, accepted=False, reason="bad-txns-nonstandard-inputs")
+ # Now the node will no longer ask for getdata of this transaction when advertised by same txid
+ self.std_node.announce_tx_and_wait_for_getdata(tx3, timeout=5, success=False)
+
# Spending a higher version witness output is not allowed by policy,
# even with fRequireStandard=false.
test_transaction_acceptance(self.nodes[0], self.test_node, tx3, with_witness=True, accepted=False, reason="reserved for soft-fork upgrades")